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


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


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RECOLLECTIONS OF
FORTY YEARS

BY
FERDINAND DE LESSEPS

TRANSLATED BY C. B. PITMAN

TWO VOLUMES IN ONE

NEW YORK
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1888

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RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS.

VOL. I.

THE TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

ONE of the greatest of Roman Emperors, when lying upon his death-bed at York, said, "Omnia feci, nihil expedit." And yet, when asked for the watchword of the night, with his dying breath he gave it: "Laboremus." M. de Lesseps, in the course of his long and honoured career, has made the watchword of the dying Emperor his rule of life; but he is not likely, when his last hour comes, to "look on all the works his hands have wrought and on the labour that he has laboured to do," and find them "vanity and vexation of spirit." For what else was the exclamation of the Roman Emperor but a paraphrase of the Preacher's sermon upon the vanity of all human effort and human enjoyment? In a spiritual sense all this is true enough, no doubt, but the labour of a life mainly devoted to the furtherance of works calculated to benefit others rather than oneself, and to add to the general sum of the welfare of humanity, is not assuredly wasted.

How active and how beneficent a life that of M. de Lesseps has been we most of us know already, though to posterity it must be left to assign the proper place which his name will occupy among the worthies of the nineteenth century. In the meanwhile, the glimpses of the domestic and personal side of his life and character which M. de Lesseps allows us to catch in these volumes cannot fail to be interesting, and some of us may, perhaps, be selfish enough to regret that he has not gone more into detail with regard to this part of his life, even if, to do so, he had been compelled to abridge the account of his diplomatic mission to Rome in 1849 and to omit one or two chapters, such as those upon "Steam" and upon the "Origin and Functions of Consuls," which are of a more general and technical character. I imagine, however, that M. de Lesseps, feeling himself the repository of many secrets, has deemed it best to reserve for some future time the numberless anecdotes which he could, if he were so disposed, relate about the celebrities of every nationality and every profession with whom he has been in contact for upwards of half a century. But the reader of these two volumes will find an abundance of interesting information relating first of all to M. de Lesseps's diplomatic missions to Madrid and Rome, and secondly to the preliminary survey of the Isthmus of Suez, and the intricate negotiations which preceded the actual making of the Canal. As regards the mission to Rome, with which M. de Lesseps com-

mences his "Recollections," I have, while omitting some of the official despatches, the translation of which is not required in order to put the reader in possession of M. de Lesseps's own version of this incident in his career, been careful not to attempt anything like a *précis* of what he says, and this for personal reasons. Having for many years enjoyed the friendship of the late M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, as Foreign Minister in 1849, entrusted M. de Lesseps with this mission to Rome, I had often heard him speak of it and of the circumstances connected with it. His view was, I need hardly say, diametrically opposite to that expressed here by M. de Lesseps, and I have, therefore, left the latter to tell the story in his own words. I have, however, taken it upon myself to omit two chapters altogether, one being a treatise upon the French Revolution of 1848 by Don Balmès, a Spanish writer, and the other a criticism by M. de Lesseps himself of this author's writings. French readers may possibly be curious to know, even at this remote date, what a Spanish writer has to say about the most deplorable and senseless of the many revolutions which have occurred in their country, but foreigners can scarcely be expected to feel any interest in what is, after all, but the individual expression of opinion by a writer of whom they know nothing upon a subject which has passed quite out of their memory.

To English readers the most interesting, but in some ways the most humiliating, part of the book will

be that in which M. de Lesseps tells at considerable length the story of how, in face of the stubborn and unreasoning opposition of Lord Palmerston and other English Ministers, he carried through his project of making the Suez Canal. The unflagging energy, the indomitable perseverance, the never-failing good-humour with which he met all difficulties and fought against every kind of obstacle, convey a lesson which ought not to be thrown away upon the half-hearted and upon those who are always ready to take no for an answer. But there is another lesson to be learnt from the story which M. de Lesseps relates with such merciless precision. Lord Palmerston opposed the making of the Suez Canal upon four grounds: first, because it was impracticable, as he had learnt from Mr. Robert Stephenson, the engineer, who had not surveyed more than a small part of the isthmus; secondly, because, even granting that it could be made, it would never pay; thirdly, because it was detrimental to English interests; and fourthly, because it would impair the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and render Egypt virtually independent of the Porte. As M. de Lesseps points out, the two first objections had no force so far as England was concerned until he came to ask the Government to subsidise the undertaking; while as to the third, he triumphantly points out that while the English Government is denying the right of the Viceroy of Egypt to make the Canal through the isthmus without


the Sultan's firman, it is urging him to complete the railway from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea without waiting for any such authorisation. M. de Lesseps reminds his readers, too, that England was very glad to use the route through Egypt for sending troops to the relief of India during the mutiny, and he is not less successful in showing that the cutting of the canal could not of itself affect the relations of Egypt to its Suzerain. He shows how, step by step, one country after another rallied to his cause, and how, even in England, public opinion came round to him, the series of meetings which he held throughout the kingdom being unanimous in favour of the scheme. Lord Palmerston, however, remained obdurate, and the English ambassadors at Constantinople—first Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and then Sir Henry Bulwer—moved heaven and earth to quash the project. But M. de Lesseps, who in this instance at all events showed himself a consummate diplomatist, not only enlisted the active sympathies of several influential persons, such as the Empress of the French, but removed, one by one, the obstacles from his path, and, as we know, brought his work to a triumphant conclusion. Well, I would say that when we come to consider the objections and arguments which are at the present time being urged against other great engineering projects intended to facilitate communication between different parts of the globe, one cannot fail to be struck by their close similarity to those

with which M. de Lesseps was met thirty years ago when about to commence the Suez Canal. We are told now that the Panama Canal—in which, as my readers will all be aware, he is the guiding and controlling spirit—can never be completed, not at least for a sum which is, practically speaking, obtainable; and that the Channel Tunnel between France and England, if not as impracticable from an engineering and financial point of view, would be as detrimental to the interests of England as Lord Palmerston declared the Suez Canal to be. I do not profess of myself to have sufficient knowledge to speak with authority upon either of these subjects, though, of course, it can only be in joke that people talk about the military risk which the making of a submarine tunnel would involve. But when one finds how the self-same arguments which retarded, but did not prevent, the cutting of the Suez Canal—all of them falsified in the event—are being served up again by the adversaries of these two projects it is impossible to avoid feeling that a little more prudence, a little more self-restraint, a little less self-confidence would not be out of place. Those who declare that the Panama Canal never can be made, and that the Channel Tunnel never ought to be made, may be justified by the result, and the arguments which in the case of the Suez Canal were so utterly falsified may in these instances prove sound. But, to borrow a famous phrase, one would be sorry to be “as cocksure of anything as they are of everything,” and M.

de Lesseps will have increased the debt which the friends of progress and of civilisation owe to him if, by writing the history of his great work in Egypt, he shall have inculcated upon some of us the danger of speaking too dogmatically upon subjects of which our knowledge is necessarily imperfect, and in most cases second or even third-hand.

C. B. PITMAN.

October, 1887.



RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS.

CHAPTER I.

THE MISSION TO ROME.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

WHEN the Austrian army was hanging upon the frontiers of Piedmont, the French National Assembly, using its right of initiative, called upon the Ministry to assume a resolute attitude, and authorised it, should such a step be deemed in the best interests of France, to occupy temporarily some part of the Italian peninsula. A few days after this had been voted, the news of the reverse sustained by the Piedmontese army at Novara reached Paris. The President of the Council laid before the Assembly, upon the 16th of April, 1849, an estimate of £48,000 for the extraordinary expenses which the maintenance of the expeditionary force for three months in the Mediterranean would, it was estimated, entail. The credit was voted, and a force was sent to occupy Civita

Vecchia under the command of General Oudinot, but the Roman Assembly and the Triumvirate declined to receive what they regarded as a hostile force, and ordered the commander at Civita Vecchia to resist to the last extremity. Their order came too late, however, the French troops having already disembarked and entered upon a joint occupation of the place with the Italian troops. General Oudinot, finding that his entry into Rome would meet with a determined resistance, then decreed sterner measures at Civita Vecchia, placing it in a state of siege and disarming the garrison. The prefect of the town having protested against these measures, was cast into prison, and General Oudinot, being anxious to bring matters to a head, marched on Rome, before the walls of which he arrived at the end of April. The result of the combat on the 30th, in which the Roman population spontaneously took so active a part, is well known, and I was able to see for myself that out of every ten Italians whose wounds were being seen to in the hospitals at least eight were natives of Rome. The news of this combat created profound emotion in Paris. The National Assembly, composed of nine hundred members, was very indignant, and showed an inclination not only to upset the Ministry, but to put the Prince President of the Republic upon his trial for treason. The Committee appointed to report upon the situation proposed a resolution calling upon the Government "to take without delay such steps as

may be necessary to prevent the Italian expedition from being any longer kept from carrying out the aim assigned to it." The Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) cast all the blame for what had occurred upon General Oudinot, who, he asserted, had received no instructions to attack the Roman Republic. The resolution of the Committee was, however, carried by a majority of 338 to 241, and though this was to a great extent a vote of want of confidence, the Ministry did not resign, but appointed a diplomatic agent, whose mission M. Odilon Barrot, the President of the Council, explained as follows at the sitting of the Assembly on the 9th of May :—

"I assure you that as long as I am in office French arms shall never be used for the restoration of abuses. It is with this feeling, in order to learn from trustworthy agents the real truth, and also in order to convey to those concerned the faithful and precise expression of the intentions of the Assembly and of the Government in regard to the aim and object of this expedition, that the Government has decided to despatch a man who enjoys our full confidence, whom we have put to the test in very trying circumstances, and who has always served the cause of liberty and humanity. M. de Lesseps, to give you his name, has been sent, and we have specially instructed him to place himself in immediate communication with the Government and to keep us informed day by day of whatever may happen. We have further im-

pressed upon him that he is to employ his utmost influence so that our intervention may secure genuine and real guarantees of liberty for the Roman States."

I should have said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent for me on the morning of the 8th, after the day and night sitting of the Assembly, at both of which I had been present, and had asked me if I was disposed to undertake a very important mission for which the Ministry, at the Cabinet Council just held, had selected me.

I replied that, as I had been deemed worthy of so high a mark of confidence, I felt it my duty frankly to declare that if the Government had not, at the outset, been animated by an open and resolute policy, it would have been much better not to have compromised us by sending an expedition to Civita Vecchia. However, I added, the point now is to repair the mischief done by the affair of April 30th and not to fall into the same blunder again. I also said that I should be ready to start in two hours if necessary, and I promised to leave no stone unturned to arrive at the aim indicated in the vote of the previous day. M. Drouyn de Lhuys congratulated me upon my readiness, and added that the manner in which I expressed myself went far to show that the Government had made a judicious selection. While I was with him he sent for the chief clerk of the political department, M. de Viel-Castel, and requested him to draw up instructions

which would leave me such latitude and initiative that my political action would not be hampered either by the general entrusted with the military operations or by orders which would clash with unforeseen events that might have occurred since the 30th of April. He also advised me to get several copies of the *Moniteur* (then the French official journal, which contained the reports of the debates in the Assembly) and hand over one to General Oudinot as soon as I arrived, being of opinion that it was upon the decision of the Chamber that we should base our course of action.

The text of these instructions was as follows:—

“ The events which have marked the first steps of the French expedition sent to Civita Vecchia being calculated to complicate a question which at first seemed a very simple one, the Government has come to the conclusion that it is advisable to appoint, in addition to the military commander of the forces despatched to Italy, a diplomatic agent, who, devoting himself exclusively to the negotiations and relations to be established with the Roman authorities and inhabitants, will be able to give these grave matters the close attention and anxious care which they require. Your tried zeal, your experience, and the conciliatory disposition which you have more than once displayed in the course of your career, have induced the Government to select you for this delicate mission. I have explained to you the present state of the question

upon the solution of which you are about to enter. The object which we have in view is at once to deliver the States of the Church from the anarchy which prevails in them, and to ensure that the re-establishment of a regular power is not darkened, not to say imperilled, in future by reactionary fury. Any step which, in presence of the intervention exercised by other Powers animated by less moderate views, will give more scope to our special and direct influence, will naturally make the object which I have pointed out to you more easy of attainment. You will therefore concentrate all your efforts upon bringing about such a result with as little delay as possible; but in the efforts which you will make towards this end, there are two risks to be guarded against, as I will point out to you. You must be careful to avoid allowing the men at present invested with power in the Roman States to suppose that we regard them as a regular Government, for that would give them a moral force in which they are at present lacking. It will be desirable, in the partial arrangements which you may conclude with them, to avoid using any expression or making any stipulation which may be likely to excite the susceptibilities of the Holy See or of the Gaëta conference, which is only too ready to assume that we are inclined to attach no value to the authority and interests of the Court of Rome. Upon the ground on which you will be standing, and with the men with whom you will have to deal, the ques-

tion of form is almost as important as that of principle. These are the only instructions which I can give you, for, in order to render them more precise and more detailed, it would be necessary to have before me information, not yet forthcoming, of what has happened in the Roman States during the last few days. Your upright and enlightened judgment will inspire you according to circumstances. But in any case you will confer with MM. d'Harcourt and de Rayneval in reference to all matters which do not call for an immediate solution. It will be superfluous for me to engage you to maintain close and confidential relations with General Oudinot, this being absolutely essential to the success of the enterprise which you are called to work out in common.

“DROUYN DE LHUYS.”

M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself read me these instructions, and, dwelling at the first passage which authorised me “to devote myself exclusively to the negotiations and the relations to be established with the Roman authorities and inhabitants,” he pointed out to me that this left me a very large share of authority independent of the general in command. He dwelt also upon the final paragraph which left me full latitude in presence of unforeseen difficulties or incidents.

With regard to the passage relating to concerting with MM. d'Harcourt and de Rayneval, I pointed

out that such a concert was impossible, as their mission and mine had a quite different, not to say contrary, principle. The answer was: "Simply send them duplicates of your despatches."

I was still with him when a message from the Prince President summoned me to the Elysée, where I had already been in the morning; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys asked me to come and let him know what passed between us.

The Prince told me that he had carefully considered the object of my mission, and that one point, about which he was afraid that he had not spoken to me, gave him great concern. This was the attitude of our troops in the event of an armed intervention of the Austrians and Neapolitans, whose action must at all costs be prevented from being brought into common with ours. He gave me, in connection with this, a letter for General Oudinot, and asked to see my instructions, which he thought rather ambiguous, and not sufficiently explicit. He informed me that he intended sending to Rome General Vaillant, who would be instructed to come to an understanding with me, and who would replace General Oudinot if the latter did not hit it off with us, or assume command of the engineering operations if the siege of Rome should be renewed. He added that I should do well, if the opportunity occurred, to call attention to the fact that in 1831 he had already taken part against the Temporal Power when he was before

Rome in the company of his elder brother, who died during the insurrection.

Upon returning to see M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I was careful not to confide this matter to him, nor did I make any use of it while in Rome, so as not to excite public feeling unnecessarily. But when I repeated to him the Prince's observation about a foreign intervention in the Roman States, he asked me how I interpreted the expression "at all costs" as applied to preventing anything like a common action with the Austrians and Neapolitans. I told him that it was for him to settle that with the President and write to me ; but that, until I heard further, I should interpret it in the widest sense. M. Drouyn de Lhuys's salon being then full of visitors, as it was his regular reception-day, I took leave of him and was soon travelling in a post-chaise to Toulon, where telegraphic orders had been sent for a man-of-war to be got ready for me, upon which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had given leave for Signor Accursi, a friend of Mazzini and Minister for Home Affairs of the Roman Republic, also to travel. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had suggested that Signor Accursi should accompany me to Toulon ; but I pointed out that this might be compromising.

Before embarking I received two despatches from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for MM. d'Harcourt and de Rayneval and for myself, which I give in their entirety.

“ *The Minister of Foreign Affairs to MM. de Rayneval and d’Harcourt.*

“ PARIS, May 9, 1849.

“ What pains us even more deeply than the mistrust which is still shown us at Gaëta, but which time will eventually dissipate, is the nature of the influences which evidently prevail in the councils of the Holy See. The nearer we seem to the *dénouement*, the more clearly come out dangerous propensities which are for the moment disguised beneath more or less specious pretexts. In order to avoid making any set declaration as to the intentions of the Holy Father, his advisers say how inconvenient it would be for them to have his hands tied. There might be something in this objection if it were necessary to settle in detail the basis of a fresh *régime*; but when all we ask is what course it is intended to follow, once the authority of the Holy See is re-established, it is hard to understand why the Holy See should wrap itself in impenetrable silence, unless there is a hidden resolve to return simply to all the abuses of the ancient *régime*.

“ We are told that there are certain reactionary tendencies among the populations which must be treated tenderly, and of which we have not taken sufficient account. If these tendencies had the great force which is attributed to them, would it not be advisable to assume without delay an attitude which would at some future time place the Holy See in a

position to combat them? Is it supposed, moreover, that there is no need to reassure that numerous portion of the Roman population which, while detesting the rule of anarchy, dreads almost as much the return of one who has left so melancholy a mark upon the reign of Gregory XVI.; of a *régime* which at the death of that Pontiff had rendered a change of that system absolutely necessary, and which, by provoking a vigorous reaction, has done far more to bring about the misfortunes of these recent times than the hurried introduction of certain reforms which were not, perhaps, sufficiently thought out. The men of whom I speak, and who, if I am not mistaken, comprise nearly the whole of the well-to-do and enlightened classes, would gladly rally now to any combination which offered them guarantees of good order, security, and sound administration; but how can they be otherwise than uneasy when they see that not a word is said as to the future? and are they not justified in fearing that there is a design to annul all the concessions due to the generosity of Pius IX., including the secularisation of public functions, the prime and essential basis, without which any reform attempted in the States of the Church can be but illusory?

“I will say no more upon this subject. You are aware of the painful reflections which it has forced upon me, and you have done your best to bring those who obstinately refuse to recognise the truth of these

reflections to take a more accurate view. In refusing to allow the Holy Father to reassure the public mind by explanations and promises, they have probably contributed to intensify the unexpected resistance which our expedition has encountered. They trust to the Pope being brought back to his States by foreign aid, but have they taken any thought of the future which they are preparing for him by urging him to take this deplorable course? Will the excuse of an ill-omened success, of an attempt at reform made in the most deplorable conditions, have more weight than all the arguments of reason, backed up by so many examples borrowed from the history of these recent times?

“Be this as it may, what we are now doing for the pacification of the States of the Church, the sacrifices which an undertaking of this kind entails upon us, and the moral responsibility which it imposes upon us, unquestionably justify us in urging that a line of conduct which would so intensify that responsibility shall not be persisted in.

“The desire which we thus express does not, moreover, go beyond what might legitimately be expected. We only ask for what has up to the present time been promised us without any difficulty. It is the realisation of a line of conduct which up till the other day did not seem to be at all questioned. We were repeatedly being told that a return to the ancient *régime* was impossible; that the present state of

men's minds and the general situation of Europe were incompatible with it; and the most that was hinted was that it would perhaps be prudent to make some slight changes in the constitutional statute granted by Pius IX. The necessity, the expediency of such changes may be taken into consideration when order and peace have been re-established; but I must add that we do not admit that this statute itself can in future be regarded as null and void. The respect we entertain for the Holy Father prevents us from admitting that the institutions which he granted to his people have been completely annulled by the deplorable events which have occurred in Rome since last November. The idea that the *régime* anterior to 1846 would be revived in Rome never entered into our minds or calculations. We acted under the influence of quite an opposite conviction.

“We still hope that we were not mistaken. We do not wish to attach too much importance to a few words hastily uttered, perhaps in a moment of excitement, but interests of too high an order are at stake for me to await explanations which would perhaps dissipate our anxieties before instructing you to make to the Cardinal Secretary of State, to the Holy Father himself, and, if you think it well, to the members of the Conference, representations the urgency of which must of course be in proportion to the gravity of the dangers which they are designed to avert. They will understand that, in the position we hold, we have

serious duties to perform, and these duties we are resolved to fulfil.

“Do not lose an hour in letting me know what answer you have received to the pressing advice of which you will find the text inclosed. It is important for us to know what we have to expect.

“DROUYN DE LHUYS.”

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps.

“PARIS, May 10, 1849.

“We have learnt that General Oudinot had thought it incumbent to request a commissioner sent, in the name of the Holy Father, to Civita Vecchia, not to prolong his stay in that town, where his presence produced a bad effect. The Government of the Republic quite approves of this step, dictated by a sound comprehension of the necessities of the situation and of what the safety of our army demands.

“Until the object of our expedition has been attained we cannot allow centres of authority to be organised outside our influence upon the territory we occupy, which might, even if unintentionally, go counter to our action and compromise its success. It is with this in view, that you will make use of the powers which have been confided to you. No one better than yourself will know how to use these powers with the necessary degree of firmness and at

the same time with such consideration as to spare susceptibilities, of which it is extremely desirable to take all possible account.

“DROUYN DE LHUYS.”

At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the impression of the vote of May 7th and of the refusal of the Gaëta Cabinet to assist our enterprise, and to promise the inhabitants of Rome liberal institutions, sent to General Oudinot the following telegram intended to precede me, in the event of my journey to Italy being delayed :—

“PARIS, *May* 10, 10 A.M.

“Inform the Romans that we do not intend to join with the Neapolitans against them. Follow up the negotiations in the sense indicated by your instructions. Reinforcements are being sent to you, await their coming. Endeavour to enter Rome with the assent of the inhabitants, or if you are compelled to attack, do so with the most absolute certainty of success.”

I reached the head-quarters at Castel de Guido at one in the morning. Being at once taken to see the General, who was ill in bed, as a result of his repulse before the walls of Rome, I read him from the *Moniteur*, a copy of which I left with him, the report of the debate of the 7th in the National Assembly,

and communicated my instructions to him. He promised me his help in the accomplishment of my mission. As he could not use his pen, I wrote, under his dictation, to Count de Ludolf, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the King of Italy, who was encamped with his escort and Neapolitan army upon the other side of Rome, to let him know how matters stood, enclosing with my letter a copy of the *Moniteur*.

As my arrival was to modify the operations already begun, the General lost no time in sending out orders in different directions, so that any offensive movements which might hamper my negotiations should not be carried out.

As soon as it was daylight, I went into Rome, accompanied by M. de la Tour d'Auvergne, Secretary of Legation. We had some difficulty in obtaining admission, and it was necessary to make a partial circuit of the walls, as several of the gates were barricaded. All along the road were posts upon which were inscribed in large letters the clause of our constitution which forbids any attack upon a foreign nationality. Some of the sentinels upon the ramparts levelled their rifles at us, but my servant, who was sitting beside the driver of our brougham, flourished a white handkerchief, and the rifles were at once lowered. At last I saw a gate open, and a young officer, Colonel Medici, who recognised me, came forward and offered me his services, saying that the city of Rome would be glad to hear of my arrival.

He had me accompanied by a detachment of his men to the Via Condotti, where I alighted at the Hotel d'Allemagne, thinking it advisable not to go just yet to the French Embassy.

After having several visits paid me, among the visitors being Charles Bonaparte (Prince de Canino), President of the Assembly, I forthwith wrote as under to the general in command :—

“Having regard to the expectant attitude in which we are placed, it seems to me of the utmost importance to avoid any sort of engagement. I find a whole city in arms, with the population apparently bent on resistance, while, without any exaggeration, there are 25,000 men ready to fight. If we entered Rome by force, not only should we have to do so over the bodies of a certain number of foreign adventurers, but we should have to strike down a great many shopkeepers and young men of good family, representatives of the classes which defend social order in Paris. We must, therefore, take account of this situation, not act precipitately or implicate our Government in anything opposed to the object which it had in view at the beginning of the expedition—an object which it has just declared anew—or to the wishes of the National Assembly. I should, therefore, hold myself much to blame if I did not use my best efforts to induce you to suspend all acts of hostility or any demonstrations likely to bring them about until I have seen you, and been able to give you an

account of what I have seen. You are of my opinion, I know. At the same time, I shall declare that our soldiers will not budge an inch. Your attitude and your kindly disposition cannot fail to facilitate an honourable arrangement. We are strong, we can afford to wait."

I came to a verbal understanding with General Oudinot and the Roman authorities as to a suspension of hostilities.

Having obtained this result, I endeavoured to form a correct estimate of the situation and of the difficulties by which I might expect to be confronted. I was not long in discovering that in Rome I should have to face the prejudices of a population still very irritated by the events of April 30th; the impossibility in which we found ourselves placed of officially recognising the Roman Republic or even of promising the maintenance of a government which esteemed itself to be as legitimate as our own; and the blindness of certain influential persons who were relying for the triumph of their cause upon a revolutionary movement in Paris, just as many French politicians, even in the ministerial party, believed in the existence of a *moderate Roman party*, which had promised to open us the gates of Rome on the 30th of April, and would be more fortunate if we attacked the city again.

Upon the other hand, I had remarked that the impatience of several generals, the desire to make

amends for a personal check, the constant instigations of persons interested in a renewal of hostilities, and the echo of the unenlightened advice by which the Holy Father was guided, would raise up for me at the French head-quarters obstacles which, if less imminent, would perhaps be more persistent than those which I had just surmounted in Rome.

DIRECTION POLITIQUE. No. 1.

First Despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

“ROME, May 16, 1849.

“Monsieur le Ministre,—I informed you yesterday by telegraph that, after having come to an understanding with General Oudinot, I should start for Rome accompanied by M. de la Tour d’Auvergne, in order to ascertain for myself the real sentiments of the Roman population and supply you with an exact account of the information which I obtained. I subjoin you a copy of the letter which I wrote the same day to General Oudinot from Rome. M. de la Tour d’Auvergne quite shares my ideas. M. de Gérard, a man of good sense, whom I had heard highly spoken of at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before I left Paris, confirms my opinion as to the resistance which would be offered us being a very general one. Not that I doubt the ultimate success of our arms, but it would only be reached through

a sea of blood, and that is what neither you nor I desire.

"I had not been long in Rome before the Triumvirs expressed their wish to see me. When I called upon them I informed them that I had been sent by my Government to ascertain and to speak the truth as to the state of public feeling in Rome since the events of April 30th; that our object was to employ all the means compatible with our dignity and military honour to prevent a deplorable struggle between the French and the Romans; that, after what I had seen and should communicate to General Oudinet, I hoped soon to be able to announce that all hostile acts or demonstrations upon the part of the French army against Rome would come to an end.

"This morning I sent M. de la Tour d'Auvergne to head-quarters, and he informed the General of what I had done, and brought back with him the latter's promise not to hamper my action by any hostile demonstration. I am therefore in a position to promise, upon behalf of the General in command as well as of myself, that hostilities would be suspended, and to show myself ready to enter into negotiations. I have confidently suggested that the National Assembly should send a deputation selected from its midst to head-quarters to negotiate, and should ask me to accompany it. I am in hopes that this suggestion will be adopted; and I have already ascertained that the Triumvirs, the President, and several deputies of

the Assembly, and many other persons of influence over the inhabitants, are favourable to it. The result seems well assured, and it does not compromise us in any way, as the object is to enable us to negotiate with the executive of a Government which we cannot recognise officially. It has been arrived at after exertions which have not left me a minute's leisure. When I arrive with a deputation from the Assembly at head-quarters, it will be the time to come to some arrangement. I have just drawn up a scheme, of which a copy is annexed herewith. I shall go and discuss the basis of it to-morrow morning with the General, and probably with M. d'Harcourt, whose arrival is announced as imminent. You will see for yourself whether he conciliates the very complicated interests which we have to study, whether he reserves for the Government of the Republic full liberty to pursue, according as its interests and fresh circumstances may dictate, a clear and resolute course of policy.

"A column of 12,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, under the command of Garibaldi, left at five o'clock this afternoon to attack the Neapolitans.

"FERDINAND DE LESSEPS.

"P.S.—I have paid a visit, in company of M. de la Tour d'Auvergne, to two hospitals in which twenty-six French soldiers, wounded in the engagement of April 30th, are under treatment. I promised them

that they should rejoin their comrades as soon as they were cured. They could not possibly be better cared for, as Roman ladies of the highest families are tending them day and night, having taken up their residence in the hospitals, the Princess Beljioso at their head."

*Second Despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Paris.*

"ROME, May 18, 1849.

"Monsieur le Ministre,—A conference has been held at the head-quarters of the French army between General Oudinot, M. d'Harcourt, and myself. I read and commended my first despatch. My preliminary measures were approved, as well as the scheme destined to form a basis for negotiations. This scheme will undoubtedly undergo modifications of detail which will not alter its main principles.

"Upon my return to Rome I learnt that the Assembly had unanimously decided that a committee of three members should be selected, and the members chosen were MM. Sturbinetti, Audinot (Bologna), and Cernuschi (Milan). This latter, who would have been a very desirable choice, as indeed were the two others, would not accept out of delicacy, and it occurred to me that it would be better that the deputation should consist of Italians who were natives of the Roman States. His successor was chosen to-day, Signor Agostini.

“ Previous to the sitting at which yesterday’s resolution was carried, I had several visitors in my room, among others M. Charles Bonaparte, who was to take the chair. An attempt was made to draw a distinction between my intentions and those of General Oudinot and the French Government. I was asked what could be done to destroy the prejudices which existed in this respect among the Roman population. I then told them that nothing could be easier, as you had just written to me under date of the 10th, signifying your approval of the conduct of General Oudinot, who had thought it best to expel from Civita Vecchia an envoy of the Pope, whose presence was calculated to produce a bad effect and hamper our action. I need scarcely assure you that I do not say a word more than is necessary to extricate us from one of the most difficult positions in which we have been for a long time placed ; that in all other respects I am very reserved in my relations with every one ; and that if I listen to men of all nations, all sorts, and all parties, who come to see me as early as five in the morning and as late as midnight, giving them all a cordial welcome, it is in order to accomplish to the best of my ability the mission you have entrusted me with.

“ To-morrow probably will begin the negotiations ; I am starting for head-quarters in order to concert about them with the General, with whom I am on such terms as might be expected from his patriotism

and from the loyalty of his character. I take care to arrange with him in respect of everything which bears upon our common instructions.

“M. de Forbin-Janson will convey this despatch and the preceding one. M. d’Harcourt has authorised him to proceed to Paris in order that he may tell you what he has seen and what the present condition of Rome is, as his information is likely to be of use.

“I begged Signor Mazzini to hand me a note explaining his views as to the present situation of Rome, and he readily acceded to my request. I have the honour to forward you a copy of his letter, which you will, I feel sure, consider a very remarkable one.

“FERDINAND DE LESSEPS.”

Annex to Despatch No. 2.

“Sir,—You ask me for a few notes upon the present condition of the Roman Republic, and I will write them for you with that frankness which has for twenty years been the invariable rule of my political life. We have nothing to conceal or to disguise. We have of late been singularly vilified in Europe, but we have always said to those to whom we have been so calumniously denounced, ‘Come and see for yourself.’ You are here, and can therefore verify for yourselves how far these accusations are true. Your mission can be carried out with full and complete freedom. We have saluted it with joy, for it is our best safeguard.

“France doubtless does not question our right to govern ourselves in our own way, the right to draw, so to speak, from the entrails of the country the idea which regulates its existence, and to make of it the basis of our institutions. All that France can say to us is, ‘In recognising your independence, it is the free and spontaneous wish of the majority which I desire to recognise. United to the European Powers, and being anxious for peace, if it were true that a minority among you sought to oppose the national tendencies, if it were true that the present form of your government was only the capricious fancy of a faction, substituting itself for the common aspirations, I could not look on with indifference while the peace of Europe was being constantly endangered by the turbulent scenes of anarchy which necessarily characterise the reign of a faction.’ We recognise that France has this right, for we believe in the solidarity of nations for good. But we maintain that if ever there was a Government springing from the wishes of the majority of the nation, and maintained in power by it, that Government is our own.

“The Republic has been implanted in our midst by the will of an Assembly elected by universal suffrage. It has everywhere been accepted with enthusiasm; nowhere has it encountered the least opposition.

“And you must remember that never was opposition so easy, so devoid of danger, I may even add so provoked, not by its acts, but by the exceptionally

unfavourable circumstances in which the Government started upon its career.

“It followed upon a long anarchy inherent in the organisation of the Government which preceded it. The agitations which are inseparable from all great transformations, and which were at the same time fomented by the crisis of the Italian question and by the efforts of the retrograde party, had thrown it into a state of feverish excitement which rendered it accessible to any bold attempt, to any appeal to interests and passions. We had no army, no repressive powers. As a consequence of previous waste our finances were impoverished, not to say exhausted. The religious question, in the hands of able and interested persons, was available as a pretext to work upon the feelings of a population of gentle instincts and peaceful aspirations, but not very enlightened.

“And yet no sooner had the Republican principle been proclaimed than order prevailed. The Papal Government does not tell us anything about its insurrections: there has not been one under the Republic. The assassination of M. Rossi—a deplorable but an isolated event, an individual act reproved and condemned by us all, provoked it may be by an imprudent attitude, and the source of which has never been traced—was followed by the most perfect order.

“The financial crisis reached its highest pitch; there was a brief period during which the paper money of the Republic was reduced, through dishonourable

manceuvres, to a discount of 41 or 42 per cent. The attitude of the Italian and European Governments became more and more hostile. These difficulties, as well as their material isolation, the people endured with the utmost calm, having faith in the future which would be evolved out of the new principle proclaimed.

“By means of obscure threats, but more especially owing to unfamiliarity with political habits, a certain number of electors had abstained from contributing to the formation of the Assembly, and this seemed to weaken the expression of the national will. But a second and very vital and characteristic fact triumphantly refuted any doubt there might have been upon this score. Shortly before the formal institution of the Triumvirate there was a fresh election of the municipalities. The vote was a large one, and though the municipal element is always the most conservative one in the State, so much so that we were for a time afraid that the elections would show retrograde tendencies, the municipalities selected this very moment to give in their spontaneous adhesion to the new form of government. During the first fortnight of this month we received, in addition to those of the clubs and the commanders of the National Guard, the addresses of all the municipalities with two or three exceptions. I have had the honour to send you the list of them. They all proclaim explicitly their devotion to the Republic, and a profound conviction that the two powers united under one head are incompatible with each

other. This, I repeat, constitutes a decisive fact. It is a second legal proof completing the first in the most absolute manner, and testifying to our rights.

“At the present time, amid the crisis which prevails, in presence of the French, Austrian, and Neapolitan invasion, our finances are improved and our credit restored ; our paper is discounted at 12 per cent. ; our army is increasing each day, and there are whole masses of men ready to rise and reinforce it. You have seen Rome, and you know how heroic a struggle Bologna is carrying on. I write this at night amid the most profound calm. The garrison left the city last evening, and before the fresh troops could come in, at midnight, our gates and barricades were, by means of a simple password handed on from mouth to mouth, guarded without noise or ostentation by the people in arms. There is in the heart of this people one resolute determination, and that is the downfall of the temporal power invested in the Pope, the hatred of priestly government under whatever attenuated or indirect form it may present itself. I say hatred, not of individuals, but of the government. Towards individuals our people have, thank God ! ever since the foundation of the Republic shown themselves generous, but the very idea of a clerical government, of a pontiff-king, makes them shudder. They will fight to the death against any scheme of restoration, and show themselves schismatic to the last rather than endure it.

“When the two questions were submitted to the Assembly, there were a few timid members who thought that the proclamation of the Republic might be premature and dangerous in the present state of Europe, but not one to vote against the downfall of the Papacy, right and left uniting to declare that the temporal power of the Pope was for ever abolished.

“With such a people what can be done? Is there a single free government which, without committing a crime and contradicting its essence, can assume the right to impose upon it a return to the past?

“Remember that a return to the past means neither more nor less than organised disorder, a renewal of the struggle of secret societies, the uprising of anarchy in the heart of Italy, the inoculation of vengeance into a people which is only desirous of forgetting, a brand of discord permanently implanted in the midst of Europe, the programme of the extreme parties supplanting the orderly Republican Government of which we are now the organs.

“This surely cannot be desired by France, by her Government, by the nephew of Napoleon; especially in the presence of the double invasion of the Neapolitans and Austrians.

“An attitude of hostility against us just now would recall in some measure the hideous concert of 1772 against Poland. Such a design would, moreover, be impossible to realise, for the flag hauled

down by the will of the people could only be raised aloft again over a mountain of corpses and the ruins of our cities.

“I shall have the honour of submitting some other considerations to you to-morrow or the day after.

“Your very devoted

“JOSEPH MAZZINI.”

Signor Mazzini to M. de Lesseps.

“[Private.]

“ROME, May 17, 1849.

“The messengers carrying the ordinary correspondence, who go out by the Angelica gates, have just been driven back by the French, at the orders of the General. What does a cessation of hostilities mean if we are still to be hampered and embarrassed in keeping up communications with the provinces and in preparing our means of defence against the Austrians and the Neapolitans? The only effect it can produce upon our populations is to induce the belief that the truce is, so far as it regards ourselves, a word void of meaning! This state of things cannot last. Remember that our territory is invaded, and that we must defend ourselves. The messengers were stopped at the Acqua Traversa bridge. See if you can set this right. I know the country, and I am certain that all negotiation will be impossible if this state of things lasts.

“JOSEPH MAZZINI.”

M. de Lesseps to Signor Mazzini.

“ROME, May 18, 10 A.M.

“I received your letter upon my return late last night. The matter of the messengers shall be arranged at once.

“It might be inferred from something said in the Chamber yesterday that an attempt would be made to distinguish between the conduct and the intentions of my Government. I think it fair to inform you that if the Powers with which we are about to treat entertain any idea of this kind, or if a language which would be the consequence of it should be made use of, either against the President of the Republic, the Ministers who sent me to Rome, or the honourable General Oudinot, all negotiations would be at once broken off.

“My Government has been charged with having some afterthought. If this were the case I should not have been entrusted with a loyal and humane mission which I intend to fulfil to the very last, and in connection with which I have already found that I can count upon your able co-operation. I do not doubt but what I shall succeed, inasmuch as the result which we were endeavouring to arrive at is one which will bear the light of day.

“I have sent your note on to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. I thank you for it.

“F. DE LESSEPS.

“P.S.—I authorise you to make what use you may think proper of this letter.”

M. de Lesseps to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

“ROME, May 22, 1849.

“M. de la Tour d’Auvergne, whom I am sending to Paris, and whom I beg you to send back to me at once, will give you the information which I consider indispensable in the present juncture for the furtherance of our policy. It is impossible for me to furnish you with it by letter, for at this moment my rôle is altogether an active one, and leaves little time for despatches. The documents annexed form the main elements of the information which M. de la Tour d’Auvergne will be well able to lay before you. I have the utmost confidence in him, and could not be better seconded than I am by him. The documents which he will submit to you are:—

“1st. A draft of arrangement as modified after the discussions which have taken place with the Commissioners of the Roman Assembly.

“2nd. Note of explanation handed to the Roman Commissioners and the equivalent of the *procès-verbal* of the conference.

“3rd. Letter addressed to me, on the 19th, by the members of the Triumvirate.

“4th. Copy of private letters exchanged on the 21st inst. by General Oudinot and myself.

“5th. Extracts of a correspondence with Signor Mazzini.

“6th. Letter from Commander Espivent, General

Oudinot's head aide-de-camp, and letters from General Oudinot with reference to an ambulance waggon presented to the Roman hospitals in recognition of the attentions shown to our soldiers who were wounded on the 30th of April.

"7th. Note addressed to the Triumvirate.

"8th. Collective declaration communicated to the Roman Assembly and the Triumvirate.

"9th. Reply of the Triumvirate.

"It will be gathered from the two last documents that the course deemed most in harmony with our interests is to allow the Roman population, which seems favourable to our proposed settlement, to manifest its sentiments in such a manner as to bring the men who are at its head to a true appreciation of their interests. I have thought it right to urge upon General Oudinot that the suspension of hostilities should be prolonged, so that the French Government may have sufficient time to see its way and decide upon its course after receiving information of a trustworthy character.

"But whatever the solution may be, I do not think that our expeditionary force is strong enough, taking into consideration the increase of the defensive works and the general arming of the population. After having carefully discussed the matter with the general in command, and after having gone over the city with his first aide-de-camp, M. d'Espivent, who has been here with me for the last two days, I am convinced that it is necessary to send off from twenty to five-and-twenty

thousand men from Toulon and Marseilles. This will be none too many. In the event of an understanding being come to with Rome, and our troops entering the city as allies, it would be desirable that our troops should be on the road before the arrangement, which I see no necessity for hurrying on, is completed. If we sent for reinforcements after the occupation of Rome, to overcome any fresh difficulties which might arise, this step might, in the midst of a population which would have received us as friends, tend to aggravate our difficulties. If we are very strong before any definite step is taken we shall terminate matters far more expeditiously and at less cost, and we should be able to send our troops home afterwards far more quickly.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the increase and concentration of the French forces at Civita Vecchia and Rome will not weaken us internally, for when once our flag is firmly implanted in Italy we shall have no more risings to put down, and in any event it must be borne in mind that we have now to do not with the soldiers of the Pope, but with the Roman soldiers.

"I am of opinion that General Oudinot should be kept where he is. Whatever you do, do not send him any more siege material. What he wants is a reinforcement of troops, and if he gets them Austria will hesitate to attack us, whereas with fresh siege material it will seem as if we are determined to annihilate Rome, to which I will not in any circumstance whatever lend a hand. And if the intentions of the Govern-

ment should happen not to be what I believe them to be, I do not hesitate to ask you to recall me, for if I had not my liberty of conduct and was not free to act as circumstances might dictate in the midst of this very complicated crisis my position would be untenable. I shall continue therefore to act without hesitation, and in spite of all material and personal obstacles, until M. de la Tour d'Auvergne has given you by word of mouth the details which it is impossible for me to furnish you with by letter, and until you have informed me by telegraph, yes or no, whether I am in agreement with you.

"It is of set purpose that I have altered clause 3 of the draft of arrangement. I have endeavoured to reduce it to its most simple expression by eliminating all that is not urgent, and by avoiding the two dangers which were pointed out to me—that of formally recognising the Roman Republic, and that of exciting the susceptibilities of Gaëta by alluding to the conflict between the Holy Father and the liberties of Rome. I came to the conclusion, after mature consideration, that by maintaining this clause as it stood we should at once shut the door upon any attempt at conciliation.

"F. DE LESÈPES.

"P.S.—I have just come in from head-quarters. I have read this despatch to M. d'Harcourt. He protests against the inaction of the army, without, however, setting himself against the carrying out of my

advice, accepted by General Oudinot. I am still going forward with it. You will see which of us is right. If not agreed upon these points, we are on very cordial terms."

Ever since the 16th inst. I had been agreed with General Oudinot as to the drawing up of the following project, opposed by M. d'Harcourt, which I forwarded to the Ministry, with an intimation that it would undoubtedly be modified in some particulars:—

"Clause I.—No restriction shall be in future placed by the French army upon the liberty of communications between Rome and the rest of the Roman States.

"Clause II.—Rome shall treat the French army as a friendly force.

"Clause III.—The present executive power shall resign and be replaced by a provisional government composed of Roman citizens, and appointed by the Roman National Assembly, until the inhabitants, having been called upon to express their wishes, the Senate shall have decided as to the form of government by which they are to be ruled, and as to the guarantees to be given in favour of the Catholic religion and the Papacy."

I soon found, after a preliminary conference with the Roman authorities, that this question could not even be discussed without awkward consequences, and that Clause III., relating to the resignation of the executive power, would lead to interminable discus-

sion. Moreover, such a clause, much as it was desired by the general in command, did not appear to me to form part of my instructions, or to be adumbrated by the speeches of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, at the sitting of the 7th inst., had defied the Opposition to find any proof of the Roman Government having been called upon to resign its powers. The first proclamation of General Oudinot, drawn up, as has been shown, by the Minister himself, was, moreover, very explicit upon this point, as it ran: "We will concert with the existing authorities in order that our momentary occupation may not in any way embarrass you." I found, moreover, after having well informed myself as to the actual state of public feeling, that as my mission was a special one and designed solely to effect a conciliation between the French army and the population of Rome, it would be prudent to reserve in all their integrity the questions relating to the Holy See, and not to allow his sacred person or Catholicism to be dragged into a public discussion, the tone of which it was impossible to foretell. It seemed therefore better policy to limit these discussions to the subject of a partial arrangement, as an indispensable preliminary to the general negotiations which might be carried on later between the different Governments. A fresh wording was accordingly agreed upon by General Oudinot and myself. The three commissioners elected by the Roman Constituent Assembly were appointed to discuss it with me. They called upon me, but as

they said that the Assembly had given them no powers beyond those of hearing what I had to say and referring back to it, I did not deem it fitting to open up any conferences with them at head-quarters. They were merely charged with the duty of submitting to the Assembly the three following proposals:—

“ Clause I.—The Roman States request the fraternal protection of the French Republic.

“ Clause II.—The Roman populations have full right to decide for themselves upon the form of government.

“ Clause III.—Rome will welcome the French army as a friendly force. The French troops will assist in maintaining order in the city. The Roman authorities will act in accordance with their legal functions.”

I had made my mind up quite clearly in changing the third clause of this draft of agreement. I had sought to reduce it to its most simple expression, and to avoid the difficulties already referred to.* The first draft made no reference to the occupation of Rome by the French army; the second made special mention of it, in deference to the views expressed by General Oudinot and M. d'Harcourt. Although my own opinion was contrary to the military occupation of Rome by the French army, for reasons which I will give presently, I did not like to refuse to demand it, in spite of my fear that it would not be granted, not wishing to begin by separating my views from those

* Note of the Translator. See p. 14.

of persons with whom I was desirous of acting in concert. It was on this account that I was led to propose that the military service of the capital should be performed by our troops conjointly with those of Rome. Nevertheless, we had already before us the example of Civita Vecchia, which was by no means calculated to encourage a continuance of the same system.

The Triumvirate informed me, in a note dated the 19th, that our proposals could not be accepted, as they were not considered to offer a sufficient guarantee in favour of the liberties and independence of the Roman States, and because the military occupation of Rome was viewed with disfavour by public opinion. It was added that the siege operations and the closer investment of the city by the French army, regarded as contrary to the spirit of the suspension of arms, had contributed not a little to the decision of the Assembly. The note wound up by announcing that a counter proposition, which would, it was hoped, facilitate an understanding, would be submitted to me the following day.

As no such counter proposition had reached me on the 22nd, I felt it incumbent, after consultation with General Oudinot, to intimate that we considered that we had exhausted all the means of conciliation, and we accompanied this note by announcing the rupture of negotiations, and stating that we would notify the resumption of hostilities a week in advance. I had

calculated with General Oudinot that this interval would enable me to receive from Paris a telegraphic reply at all events to my first despatches.

But the Executive replied to me on the same day that the reason why the promised counter proposition had not been officially transmitted was that fresh bases of negotiation had within the last two days been the subject of verbal communications between the President of the National Assembly, General Oudinot, and the United States Minister. I inquired as to the truth of this of General Oudinot, and he sent me the following reply :—

“The United States Ambassador (Mr. Cass, son of the general), came to my head-quarters yesterday and expressed his anxiety to assist, unofficially, in making the Roman Government see the necessity of averting the calamities which are impending over the population.”

General Oudinot, in expressing his regret that the step which had been taken by Mr. Cass, the son of the American Ambassador, a step to which he had not attached any importance, should have been seized as an excuse for the delay of the Triumvirs to reply to my ultimatum, said he remembered the American agent leaving a paper with him which he had scarcely looked at. This paper was handed to me, and it embodied the following proposals :—

“Article I.—The Roman Republic, accepting the deliberations of the French Assembly which authorise

the despatch of troops to Italy to prevent foreign intervention, will be grateful for the support which it may receive.

“Article II.—The Roman people are entitled to decide for themselves upon their form of government, and the French Republic, which has never questioned this right, will be pleased to recognise it formally, when the constitution, as created by the National Assembly, shall have been sanctioned by a general vote.

“Article III.—Rome will welcome the French soldiers as brethren, but they will not enter the city, unless the Roman Government, threatened by an immediate danger, shall call upon them to do so. The civil and military authorities of the Roman Republic shall fulfil their respective functions. The French Republic guarantees more especially the right which it recognised the Constituent Assembly as possessing to complete and put into working the constitution of the Republic.”

This scheme was drafted in the handwriting of M. Charles Bonaparte, the Vice-President of the Roman Assembly, who subsequently gave me a second copy of it. In that which had been handed to General Oudinot by Mr. Cass, the latter had introduced a fourth clause, in which it was proposed that he should sign the agreement as Minister of the United States. It will be readily understood that in view of my instructions I abstained from discussing

proposals at nearly every line of which the Roman Republic, which I had not been charged to recognise, was specifically mentioned. I declined to allow them even to be the subject of any written communication on my part.

This incident led me to suspect that the Roman executive power, finding that I was resolved to follow closely the line which I had adopted from the first, was endeavouring to act, irrespectively of me, upon the mind of the general in command, and I was aware that, upon the other hand, a party which had little confidence in the friendly intentions of France, and was disposed to repel all attempts at conciliation, endeavoured to make me appear as an obstacle and a disturbing element. It was openly stated in the clubs that I was another Rossi. The irritation produced by the ringleaders upon a few fanatics led to a disgraceful scene which disturbed a meeting of Frenchmen at the French Embassy. Three men, wearing the uniform of the Roman National Guard, furious at not having met me there and at having "missed their chance," as they phrased it, insulted M. de la Tour d'Auvergne, who had attended in my place.

The complaint which I lodged with the Roman authorities was at first received very coldly, though it is only fair to add that they were not aware of the criminal intentions which, as I had been privately informed, these men had cherished. It was not till

the next day, after the discovery of a fresh plot, and after hearing the details spontaneously communicated to them by Colonel Lavelaine de Maubeuge, while I was in conference at head-quarters, that they proceeded to arrest one of the culprits, a Frenchman named Colin. This man was still confined in a dungeon of St. Angelo when I left Rome on the 1st of June.

The general in command kept on writing to urge me to have done with the matter off hand, and though we had both quite agreed that it was indispensable, in the absence of any instructions posterior to my leaving Paris, to gain time and await, at all events for a week, replies to the letters which I had forwarded through M. Forbin-Janson, he sent me message upon message, saying that the generals were pressing him to act; that he had full confidence in me, but that no one shared my sanguine views, and regarded them as illusory. He added that, in the opinion of General Vaillant, the *statu quo* was derogatory to the dignity and interests of the army.

I replied to him on the 23rd :—

“I have communicated to you, before sending them, all the despatches which I have addressed to the Government since my arrival at Rome, and I have to-day sent to Paris, by M. de la Tour d’Auvergne, a general report which I discussed with you yesterday, and to which you raised no objections.

Nor did General Vaillant raise any when he came to confer with me on your behalf, and I really cannot understand so sudden and complete a change of front as your successive letters intimate. My conduct has hitherto been most consistent, and as I am to-day sending to Paris the report which, as was agreed with you, reserves all initiative on the part of the Government until its reply arrives, it is impossible for me to alter my course without the most urgent cause. At the same time, as my mission cannot be of any effect if I am harassed in all directions, I am quite prepared to inform the Roman authorities that I shall retire to head-quarters if within a week from the present time a solution is not offered us, either by the acceptance of our original proposals or by a counter scheme which would change the form of it without altering its spirit. As to illusions, I have none. Nothing surprises me from anybody, and I am quite equal to meeting all the officious insinuations designed to make me deviate from the course which I have adopted.

“The honour of the army is as dear to me, General, as it is to you; but at the same time I set great store by the written and verbal instructions of my Government, and of public opinion in France. Do you desire, yes or no, to enter Rome by force and assume the offensive without having been attacked, or having received any formal orders? When you have once reached the gates of Rome, and destroyed its walls

with your guns, how are you going to occupy the city?

“Are we at once to give notice to the French families residing in Rome that they had better withdraw if they dread the consequences of an early rupture? And are you prepared to make yourself responsible for the consequences of forcing your protection upon an unwilling population?”

“F. DE LESSEPS.”

The above considerations and the intentions of the staff, as manifested by General Oudinot's correspondence, made it necessary for me to take up my residence for a time at head-quarters. I went there on the 24th, and the General gave me a room in the Villa Santucci, where he was living himself, and where he received me very kindly. From there I lost no time in addressing, after reading it to him, to the Constituent Assembly a message explaining our draft of agreement, the clauses of which we retained, with this addition :—

“The French Republic guarantees against all foreign invasion the Roman States occupied by our troops.”

This clause was the reproduction of an order of the day, addressed by the general in command to the commanders of the different corps when the march of the Austrians into the States of Rome was made

known, the which order he had authorised me to copy from his correspondence. He informed me, however, that he had kept it secret up to the present, and that if I thought it expedient to make use of the expression in our draft of agreement with the Romans, he saw no objection.

General Oudinot again promised me to await the final decision of the French Government, but he was still much worried by the complaints which the generals under him made as to the inaction of the army. It was agreed that I should explain, at the next council of war, the political situation in which we were placed. The generals who were present were Vaillant, Rostolan, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, generals of division; Gueswiller, Le Vaillant, and Mollière, generals of brigade, and two others, whose names I have forgotten; in addition to Colonel de Tirion, the chief of the staff.

I read part of my despatches to the Ministry as well as the accompanying documents, and I added that I had resolved to formally oppose a resumption of hostilities against Rome pending the arrival of orders from the Government, basing my declaration upon the latest instructions sent to the commander-in-chief by telegraph on the 10th of May. Several generals asserted that a simple demonstration would suffice to ensure the opening of the gates, that at the most there would be no need to do more than knock down the corner of a single wall, and that there would

be no real resistance. I maintained that they were mistaken; that once hostilities had been begun we should be led on to shed a great deal of blood and destroy many buildings; that the resistance would be an obstinate one; that we should be obliged to lay a regular siege; and that though we should undoubtedly end by accomplishing our aim, nothing being impossible to a French army, I would never take upon myself the responsibility of evils easy to foresee; and that the general in command had received no instructions which authorised him to assume himself the responsibility contrary to my expressed opinions.

General Oudinot submitted to the consideration of the Council the following question:—

“Is it desirable to abandon the negotiations and resume the attack upon Rome, without regard to the conclusions of M. de Lesseps and without awaiting fresh instructions?”

The majority was at first inclined to vote for attacking at once; but General Mollière, well known for his exploits in Algeria, the youngest member of the Council, had not yet spoken. Being asked to give his opinion, he said that he was sorry, as a soldier, not to be able to vote in favour of immediate action, but that he felt it difficult to dissent from my opinion as to the expediency of waiting for fresh instructions. It was accordingly decided to maintain the *statu quo*.

During my stay at head-quarters I kept up, through my private secretary, M. Leduc, daily intercourse with the Roman authorities and several influential persons not in office.

On the 24th of May I addressed a letter to the French residents in Rome, informing them that during my absence the French flag would continue to float over my hotel and the French public buildings, and that they could display it from the windows of their own houses if they pleased. I added that they were to apply to M. Gerando, the Chancellor of the Embassy, in case of need; and impressed upon them the importance of their being reserved and discreet in their intercourse with the Romans.

I also forwarded to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris a letter which I had received from the Triumvirate on the 26th, urging that the French troops, while remaining in occupation of Civita Vecchia, should not enter Rome, or interfere to prevent the Romans from taking the field against the Austrian and Neapolitan forces. To this I replied by the following letter, a copy of which I forwarded at the same time to M. Drouyn de Lhuys:—

“FRENCH HEAD-QUARTERS,

“VILLA SANTUCCI, *May 26.*

“Gentlemen,—I have received with much satisfaction the letter which you did me the honour to address me yesterday. The explanations which I have already

given to the three commissioners of the Roman Constituent Assembly, and the communications which I have thought it incumbent upon me to make to the Assembly itself, meet, without exception, all the objections raised in your note, and whenever you see fit to complete the negotiations by sending your commissioners invested with the necessary authorisations, it will be very easy, in my opinion, for us to come to a complete understanding and settle the basis of a definite arrangement, which must, of course, be one such as will quite satisfy the two contracting parties. This declaration, which my private secretary will be able to supplement with a few verbal observations, will, I am sure, dissipate the unfortunate misunderstandings which may have hitherto arisen upon either side. For my own part, I have been, still am, and shall still remain desirous of clearing up the obscurities which have hung about the question, just as I hope that my language will destroy any lingering doubts which you may have felt as to the result you have in view. There is only one point which could in any way make you feel anxious, and that is the idea that we are intent upon imposing on you by force the obligation to receive us as friends. Friendship and violence do not go together, so that it would be illogical of us to begin by cannonading you as a preliminary to getting you to look upon us as your natural protectors. Such a contradiction in terms does not enter into my intentions, or into those of my Government or of our army.

This was the purport of what General Oudinot said yesterday in my presence to the Roman deputation which came to offer, in your name, a present of fifty thousand cigars and two hundred pounds of tobacco for our soldiers, and his remarks must have removed any doubts which may have lingered in some minds. But so long as we begin to understand each other, there is no good in going back upon the past. Let us rather concern ourselves with the present and the future. You will, I repeat, find us entirely disposed, by our words and written statements, to give you the explanations and guarantees which your natural susceptibility from a national point of view may demand. It would ill become Frenchmen, noted for their unlimited devotion to their country, to blame other nations for defending their territory against their real enemies, or to compel you to do the very contrary of what they would always do in their own case.

“Accept, &c.,
“F. DE LESSEPS.”

CONFERENCE HELD AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS, VILLA
SANTUCCI, BETWEEN M. DE LESSEPS AND M. DE
RAYNEVAL.

*Note from M. de Rayneval to M.
de Lesseps.*

*Note from M. de Lesseps in reply
to M. de Rayneval.*

May 27.

1. You have had the kindness to take me into full confidence as to your ideas, your

1. M. de Rayneval, starting from a different standpoint from mine as to the attitude to

projects, and your action. In return for the confidence which you have shown me, I feel that I cannot do less than treat you with equal frankness.

2. My private views are of little consequence, but the Government of the Republic, in requesting you explicitly to concert your action with the plenipotentiaries of the Gaëta Conference, was evidently anxious to avoid speaking with two voices. I am obliged to say that you have not been influenced by this consideration, a very important one in my eyes, as it involves the honour and good faith of the country.

be taken in this business, should be consistent with his principles, as I have been with mine. His reservations do honour to the perspicacity of his eminently politic mind, and to the hereditary loyalty of his disposition.

2. My instructions were to the effect that I was to concert with MM. d'Harcourt and Rayneval upon all matters not requiring an immediate solution. I have communicated with M. d'Harcourt whenever he has come to head-quarters, where I have made a point of meeting him, despite my incessant occupations, to communicate to him not only all that I had done, but the ideas which inspired me in my action. At the same time, I sent to M. de Rayneval at Gaëta duplicates of my earlier despatches to Paris, and I should have gone on doing so had he not, much to my satisfaction, come to my satisfaction, come to head-quarters. I have kept nothing back from him; I have let him know all the powerful motives, public or secret, which have directed my conduct, and he must have carried away with him the conviction that if we were divided as to our views, I was not less anxious than he to maintain intact the honour and good name of our country. As to consulting

3. I also have to point out that you act not only without any regard to antecedents, but solely guided by your inspirations and without any written instructions from Government.

MM. d'Harcourt and Rayneval previous to each of my steps, which, day by day, hour by hour, minute by minute, demanded immediate and varying decisions, it would have been impossible. Even General Oudinot, who was more directly concerned with me, did not expect this.

3. The antecedents which at the outset guided the course of M. de Rayneval should unquestionably have been taken into consideration by me, but they could not serve as an invariable rule for me, because, upon the one hand, the Holy Father, who will certainly recognise the necessity of putting himself in our hands, has never done as we advised him; because he has followed advice diametrically opposed to ours; because his court has become a modern Coblenz, from which French influence has been excluded; and because, upon the other hand, the facts which had marked the début of the French expedition, after the occupation of Civita Vecchia, had complicated the question and produced a quite different situation. This situation, the exact nature of which the Government could not understand when I left Paris on the 8th of May, prevented their giving me precise and detailed

4. Being quite out of harmony with d'Harcourt and myself, deriving all your force and authority from the circumstance—the importance of which I quite admit—that you have more recent information as to the intentions of our Government, you are quite master of the situation and paralyse the army.

5. You have gone so far all at once that the risk of putting obstacles in your way is as great as that which you have voluntarily incurred. Moreover, you have appealed to the supreme judgment of the Government, so that it is but right to await their decision, which will, I trust, be not long delayed.

6. It is possible that the Romans will open the gates of the city to us. They will be the less likely to do so when they see that the army is not preparing to act. But owing to the conditions which you

instructions. I was merely told to “devote my attention exclusively to the establishment of relations with the Roman authorities and inhabitants. . . . You will be guided in your judgment by circumstances.”

4. I have reported to the Government all that I have done to check the eagerness of the army—an eagerness which is greatly to its credit, but which, if not moderated in present circumstances, would have led to an irreparable catastrophe, the result of which would have been, in my opinion, to destroy our influence and aid the schemes of our enemies at home and abroad.

5. My object was to ascertain the truth, to let the Government know it, to clear the way for them, and to enable them to come to a final decision, the announcement of which I am awaiting not less eagerly than M. de Rayneval.

6. I had no wish that the Romans should at once open their gates, as it was better to give time for the passions which had been excited by the events of April 30th to subside. All the conditions which I had at

have laid down, the solution of the question, it seems to me, is more likely to be retarded than advanced.

first proposed could not be accepted, and I should have been sorry if they had been; among others, that which consisted in having the military service of the city performed jointly by our troops and those of Rome.

The general in command was very anxious that this should be done, but I have always declared that I regarded this as a danger, because it would involve us in questions of Roman administration to a greater extent than I deemed advisable, and because it would entail our taking upon us a part of the inheritance of the present executive.

7. I protest to the utmost of my convictions against your proposals. They involve not only the recognition of a Government which the French Republic has expressly declared that it will not recognise, but an offensive and defensive alliance with this Government.

This is the first and a very grave infraction upon what I believe to be the instructions of our own Government.

8. In reality we are throwing down the glove, not only to the three Powers which have declared war against the Government of the Republic,

7. In my proposals there is not a word as to the recognition of the Roman Republic, and that is so true that they are regarded by Mazzini himself as unacceptable, and as containing in reality nothing more than the substance of General Oudinot's first proclamation before Civita Vecchia. I was instructed to negotiate with the people and authorities of Rome, and in doing so I have merely conformed to the written instructions of our Government.

8. By our conduct here we are in no way throwing down the gauntlet to the three Powers which have declared war against the Government

and which have the support of all Europe, but to a Power superior to all these, and destined to play a very important part in our internal destinies: I mean the Papacy.

This is a second and not less serious infraction of the rules laid down by the Government of the Republic, which has not declared war upon Austria, which is solely desirous of placing itself in such a position as to exercise the due influence of the French Republic in the ulterior regulation of the affairs of Rome.

Naples has seen fit to take military action, but we never promised to side with her, and when General Oudinot was called upon by M. de Ludolf to come to a decision, he left him with no doubt upon the subject. A telegraphic despatch of May 10th, sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to General Oudinot, instructed him to inform the Romans that we did not intend to join with the Neapolitans against them. We do not therefore throw down the glove to Naples, any more than we do to Spain, whom I was myself instructed to inform that her ambassador at Gaëta had very unwisely separated her cause from ours, and that in taking part, together with Austria, against us, he was serving the interests neither of the Papacy nor of Spain. With regard to Austria, her principles are so different from ours that it is very difficult for us to be agreed, while a pretence of agreement would not be of any use to you, and would alienate for ever the Roman populations. A decision must therefore be come to, and if we are to avoid war with her it is by going on as we have begun, unless new and unforeseen circumstances should arise, and by fortifying day by day our

9. In uniting with the enemies of the Pope, you inevitably drive him more than ever beneath the exclusive influence of Austria. This assuredly is not a result which it is desirable to attain.

10. Is it really the desire of France to offer her hand to a Government which began its career by murder and which relies for its existence upon our internal troubles?

And you must bear in mind that directly we recognise this

military political position in the Roman States. . . .

9. Far from uniting with the enemies of the Pope, we prove to him, on the contrary, that we are the only nation sympathetic to the Roman populations which conceive their interests in a just and liberal measure; and if at this moment his spiritual influence even is compromised at Rome by his imprudent friends quite as much as by the hatred of his enemies, he will be convinced one day that we alone can open for him the doors of St. Peter's, and lead him along a way strewn with flowers. He will understand that access to that basilica would be closed to him if he had to reach it along a path sprinkled with the blood which he had caused to be shed. Some sincere friends of His Holiness have encouraged me in the path which I have followed, and they have strongly urged him not to raise any difficulties in my path.

10. It is no more accurate to say that the Roman Republic is responsible for the murder of M. Rossi than to make our Republic of '48 responsible for the crimes of '93. The Roman Republic—which, moreover, I have not been charged with recognising—has succeeded, by

Government, we cut from under our feet the only ground upon which we can maintain ourselves. If, in our eyes, this Government exists, if it is the outcome of the free choice of the nation, we are bound to support it. It would not be right for us to do what we can to bring about its fall except while it remains what it now is, the work of a faction composed chiefly of foreigners.

11. You paralyse the army, forgetting the maxim, "*Si vis pacem,*" &c. You expose it to demoralisation and to disease. The army, which is anxious to show what it can do and to shed a fresh lustre upon the French name, is condemned to capitulate

an almost unanimous vote, to the Government which had been the direct heir of the murder of Rossi; and it was proclaimed by an Assembly whose mission it was to choose the form of government which it preferred. This is a fact, the consequences of which I am not called upon to discuss.

11. I do not paralyse the army, but do all I can to prevent its admirable ardour causing it to deviate from the right path. The army will have deserved the gratitude of the country by reserving this ardour to combat the enemies of our independence and influence, instead of committing the deplorable error of employing it to make breaches in crumbling walls and to destroy the finest monuments of ancient and modern genius. My despatch No. 6 indicates how our army, so brave, so well disciplined, and so well commanded, may maintain its position, and fortify and improve it by a change of quarters, in the event of Rome not opening her gates before the season of fevers sets in. This project ought, by good rights, to be carried out from the very day that an arrangement is come

to between the Romans and the French. To avoid any unfortunate contact between the two forces, and to place us in such a position that we could retire without inconvenience whenever France might require her troops, a strong position in the city, where the head-quarters could be established with the necessary forces, will be the object of special stipulations in the event of an agreement being come to. I have pointed out to M. de Rayneval, upon a map of Rome, the advantage we should derive from occupying, upon Monte-Pincio, a part of the Académie de France and all the buildings attached to the splendid convent of Notre-Dame-du-Mont. These French properties form a very good body of military positions. The steps of the convent descend into the interior of the city, and up to 1815 any man pursued by the police had only to put his foot upon the first step of these stairs to enjoy the privileges of the inviolability of French territory. The sisters of the Sacred Heart, who now inhabit it, are only tenants of the French Government, and they have two other very fine properties in Rome, to which they could meet.

12. While our army remains

12. The principal canton-

inactive under the walls of Rome the Austrians advance, and the Pope might very possibly go and re-establish at Bologna, under their ægis, the seat of authority.

Beneath the walls of Rome, and even if we were to agree to share the few posts in the city which the authorities might condescend to offer us, should we be in a position to hold, either to the Austrians or to the Pope, the language which it is fitting that France should employ? Our only resource in dealing with the former would be force, which would be utterly useless in regard to the latter.

13. Primary assemblies in countries such as this have not the moral force which they generally have with us, because every one knows that in Italy the populations are incapable of expressing their wishes in this way. In leaving them to decide the future fate of the Roman States, we implicitly declare that we no longer concern ourselves with the sovereignty of the Pope,

ments of our army being established at Frascati, Albano, and in the neighbourhood known as the Camp of Hannibal, we should maintain our free communications with Civita Vecchia, the routes to Florence, Bologna, and Fiumicino by the Tiber ferry, or the post which General Oudinot has already prepared, and we should have a new and better communication with the sea by the Porto d'Anzio (Portus Neronis). In such a situation, which is being thought out at the present time by General Vaillant, we could not be regarded as having wasted our time or remained inactive. The march of the Austrians need not cause us any uneasiness. As to the fear of seeing the Pope establish his see under the ægis of Austria at Bologna, an open and defenceless city, I do not think that there is any foundation for it.

13. In declaring to the people of Rome that we do not dispute their right to choose freely their form of government, we do not indicate how this free choice is to be used; and if we do not just at this moment raise the questions relating to the interests of the Holy Father, it is because we should regard it as very imprudent to do so prematurely, being convinced that time alone can

whereas we have solemnly declared in the face of Europe that we would respect the territorial divisions recognised by the treaties.

14. I am not in the least alarmed by the efforts of the Protestant missionaries. They may create a scandal, but that is all.

15. One word again as to the kingdom of Naples. You expose it to the invasion of armed bands whom our inaction leaves at liberty. Is the French Government desirous that the agitation in Italy, no sooner suppressed in the north, the centre, and Sicily, should break out anew in Naples?

16. I have said enough to show how sad at heart I feel in leaving Rome with matters in such a pass as they are. I should deplore as much as you that the way of the Papacy should be one of bloodshed and ruin. Such must not be

create a spontaneous movement in his favour. As to bringing him back by force, no one can deny that his restoration would not be durable unless it was maintained by the same violent means which had effected it.

14. I saw a good deal of what the Protestants are doing in Rome; the danger is a real one. It might perhaps be only a passing one, fated to diminish or disappear altogether when the help upon which they now rely is no longer to be had. But as, after all, we have to do with things as they are at present, not as they have been or may be again, it is necessary to combat and to beat down the hostile elements opposed to us.

15. It is not our fault if the kingdom of Naples is exposed to being invaded by Garibaldi's forces; but it is owing to the imprudence of the Neapolitan troops in advancing into the States of Rome.

16. In the situation as it now is, an attack upon Rome would, as I hope that I have demonstrated in my correspondence with the Ministry, have led to great disasters and would have been aimless.

the case. In my opinion, a very firm attitude, an attack which, with no worse results than the destruction of a few tottering walls, would have made us masters of the Roman head-quarters, would have led the population to decide in our favour. . . . We should at all events have been in a strong, healthy, and satisfactory position, both as regards our national pride and the political necessities of the day. Sooner or later we should have been received unconditionally, and been allowed to dictate our own terms. We should not have had to struggle, as we now shall have to do, if you succeed, against engagements which we cannot fulfil, and which will most seriously compromise us in the eyes of all Europe.

17. I deem it my duty to decline formally and fully all responsibility for what has taken place since your arrival. But I will not conclude without rendering homage to your zeal and good intentions, without begging you to see in my outspoken frankness nothing save a proof of my confidence in your character and of my now long-standing affection.

DE RAYNEVAL.

17. I willingly assume full responsibility for what is being done before Rome. I do not ask anyone to share it with me, and I honour M. de Rayneval for arriving at convictions different from mine as the outcome of ideas which spring from the same patriotic source as my own. I thank him for his frankness, which harmonizes so well with my own, and with the sincere affection which I feel for him.

F. DE LESSEPS.

Different as were our views as to the pending negotiations and the hopes which they might evoke, M. de Rayneval, indicated (see clause 5) the essential point. "You have appealed to the supreme judgment of the French Government, so that it is but right to await their decision."

Upon the 28th General Oudinot held, a few miles from head-quarters, a review of 10,000 men, most of them belonging to corps recently arrived from France, and he asked me to accompany him. On the 29th I arranged with him to address a very pressing communication to the Roman authorities.

The announcement of the forward march of the Austrians, the desire to give satisfaction to the army, and the hope of seeing an honourable compromise agreed to by the majority of the Assembly, which, I was assured, was very favourably disposed, induced us to send to Rome what was practically an ultimatum to the Assembly, the Municipality, and the Triumvirate each of them receiving a copy from M. Leduc, my private secretary. This declaration was as follows:—

"The undersigned, F. de Lesseps, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic; Considering that the march of the Austrian army upon the Roman States changes the respective position of the French army and the Roman troops; Considering that the Austrians, in advancing upon Rome, might seize positions which would be threatening for the security of the French army; Consider-

ing that the prolongation of the *statu quo*, to which General Oudinot, the commander-in-chief, had at his request consented, might become injurious to the French army; Considering that no communication has been addressed to him since his last note to the Triumvirate, dated the 26th inst.; calls upon the Roman authorities and Constituent Assembly to give a definite answer to the four following articles:—

“Art. 1. The Romans request the protection of the French Republic.

“Art. 2. France does not dispute the right of the population to pronounce freely as to their form of government.

“Art. 3. The French army will be welcomed by the Romans as a friendly one. It will occupy the cantonments which it may deem the most suitable, both for the defence of the city and for sanitary reasons. It will not interfere at all in the general administration of the country.

“Art. 4. The French Republic guarantees the territory occupied by its troops against any foreign invasion.

“In consequence, the undersigned declares, in agreement with General Oudinot, that if the above articles are not at once accepted, he shall regard his mission as terminated, and the French army will resume its liberty of action.

“F. DE LESSEPS.

“(Countersigned) OUDINOT DE REGGIO.

“HEAD-QUARTERS, VILLE SANTUCCI,

“May 29, 1849.”

Subsequently it was agreed that a further delay of twenty-four hours, expiring at midnight on the 30th, should be granted.

After the departure of M. Leduc, in the night of the 29th to the 30th, I remarked that there was a great stir among the staff of the general in command, and that preparations were being made for some movement the next day. I at once handed to the General, in whose house I still resided, a note in which I said, "In the event of your deeming it your duty to seize, by surprise or otherwise, positions inside Rome, or even just outside its walls, without previously consulting me, I think it only right to disclaim all responsibilities for the political consequences which may result from it. Until orders arrive from the Government, either blaming or approving of my conduct, it is not in keeping with my mission that you should alone determine upon any measures, military or otherwise, which might compromise our Government or implicate our country in a cause which I deem to be ill-advised and dangerous."

It should be added that I had not, up to this date, heard a word from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, nor had General Oudinot. The embarrassment which this silence might cause had been pointed out by me in all my despatches, notably in those sent through M. de la Tour d'Auvergne and one or two other messengers.

I knew that the General had sent for several

generals commanding army corps, to give them his instructions with regard to the attack on Rome which was to begin at midnight. Having learnt that the General had determined to take no account of my advice, I thought it my duty to submit to General Vaillant, who had recently arrived from Paris, whose coming had been telegraphed to me by the President, and who might therefore be supposed to be in possession of the latest views of the Government, my serious motives for opposing the proposed attack, and for believing that the immediate occupation of Rome was pregnant with danger. I wrote to him as follows :—

“ *May 30, 1849.*

“ I was hoping to have come to see you this morning, in order to communicate to you confidentially the result of my latest conference with M. de Rayneval. But I have not been able to find the time, being busy preparing a note for the purpose of showing that, from the political point of view, the necessity of despatching a division which would be distributed over Albano, Frascati, and Marino, on account of the recent landing of 4,000 Spaniards at Gaëta. It is said that they will give fresh courage to the Neapolitans and that the campaign will be resumed. It is our duty to anticipate them in the occupying of the encampments around Rome which they might otherwise seize, and, by thus anticipating them, make our-

selves the sole masters of the city. In this way we do not compromise our Government by a premature entry into Rome, by remaining in a city which even its inhabitants abandon in summer. . . . We shall be the real masters of Rome if we surround it with troops, and the Government of the Republic, *which does not desire our entry into Rome except by agreement with the inhabitants*, will thank you for having contributed, by the wisdom of your counsels, to bring about the triumph of the true and only policy stripped from all petty questions of *amour propre* and vainglory."

At three o'clock the same day (that is, nine hours before the expiration of the delay agreed upon) I received the replies of the President of the Roman Assembly and the members of the municipality to terminate the negotiations, to prevent France assuming towards Rome the part of Austria, and to put an end to the misfortunes with which a peaceful city, the home of so many monuments and of the arts, was threatened. At the same time the Triumvirate sent me a note and a set of counter proposals. It was evident that the General-in-chief and myself could take the counter project of the Roman authorities into consideration, discuss it, and only break off all negotiations, pending instructions from Paris, in the event of our finding it impossible to come to an understanding. The simple dictates of humanity would have led us to do so, even if this course had not been indicated by

the situation in which we found ourselves placed, and which had not varied since the 15th of the month, the day of my arrival; that is to say, our Government, which had long since been called upon to decide, had not sent us a word either by courier or by telegraph. Thus General Oudinot was still bound by the despatch of the 10th, which did not allow him to attack. I put together the letters of the Roman municipality, the Assembly, the Triumvirate, as well as the project which I had annotated. I added to it the following memorandum, and requested Commander Espivent to hand the whole to General Oudinot:—

“MEMORANDUM.

“Having started from Paris while the impression produced by the events of April 30th was still fresh, and having come for the purpose of treating with the Roman populations, I have no need to recall the fact that I have never allowed for an instant my cause to be treated as a distinct one from that of the worthy Commander-in-chief.

“I was not blind to the difficulties which I should experience in bringing people to believe that the intentions of the French Government and of its general were the same after as they were before the 30th of April. But I have at last succeeded. I am disposed to sign at once, with a few modifications and the rejection of Art. 3 relating to the recognition of the Roman Republic, the counter proposal sent me by the

Triumvirate, and approved by the Roman Constituent Assembly, as well as by the senators and conservators of the Roman municipality, in the belief that this act is calculated permanently to strengthen French influence in Italy, and maintain the unspotted honour of our army and of our glorious flag.

“May 30, 1849.”

M. Espivent shortly afterwards returned me, by General Oudinot's order, the bundle of letters, which he had not had time to read, being very occupied with the details of his service and the orders he had to give to the army. He had added, however, that I could explain my views presently at a council meeting of the generals which took place at four o'clock. Despite my reading of the above documents and of my observations as to the absence of orders from our Government and of the perilous nature of the situation, nothing could alter General Oudinot's resolve, while the manner in which he expressed his views made all discussion impossible, and compelled me to advance my official position in order to check the outbursts of temper which I plainly said that I would not stand.

A similar scene occurred again at night in the presence of one of my friends, Captain Chaigneau, in command of the frigate *Magellan*. But my firmness, coupled with the dropping of my hand on to the hilt of my sword when the General talked of having me placed under arrest, fortunately had the effect of re-

voking at the last moment all along the line of advance posts the order which had been given for an immediate attack.

However, as I was afraid that these orders would not arrive in time to prevent deplorable consequences, I made it known in Rome, whither I at once proceeded, that there was no occasion to feel uneasiness at our movements, which were only intended to enable us to make sure of the positions which foreign armies marching upon Rome might seize. But for this advice we should not have been allowed to occupy Monte Mario without resistance. The aide-de-camp sent to countermand the occupation of it arrived too late. I returned during the night to head-quarters.

Early the next morning General Oudinot, having heard that I was making my preparations to return to Rome, sent one of his aide-de-camps to ask me to come and see him before I started, and I replied, that as I had a final note to hand him, it was my intention to have done so. The General told me that he much regretted what had occurred ; but I would not let him finish his sentence, and grasped the hand which he had put out. I told him that I was going into the city in order to complete the negotiations upon the basis of our annotated project. In order to show him that I had foreseen the possibility of my not stipulating for the immediate occupation of Rome by the French army, I took the precaution of reading him

the following notes, the original of which I left in his hands :—

“It is expedient, until their passions are calmed down, to avoid all contact between the army and the people, whom so many causes maintain in a state of effervescence.

“The air of Rome is insalubrious in summer.

“The sojourn in Rome of any part of our army might, as I have not ceased to declare since my first conference with M. d’Harcourt, involve us more deeply in internal Roman questions than we should wish to compromise our Government. M. de Rayneval was of opinion that the military service conducted jointly by our troops and those of Rome would be most prejudicial to our interests.

“The general embarrassment arising from the empty state of the treasury, the accounts which have to be rendered for the immense sums of money spent without any sort of check, are so many insurmountable difficulties in the way of the present Government should it become consolidated, or for any other power which might succeed it. The administration, being bound to offer some sort of justification to the people for all the financial embarrassments which will have arisen, will no doubt seek to attribute the effects of it to the French occupation. This forced occupation might, moreover, have the result of keeping up a feeling of irritation against, and a desire of vengeance upon,

our soldiers, which the slightest incident might bring to a painful head. Is it not better to wait till these feelings have calmed down? Then the people themselves will come to ask the French soldiers to enter the city, and perhaps in a few days. It is all very well for us to declare that we shall not interfere in the general administration of the city; but a military occupation would be certain to entail this; and how can we tell that, once entering Rome by force, we should not be obliged to employ force to maintain ourselves there, or that we should be free to withdraw our troops just when it was convenient or necessary to do so? It seems unnecessary that I should dwell further upon this situation or upon the other grave matters to which I have made allusion.

“F. DE LESSEPS.

“P.S.—M. de Rayneval writes to me from Gaëta, under date of the 28th, that, according to letters from Rome, the city has resolved to defend itself if attacked. He adds, ‘The moderate party would not care to face the perils of a reaction of which they hope that we shall spare them the cost.’ This was just the view I had taken the day I arrived in Rome. I am very glad that this view, so opposed to all that had been said before, is confirmed by the news from Gaëta.”

The General sent me a note, written in pencil, in which the aide-de-camp sent to communicate with the commander of the column ordered to take up a position

on Monte Mario said that he had not arrived in time to countermand the movement. This note was intended to reassure the Roman authorities as to our intentions, and it enabled me to explain the occupation of Monte Mario to the Triumvirs.

Upon my arrival in Rome, I found them very much concerned about the occupation of this important point, and numerous complaints had been addressed to them from all parts of the city. I gave them to understand that it was all a mistake, and they undertook to reassure the population.

I handed them a final proposal, which I had thought out with great care, and which I believed to be as faithful an expression as possible of my instructions and of the intentions of the Government, as conveyed by the speeches of ministers at the sittings of April 16 and May 7 and 9. My proposals did not respond to the hopes of the Triumvirs, because they made no mention of the Roman Republic, which I could not recognise, and because they only guaranteed from foreign invasion the territories occupied by our troops. They were, however, accepted as a necessity, and Mazzini told me that if the Assembly agreed to them it would be a proof of the great confidence which I had inspired as to the intentions of the Government; for if these intentions were not such as I described them, it would be very dangerous for the Romans to agree to my project. "For," he added, "the positions of which we are about to facilitate your occupation

of, and the privilege which you reserve for yourselves of only repulsing our foreign enemies if they come directly in contact with yourselves, leaves our political existence at the mercy of your good faith."

The Roman Assembly, convoked the same day, in a sitting with closed doors, adopted my scheme all but unanimously. This result was announced to me by the Triumvirs in the following letter:—

"The result of the long discussion in the Chamber is as follows:

"Art. 1. The support of France is assured to the inhabitants of the Roman States. They regard the French army as a friendly one, come to aid in the defence of their territory.

"Art. 2. By arrangement with the Roman Government, and without in any way interfering in the administration of the country, the French army will occupy the outward cantonments most suitable for the purposes of defence and for the good health of the troops. Communications shall be free.

"Art. 3. The French Republic guarantees against all foreign invasion the territories occupied by its troops.

"Art. 4. It is understood that the present arrangement is to be submitted for ratification by the French Republic.

"Art. 5. In no case shall the effects of the present undertaking lapse until a fortnight after official communication of the note having been ratified.

"There appear only to be very slight changes in the wording of this project which can give rise to any objections. If this is so, all that remains to do is to settle the means and the form of the communication.

"It is impossible to select this evening a deputation of the Chamber to send to head-quarters, but we could arrange that the senator of Rome, Sturbinetti (president of the municipality), should form part of that which we would despatch to-morrow.

"The basis of the arrangement being agreed upon, we would proceed at once to the election of the plenipotentiaries, who would proceed to the camp to settle all details, such as the choice of cantonments, which would be the first result of the convention, and to invite the general in command and his staff to come and reside at Rome with a guard of honour.

(Signed) "J. MAZZINI, A. SAFFI, C. ARMELLINI."

We did not think it wise to fix in advance the number of men who should form the guard of the General; we merely agreed that, by the clause which established liberty of communications between the city and its outer cantonments, the General would be at liberty to let all the forces of his army, one after another, pass through the city.

I then had three copies of the convention drawn up, which were at once signed by the Triumvirs, with the assent of the Roman Assembly and the municipality. The General, to whom I read the proposed con-

vention, declared, directly I came to the question of cantonments, that he would not sign it. He refused to listen to any explanation, and as he spoke in a tone which I did not at all like, I was obliged to reply to him in a way which cut short the whole discussion. Being convinced that this project met all the necessities of the case quite as well as the previous one which he had approved of, and that in some particulars it was preferable to the other, it was impossible for me to give way, especially as I knew that it was General Oudinot's intention to take advantage of the rupture of negotiations and not wait for official orders from Paris; for I had no doubt whatever as to his being secretly in harmony with those members of our Government who belonged to the reactionary party. I bore in mind the vote of the 7th of May, which had led to my mission; I had just read over again the speech delivered by the President of the Council at the sitting of May 9th, according to which I was to be "the faithful and exact expression of the ideas of the Assembly and of those of the Government, with respect to the aim and character which the French expedition was to maintain to the very end and in spite of all eventualities whatsoever." I was acquainted with all the means of defence in the city, and I was certain that until we had received reinforcements and fresh material of war we could not carry it by assault; that the resistance would be prolonged and general. The further time I had spent in

Rome only confirmed me in the opinion which I had expressed on the 15th, the very day of my arrival. I saw that our Government was being entangled in the most deplorable manner, and I felt that, pending fresh instructions, it was our duty to conform to the telegraphic despatch of May 10th, which authorised our entering Rome, "if we were agreed with the inhabitants," and which permitted us to attack "if we were compelled to do so, and in the event only of having the fairest prospects of success."

Could I tear up my own agreement and dispense myself from submitting it to the consideration of my Government, which, after all, had *exclusively* instructed me to negotiate with the *Roman authorities* and to conclude partial arrangements with them?

In short, I considered that the essential thing to be done was to prevent an immediate and imprudent attack; that my provisional arrangement would at all events have the effect of suspending it for a few days, and of leaving Government the choice between peace and war. I had, moreover, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, by telegram on the 22nd, that if it had been resolved to adopt a line of policy differing from that which I considered to be the outcome of the vote of May 7th, I wished to be recalled.

Moved by these considerations, I determined not to be deterred by the opposition of General Oudinot. I signed in his presence and left on his table one of the three copies of the convention. I informed him that

I should send a second one to Paris by Colonel Lavelaine de Maubeuge, and that the third would remain in the hands of the Roman authorities. Returning to Rome the same night, I received the next morning (June 1) a letter from General Oudinot, protesting against the arrangement concluded with the city. The Triumvirate subsequently sent me a copy of a communication by which he declared that what I had done was null and of no effect. I replied that so far as concerned myself I adhered to the arrangement, subject to the ratification of my Government, and that I was about to start for Paris.

Subjoined are the documents relating to the final incidents of my mission.

“ROME, *June 1, 1849.*

“M. le Ministre,—My despatch of the 29th ult. was accompanied by a declaration, in the form of an ultimatum addressed by agreement with General Oudinot, to the Roman authorities. The result which I hoped for was attained ; nine hours before the expiry of the time fixed I received from the President of the Constituent Assembly and the members of the Municipality, composed of all the most distinguished men in Rome, very satisfactory replies, the Executive Power, which had been appointed to arrange with me, sending me at the same time a counter project. This document, upon the margin of which I at once

annotated my remarks, was of a character to be taken into consideration, and proved to me that the persons who a few days before were resolved to throw difficulties in the way of all attempts at conciliation were no longer masters of the situation. The accompanying documents and the verbal explanations which you will doubtless receive from Colonel de Maubeuge will show you the unexpected and to me very painful behaviour of General Oudinot, who has hampered my operations and was on the point of foiling them altogether. In spite of an opposition and of difficulties which I ought not to have had to meet, an arrangement has been come to between the Roman authorities and myself.

“I have the honour of sending to you one of the three original documents, of which a second is in the hands of the Triumvirate and a third in those of General Oudinot. You will observe that I have suppressed Article II. of the previous project, in which mention was made of the right of the Roman people to select their own form of government, a right which it would be hard for us to question, but the recognition of which, according to M. de Rayneval, had very considerably increased the susceptibilities felt at Gaëta. . . . My position at head-quarters would be as false as it would be at Rome. I therefore consider my mission as at an end, or at all events as being of necessity suspended, and I am about to make over to M. Gerando the supervision of the

interests of the French who are still in Rome. . . .
My preparations for starting will not take long, and
I shall follow close upon the bearer of this letter.
(Signed) "F. DE LESSEPS."

The Triumvirate to M. de Lesseps.

"ROME, May 30.

"Sir,—We have received the declaration of May 29th which you have done us the honour of addressing us. The Assembly, to whom a copy was also sent, having confirmed its original decision, which delegated us full powers to treat, it is for us to reply to you. We do so with all due speed. If we have not sooner answered your letter of the 26th, it was because, as it did not contain any proposal on the part of France, nor any reference to that which we had made to you, it did not seem to call for any urgent reply.

"We have carefully examined your declaration, and we append the modifications which we deem it our duty to submit to you. As you will at once see, they relate more to matters of form than of substance. We might say a good deal in advocacy of the changes which we propose—changes which, as we believe, are demanded not only by the nature of the mandate which we hold from the Assembly, but also by the clearly expressed wishes of our fellow-citizens, without whose assent no efficacious or definite agreement is possible. But time presses, and we must pass over details. We prefer to leave them to your good faith,

and to the lively sympathy which you have often expressed for our cause and its destinies. It is not, we can assure you, by diplomatic means that we can come to a mutual agreement, but by an appeal from people to people, frankly and cordially expressed, without mistrust as without afterthought. France, more than any other nation, is capable of hearing and understanding this appeal. This appeal for the cessation of an^{old} normal state of things, and one which, between the French Republic and us, especially after the declaration of your Assembly and the newly expressed sympathies of the French people for us, would, if continued, become absolutely incomprehensible, we now address to you for the last time, with all the force of conviction and desire which is in us. May you hold it sacred, sir, for it sums up the immovable convictions and ardent desires of a small but brave and honourable people, which has not forgotten its ancestors, which has not forgotten that they did something for the world, and which, fighting to-day for a sacred cause, that of its independence and liberty, is irrevocably resolved to follow in their footsteps. This people, sir, has the right to be understood by France, and to find in her a prop and not a hostile power. It has the right to expect from France *fraternity* and not *protection*, the demand for which would, at the present hour, be interpreted in Europe as a cry of distress, lowering it in its own eyes, and rendering it unworthy of the protection of France, upon which it

has always relied. Such a cry of distress ill becomes us. There is no such a thing as impotence for a people which knows how to die, and it would be ungenerous on the part of a great and proud nation to misinterpret the sentiment which inspires us.

“It is time, sir, that this state of things ended; it is time that fraternity ceased to be an idle word, with no practical results; it is time that our messengers, our troops, and our arms should be able to circulate without let or hindrance throughout the length and breadth of our territory. It is time that the Romans should no longer have to regard with suspicion the men whom they have been accustomed to treat as friends. It is time that we should be free to defend ourselves, with all our resources, against the Austrians who are bombarding our city.” It is time that there should be no mistake anywhere as to the good and loyal intentions of France. It is time that Europe should no longer be able to say that she deprives us of our means of defence, in order to force upon us by-and-bye a protection which would preserve for us our territorial integrity without preserving for us what is dearer to us by far, our honour and our liberty.

“Do that, sir, and many difficulties will be smoothed over, many sympathetic ties, now loosened, will be tightened once more, and France will have asserted her right of counsel amongst us far more effectual than by the apparent state of hostility which now subsists between us.

"The cantonments which, as well as we can judge, would be the most suitable, would be those upon the line which extends from Frascati to Villettri. The preamble of the declaration may very well be adopted as it stands.

(Signed) "The Triumvirs,
" *ARMELLINI, J. MAZZINI, and SAFFI.*"

The General in command wrote to me declining to co-operate. He did not communicate his fresh instructions to me, this being evidently the result of the change which had occurred in the policy of our Government, but he wrote to me on the evening of May 31st :—

"Your convention is opposed to the instructions which I have received. I will not give it my assent, and I am obliged to declare this to the Roman authorities. When the Ministry, after having received the communications conveyed to it through M. de la Tour d'Auvergne, shall have made known its intentions, I shall conform scrupulously to them. In the meanwhile, I regret that I cannot possibly act in concert with you.

(Signed) " *LOUDINOT.*"

My reply was as follows :—

" *ROME, June 1, 1849.*

" *Monsieur le Général en Chef*,—I have devotedly, and with much personal abnegation, followed the

directions which I received from the Government of the Republic. Upon the day when, in presence of many eye-witnesses, you created a scandalous scene which nothing but my *sang-froid* and calm resolve prevented from degenerating into personal violence, upon the day when, ignoring me altogether, you gave your commanders of corps orders to commence hostilities all of a sudden and under cover of the night, my mind was made up beyond the possibility of change. I left with you the day before yesterday, at 8 A.M., and at 3 P.M., and yesterday at 6 A.M., three notes, copies of which I am also forwarding to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These documents will show that, anticipating your projects, I had called upon you not to put them into execution. You imagined that as I had addressed an ultimatum to the Roman authorities, the declaration I made to you that my mission was at an end and that hostilities might recommence at the expiry of the time named, was absolute and independent of any fresh incident which might arise. But I stated to you in due time, and I here repeat, that nine hours before the time named (twenty-four hours) had expired the Roman authorities had replied to our ultimatum; that they had sent me a counter project, which the plainest common sense, the elementary principles of diplomacy, and, above all, the dictates of humanity, made it incumbent for us to take into consideration.

“You could scarcely find time to cast your eyes

over this paper, or over the letters of the Municipality of Rome, the President of the Constituent Assembly, and of the Roman Executive Power. You sent me back the correspondence by your chief aide-de-camp, M. d'Espivent, who told me that you were too busy to read it carefully ; you afterwards convoked Generals Vaillant, Regnault St. Jean d'Angely, Mollière, the chief commissioner of the army, and the chief of your staff, Colonel de Tirion. In their presence, and notwithstanding your loud talk and threatening gestures, I quietly read all my documents as well as my notes of the day which I had addressed to you. As my representations were useless, and as I formally refused to associate myself with your project for a night attack without previously warning the Roman authorities—an act which would have perhaps led to the massacre of the French colony in Rome—I withdrew. I am desirous of placing on record here the fact that all the persons present at the meeting treated the official representative of the Republic with the utmost courtesy.

“Upon reflection, and in compliance with the urgent and enlightened advice tendered you, you decided at the eleventh hour to recall your order for the resumption of hostilities. But these orders did not arrive in time to prevent the occupation of Monte Mario, where you met with no resistance, because I had had time to let the authorities in Rome know through my secretary, M. Leduc, that there was no

cause for alarm, your movements being merely made to anticipate the foreign armies which were marching on Rome from seizing these positions. But for this and for my return to Rome the tocsin would have been sounded, the garrison and the population of the city, down even to the women of the Trastevere armed with their knives, would have mounted to the assault of Monte Mario. I feel sure that our brave soldiers would have held their own, but the consequences of an attack and of a desperate assault would have gone straight to the heart of our country.

“Having left head-quarters after I had handed you my last note, and having my eyes thoroughly open to the objections to the immediate entrance of the French army into Rome, where you would probably have compromised the interests which it is my duty to forward, I drew up of myself a fresh draft of agreement, entirely in conformity with the directions which I had received from the French Government. This project, adopted after some discussion by the executive power, has been approved, with only three dissenting votes, by the Constituent Assembly.

“I handed to you, before signing it, a copy accompanied by a declaration, first communicating to you my instructions of May 8th.

“With regard to your declaration that you will consider as null and of no effect the arrangement duly signed yesterday by the executive power and myself, it will be for our Government to decide, and, in accord-

ing with usage, you will not be at liberty to infringe it in any way pending its ratification or non-ratification.

(Signed) "F. DE LESSEPS."

"P.S.—The Triumvirate has forwarded to me a copy of the letter which you addressed them this morning with their reply. The step which you have taken is a deplorable one, because it makes public a difference of opinion as to which our Government was the sole judge, and which for the present should have remained a private matter between ourselves."

General Oudinot to the Triumvirs.

"May 31, 1849.

"Gentlemen,—I had the honour of informing you this morning that I accepted, so far as regarded myself, the ultimatum which was transmitted to you on the 29th by M. de Lesseps.

"To my great surprise, M. de Lesseps, upon his return from Rome, brought me a species of convention completely opposed to the basis and spirit of the ultimatum. I am convinced that in signing it he has exceeded his powers.

"The instructions which I have received from my Government formally prevent me from associating myself with this last proceeding, which I regard of no effect, and it is my duty to inform you of this without delay.

(Signed) "OUDINOT DE REGGIO."

The Triumvirs to General Oudinot.

“ROME, June 1.

“Monsieur le Général,—We have this moment received, with surprise and regret, your despatch of May 31st.

“The difference of opinion between the General in command and the Minister Plenipotentiary of France was not an event for which we could be prepared ; and as this difference of opinion arises with regard to a convention the spirit of which is in entire harmony with the explicit aspirations which recently emanated from the French Assembly and with the well-grounded sympathies of your nation, it is a very deplorable occurrence, and one which may result in the gravest consequences, the responsibility for which does not rest with us.

“We hope that in the material interests of Rome, as in the moral interests of France, this difference of opinion will speedily disappear.

“For the Triumvirate,

(Signed)

“JOSEPH MAZZINI.”

I replied as follows to the Triumvirate :—

“June 1, 10 A.M.

“Gentlemen,—In reply to yours of this morning, containing General Oudinot’s letter and your reply, I have the honour to inform you that I adhere to the arrangement signed yesterday, and that I am starting

for Paris in order to get it ratified. This arrangement was concluded by virtue of the instructions which charged me to devote myself "exclusively to the negotiations and relations which it might be desirable to establish with the Roman authorities and people."

(Signed) "F. DE LESSEPS."

I consequently informed the Minister of Foreign affairs that, in consequence of what had occurred, my position would be a false one at head-quarters, that it would be equally so at Rome, and that I must therefore consider my mission as ended, or at all events as in abeyance.

I was already making my preparations for a start when M. de Gerando, the Chancellor of the French Embassy at Rome, handed me in an open envelope, upon behalf of the chief of the staff of the French army, a telegraphic despatch thus worded from the Minister of Foreign Affairs:—

"PARIS, *May 29, 1849, 4 P.M.*"

"The Government of the Republic has put a stop to your mission. You will be good enough to start upon your return to France as soon as you have received this despatch."

The orders of the Government found me ready to

execute them without delay, and, leaving Rome at 3 P.M., June 1st, I reached Paris at five in the morning of the 5th.

M. de Tocqueville had succeeded M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and upon my calling to see him at his own residence, he told me that he had not had time to read my correspondence, and that he was not very well up in the Roman question. I placed myself at his disposal for all the information which he might desire. Neither M. Odilon Barrot, who before my departure had said to me, at the time of the Assembly passing the resolution which condemned the attack upon Rome, "You will have to get us out of this dilemma, we reckon on you," nor any member of the Government had expressed a desire to hear what I had to say. Silence was necessary for them, in order to get through the interval between the National and the Legislative Assembly, in which the reactionary party was to have a majority, and the Prince-President, who was already preparing for his *coup d'etat*, received me with his customary good nature, his sympathy for Italy, and a show of indifference for our internal situation. He none the less countersigned, in order to maintain the silence which had been agreed upon concerning Rome, the decree for the examination of my conduct by the Council of State, by virtue of Art. 99 of the Constitution, which subjected to the jurisdiction of that body the high functionaries of the State in certain predetermined cases, of which mine was the

only one. This article was not included in the future constitutions.

The Government never informed me of what they had to complain in my conduct; but M. Odilon Barrot, who made everything subservient to his keeping himself in power, completely eluded the question upon which he had to give a reply. For what had he to answer, if it was not to explain the sudden recall of the agent charged with negotiating with the Romans, and the order for our troops to enter Rome by force.

Instead of giving the hitherto concealed motives for these two decisions arrived at on May 29th, the President of the Council diverted the debate into another channel, and in order to escape from embarrassing questions he attacked my treaty of the 31st, which was not concluded until two days after the order for my recall. It must be remembered that the telegraphic despatch of May 29th, containing the order for my recall, reached head-quarters twelve hours after the signature of my convention, and that General Oudinot could not have availed himself of it, as falsely asserted by M. Odilon Barrot to justify his refusal to adhere to the convention. Nor must it be forgotten that the date of May 29th marked the change from the Constituent to the Legislative Assembly.

It appears necessary for me, in the interests of

historical truth, to sum up and refute the principal heads of complaint urged by M. Odilon Barrot.

1st. The provisional arrangement of May 31st compromised the honour of France and the dignity of our arms. M. Barrot blamed me for having placed France in a compromising position, and this in face of the statement of facts which I have just made—viz., that I was careful from first to last to reserve the full liberty of the Government, and that I scrupulously avoided pledging it to a share in the work which I believed to be in the interests of France both as regards the present and the future.

The treaty of May 29th only became binding if ratified by the Government. If I had been over-zealous it was easy to refuse ratification.

But in what respect was this treaty open to the severe criticism to which it was subjected? I need not make any secret now, as I had to do forty years ago, of the unvarying idea which served as a rule to all my actions, in the discharge of a mission which I had not solicited.

When, on leaving for Rome, I had put into my hands, as my main guiding point, the *Moniteur* of May 8th, which contained the resolution voted by the Assembly, I supposed—and I could not but suppose—that I was sent to carry out the wishes of the Assembly.

When the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prince President of the Republic gave me their final

verbal instructions, there was nothing to show (nor if there had been should I have consented to do so) that I was not meant to take into serious account the resolutions of a sovereign authority, resolutions which I had heard discussed in advance, and the spirit of which was perfectly familiar to me. I may take this opportunity of adding that, from the time of my departure till my recall, I received no fresh instructions, nor a word in reply to the telegrams in which I asked for a simple *yes* or *no* as to the measures which I suggested—nothing, in short, which could modify the inspiration by which my course of conduct was guided.

Was I sent to Rome to insist upon the Romans opening the gates to our army, under pain, in the event of their refusal, of seeing their houses devastated and their fellow-citizens decimated by the sword? It is evident that I was sent to come to an understanding with a population which we regarded as having lost its head, to bring together parties which, irritated by recent occurrences, could not act of themselves. There was no suggestion that I should facilitate a surprise or provoke a struggle, but what I had to do was to give the Romans a proof of our disinterestedness and friendship. I went to Rome to make the inhabitants feel that they would do well to place themselves under the protection of France and escape from all the consequences of reaction by accepting our support. The honour of our flag was

not dependent upon our occupying Rome at a given date and at the hour we saw proper to fix ; but what we had to do was to be on the watch for, and if necessary prevent, the entry of foreign troops, and be ready to succour a friendly people should danger threaten it. Can the honour of a nation like France be banished because she treats considerably a city which she wishes to take under her protection ?

In the state in which I found Rome there were two courses open, either to have recourse to force, trampling my instructions under foot and being untrue to the national will ; or to do as I did, and, by standing in the way of an imminent conflict, arrest the unfortunate events which have since occurred there.

2nd. The negotiations ought not to have been resumed after the collective declaration of May 30th. I think that I have explained clearly enough in the above narrative of facts how I was led to resume negotiations after the reception of another project presented within the dates fixed by the ultimatum, and how the drafting of my agreement, which was the logical outcome of my instructions and of the circumstances in which I was placed, seemed to me to meet the difficulties which met me on every side.

It may not be out of place to mention here that the telegraphic order for my recall of May 29th had not reached General Oudinot on the 30th, and that the cause of it could not have been this treaty, which

the Ministry did not know of until the 6th of June.

3rd. My negotiations had facilitated the re-victualling of the city. From the beginning of the armistice until the 1st of June, General Oudinot did not allow the city to be revictualled. Communication was free at the points occupied by the French posts only for unarmed persons provided with proper safe-conducts and for small quantities of provisions. Several French merchants sent me a petition asking me to authorise their fetching from Civita Vecchia season goods over which they would incur serious loss if their sale was delayed. I communicated their petition to the General, who refused to do as they asked.

4th. I am accused of having unnecessarily kept the troops inactive. It is quite clear that my mission as a negotiator did not admit of my engaging in hostilities, and that if the troops had been ready to attack they would have had to wait. But I maintain that they were not in a position to undertake the siege when I reached head-quarters on the 15th of May, which reduces the period of my negotiations to a fortnight and not to a month as has been stated. During this time the French troops did not remain inactive, and the preparations for a siege were not suspended for an hour. A large number of fascines were made every day, and movements which excited the apprehensions of the Roman populations

and often hampered me in my intercourse with the authorities were constantly being carried out. The bridge of boats on the Lower Tiber was being got ready, and it was thrown across the river previous to the rupture of negotiations, though it interrupted all communication between Rome and the sea by water, and though, by closing the passage to fishermen's boats, it deprived a portion of the population of their means of livelihood.

A *tête-de-pont* was being constructed on the left bank of the Tiber, and troops were sent there, although this point had not been occupied at the commencement of the armistice; the large church and convent of St. Paul, which are still nearer to the city, were also seized. Thus the time which I spent in negotiating was not lost to the army, and, what is still more to the point, the reinforcements which the Government had on the 10th of May telegraphed to General Oudinot to await had not yet arrived when I reached Civita Vecchia. A letter of June 18th gives this explanation of the delay in the siege which assuredly could not be attributed to me after my departure.

5th. It is said that the armistice gave time to all the men who disturb Italy to assemble in Rome and form an army which now confronts us.

“The forces which were defending Rome did not increase during my stay there as alleged by the President of the Council. At the end of my negotia-

tions they were the same as they had been at the beginning, and if the delay in attacking has been of advantage to either side, it has notoriously been so to the French forces.

Not a single foreigner joined the Roman army during my stay, and those who had been there before I came consisted simply of some twenty Frenchmen, a few Germans, and from 150 to 200 Poles, who expressed to me *in writing* their desire to quit Rome rather than join in hostilities against France, and to go wherever we might see fit to send them.

With regard to the Italians of states other than the Romagna, are they to be considered as strangers to the cause for which Rome is struggling? In any event, it would be absurd to attach much importance to them in a city which contains 30,000 regular soldiers, and a whole population in arms ready to offer the most desperate resistance. I had already informed the Government of these facts by a despatch dated May 16th, and I had specially instructed MM. de Forbin-Janson and de la Tour d'Auvergne to confirm their tenour.

6th. I should have stipulated for the occupation of Rome, as the only means of holding a high tone with the foreign armies which were advancing.

Is it fair, is it reasonable to reproach me with not having insisted, as the *sine quâ non* of any agreement, upon a clause for the occupation of Rome, when M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared in the sitting of

May 7th, not only that he had not given orders for the attack upon Rome, but that he "had only authorised the march upon Rome on the condition of no serious resistance being offered, or of our being appealed to by the population at large"?

Can there be any more flagrant contradiction than that which is involved in this utterance, and the order given to attack and seize Rome before the result of our negotiations could be known?

Lastly, was it possible for us to have mingled without restriction with the Roman population and garrison, while preserving a mixed and expectant attitude, in conformity with the object of the expedition and that of my mission?

The permanent occupation of Rome by our troops was not indicated either directly or indirectly by my instructions as an indispensable element of the conciliation which I was instructed to bring about. It exposed us to countless difficulties. The Roman authorities have incessantly declared in their notes, as I have pointed out, that they could not agree to it so long as we had not recognised their Republic and the powers by which it was governed.

As to the "firm and resolute" language which our army was to have employed, when it had once taken possession of Rome, I do not know upon what such an idea is founded. If we had entered Rome after having destroyed the Republic, we should have had no need to have employed that tone to any one, for we

should have begun by doing what the Austrians, Spaniards, and Neapolitans would have liked to do. If, upon the other hand, we had made our entry under the cover of treaties, and in promising to maintain a National Government of some kind (either the old or the new), to uphold the laws of the country, and respect the free will of the inhabitants, I would ask whether war with Austria might not have resulted from a situation of this kind, in the event of the Imperial troops advancing beneath the walls of Rome occupied by our army and manifesting their intention of restoring the temporal power of the Pope upon the lines indicated by the Court of Gaëta.

The outer cantonments of the city occupying healthy and strong positions, the possibility of the General in command residing upon the French properties at Monte Pincio, and bringing into the city, one after the other, the whole of his army corps, which indeed the population would have clamoured for the day my convention was signed ; these, surely, were conditions which satisfied the aim of the expedition, while satisfying the military honour of the army and the *amour propre* of the General. What has an opposite policy done for us, and what embarrassments has it not in store for us ?

7th. The last project agreed to by General Oudinot would have been met with the jeers and murmurings of the Roman Assembly, so that I ought not to have pursued the negotiations further.

It is not accurate to say that General Oudinot's project would have been so received, and if it had been I should have broken off the negotiations instantaneously.

I have more than once shown, in the course of twenty-three years' service abroad, that I am neither patient nor slow of speech when the honour and dignity of my country are concerned.

* * * * *

I have mentioned above, in reply to complaint No. 5, that I had specially charged MM. de Forbin-Janson and de la Tour d'Auvergne to communicate to the Government the exact position of the Roman army. With regard to the latter, he was at this time a *débutant* in diplomacy. I had taken a great liking for him on account of his distinction and ability, and I foretold that his career would be a brilliant one. I did not see him again for twenty years, when he was ambassador in London during the period of my struggle with Lord Palmerston on the Suez Canal question.* One evening after dinner he admitted to me that on his return to Paris from Rome M. Drouyn de Lhuys questioned him a good deal about me, and asked him if he had not noticed that I was rather flighty. He confessed, with some confusion, that he had answered in the affirmative, little suspecting to what use the

* Note of the Translator.—Twenty years after 1849 would bring us to 1869, the year in which the Suez Canal was opened, while Lord Palmerston died in 1865. But M. de Lesseps does not intend to be taken too literally.

Minister would put his answer, which was a perfectly innocent one, and related to a conversation which we had during one of our visits to the monuments of Rome. "You see," I said to him, "all these fine palaces which are now unoccupied: in twenty years' time they will be the refuge places of all the petty sovereigns of Italy." Brought up by his brother, the cardinal, in the ideas of the previous century, the young man had taken my remark as the sign of a diseased imagination. It was on this account, no doubt, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after his betrayal of me, endeavoured to make people believe that I was off my head. The story got about among the clerks of the Foreign Office, and upon my return to France it was mentioned in print by the *Siècle*. I at once wrote to the manager of that paper, M. Chambolle, to ask him what he meant, and he at once contradicted the report in very proper terms. I went at once to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and met M. Drouyn de Lhuys as he was leaving his room after handing over the conduct of affairs to M. de Tocqueville. I met him on the stairs, and as I looked him straight in the face he hastily ascended to the next story and entered the bureau occupied by my brother. After seeing M. de Tocqueville, who informed him that he had not yet made himself familiar with the Roman question, I proceeded to the Elysée, where the Prince President greeted me very kindly; but while on the day of my departure he spoke his mind freely as to the revolutionists who had embraced the same cause

which he had served in his youth—viz. in 1831, when his elder brother died of fever under the walls of Rome—he this time spoke of the obstinacy of the Roman Court, to which he attributed the impossibility of anything like conciliation. He appeared to me very uneasy as to the position of his Government, placed between the cross fire of two irreconcilable parties—the Reactionists and the party of the Mountain under Ledru-Rollin. I felt convinced from that hour that the President was preparing to combat them both.

I was not, therefore, surprised when I saw soon after the walls of Paris covered with bills announcing the invasion of the Chamber by the troops, the flight of Ledru-Rollin after the affray at the Arts-et-Métiers, and the arrest of several deputies.

Holding aloof, as I have always done, from the internal dissensions of my country, I awaited quietly at home the decisions which might be come to with regard to myself, and the *Moniteur* shortly afterwards published a decree which, by virtue of Art. 99 of the Constitution, referred to the Council of the State the examination of my mission to Rome.

The Ministry which had entrusted me, in a very critical phase of its own existence, with a mission bristling with difficulties, and which had so readily abandoned me without deigning even to examine my action, had not only countenanced attacks upon me, but had itself attacked me from the national tribune while I maintained a complete silence, and before the Council

of the State had had time to commence its work. I had only at the last moment availed myself of my right of defence, and I had done so in a memorandum addressed to the Council of State. I had spoken with the reserve, moderation, and sincerity which becomes a man who, out of respect for himself and for public opinion, does not choose to imitate his enemies. But it was thought that even thus I was taking too much upon myself, and my independence was denounced as an infringement of discipline, while as the plain statement of facts stripped bare the policy by which I had had the bad grace not to allow myself to be crushed, fresh blows were aimed at me during the sittings of the Legislative Assembly on the 6th and 7th of August.

At the sitting of the 7th, M. de Falloux endeavoured to cast doubts upon the value to be attached to my statement as to the nature of the resistance which Rome could offer, and as to the presence there of more than 25,000 regular soldiers. These figures, which I had given as far back as the 15th of May, the day of my arrival, had been communicated to me by General Oudinot after his entering the city.

I learnt that it was proposed, at whose instigation I knew not, to retard as much as possible, or perhaps adjourn *sine die*, my appearance before the Council. But on the 9th of July I wrote to M. Vivien, the President, demanding the execution of the decree, and he replied to me, but not till the 20th, that the

legislative section was ready to hear the case, and he requested me to present my defence.

M. Boulay de la Meurthe, Vice-President of the Republic, after having made a semi-official effort to induce me to abandon the cause and failed, announced to me on the 28th that the legislative section would assemble on the 30th to hear my verbal explanations.

The sitting opened at midday. When President Vivien had explained the object of it, I asked him before entering upon the case to inform me if the Ministry had explained the motives which had induced it to submit the examination of my mission to the Council of State, and if the latter had set forth any special accusation of which I could be asked to clear myself. I said that I had thought that Art. 99 of the Constitution, adopted by virtue of the principle of the responsibility of Government servants, could only apply to my case if there existed some definite fact which involved my responsibility, and which was outside the competency of my natural judge, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In that case, I could admit the competency of the Council of State, and though its forms of jurisdiction were not well defined, I should submit myself to its judgment in all confidence, in order to publicly crush all the calumnies spread about to my disadvantage, and to establish that the motives of my conduct were above all reproach. The answer made me was that the Council of State had not been called upon to give its

opinion as to any allegation of wrong done; that it was merely instructed to examine my conduct, that it was not constituted into a tribunal, and that, so far as it was concerned, there was neither accuser nor accused. I did not insist any further, and merely observed that as the Minister of Foreign Affairs had not made any definite allegation of a kind to involve the responsibility of his agent to a tribunal, it seemed to me strange that he should have had recourse to the Council of State to decide whether I had discharged my duties well or badly. I added that, without disrespect to the councillors of the State, it might be held that they were not in a position to judge of a diplomatic negotiation, especially as they did not summon witnesses or hear counsel, and as they take no account of what they have styled "outward circumstances and external commentaries."

This matter having been discussed, the President read out the instructions which had been handed to me on the 8th of May by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. M. Vivien and myself both of us pointed out in the same breath, that in the copy communicated by the Ministry there was a phrase which was not to be found in the instructions which I have given at page 14 of this chapter. The phrase inserted was as follows: "Everything which will hasten the end of a *régime* destined by the force of events to perish."

I at once submitted to the Council the *original* of my instructions, signed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys,

and which I was following as the document communicated by the Minister was being read. The members of the Council, to all of whom it was passed, were able to see for themselves that this phrase was not embodied in them. Thereupon I myself caused the sitting to be adjourned, and wrote the next day the following letter to the President of the Council of State, M. Boulay de la Meurthe :—

“ PARIS, *July 31, 1849.*

“ Monsieur le President,—On leaving the Council of State yesterday, I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ascertained from M. Viel-Castel, the director of the political department, that the minute of the ministerial despatch of the 8th of May, containing the instructions relative to my mission to Rome, agreed in every detail with the copy which was handed to me before my departure from Paris and which I showed to the members of the legislative section. I shall be obliged if you will communicate this fact to the Councillors, who will form their opinion as to the circumstances under which an important phrase was inserted in the copy certified and communicated by the Ministry. This phrase was, to my mind, very conclusive, as it might of itself alone have served as a base to the system which was designed to prove that my conduct was inconsistent with my instructions.

(Signed)

“ F. DE LESSEPS.”

At the second sitting of the Council of State, replying to an examination which lasted four hours, I pointed out how impartially I had judged the internal situation of Rome, free as I was from all political preoccupation or influences. For, in truth, happening to be in Paris a very few days after my return from Madrid, and being about to accept the legation at Berne, I should not have agreed to undertake the temporary mission to Italy unless I had had a well-defined object placed before me, and if I had had to deal all of a sudden with questions which I had not had time to prepare myself for. All that I had, as I considered, to do was to prevent a renewal of hostilities between the French army and the Romans, and to avoid the recurrence of a misunderstanding similar to that of April 30, which had created so painful a sensation in France. To bring about a suspension of hostile demonstrations upon either side, to prevent, pending further orders, a bloody collision which neither the Ministry nor the National Assembly then desired, to ascertain what fresh events had taken place since April 30, to see that I did not involve or allow any one else to involve my Government definitely either in war or peace until it had had time to be informed of how things stood and could decide for itself, and not to recognise but not to destroy by force of arms the Roman Republic, such were the points to which I was told to direct my attention when I started from Paris.

As I stated to the Council, the Government was so far from intending to attack Rome with our troops, and was so anxious to follow a conciliatory course, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself introduced me in his own drawing-room to the envoy of the Roman Republic, Signor Accursi, a member of the Constituent Assembly, who had recently been Minister of the Interior under the Triumvirate. He proposed that we should travel together to Toulon, a suggestion which I deemed it inadvisable to accept. It was then agreed that he should go to Toulon alone and embark upon the first vessel sailing for Civita Vecchia. Finally, during the last few days of my stay in Rome, I received a visit from an Italian who brought me a note in M. Drouyn de Lhuys's own handwriting, because, the note said, he was a friend of Mazzini and might help to effect a settlement. In order to let the Council of State know what impressions I had derived during the early part of my sojourn at Rome, and of the view, fully justified by events, which I took of the situation, I read to them extracts from my journal kept from day to day. One of these extracts, dated May 15—19, contained the following passage:—

“The city is in arms, barricades and defensive works are being erected in all directions. The resistance will be a very general one. The English Consul, who has resided in Rome for thirty years, has shown me his despatches to Lord Palmerston. He is of the same opinion as myself.

“The captain of an American man-of-war, who has visited all the defensive works, has told me that it would require twenty thousand men at the least to take Rome, and after a regular siege.

“Lord Napier and the captain of the *Bulldog*, an English war vessel, are of the same opinion.”

* * * * *

I learnt that the day after I had appeared before the Council of State the Duc d'Harcourt, ambassador to the Pope, who had been called to give evidence, insisted that all diplomatic action would be made impossible if the conduct adopted in regard to me was to prevail, and that he expressed himself in the most favourable terms towards me, asking how any one could have thought of blaming me for occurrences of which he had been an eye-witness, and of which he was better able than any one else to form an opinion, though he and I were not always agreed. The evidence of so competent a witness was of great weight, but there is no reference to it in the report of the Council of State,* to which I made the following reply:—

“The theory of the infallibility of the instructions given to an agent, inaugurated by the report of the Council of State, upsets all the ideas hitherto current in diplomacy, converts an agent intrusted with a mission into an automaton deprived of all initiative,

* Note of the Translator.—M. de Lesseps does not give the report of the Council of State, though he states (see page 118) that it was adverse to him.

and rivets him to a chain which would prevent him from executing any movement in all the circumstances which had not been foreseen or literally explained by his Government.

“In my own case I still maintain, despite the opinion of the Council, that I have not acted contrary to the letter or spirit of my instructions; but before attempting to prove it, by challenging the fundamental errors of the report, I must take up the defence of the true principles, by contrasting the views held by M. Martens with the doctrine propounded in the following paragraph:—

“‘The instructions of the Government are in no case to be attenuated, extended, or modified by the aid of outward circumstances or external commentaries not forming part of them; all the rules of hierarchy and of responsibility would be set at naught if this principle was not strictly followed, and the Council of State would be wanting in its duty if it did not scrupulously adhere to the same.’

“Not only did M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself take a contrary view (see his instructions of May 8th, at page 14), but M. Martens, in his ‘*Manuel Diplomatique*,’ vol. i. p. 131, says, ‘Even when the course which a diplomatic agent is to follow and his political actions are traced for him in his instructions, and his duty obliges him to conform to them, there are, however, cases in which the orders he has received are such that the execution of them would produce an effect

opposed to the views of his superior, and detrimental to the interests of his country. In a case of this kind, and assuming that the diplomatic agent, having the aim of his mission clearly before him, should be thoroughly convinced that in obeying the orders he had received he would be running directly counter to this aim, he might, and perhaps ought, to take it upon himself to suspend the execution of them, losing no time in informing his Minister of what he has done, and in giving reasons to justify his conduct.

“‘Moreover, his responsibility is not determined by the concessions which he may make, nor by the exigencies which he may insist upon, and the extent of which is laid down for him in his instructions; his main duty consists in doing what is best to the utmost of his ability.’

“The reporter of the Council of State declares that my letter of instructions should have been my sole guide, and, while blaming me for putting my own interpretation upon it, its meaning is so far from being clear to him, when it has not the light of external commentaries to guide him, that he has to preface it with a preamble of the political intentions which he attributes to the Government, and that he has to comment upon them, to make extracts from them, and recast them, so to speak, in order to draw from them any positive meaning to support his own views. And I am to be blamed for having regarded as serious and binding the formal engagements entered into by the

Government, with the majority of a sovereign Assembly! But if the Minister for Foreign Affairs had at the time an *arrière-pensée*, which I will not even now do him the injustice of supposing, was I the man to accept, in view of a wretched personal interest, a mission the object of which was to do the very opposite of what my country had the right to expect of me after the public statements made from the tribune?

“ My instructions authorised me in so many words to be ‘guided by circumstances,’ so how can it be argued that they limit me within the hard and fast lines of the despatch of May 8th? Are the subsequent utterances of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, M. Odilon Barrot, and the President of the Republic to go for nothing? Is the speech of M. Barrot (President of the Council) on the 9th of May, announcing my departure and the object of my mission in conformity with the vote of the 7th, of no value in the eyes of the Council? Then in that case the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered on May 22nd, should be erased from the official record of the Assembly, when he said: ‘As to the Roman expedition, it has been the subject of two debates. The second was a very recent one; the Government explained the object of the expedition; the Assembly expressed its views and made known its decrees, and an agent was at once sent to Rome and to head-quarters. *He took with him as his instructions the report of the debate in*

this Assembly, and he has been instructed to shape his course in conformity with it.'

"Thus, even excluding from consideration the unquestioned principles which I have just referred to, it has been admitted by the official declaration of the Minister who signed the despatch of May 8th, containing my letter of instructions, that this letter was not to be my sole rule of conduct, that the aim of my mission was collaterally indicated by the *outside circumstances*, such as those which occurred in the course of my mission to Rome, or by the *external commentaries*, such as the votes of April 16th and May 7th, and the ministerial undertakings bearing upon them. The nature of these undertakings is very clearly indicated by the speeches of M. Odilon Barrot, the President of the Council, both at the sittings of April 6th and May 7th, and again on June 9th, upon all three of which occasions he explicitly declares that the French expedition under General Oudinot was not sent with any intention of attacking the Roman Republic, of entering the city by force, or of restoring the rule of the Pope.

"The reporter of the Council admits that the discussions in the National Assembly do not in any way invalidate the character of my instructions, but he nevertheless asserts that all I had to concern myself with was what related to the entry of the (French) troops into Rome and with the special conventions calculated to secure it.

“The pretended necessity of having Rome occupied, despite the opposition of the Roman Assembly, the authorities, and the inhabitants, was not so much as referred to in my instructions, and it was in opposition with the statements of the Minister in the Chamber. Be this as it may, the reporter, taking as his starting point the principle of an entry, by force if necessary, into Rome, encompasses me within the circle which he has seen fit to trace, and beyond the limits of which I was not, according to him, to have stepped.

“The report charges that my first proposals did not produce any immediate effect, and that they underwent modifications. Inasmuch as I was instructed to treat, and as in all negotiations there are several contracting parties whose interests are different from one another, I could not, from the very outset, force my own views upon those with whom I was treating. I could not but admit the presentation of counter projects, discuss them, and be led perhaps, either by force of conviction or by the urgency of circumstances, to make concessions.

“The reporter blames me for not having shown sufficient consideration for the susceptibilities of the Papal Court at Gaëta. This is a question which the Council of State could not possibly have sufficient data for discussing; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in laying it down in my instructions, had certainly no idea of fixing any particular limit. The

susceptibilities in question had been excited in regard to us long before my mission by the very principle of our expedition, which had been undertaken without the Holy Father having first had it notified to him; by the maintenance of the Italian tricolour, which we had allowed to float side by side with ours at Civita Vecchia until after the capture of Rome; by the first proclamations of General Oudinot; by the expulsion from Civita Vecchia of the three commissioners appointed to represent there the interests of the Holy See; and by the telegraphic despatch addressed to General Oudinot as well as to myself, and beginning, ‘Inform the Romans that we do not intend to act with the Neapolitans *against them*.’ This despatch evoked accusations of treachery against us from Gaëta as well as from the staff of the King of Naples, who had already arrived almost within sight of Rome, and who lost no time in raising his camp and hurrying back to the frontiers of his kingdom. It will be seen that the very principle of my mission, aggravated by circumstances for which personally I was in no degree responsible, was a permanent cause of irritation at Gaëta. I could not take a step without incurring to some extent the reproach which the report of the Council seems to admit as more or less well-founded, but there was no help for it.

“The report says that I expressly disobeyed my instructions:—

"1st. In lending myself to acts which gave the Roman authorities a moral sanction.

"2nd. In placing myself at variance with MM. d'Harcourt and de Rayneval.

"3rd. In making arrangements which were not partial, inasmuch as I had only to concern myself with what related to the entry of the (French) troops into Rome, and the special conventions calculated to secure that end."

"To this I reply :—

"1st. Was the Council of State in a measure to judge how far my action gave any moral force to the Roman authorities? The Council could know no more as to this than as to the susceptibilities of Gaëta. So far as I am concerned, I am convinced that I have done nothing to deserve such an imputation, and the details given in my memorandum should have sufficed to show that this was so. But, after all, did not my instructions authorise me, in so many words, 'to devote myself exclusively to the negotiations and the relations which it might be desirable to establish with the Roman authorities and inhabitants, and to come to terms with the men at this moment (May 8th) invested with power in the Roman States. I have carefully avoided going beyond the line I have laid down for myself, and it is a well-ascertained fact I have not recognised the Republic, the name of which does not appear in any of my agreements. It is a principle of diplomacy that the relations between the various

Powers and the *de facto* authorities of a foreign country do not necessarily imply the recognition of that authority.

“2nd. My instructions directed me, *save in urgent circumstances*, to act in concert with MM. d’Harcourt and de Rayneval, but they did not make it compulsory upon me to be, at all times and upon all points, in agreement with them, nor to follow absolutely their advice if I deemed it opposed to the aim of my mission, which was different from theirs. MM. d’Harcourt and de Rayneval, whose competence is undeniable, had quite understood this themselves. They would only have had the right to be exacting in regard to me if they had obtained from the Holy See something in the shape of liberal declarations of policy, and if their efforts had not, as M. d’Harcourt so clearly foresaw that they would, been counteracted by the reactionary tendencies of the Papal Court. It was for each of us to give his opinion to the Government, with whom it remained to examine and settle the question in the last resort, and give its orders accordingly. Indeed, M. de Rayneval wrote to me on May 28th: ‘You have appealed to the supreme judgment of the Government; it is only right to await its decision.’ The Minister of Foreign Affairs took the same view, for when I asked him, on the eve of my departure from Paris, for explanations as to the passage in my instructions which bore upon my relations with MM. d’Harcourt and de Rayneval, he replied to

me, in the presence of M. de Viel-Castel, now my colleague in the French Academy,* 'Send them duplicates of your despatches.'

"3rd. I have already said that there was not a word in my instructions which bade me concern myself with arranging 'special conventions calculated to secure the entry (of the French troops) into Rome.' Consequently, according to the system laid down by M. Vivien, by which one should do nothing not expressly laid down in the instructions, I ought not to have proposed that our troops should enter Rome. Nevertheless, I did so several times; and even in connection with the arrangement of May 31st, I have shown in my memorandum how we might have gained a very important position inside the city, and how we should have been asked to come in a very short time by the inhabitants themselves. Specially authorised, quite independently of my instructions, to conclude *partial arrangements* with the Roman authorities, I abstained from touching upon the principal question, viz. that of the relations between the Pope and the Romans. The Council of State regards me as exclusively responsible for the first projects of arrangement proposed in concert with General Oudinot, inasmuch as in condemning these proposals it blames me alone; but it is inconsistent to reproach me with having signed the provisional agreement of May 31st, in spite of the opposition of the General, whose

* M. de Viel-Castel died October 6th, 1887.

responsibility was not so deeply engaged as mine, and whose co-operation I was not bound to accept."

It will have been gathered by what I have said that the Council of State had not taken into consideration at all the circumstances which had led to my mission, or those in which I was placed during my mission; my correspondence with the Minister of Foreign Affairs; or the information which I supplied him with, and which gave him the opportunity of sketching for me the policy he deemed best; the absence of any reply, any order, instruction, or indication, from the time of my arrival in Italy till my departure from Civita Vecchia on June 1st; or of the change of policy which suddenly occurred in Paris on May 29th, when the Legislative succeeded the Constituent Assembly. By virtue of Article 99 of the Constitution of 1848, the Government remitted the examination of my conduct to the Council of State, and secured "for reasons of State" a vote of condemnation passed unanimously less the one independent voice of M. Pons, of the Hérault department.

The vote of blame was a fortunate one for me, as, returning to private life, I have since been absolved from it by my country, which has shown its confidence in me by generously placing at my disposal the means for carrying out two great undertakings conducive to its glory and to the progress of the whole human race.

PARIS, 1886.

CHAPTER II.

EPISODES OF 1848 AT PARIS AND MADRID.

SELECTED at the outset of the Revolution by M. de Lamartine for the French Embassy in Spain, I was about to repair to Madrid, when I received an extract from a Spanish journal, in which it was said that the people of Paris, after having seized the Tuileries, had stolen the things left there by an Infanta of Spain. The Royal Family, on leaving the Tuileries, had left behind them all their most valuable effects, and among others the jewellery of the Spanish princess, who was the wife of the Duc de Montpensier. I accordingly asked M. de Lamartine to let me take possession of this jewellery. He told me that he had no power over the invaders of the Tuileries, who had erected barricades and would not allow any one to enter the palace, but he advised me to go and see M. Marrast, the Mayor of Paris. The latter, formerly a writer in the *National*, with whom I was well acquainted, said to me, "The fact is I do not in the least know the people who occupy the Tuileries, and I have no idea what their plans and intentions may

be. M. de Lamartine and myself are in a very ticklish position, which does not admit of our coming into conflict with them ; but as you have made up your mind to go there and parley with them, I will give you a letter of introduction for their leader, if they have one, in your quality of representative of the Republic in Spain." He at once wrote a note, which I regret not having kept, but which I can quote from memory. It ran as follows : "M. de Lesseps is appointed Ambassador of the French Republic in Spain. He would like to take with him the effects belonging to the Spanish Infanta. As she is a foreigner, it would be advisable to respect what property she left at the Tuileries. I will be obliged, therefore, if you will hand over to M. de Lesseps the articles which this 'young person' asks for." I went with this note to the Echelle wicket gate, by way of the Rue du Louvre, where I saw a number of men in their shirt sleeves, very untidy, some of them wounded and wearing bandages on their heads. They asked me what I wanted, and I replied—

"I am the Ambassador of the French Republic in Spain. There is a Spanish newspaper which says that you have been robbing the Infanta of Spain."

They asked me if I believed them to be thieves, and I begged them to take me to their leader, as I had a letter for him from the Mayor of Paris. They accompanied me to the part of the palace which is still standing, and I was presented to M. St. Amand, a

captain in and wearing the uniform of the National Guard, who was in the grand saloon of the Duchess of Orleans. . . . I had with me the King's groom of the chambers, who had brought with him a list of all the articles which had been left behind by the Royal Family. M. St. Amand, assuming an air of great dignity and authority, observed, "This is a very long list," to which I at once replied, "But when it is a question of giving back what does not belong to one, there can be no question of much or little." Whereupon a common man joined in and said, "This gentleman is quite right."

The crowd closed in, and as I was about to be shown into the rooms where the effects claimed had been collected, a young man in a white blouse, with very delicate hands and features, pushed my elbow and said in a whisper, "Persevere in the same course; all these people are much better than they have credit for being." He was a M. de Montaut, a student of the Polytechnic School, who has since entered the corps of ponts et chaussées, and who was the first engineer attached to the Suez Canal, where I entrusted him with one of the divisions of the works. The people thereupon, without further reference to the captain of the National Guard, conducted me into one of the rooms on the ground floor, facing the Rue de Rivoli, where all the effects belonging to the Royal Family had been laid out on tables and ticketed, with as much order as in a curiosity shop. On looking

over them, list in hand, I could see nothing of the jewellery, plate, or above all of a splendid album, the cover of which was enriched with precious stones, and which contained drawings by the leading French artists. It was a family present given to the Infanta upon her marriage. I was told that, "ragged as you see us, we stored all the most valuable articles into carts and slept upon them, taking the jewellery and plate the next morning to the Ministry of Finance, and the album to the National Library." I arranged with the young Polytechnician to have the whole taken to the Spanish Embassy, and gave a receipt for what was deposited in the Treasury and the Library, the transfer taking place without any difficulty.

After taking leave of M. de Lamartine and arming myself with letters of introduction for the authorities of the departments bordering on Spain, I went all along the frontier from Bayonne to Perpignan, in order to make sure that no revolutionary propaganda was being prepared for Spain, in accordance with the conditions which had been frankly accepted by M. de Lamartine and his secretary, M. Bastide.

We did not know what view other States would take of the revolution which had just occurred, and we had every interest to keep up friendly relations with Spain, as in the event of any difficulty with other Powers, this would dispense us from the necessity of keeping an army upon the frontier.

Having spent eight years in Andalusia and Cata-

lonia during a period of disturbance and revolution, I was on excellent terms with the Royal Family, the Government, and the generals of different parties. After having satisfied myself that there was nothing to fear on the French side of the frontier, I went to fetch my family at Barcelona, and we started for Madrid by way of the Catalonian mountains, where civil war had prevailed for the last twenty years, and which were still occupied by bands of insurgents, Carlists, smugglers, and brigands. I was asked if I should like to have an escort, but it would have done more harm than good. So I started with my wife and children. Every now and then a group of horsemen would pull up at a certain distance from us, and one of them would come forward to the carriage and ask who I was. Upon my telling him he rode back to his companions, and they at once made off.

In this way I reached Saragossa, where M. Charles Valois, the first secretary of the Embassy, had preceded me, and thence I reached Madrid upon the day following a mutiny of two regiments, which Marshal Narvaez, Duke of Valencia, had succeeded in quelling, after seeing General Fulgosio, Governor of Madrid, and several officers of his staff killed at the beginning of the revolt. I had scarcely taken up my residence at the French Embassy when I was called up in the middle of the night and told that a lady, thickly veiled, was waiting in my study to see me. I came down at once and recognised her as soon as she

had lowered her veil. She was the wife of General Moreno de las Peñas, and she told me that her husband had been denounced by the sergeants of the regiments which had mutinied as the leader of the movement. The court-martial had accordingly sentenced him to be shot within the twenty-four hours if he was captured. His wife came to implore me to assist him in escaping, as I had done once before at Barcelona, by embarking him on board a French man-of-war which conveyed him to France. I told her that the situation was a very different one here, in the centre of Spain, from what it was on the seaboard at Barcelona, but that I would see what could be done if she would come back later in the day. As soon as it was daylight I went to see my friend Narvaez, and was much surprised at finding him come to open the door himself, with a very disturbed look upon his face. I explained in as few words as possible the object of my early visit, and he told me that he was afraid, when he heard the bell, that the police had come to inform him of the capture of Moreno, and that the latter had been his companion at the military school and in the great defensive struggle of 1808. He would, therefore, have been much pained if he had been compelled to have him shot. I shook him heartily by the hand, and it was accordingly arranged that I should avail myself of the departure of a French family for Bayonne that same day by the mail-coach to get the General away with them. Orders were given to the

police to repair to some place away from the square of the post-office whence the mails started, and the General arrived in disguise, carrying a trunk. Narvaez has been given such a character for cruelty that this story may perhaps cause astonishment, for it has even been related of him that, in reply to the confessor who, upon his deathbed, asked him if he had forgiven his enemies, replied, "I have no need to do so, for I have had them all shot." This story is an outrageous calumny, for I have known few more generous and kindly men. Narvaez was always ready to sacrifice his own life, either to defend his country from the stranger or to maintain order at home.

A few days after this I was told that Mdlle. Eugénie de Montijo, accompanied by her governess, was waiting to see me in the drawing-room, in order to speak to me on a very pressing and important matter. It appeared that, on hearing of the revolt at Madrid, and without waiting to know the result, a regiment stationed at Valencia had mutinied, but as the revolt was unsuccessful the authorities assembled a court-martial, and thirteen officers belonging to the leading families at Court had been sentenced to death. The captain-general of the province had remitted the sentence to Madrid to be countersigned by the President before carrying it out, and the sister of one of the officers had come to implore of Mdlle. de Montijo, whose mother was grand mistress of the Court, to present her to Queen Isabella. She had taken her to the palace,

and the young lady, after having implored the Queen's clemency, had fallen fainting at her feet. The Queen, deeply moved, had sent for the Prime Minister, who, however, was inflexible, declaring that he should be obliged, in the actual state of affairs, to resign if the sentence was not executed. But as the Queen had not yet affixed her signature to the death-warrant, she left the palace at Madrid and went to Aranjuez—a two hours journey—followed by all her Ministers.

It was at this juncture that my intervention was asked for. I could not well refuse it, but there seemed little if any hope of success. I sent for post horses, and during the journey went over everything which I could think of as likely to mollify the severe policy of Narvaez. I at last hit upon what seemed to be the best plan. On reaching the palace I waited in a gallery leading to the room where the Ministers had assembled, previous to submitting to the Queen the death-warrant for signature. I requested an usher to tell the Prime Minister that I wished to speak to him. He at once came out, and as we leant over the balustrade of the gallery I said quietly to him, "I have come to take leave of you, for you will see that, as the conditions of my mission to Spain were accepted by a sovereign Assembly because I might be able to exercise a salutary influence over your Government, if it is learnt that Mdlle de Montijo, belonging to one of the highest families in Spain, has unsuccessfully soli-

cited my intervention to procure a pardon which, in my opinion, will strengthen rather than weaken you, there is nothing left for me but to retire and to take leave of you." Whereupon Narvaez, looking me straight in the face, and seeing how determined I was, shook me vigorously by the hand and said to me in Spanish, "You may be off, Ferdinand, with these men's heads in your pocket." I did not stop to hear more, and grasping Narvaez by the hand in turn, went back to Madrid, where I learnt that the Queen had, at the instance of Narvaez, signed the pardon of the condemned men.

A few days after this I received a message from the French Consul at Bilbao, informing me that a French merchant vessel, with forty-five political refugees on board, who had been implicated in some unsuccessful revolt, had left that port in the middle of the night, but had been obliged, owing to a violent tempest, to put back the next day. The authorities had laid an embargo upon the vessel, and had demanded that the refugees, who had embarked clandestinely, without passports, should be delivered up. The Consul had asked for a delay until he could communicate with me. I at once went to see Marshal Narvaez, and pointed out to him that we had no right to detain the Spanish refugees on board a merchant vessel, which did not enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality, which is exclusively reserved for men-of-war, and that the unhappy men were at his disposal. He did not hesi-

tate a moment, and sent orders that the vessel should be allowed to leave with them for Bordeaux.

My personal position thus enabled me to render some service to my country during my mission at Madrid, and among other things I was able to conclude a postal convention, which had been under discussion for seventy years, and, while granting certain privileges to Spaniards, obtain the retrocession of the buildings of the church of St. Louis-des-Français, which had been under sequestration since the war of 1808.

Moreover, I had the satisfaction, when my mission was terminated by a change of residence which I had not solicited, of having the following words addressed to me by the Queen of Spain in public audience: "You carry away with you my esteem and that of all my subjects." If I repeat these words it is not out of personal vanity, but because they may be of some service to my country and to my children.

CHAPTER III.

ROME—SUEZ—PANAMA.

AT the age of twenty I was sent upon a mission, in the year 1825, under the orders of my uncle, J. B. de Lesseps, the sole survivor of the Lapeyrouse expedition, who was then Chargé d’Affaires at Lisbon. Since then I have held different posts in the administration of Foreign Affairs at Tunis, in Algeria, in Egypt, in Holland, and in Spain. At the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848, M. de Lamartine summoned me from Barcelona to Paris, and sent me to Madrid as Minister Plenipotentiary. I had been eight years in Spain, during which time I had been upon terms of intimacy with the principal generals and public men, and though I had never mixed myself up in the political dissensions, I had established friendly relations with all the different party leaders. Lamartine said to me, “We are at the beginning of a revolution here; we cannot tell if foreigners will be friendly to us. It is important for us that things should be quiet in Spain. You know the Court, the representatives of

the different political parties, and the population at large; and you have left a very good impression behind you. What I want you to do is to proceed to the Madrid Embassy, because, in the event of a foreign war, a good understanding with Spain is equivalent to 200,000 men on the Pyrenean frontier." I accordingly started for Madrid. Marshal Narvaez, who had no liking for the revolutionists, was in power, and I somewhat toned down his ardour and managed to save a certain number of persons who had compromised themselves. After a year's residence at Madrid, M. Drouyn de Lhuys saw fit to put Prince Napoleon in my place and to select me for the Legation at Berne. Upon the day of my arrival in Paris I went to the National Assembly and witnessed, from the diplomatists' gallery, a very stormy sitting. A telegram from Italy had just come in stating that General Oudinot, despite the declarations that had been publicly made, had attacked Italy, or rather the Roman Republic, and that the Government was gravely compromised. There was a talk even of sending the Prince President to Vincennes, of turning out the Ministry of course, and of giving strict injunctions for a complete change of policy. The irritation was very great in the Chamber, M. Ledru Rollin and the rest of the Extreme Left shaking their fists at the Ministry, and a free fight being imminent, when M. Senard, who was a man of considerable experience, calmed down his friends and got them to

adjourn the sitting till the evening, in order to decide what should be done. During this interval the committees of the Chamber met, and M. Senard said to them, "The Government has acted very wrongly, but it has admitted the fact and has declared that it had given no orders, throwing all the responsibility upon the General. This being the case, if we despatch to Rome, without creating any crisis at home, a man upon whom we can rely, I feel convinced that the matter can be arranged." He then named me, and added, "I do not mean to say that he is a perfervid Republican, but he has always served his country well abroad without concerning himself with home politics, and if he accepts a mission he will carry it out faithfully."

I reached Rome, as explained in the first chapter, at a very critical moment. Garibaldi with his army was in the city, and knowing that the French troops would not interfere, he went in pursuit of the Neapolitan forces. When it was found that I was trying to effect an amicable arrangement the extreme party imagined that I was not acting loyally and determined to have their revenge upon me. I was informed of this project by a man of whom I shall have occasion to speak presently, one of those conspirators who are to be met with everywhere, who had been condemned to death in Spain but whose life I had saved. He was in turn to render me a like service, and in this wise. As soon as I reached Rome

I had summoned the Frenchmen in the city to meet me, and informed them that I was about to commence my negotiations, adding, "You will come and see me again to-morrow. I will tell you what has been done." They cheered me very heartily, and several of them shook hands with me on the stairs. I had with me General Vaillant, who was to have taken the command in the event of an attack upon Rome, and to have succeeded General Oudinot if we did not get on together. The next day I was going, after a conference with the Triumvirs, to keep the appointment I had made with the French residents, when a man came rushing up to me with his hair flying in the wind and exclaiming: "M. de Lesseps, I am in time, as you have not started. Yesterday, when you came down from the room where you had got the Frenchmen together, three men came close up to you. You of course thought that they were your compatriots, and one of them put out his hand. You took it, and then turned round. Well, the man who shook hands with you will do so again to-day, and then the one beside him, who was watching your movements, will cut your throat, as was done with Rossi." Rossi had received a letter from a lady to whom the man who warned me had written, informing her of the plot. The letter was found in his pocket. There was no absolute necessity for me to go to the Embassy, as I could inform my compatriots by proxy of what had been done, but I first made my informant swear that

any one whom I might send in my place would not run any risk. He swore it upon the Gospel, but I told him that as I knew he did not set any store by that I must have a different sort of oath. He then swore it upon the head of his sister, and I was satisfied. As M. de la Tour d'Auvergne, whom I had sent in my stead, was some time coming back, I began to get uneasy, when Prince Wolkonsky, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires arrived, and said to me, "When you assembled your compatriots yesterday (I hope you will forgive me for what I am going to say, but we are obliged to keep our Governments informed of all that is important), I took advantage of my familiarity with the Embassy during the time that your predecessor, the Duc d'Harcourt, was there, to make my way to a small staircase, the landing of which is contiguous to the saloon in which you had assembled your fellow-countrymen. I put my ear to the partition and heard all that you said, and reported it to my Government. I was about to do the same thing to-day, when I heard three men speaking in French. One of them said, 'Ah! the scoundrel has not come to-day. If he had come, a few inches of cold steel would have settled the job. Why did not M. de Lesseps come?' "

One of my friends, Count Rampon, subsequently a Vice-President of the Republican Senate in France, and an old schoolfellow of mine, who was in the room at the time, seized one of the men, and was going to

throw him into the street, but the Frenchmen surrounded him and pushed these three men into the staircase where Prince Wolkonsky was standing. On M. de la Tour d'Auvergne getting back, I asked him what had occurred. He said, "Three men came up to the carriage as I was starting and grumbled a little because you had not come."

Colonel de Maubeuge had been sent to assist me in my negotiations, so I despatched him to Mazzini to complain of this. I had the names of the three men, and one was a Frenchman named Colin, who, like the two others, has since died. I remember that on the previous night a dozen individuals had come and yelled the "Ca ira" under the windows of the Embassy, so I instructed Colonel de Maubeuge to inform Mazzini that if the three men were not at once cast into prison I should order General Oudinot to attack the city. He replied that he had no power to do so. The man who had saved my life was up to everything which occurred, and it was arranged that he should generally take his stand at the corner of a street facing the hotel. I accordingly made a signal for him to come and talk to me, and after informing him of Mazzini's answer, asked what had best be done. He advised my applying to Ciceronaccio, a popular leader of great influence who had organised the revolution. So I sent to tell Mazzini that if he could not calm the population I must ask Ciceronaccio to do so, and the effect was magical.

At nightfall I went out into the city to see what was being done, and found Garibaldi's army going off in pursuit of the Neapolitans. My anonymous adviser, who was at my side, urged me to see Mazzini that very night, and arranged to meet me in front of the Palace of the Consulta at one in the morning, at the foot of one of the great statues. I kept the appointment, and he then insisted that I should go up to the first floor of the palace, take off my boots, and steal past the soldiers on duty, who would probably be asleep, and find my way into the room at the further end of the palace, where I should find Mazzini fast asleep. This was rather a hardy and undiplomatic enterprise, but I undertook it, and reached the room where Mazzini was asleep. He had a very handsome face, I thought, as he lay there asleep; and though he had been exiled from so many States, he was then still a young man. I waited a little to see if he would awake, but as he did not I shouted his name. He jumped up in the bed, looked at me, and said, "Are you come to murder me?" I replied, "No, indeed; if one of us is to murder the other it will not be me. I have been told that you will not act openly with me. I have orders not to treat with you" (in consequence of the diplomatic difficulties which the fact of his being such a downright conspirator might have created for us with other States), "as it would not have done to let the world see that you held the thread of the negotiations I have come here to carry on. You have

a Roman Assembly, composed of the great landowners in the country, who are devoted to your cause, and who are not mistrusted by Europe. It is with them that I must negotiate; but as you are the most important personage, I wish you to be kept informed of everything. You are aware that at the sitting which took place this evening before Garibaldi started it was decided that certain Roman statesmen, not, with one or two exceptions, residents in the city, were selected to negotiate with me, but you insisted upon being put in their place. Consequently, you have not kept your word or adhered to what was agreed upon between us." When a difficulty occurs a woman will burst into tears, but a man will throw himself into your arms.* Mazzini did this, and so we continued the negotiations. I found out afterwards that, urged on by his own party, he was somewhat opposed to the object of the negotiations, and that he kept up the agitation in Rome. I was at the head-quarters preparing for the negotiations, when Veyrassat, the man to whom I owed the previous information about Mazzini, came rushing into the camp, bathed in perspiration, and urged me not to go into Rome as I had arranged to do, in order to thank the Princess Beljioso and other ladies for the care they had taken of our wounded. But he urged me to alter my plans, as he said that the Piazza di Spagna and the Via Condotti were filled with people, and that the plot to assassinate me would

* Not in England, M. de Lesseps. Note of the Translator.

indubitably be carried out. However, as all had been settled for my going, I asked at head-quarters for an officer to accompany me, and Commandant Espivent, who has recently been general in command at Marseilles, came with me in an open carriage. I proposed that we should each take two pistols, and that my servant, who rode in the rumble, should also carry two pistols to keep off those who might try to get up behind, as the men who use daggers are very afraid of firearms. I was therefore pretty sure that by acting boldly we should get through the crowd without any mishap. When we reached the Piazza di Spagna the horse of the gendarme who was riding in front of us stumbled, but fortunately did not fall. A petition had been presented to him calling upon the army to rise in rebellion, and he was imprudent enough to tear it up and throw it in the face of the public. The crowd then surged up to the carriage, but when they caught sight of my pistols they drew back. In this way our carriage reached the Hôtel d'Allemagne, and we all three walked backwards into the hotel so as to keep our faces to the crowd.

I resumed my negotiations with Mazzini, who seemed disposed to carry them out loyally; but I afterwards learnt that a Frenchman, who had accompanied Louis Napoleon in the Boulogne and Strasburg expeditions, was exciting him against the French army, and had advised him, in response to the present of an ambulance which we had made, to send our soldiers a number

of cigars, inside which were to be proclamations addressed to the French army. I learnt the same day from Veyrassat that Mazzini had on his table several small sheets of very thin paper, upon which were written the appeals to the French soldiers to mutiny. He advised me to go to see Mazzini about two o'clock, and as he had always many people to see him who were generally on his right, I was to place myself on his left, and I should then be able to lay hold of one of these sheets, and prove to him that he had again deceived me.

I did this, and was able to seize one of these pieces of paper and put it in the crown of my hat. I then said to him, "Do you know what I am told. You were twice led away by your friends, conspirators by habit, and you have twice tried to deceive me. This is the third time. I am informed that you have meditated sending proclamations to the French troops. The French soldier would burn down his mother's house if he received orders to do so. Despite your experience, you do not know the French soldier, and you have consequently made a great blunder. He denied the accusation. Whereupon I said, taking the proclamation out of my hat, "What do you mean by No? I have done to-day a thing that I will never do again, and that is to lay my hands upon this sheet of paper." He then again embraced me, and I followed up my negotiations, which ended in a draft of agreement.

This over, I returned to Paris, and this is the origin

of the Suez Canal. The French Government had left me to act without giving me a word of reply. I was being deceived behind my back until the time came to betray me openly. I sent my four secretaries of the Embassy to Paris, but got no reply. Those in authority were very well satisfied to compromise me, and it was intended to react against the policy of the National Assembly. Seeing this, I determined not to play a double part. I was at last recalled, and when everything was ready the attack on Rome took place. I accordingly returned to Paris. The Government tried to make out that I was mad, and that has happened once since. I could not stand this, and I resigned my functions in the diplomatic service.

It was upon this that, having a very worthy mother-in-law, who was as attached to me as I was to her, a mother-in-law who had a large fortune while I had none, I became her land agent. She owned in the neighbourhood of Paris a property which was of some value, but which involved a heavy expenditure; so I induced her to buy a large tract of uncultivated land in the Berry district, and had it put into cultivation. I built a model farm, which is still in existence, and restored an ancient castle which had belonged to Agnes Sorel.

While I was superintending all this, I learnt that Abbas Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, was dead. He was a very cruel and deceitful man, and had succeeded Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in the

government of Egypt. His successor was the youngest son of Mehemet Ali, whom I had known well as a child, and taught to ride. He was enormously fat, and I made him take exercise, much to the delight of his father. This lad, who was very intelligent, was made to learn fourteen lessons a day. Mehemet Ali said to me one day, "As you are interested in my son, here are his notes." I told him that I did not wish to see them, as I could not read even then very well, and all I wanted to see was the last column showing his weight for the past and the present week. If there was an increase I should punish him, if there was a decrease I should reward him.

When I learnt my pupil's elevation to power, I wrote to congratulate him, and he replied, begging me to come and see him at once. As since my retirement I had studied in detail all the questions relating to the Suez Canal, I was perfectly familiar with the isthmus, and I was perfectly satisfied of the possibility of cutting the canal—an enterprise which had taken possession of my imagination after reading the memoirs of Lepère, the head engineer in the expedition of General Bonaparte.

I resumed my former investigations, being convinced that I should obtain the concession.

The Viceroy sent for me to come to Cairo, where he was about to assume possession of power, and he at once called together his generals to consult them on

the question. As I rode out with them on horseback, and as they were inclined to think more of a man who could jump a fence than of a savant and a bookworm, they were well disposed towards me; and when the Viceroy showed them the memorandum I had drawn up, they were unanimous in my favour. So I got my concession, and this was the origin of the Suez Canal.

Once in possession of it, I said to the Viceroy, "I am not a financier, or a man of business. What do you think I had best do?" I had many colleagues and friends who were rich. I got a hundred of them to join me, and proposed to found a company with them. We each of us put in a share of £200, and this share is now worth over £40,000. This sum served for the preliminary investigations which I had made by engineers whom I had brought from Europe to examine the ground, which had never before been done, as no one had ever dreamt that the canal could be made except with the water of the Nile. But I had always been of opinion that as the two seas were on the same level—stoutly as this was denied—the work to be undertaken must be a purely maritime one. I stuck to my text in spite of all opposition, and my obstinacy has had its reward. I intend to act just in the same way at Panama, though many engineers would prefer, on account of the difference in level, not of the seas, but of the tides, to construct a lock. I would not have one at Suez, and I do not intend to at Panama, as thus I effect a saving of more than a

million and a half. I accordingly appealed to my friends, who each subscribed £200, and I went on until all this was spent. I then said to the Viceroy, "The question as to the possibility of making the canal is settled. Would you like me to put myself in the hands of financiers at Paris who will probably get the best of me?" He replied that he had a good reserve fund (Egyptian finance was not in the terrible state that it is in now), and would bear all the cost. And in forming my company I introduced a clause according to which a certain percentage of the profits was to go to the Egyptian Government. This being settled, I set to work. We continued to make our surveys for the canal, but the opposition of England was at one time so pertinacious that the unhappy Prince was at his wits' end. It was no use his saying, "I have imprudently granted the concession to a friend, a Frenchman; you must apply to him or to his Government. I cannot withdraw it." The English opposition did not disarm for that, and he was positively wasting away, so I said to him one day, "There is only one course left open. We will continue our surveys for the canal, which is outside Egypt, in the desert. But the fact will be known, and you will be constantly pestered on the subject. Let us take another line. There is a population in the Soudan, which has been much oppressed by your family. You have a brother who was massacred near Khartoum." Mehemet Ali, I should explain, had

originally sent his brother-in-law into the Soudan with 100,000 men, and he had brought back with him the same number of slaves. He afterwards sent one of his sons to collect the tributes, or taxes, which his brother-in-law had levied upon the country. These taxes consisted of a thousand articles of each kind—viz., a thousand loads of straw, a thousand loads of wood, a thousand loads of corn, a thousand maidens, and a thousand male slaves ; all of this was brought in and placed in the camp. But the chiefs of the country formed a plot to destroy the camp, and at night, while the leaders of the force were celebrating their captures, they set fire to the wood and straw, so that not a man escaped alive. I accordingly advised the Viceroy to take only a few soldiers, besides myself, and to confer upon these populations just and beneficent laws.

We reached the frontiers of Egypt, near Korosko, and went on to Bou-Ahmed, on the confines of the Desert, having with us two caravans, which kept two days' march apart from each other, so as not to exhaust the water which was to be had on the road. At Bou-Ahmed I wished the Viceroy a "Happy new year," and in the evening rejoined him at Berber, which is close by. I found him in a terrible state of excitement, shedding copious tears, and when I asked him what was wrong, he told me that he was weeping over the misery which his family had wrought in the country. He said that since his arrival he had received

petitions from every quarter, and had seen villages which had been burnt down and never rebuilt, adding that it was so sad a sight that he preferred to return at once to Egypt. I told him that he could not, enlightened ruler as he was, do this, and that it was his duty to give just laws to the inhabitants and introduce municipal institutions.

This cheered him a little, and we went on to Chendi, the very spot where his brother had been massacred. It is most remarkable how rapidly men can be got together in this country. You send out some messengers on dromedaries, and in the course of a few days you have assembled more than 100,000 men. I found a tent all ready for me at Chendi, and the Viceroy prepared me for a wonderful sight the next morning. And there, sure enough, were 100,000 men who had been collected in the space of three or four days, and whom he harangued as follows: "I have just learnt that the Turkish Sheik, who has governed this country for the last twenty years, has slaves confined at his residence, in disobedience of my orders. There is one slave chained up in his cellar. Go and release him." He then had the Sheik placed face to the ground before the assembled people, preparatory to flogging him and loading him with the chains which his slave had been wearing. This produced such an effect that the multitude shouted, "Allah! Allah! Long live the Khedive!" He then said to them, "You see those forts which my father

had built forty years ago on the banks of the Nile to use against you. Go and take the cannon on their ramparts and throw them into the Nile." I whispered into his ear, "Perhaps, Monseigneur, you are going too far; they may make use of them after you are gone." To which he rejoined, "They are quite worthless."

He was a shrewd politician. He went on to Khar-toum, leaving the generals, ministers, and myself behind to register all the heads of families who had assembled. This took us about a day, our mode of procedure being to obtain the necessary information from the tribes who had representatives at Chendi. We placed so many numbers upon so many posts, and we each took down the names of the chiefs, of the wealthiest, the oldest, and the youngest. Having selected the leaders of the municipalities, we started on the following day to rejoin the Viceroy at Khar-toum. Upon our arrival the Viceroy came out to meet me, and taking me by the hand said, "You must dine with me. You will hear such a band of music as never played before any sovereign—that of an ancient negro regiment which dates from my father's time. The regimental chemist has mended the wind instruments with soap plaster; and this was the band which welcomed me on my arrival."

Entering the dining-room, we had our dinner served on a small table placed beside the divan, and I noticed that towards the close of the meal the Viceroy's countenance began to cloud over. He had the habit when

he was put out to draw his red fez over his eyes, close down upon his nose. He had the blood very much to his head, and his neck and even his lips began to swell, as if he was going to have an attack of apoplexy. What could be the matter? All of a sudden he got up, and unbelted his sword threw it to the end of the long room, exclaiming, "Leave me alone! Do not ask me what is the matter!" We all left the room, and he then sent for one of his confidants and said, "Take M. de Lesseps to my room," which was a magnificent one on the upper story; and I could never understand how at a place like Khartoum such splendid furniture, tapestry, &c., could have been got together.

The Ministers were all in a great state of mind, thinking that here, at five or six hundred leagues from the capital, their Sovereign had suddenly gone mad. We waited till two in the morning, but could get no tidings except that his confidant told us then that he had ordered a bath, no doubt to calm his nerves. I mention this to show what Eastern princes of another age were like. Absolute power has a tendency to drive men mad. At three the following morning he sent for me, and I found him quietly seated on a divan in a small room smoking a pipe. He had calmed down, and he said to me, "You have asked to take a turn upon the White Nile and the Blue Nile. You have two boats and my cook, so you can go on both these excursions." I replied, "In other words, you send me about my business. What was the matter with you last night,

and will you tell me?" He had said to himself, "Here is a man who leaves his family in Paris and comes all the way to Khartoum to give me a piece of good advice which had not occurred to me." This made him so furious that he threw away his sword for fear that he might forget himself and strike me with it. He had known me since he was a child, and seeing that his head was giving way he got rid of his weapon. But he sent me away in order to be able to issue himself the grand decrees which have tranquillised the country, and which restored to it a prosperity only broken by the English expedition. When Gordon was at Khartoum as governor the Viceroy informed me that he had summoned him to Cairo to join the Committee of Inquiry, of which I was president. I said to him, "You are wrong. Gordon is a man of great ability, very intelligent, very honest, and very plucky, but he keeps all the Soudan accounts in his pocket, written on small pieces of paper. All that he pays out he puts in his right pocket, and all that he receives in his left. He then makes up two bags and sends them to Cairo, and money is sent back to him. He is not the man to regulate the affairs of Egypt." The Viceroy then telegraphed to him to remain where he was, but he was so active that he came all the same, as he was administering the country in a very able manner, according to the traditions left by Mohammed Saïd. I asked him to peruse the explanations of these decrees, which he had not read, and which I had got

translated. He followed them up afterwards, and if there had been no English expedition the Soudan would not be, as it is now, a standing menace to Egypt. These are historical facts which I am stating, and which are not to be had elsewhere.

I thought that the opportunity was a favourable one for disclosing all that occurred in Egypt. Since then, being in London at the time of the English expedition, I learnt that Alexandria was about to be bombarded. No one else knew of it, so I came at once back to Paris and begged MM. de Freycinet and Ferry to come from the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. I said to them, "I warn you that Alexandria, which we have created, and which, thanks to the engineers, sailors, &c., whom we have sent out, has prospered, is about to be bombarded. Well, France must not be responsible for the carnage. When I knew it, it had a population of 45,000; now it has 200,000 inhabitants. It was created by France, and we cannot bombard it." A telegram was then sent to our fleet, ordering it to withdraw. I relate all these facts, as they are but little known. Our Government, which behaved very straightforwardly in the matter, quite understood the situation, and could have no part or lot in the destruction of the town.

The prosperity of Egypt dates from the expedition of Bonaparte and the arrival of the French in the country, and now it is on the high road to ruin. I do not scruple, when I am in England, to tell the English

that they will never be able to do any good there. Since the beginning of history all the conquerors of Egypt have been obliged to abandon it : Persians, Assyrians, Greeks, and all. The reason is a very simple one. None of the Europeans or foreigners can reproduce their species there, and a country in which this is the case is one which cannot be permanently inhabited or governed. I hope the English will in the end see this. They have already lost a great many men, and they have had to abandon the Soudan. What is wanted is a better organisation. I regret, as I have more than once openly asserted, that the ex-Khedive was dethroned in favour of his son, who is a very worthy young man, but who has neither the power nor the authority of his predecessor, who had covered the country with telegraphs and railways, and who is, to my mind, the only ruler who can with advantage be sent back there. I do not go in for diplomacy, I give my opinions before all the world, and I declare that the only way to save Egypt is to restore, not the exclusive influence of France, but the influence which she has legitimately acquired by civilising the Egyptian people for the last fifty or even eighty years. France has no desire to lord it over other nations, but she desires to maintain the influence to which she is entitled.

It has been seen how we went to work at Suez, and it will be the same with Panama, and I hope with the same satisfactory results. We spent over twenty

millions on the Suez Canal, and we have given back to France (as I showed in a memorandum handed by me to the Government) fifty millions.

This is why I have so many backers among the general public and common people. There is scarcely a small tradesman or peasant who has not his share in the Suez Canal Company. The other day I drove to my office in a cab, and when I had given the driver his thirty-five sous he took my hand and said, "M. de Lesseps, I am one of your shareholders." These are the men who made the Suez and will make the Panama Canal, and Panama will be opened in 1889. The example of Suez increases the number and confidence of the Panama shareholders. The Suez Canal was opened sixteen years ago,* and we are still at work upon it. At Panama we have means at our disposal which we did not possess at Suez, and according to the estimate which has been made we have 57,000 horse-power, which at the rate of ten men each represents an army of 570,000 men. Add to them the 20,000 workmen on the ground, and it will be seen that we shall be able, by 1889, to open a passage sufficient for the purposes of navigation, while after that we shall enlarge the canal, as we have done for Suez, which yields such a magnificent return to the shareholders, and upon which, nevertheless, we are still at work. I have just returned from Panama, where I went in the company of several distinguished

* This chapter was written in 1885. Note of the Translator.

engineers and representatives of chambers of commerce, whose reports will be published and will tell their own tale. Frenchmen alone could do all this without the assistance of government or of capitalists; they are the most devoted and disinterested people in the world, and they made the Suez as they will make the Panama Canal. We have engineers of the greatest merit, men who are young; and I like young men, though I am myself an octogenarian. Old age foresees and youth acts. Well, we have in Panama five divisions of engineers, and every one is convinced that we cannot fail to attain the desired end. We have, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, a succession of workshops and sheds, with all the means which are now available for executing works of this kind. We saw whole mountains blown up with dynamite, blocks of stone measuring more than a hundred cubic yards sent up into the air like so many pebbles. We are delighted to be able to state, after the voyage which I have just made, that the canal will be open in 1889.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

*To M. S. W. Ruysenaers, Consul-General of Holland
in Egypt.*

“PARIS, July 8, 1852.

“IT is now three years since I asked and obtained permission to be placed upon the retired list as Minister Plenipotentiary in consequence of what occurred in reference to my mission to Rome.

“Since that time I have been studying in all its different bearings a question which I had already been considering when we made acquaintance with each other in Egypt twenty years ago.

“I confess that my scheme is still in the clouds, and I do not conceal from myself that, as long as I am the only person who believes it to be possible, that is tantamount to saying it is impossible. What is wanting to make it acceptable to the public is a basis of some kind, and it is in order to obtain this basis that I seek your co-operation.

“I am referring to the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, which has been talked of from the earliest

historical times, and which, for that very reason, is regarded as impossible of execution. For we read, in fact, in the geographical dictionaries that the project would have been carried out long since if the obstacles to it had not been insurmountable.

"I send you a memorandum which embodies my ancient and more recent studies, and I have had it translated into Arabic by my friend Duchenoud, who is the best of the Government interpreters. This document is a very confidential one. You will form your own opinion as to whether the present Viceroy, Abbas Pasha, is the man to comprehend the benefit which this scheme would confer upon Egypt, and whether he would be disposed to aid in carrying it out."

To the same.

"PARIS, November 15, 1852.

"When you wrote me that there was no chance of getting Abbas Pasha to accept the idea of the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez I communicated my scheme to a financial friend, M. Benoit Fould, who was concerned in a scheme for founding a Crédit Mobilier at Constantinople. He was struck by the grandeur of the undertaking, and the advantages there would be in including, among the concessions to be applied for from Turkey, the privilege of executing the Suez Canal. The negotiator sent to Constantinople encountered difficulties which compelled him to abandon the project. One of the arguments used against him

was the impossibility of taking the initiative of a work to be executed in Egypt, where the Viceroy alone had the right to decide what should be done.

"This being the case, I must shelve for a time my memorandum on the subject, and I am going to see about the construction of a model farm upon a property which my mother-in-law, Madame Delamalle, has recently purchased."

To the same.

"LA CHÉNAIE, September 15, 1854.

"I was busy with my masons and carpenters, who are building an additional story to the old manor-house of Agnes Sorel, when the postman appeared in the courtyard with the Paris letters. They were handed up to me by the workmen, and what was my surprise to learn of the death of Abbas Pasha, and the accession to power of our early friend, the intelligent and sympathetic Mohammed Said! I at once came down from the building, and lost not an hour in writing to the new Viceroy to congratulate him on his accession. I reminded him that the course of political events had left me idle, and that I should take advantage of my liberty to go and present him my homage, if he would let me know the time of his return from Constantinople, where he was to go for investiture.

"He replied to me at once, and fixed the beginning of November for me to meet him at Alexandria. I

wish you to be one of the first to know that I shall be punctual in arrival. What a pleasure it will be to meet again upon the soil of Egypt, where we first came together ! Do not say a word about the piercing of the isthmus before I arrive."

To Madame Delamalle, Paris.

(Diary.)

"ALEXANDRIA, November 7, 1854.

"The Messageries steamer, the *Lycurgue*, landed me at eight this morning at Alexandria. My good friend Ruyssenaers and Hafouz Pasha, the Minister of Marine, came to meet me on behalf of the Viceroy, and I proceeded in a court carriage to one of his Highness's villas, about two and a half miles from Alexandria, on the Mahmoudie Canal.

"A whole battalion of servants was drawn up on the flight of stone steps, and they saluted me three times, putting out their right hands to the ground and then carrying them up to their foreheads. They were all Turks and Arabs, with the exception of a Greek valet and a Marseilles cook named Ferdinand.

"Here is a description of my house, which I remember having seen built many years ago by M. de Cerisey, the celebrated naval constructor, and the founder of the Alexandria arsenal, from which he launched in a very short time twelve vessels of the line and twelve frigates. M. de Cerisey contributed in no small measure, under Mehemet Ali, to the

deliverance of Egypt from the many burdens put upon it. The principal pavilion is in the middle of a lovely garden, with two avenues of trees leading up to it, one from the plain of Alexandria, in the direction of the Gate of Rosetta, and the other from the Mahmoudie Canal. Up till the other day it was occupied by the princess who recently bore a son to Said Pasha, who bears the name of Toussoum. The reception-rooms and dining-room are on the ground floor, while on the first floor there is a very bright drawing-room, with four rich divans running round it, and with four large windows looking on to the two avenues. Leading out of it is the bedroom, with a very elaborate bed, the hangings of which are of handsome yellow silk embroidered with red flowers and gold fringe. Inside these there are double curtains of figured tulle. Communicating with the bedroom are two dressing-rooms, the first of which has rosewood and marble furniture, while in the second, which is equally elegant, the washing utensils are in silver, the soft towels being all embroidered in gold.

“I had scarcely completed the inspection of my apartments when several intimate friends of the Viceroy came to call upon me. I got them to tell about Said Pasha’s habits since he came to the throne, what were his tastes and his tendencies, who were the people he had about him, who seemed for the time to be in favour or disfavour; in short, all that is desirable to know beforehand when you are the guest of

a prince. They told me that since his return from Constantinople he had often alluded to my visit, and spoken to those about him of his former friendship for me. I was told that he had waited to take me with him to Cairo, a journey which he was intending to make by way of the desert, along the Libyan chain of mountains, with an army of ten thousand men. This journey will certainly be an interesting one, and will take ten or twelve days. The start is fixed for Sunday.

"I see that there is a fresh batch of servants just come in, viz. a *kaouadjî* (chief coffee-maker), accompanied by several assistants and *chiboukchi bachi* (a chief of the pipes), escorted by four acolytes with their insignia, consisting of a dozen long pipes with large amber mouthpieces studded with diamonds. Nor is the mission of these personages a sinecure, for in the house of a great Turkish nobleman pipes and small cups of coffee (*findjanes*) are provided fresh for each caller.

"An officer of the Viceroy subsequently came to inform me that his Highness would receive me at twelve at the Gabbari Palace.

"I thought that from the very fact of my having known the Prince when he was in a very different position that it was all the more incumbent upon me to treat him with the respectful deference which is always so acceptable to the human heart. So I fastened on to my dress coat all my stars and orders. The Vice-

roy received me with great affection, speaking to me of his early days, of how I had sometimes taken his part when his father was very severe upon him, of the persecution to which he had been subjected during the reign of Abbas Pasha, and, lastly, of his desire to do what was right and make Egypt prosperous. I congratulated him on his intentions, adding that if Providence had intrusted the most absolute government on earth to a prince who had in his youth received a most thorough education, and who later in life had been severely tried by fortune, it was for a great purpose, and that he would, I was convinced, justify his mission.

“We discussed the forthcoming military excursion into the desert, and it was arranged that I should join the party without having to make any preparations of my own.

“When I returned to my pavilion at eleven in the evening I found all my staff of servants drawn up in the same order as before ; and the *chef* showed me a very luxuriantly laid-out table, decorated with flowers, and with several covers laid. He said that orders had been given for the table to be served in the same way both morning and evening. I told him that I should only avail myself of this of a morning, and that I intended to go to my bedroom. Two footmen came forward to help me mount the staircase, which was brilliantly illuminated. Just for once I allowed them to do so, with all due gravity, as became the friend of

a sovereign, who ought to appear as if he was accustomed to receive similar homage."

" November 8, 1854.

"I get up at five. I open the two windows of my room, which are overhung by the branches of trees which I am not enough of a botanist to know by name. The air is perfumed with the flowers of these trees and of the jasmines which line the banks of the canal, beyond which, though the sun has not yet risen, is visible Lake Mareotis, its surface rippled by a light and pleasant breeze.

"I go then to pay an early visit to the Viceroy, who, as soon as he heard of my being there, came out of his apartments, and we recline on an easy divan placed in a gallery overlooking the garden. After we had enjoyed our pipes and coffee, the Viceroy takes me out on to the balcony of the gallery to show me one of his regiments of the guard, which is to escort him on his journey. We then go out into the garden to try some revolvers, which I have brought him from France.

"After our walk I tell him that I must leave him to go and receive at his house the persons whom I had invited in his name. He thanked me for doing the honours of *my* house so well.

"I pay a visit to my neighbour Halim Pasha, the Viceroy's brother. This young prince speaks French with ease and elegance. Fond of riding and shooting, he told me that he already found there was a double bond of

fraternity between us. He is to join us in the journey through the desert, and will bring with him his falcons and greyhounds. His arms and servants are to be at my disposal."

" *November 9, 1854.*

"An early morning visit to the Viceroy, in his father's palace of Raz-el-tyn, at the extremity of the port. This is his divan for official receptions, and I witnessed the first audience granted to the Consul-General of Sardinia, who had to present his letters of credit. After the audience we enter the private apartments, where we have a long and very interesting conversation as to the best principles of government, but in the course of which not a word is said about the Suez Canal, a subject which I do not intend to broach till I am quite sure of my ground, and until the question is so far ripe that the Prince may adopt the idea as coming rather from himself than from me.

"It is all the more necessary to act prudently as Ruysenaers remembers having heard him say, before his accession to power, that his father, Mehemet Ali, to whom the project of making the canal had been suggested, had abandoned it upon account of the difficulties it might cause him with England; and that if he ever became Viceroy he should do as his father had done.

"This precedent was not an encouraging one, but I am convinced that I shall succeed."

" November 11, 1854.

"The Viceroy sends me a fine Arab horse, which he has had brought from Syria. I am informed that this morning there will be a review of troops in the plain between Alexandria and Lake Mareotis. I mount my charger and join the Viceroy, Soliman Pasha being in command of the troops. The soldiers go through their drill and practice firing, and as we are galloping along a diamond tassel drops from the Viceroy's cartridge-box, but he will not let us stop to pick it up."

" November 12, 1854.

"The Viceroy informs me that he is about to order his troops to commence the march to Cairo to-day, and he orders his aide-de-camp to take me early to-morrow to the first halt."

" November 13, 1854.

"I left the Viceroy's position at six this morning, riding the horse he made me a present of, followed by another led horse, two camels carrying my luggage, and accompanied by two cavasses mounted and two saïs on foot. We were to meet Zulfikar Pasha at the Gabarri Palace, and making the circuit of Lake Mareotis, regain the Viceroy's head-quarters. In order not to delay our march, our camels and luggage were placed in the charge of a cavass. After having left to our right the ancient baths of Cleopatra and

the Arab's Tower we reached a well, around which the Viceroy had formed his encampment the night before. He had started at four in the morning to cross the lake at a point where it was almost dried up. As we followed the wheel-marks of his carriage, which had left deep ruts at the places where our horses' feet sank deep, we could see that the troops must have some difficulty in passing all the way. I talked to Zulfikar Pasha—whom I had known years before, when he was the companion of Mohammed Said in their boyhood—of my project, and understanding its importance for Egypt, he promised me that he would avail himself of his intimacy with the Viceroy to endeavour to pave the way for me, and make him favourable to the scheme.

“After crossing the lake we enter upon that part of the Libyan desert which, in ancient times, was an inhabited and civilised country, and which has, since the Arab conquest, been abandoned to a few Bedouin tribes. Every now and again one sees around the ancient wells some of those black tents, of camels' hair, which the Scriptures speak of, and which are still the same in Palestine, Syria, Arabia, and all the coast of Africa, from Egypt to Morocco.

“The sky clouds slightly over, and a slight breeze makes the atmosphere rather cooler than it was on the other side of the lake. I witness a regular desert scene : a dog is busily engaged in tearing to pieces a dead animal, and close beside him are solemnly stalking

several birds of prey, which are awaiting their turn, and which do not stir at our approach.

"It is eleven o'clock, and Zulfikar and myself munch, as we ride along, the biscuits and sticks of chocolate which are very desirable substitutes for pistols in our saddle-bags.

"From an eminence we descry the Viceroy's camp. A Bedouin tells us that we shall reach it in half an hour; but here, as everywhere else, the peasants have a way of misleading you as to distances, and I calculate that we have at least two hours before us. Not minding either the heat or the fatigue, I ride on without dismounting once. We reach the camp about half-past two, to find that the Viceroy is taking his rest, and that a tent has been prepared for Zulfikar and myself, next to his. Inside the tent I find an iron bedstead, with an excellent mattress, a counterpane of quilted silk, cocoa-nut matting, some folding chairs, and a mahogany table.

"The servants bring us pipes and coffee, followed by basins and ewers of silver, after which they sprinkle us with rose-water, by way of a preparation for our collation, which is brought to us on a salver placed upon a stool, around which we take our seats. I was about to use my fingers, like my companion, when a knife and fork were placed before me, they, like the spoons and plates, being of Sevres china. In conformity with the injunctions of the Prophet, there was no wine, but the iced water was excellent.

“The strains of a military band told us that the Viceroy was awake, and upon going out of our tent we met him coming from his. He called me in and explained to me how he had got his artillery across the lake, going from one battery to the other and urging on the men, for everyone had assured him that it was impossible for them to cross it. He was in the best of humours, and we spent a couple of hours discussing subjects, all of which interested much, and the main objective of which was that he desired to illustrate his accession to power by some great and useful enterprise. He listened to my remarks with much attention, and spoke without the slightest reserve, the time passing very quickly, and the ceremony of ablutions coming to warn us that it was the dinner hour.

“After dinner a courier arrived from Alexandria, with the despatches which had been sent by steamer from Constantinople, and he had them read over to him by Zulfikar, translating their contents to me as he read. These despatches were from his agent at Constantinople, and from Reschid Pasha, the Grand Vizier. Among them was one which he showed me, and which had been written by the Sultan’s favourite in the harem, to thank him for a present of 150,000 piastres, which he had sent her. The letter also contained a message from the Sultan, complimenting him upon the appearance of the Egyptian troops which had recently been despatched to Turkey.

"The news from Sebastopol came up to the 2nd instant, and at that date the town had not been taken. The admirals had informed the generals that in another month's time it would be impossible to remain at sea, and this led to a decisive attack being made, which cost the allied armies from ten to fifteen thousand men.

"We are to remain here three days for two regiments of infantry, which are expected to-morrow, and for two cavalry regiments due the day after."

"November 14, 1854.

"I am up at five. The soldiers are just beginning to come out of their tents. The sky is cloudless, and the stars are still shining, while the moon lights up a vast plain which, despite its being so bare, is not devoid of charm. I go to wish the Viceroy good morning, and after having smoked a pipe and taken coffee together, we mount our horses and go to meet the two regiments. They soon come in sight, and they appear to be none the worse for their march, and in good condition. All that they had had since leaving Alexandria, early the previous morning, was three biscuits each. The Arabs are wonderfully abstemious, and are all the better for it.

"After I had returned to my tent I had a visit from Prince Halim Pasha, the Viceroy's brother, who had planted his tent about a league from our encampment. He informed me that the Bedouins whom he had sent out as scouts had told him that there were some herds

of gazelles feeding at about two hours' march, and that when we started again he would get up a hunt.

"After breakfasting with the Viceroy and his brother, I have my horse saddled and take a ride round the outskirts of the camp. In one direction the desert extends beyond the horizon, while in the other it is bounded by Lake Mareotis, and farther on by the sea. Just under my horse's hoofs there jumps up a large jackal, which had, no doubt, taken up its quarters there so as to come and prowl about the camp at night, and after galloping in pursuit of it for ten minutes, and nearly touching it with the butt-end of my whip, it disappears among the brushwood.

"On my return I find the Viceroy sitting in front of his tent, and go with him to watch some shell practice with a mortar, but none of the gunners succeed in hitting the target five hundred yards off. The Viceroy, after listening to the band, which played the *Marseillaise*, among other tunes, had his dinner served in my tent."

"November 15, 1854.

"At five I was only partly dressed. Could any one have seen me outside my tent, with my red dressing-gown, like that of a Mecca cherif, performing my ablutions with my sleeves tucked up, they would have taken me for a true believer; and in the days of the Inquisition, as you know, one of the most serious offences was that of having washed one's arms up to the elbow. The camp gradually becomes more ani-

mated, and the chilly air announces the rising of the sun, so I put on some warmer clothing and return to my observations. A few rays of the sun begin to illuminate the horizon, when suddenly there appears in the west, where the sky is cloudy, a very brilliant rainbow, running from east to west. I confess that my heart beat violently, and that I was obliged to put a rein upon my imagination, which was tempted to see in this sign of alliance spoken of in the Scriptures, the presage of the true union between the western and the eastern world, and the dawning of the day for the success of my project.

“The Viceroy’s presence served to draw me out of my reverie, as he came to wish me the ‘top of the morning,’ and to ask me to take him round the country which I had ridden over the day before. Preceded by two lancers, and followed by the staff, we reached an eminence where the ground was strewn with stones which had formed part of some ancient building. The Viceroy deemed this a very suitable place to prepare for the morrow’s start, so he sent an aide-de-camp to have his tent and carriage brought up, the latter being a sort of omnibus drawn by six mules and fitted up as a bedroom. We rest under the shade of the carriage, while the chasseurs build up a circular parapet formed of stones which they had picked up, and in this parapet they make an embrasure into which a gun is placed to salute the troops from Alexandria which are just coming in sight. When I leave the

Viceroy to go and get my breakfast, in order to show him how well my horse can jump, I put him over the parapet and gallop off to my tent. You will see that this foolhardy act was one of the reasons which induced the Viceroy's *entourage* to support my scheme, the generals who came to breakfast with me, and who had seen the feat, telling me as much.

"I thought that the Viceroy had been sufficiently prepared by my previous conversations to admit how desirable it would be for a Government to have important public works of unquestionable utility executed by a financial company, and guided by the happy presentiment of the rainbow I hoped that the day would not close without a decision having been come to with regard to the Suez Canal.

"At five o'clock I again mounted my horse and came up to the Viceroy's tent by way of the parapet. He was very bright and good tempered, and taking me by the hand, he led me to a divan and made me sit by his side. We were alone, and through the opening of the tent I could see the setting of the sun which, at its rising that morning, had so stirred my imagination. I felt inwardly calm and assured at the moment of entering upon a question which was to be decisive of my future. I had clearly before me my studies and conclusions with regard to the canal, and the execution of the work seemed so easy of realisation that I felt little doubt as to being able to convince the Prince of this. I set out my project, without entering into

details, dwelling upon the principal facts and arguments set out in my memorandum, which I had by heart. Mohammed Said listened with evident interest to what I had to say, and I begged him if there were any points which did not seem clear to him to mention them to me. He, with considerable intelligence, raised a few objections, with respect to which I was able to satisfy him, as he at last said to me: 'I am convinced; I accept your plan; we will concern ourselves during the rest of our expedition as to the means of carrying it out. You may regard the matter as settled, and trust to me.' Thereupon he summoned his generals, bade them seat themselves upon some folding chairs which were just in front of the divan, and repeated the conversation we had had together, asking them to give their opinions as to the proposals of his 'friend,' as he was pleased to call me to these improvised advisers, better suited to give an opinion as to a cavalry manœuvre than a gigantic enterprise, the significance of which they were incapable of understanding. They stared at me and looked as if they thought that their master's friend, whom they had just seen put his horse over a wall, could not be otherwise than right, they raised their hands to their heads as their master spoke in sign of assent.

"The dinner was brought in upon a salver, and just as we had all been of one assent, so we all dipped our spoons into one and the same tureen, which contained some excellent soup. Such is the faithful and

true narrative of the most important negotiation I ever undertook, or am likely to undertake.

“At about eight o'clock I took leave of the Viceroy, who told me that we were to start on the morrow. Upon regaining my encampment, Zulfikar Pasha guessed what had happened, and was not less pleased than myself. A friend of the Viceroy from childhood and his most intimate confidant, he had been of very material assistance to me in bringing about this happy result. I was not inclined to go to sleep, so I jotted down my travelling notes and gave a final polish to the memorandum which the Viceroy had asked me to draw up, and which had been ready for the last two years. It was as follows:—

“‘CAMP OF MAREA, November 15, 1854.

“‘The joining together of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by a navigable canal is an enterprise the utility of which has attracted the attention of all the great men who have reigned or been for a time in Egypt: Sesostris, Alexander, Cæsar, the Arab conqueror Amrou, Napoleon I., and Mohammed Ali. A canal communicating by way of the Nile with the two seas existed in ancient times—but for how long we know not—under the old Egyptian dynasties; during a second period of 445 years, from the first successors of Alexander and the Roman conquest until the fourth century before the Hegira, and finally for a period of 130 years after the Arab conquest.

“ ‘Napoleon, directly he arrived in Egypt, appointed a commission of engineers to ascertain whether it would not be possible to re-establish and to perfect this mode of communication. The question was decided in the affirmative, and when the learned M. Lepère handed him the report, he said : “The work is great, and though I shall not now be able to accomplish it, the Turkish Government will some day, perhaps, reap the glory of carrying it out.

“ ‘The time has come to realise Napoleon’s prediction. The piercing of the Isthmus of Suez is certainly an enterprise destined to contribute more than any other to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and to demonstrate to those who announced its approaching ruin that it still has a fruitful existence before it, and that it is capable of adding a brilliant page the more to the history of human civilisation.

“ ‘Why is it that the Governments and people of the West are at the present moment coalesced to maintain the Sultan in the possession of Constantinople? and why does the Power which has threatened to deprive him of it meet with such opposition if it be not that the passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea is of such importance that the European Power which became mistress of it would overrule all the rest?

“ ‘If a similar and still more important position were established in another part of the Ottoman Empire, and if the commerce of the world were made to pass through Egypt, the position of the Empire

would be doubly strengthened, for the great European Powers, in order to prevent any one of them ever seizing it, would regard it as a vital necessity to guarantee the neutrality of the canal.

“ ‘ M. Lepère, half a century ago, estimated that the re-opening of the old roundabout canal would take ten thousand workmen four years, and would cost from twelve to sixteen hundred thousand pounds. He also considered practicable the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez at Pelusium.

“ ‘ M. Paulin-Talabot, one of the three celebrated engineers selected ten years ago, together with Messrs. Stephenson and Negretti, by a company which had been formed to prosecute this enterprise, was in favour of the indirect route from Alexandria to Suez, making use of the dam for crossing the Nile. He estimated the total cost at £5,200,000 for the canal, and £800,000 for the port and harbour of Suez.

“ ‘ Linant-Bey, who for the last thirty years has been conducting with much ability the canalising works in Egypt, who has made this question of the junction of the two seas his constant study, and whose opinion, formed from practical experience, deserves the utmost consideration, had proposed to pierce the isthmus almost in a straight line at its narrowest point, forming a large inland port in the basin of Lake Timsah, and making the passes of Pelusium and Suez available to ships of the largest tonnage from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

“The general of engineers, Gallice-Bey, the director and designer of the fortifications of Alexandria, had, upon our initiative, submitted to Mohammed Ali a scheme very closely resembling that of Linant-Bey. Mougel-Bey, director of the dam works upon the Nile, chief engineer of roads and bridges, had also spoken to Mohammed Ali of the possibility and utility of the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez; and in 1840, at the request of Count Walewski, then upon a mission in Egypt, he was instructed to take preliminary steps in Europe, which the course of political events unfortunately cut short. Careful examination will show which of the routes is the best, but as the enterprise has been proved to be practicable, all that remains is to select the most feasible project.

“No operation, however difficult, is now regarded by modern art as impossible. Its feasibility is not doubted; it is merely a question of money, which the spirit of enterprise and co-operation will soon solve, if the profits which are to result from it are in proportion to the cost. It is easy to show that the cost of the Suez Canal, taking the highest estimate, is not out of proportion with the usefulness and the profits of this great work, which would abridge by more than half the distance between the principal countries of Europe, America, and the Indies.

“Mohammed Said has not been slow to see that there was no work which, as regards the grandeur and utility of its results, could compare with this. What

a glorious record for his reign, what an inexhaustible source of wealth for Egypt it will be ! The names of the Egyptian sovereigns who erected the pyramids, those monuments of human pride, remain unknown. The name of the Prince who opens the great maritime canal will be blessed from century to century, down to the most distant posterity.

“ ‘The pilgrimage to Mecca secured for all time and made easy for the Mohammedans ; an immense impulse given to steam navigation and long voyages ; the countries along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the eastern coast of Africa, India, the kingdom of Siam, Cochin China, Japan, the vast Chinese Empire, the Philippine Islands, Australia, and that vast archipelago towards which the emigration of ancient Europe is tending, all brought three thousand leagues nearer to the basin of the Mediterranean, as well as to the north of Europe and America : such are the sudden and immediate results of piercing the Isthmus of Suez.

“ ‘It has been calculated that the navigation of Europe and America, by the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, is equivalent to an annual movement of six million tons, and that if only half of this was conveyed by way of the Gulf of Arabia, the trade of the world would realise a profit of six millions sterling per annum.

“ ‘It is beyond doubt that the Suez Canal will lead to a great increase of tonnage, but reckoning only three million tons, a tax of ten francs a ton, which might

be reduced as the navigation increased, would yield annually £1,200,000.

“ ‘In terminating this memorandum, I think it right to call your Highness’s attention to the preparations which are being made for opening up communications between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and to the effects upon the world’s trade, and ultimately upon the future of Turkey, by the opening of these new routes if the isthmus which separates the Mediterranean and the Red Sea were to remain much longer closed to trade and navigation.

“ ‘Does not this show that the time for treating that question has arrived? May we not conclude that this great work, far more important for the future of the world, is henceforth secure from all serious opposition, and that the efforts made to realise the project will be sustained by the universal sympathy and active assistance of the enlightened men of all countries?

“ ‘F. DE LESSEPS.’

“The ground at Marea, where we are encamped (*Gheil* in Arabic) has still some traces of antiquity. I remarked the shafts of several columns and an immense cistern, half destroyed, with ten or twelve pointed arches, while all over the surrounding hills are to be seen stone which has been used for building. There is an abundance of good water, of which Ibrahim, a character of whom it is worth while to give a sketch, had brought us some from the cistern. Ibrahim

is a very good specimen of the cunning and greedy Arab, such as Europeans are familiar with. He had met Clot-Bey in the streets of Alexandria, had made out that he had formerly been under his treatment, and had declared his intention of serving him in future. In this way he had joined the camp, with the new master to whom he had, so to speak, attached himself by force. As soon as he saw me, he found that I was the most influential person in the camp, so he transferred his attentions to me, telling me that 'I was in his eye' and that he had become attached to me, and would not leave me while I was in Egypt. This sudden change of views, which I communicated to my companion, was not calculated to give me a high opinion of Ibrahim's morality; but he was so careful in anticipating all our wants, from morning to night, and so intelligent in his service, that we left him to look after all the details of our encampment, to strike the tent and have it loaded with the rest of the luggage on the camels, and to have it got ready at the next halting-place, where he was always waiting for us with some fresh water and a cup of coffee."

" November 16, 1854.

"Being the first to get up, I take advantage of this to write and communicate the good news to France, Zulfikar sending off the letters by a messenger on a dromedary to Alexandria. After breakfasting with the Viceroy, a signal gun announces that the camp is

about to be raised, and in the twinkling of an eye thousands of tents are struck and placed upon the camels' backs. This large caravan defiles past us, leaving Lake Mareotis in its rear and taking the desert road, looking like a large piece of ribbon being unwound. The infantry regiments are formed in three columns, with sharpshooters on either side, followed by the artillery and cavalry. The Viceroy follows on horseback, with me to his right, and Selim Pasha, the general of cavalry, to his left. Selim is one of the former students of the school of Giseh, whom I remember entering the service in 1833 under the French Colonel Varin. We gallop off from the hill on which we were to a plateau just opposite, and we watch the army defiling below us, the soldiers cheering and brandishing their muskets as they pass before the Viceroy, the cuirassiers, wearing the ancient Sarrazin helmets, which glittered in the sun, looking remarkably well. After the march past we took our places at the head of the army, preceded by a dozen Bedouin horsemen who acted as scouts. There had been no army on the march in this region since the expedition of General Bonaparte, whose brave troops underwent great hardships, where we were merely making a military promenade, with every conceivable comfort provided for us.

“Upon arriving at our halting-place for the night, the Viceroy sent to say that he was tired and was going to bed; but that he would send me the dinner

which, by the light of a dozen torches, a troop of some five-and-twenty or thirty cooks and scullery lads were getting ready. I went to have a look at this open-air laboratory. Three rows of saucepans, placed in a row over some trenches which had been dug in the ground, were being heated by faggots placed in the hollow of the ground. This is not an economical mode of cooking, but it is a very expeditious way. After dinner our tent is converted into a drawing-room, for it is gradually becoming the rendezvous of the staff, who come to hear the news, while Zulfikar carries on his correspondence, opens the Viceroy's letters, receives and despatches the messengers, and gives the orders in the Prince's name."

"November 17, 1854.

"At seven the Prince was up and out of his tent, and upon my going out to him he tells me that he has been disturbed by the trumpeters of the cavalry, who are quite close to his tent, which he has placed about 350 feet farther off, the intervening space being intended for the erection of targets at which he means his artillerymen and chasseurs to practise. The day is spent by the troops in bathing and washing their clothes in the canal; and, after a ride on my horse, I come to where the Viceroy is making his sharpshooters aim at a target about 550 yards off. None of them had as yet hit it, so, taking the carbine from one of them, I showed them how to shoulder it and

how to fire. The officer asked me to try a shot, and I hit the bull's-eye. The Viceroy then sent for his own carbine, one of German make, and with that too I hit the mark ; but I declined to go on again, so as not to endanger my reputation of being a good shot. After breakfast we form a circle round the tent, and the Sheik Masri, who had shown much devotion to the Viceroy when he was persecuted by Abbas Pasha, and whom he had subsequently attached to his household, related to us the war which had occurred six months before, between a tribe from Upper Egypt and that of the Ouled-Ali, to which he belonged. The Ouled-Ali tribe encamps in the deserts which extend from Lake Mareotis to the seashore as far as the frontiers of Tripoli, cultivating the land bounded by the last of the canals which separate the desert from the provinces of Lower Egypt. The Ouled-Alis, which, with a population of only 50,000, have 10,000 guns, expecting an attack from their enemies whom the policy of Abbas Pasha had raised up against them, had formed a corps composed of 6,000 men and a certain number of women whose mission it was to urge on the men to combat by their shouts and songs. In action they are mounted upon camels, and more exposed to danger than the men. The Ouled-Alis formed entrenchments with sandbags and fascines near the village of Hoche, which we shall pass to-morrow. Here they made a stand against their opponents, who lost two hundred men in the attack,

while they had four women and three men killed. The Bedouins of Upper Egypt fled and did not return."

" November 18, 1854.

" We start two hours before daylight, the Viceroy having preceded us. We overtake him about ten o'clock at Hoche, where he was awaiting us in the tent of the governor of the province. More than a hundred Bedouin chiefs of the Ouled-Ali tribe are assembled here; they are all men of high stature and appear very quick and intelligent. The troops arrive and get under canvas, the heat being terrific, and shade most grateful. The chief who was in command during the combat referred to above comes to pay us a visit, accompanied by his son, who is as tall as himself. Prince Halim Pasha joins us, and says that we have left the region where the gazelles were to be found considerably to the right, but I am not sorry for this, as I am anxious to be as much as possible alone with the Viceroy to talk over my plans.

" We start at three, preceded by a troop of Bedouins, who every now and again start off at full gallop, wheel round, and fire, this being what they call a *fantasia*. Reaching Zaoui-el-Khamour at sunset, the Viceroy, whose hours for meals are very irregular, tells me not to wait dinner for him, and after having had it served in my tent I was just going off to sleep, about nine o'clock, when I heard the sound of female

singing, mingled with the beating of tambourines and castanets. Paolini Bey came to fetch me on the part of the Viceroy, who had allowed a troop of almées (dancing girls) to come and perform. He gave me a place on his divan, the almées crouching in a circle upon the carpet. One of them was richly attired, and had, so the Viceroy informed me, more than £400 worth of embroidery and jewellery upon her. They recommenced singing, and every now and then the Kaouadji, or chief coffee man, gently struck the singers upon the cheek, as you might a child, and made them swallow sweets and syrups. After the singing was over two of the almées got up, and standing opposite to each other, like Spanish ballerinas, began to execute their dances. Two others followed, after which the whole troop filed past the Khedive, and respectfully kissing his feet, were dismissed."

" November 19, 1854.

" We start at seven and halt at nine. The Viceroy quits his horse for the carriage, so we go on ahead with Halim Pasha, reaching at noon a regular Egyptian village, called Yahoudié. We pass over a dyke and reach a small island, situated in the midst of a cultivated and partially irrigated plain, where we find a delightful shady spot, with sycamores, willows, and mulberry trees, forming a belt of verdure around a small lake. This oasis presents a charming contrast with the sandy hillocks which we have just come over,

and which will prove very embarrassing to the artillery.

“At two o'clock the Viceroy arrives, followed by his battalion of chasseurs, and upon my going to see him I hear that he has given orders for ten steamers to be collected at Neguileh, upon the Nile, where we shall be to-morrow, and he tells me that when on the steamer he shall want me to read him my memorandum upon the Suez Canal.

“The Viceroy being about to go to bed, on account of our early start in the morning, I left him and dined in my tent with Halim and the generals.”

“November 20, 1854.

“The Viceroy did not get up so early as he had intended, for he had passed a bad night. News having been brought to him that the artillery could not get through the sand, and that several horses were already dead of fatigue, he sent reinforcements, and by dint of hard work the guns were got through.

“At eight preparations were made for a start, and while our tent was being struck an eagle came and hovered over us. Zulfikar handed me his gun, and aiming at it, I brought the bird down dead at my feet. If I mention this incident, so insignificant in itself, it is because it is destined to have an influence upon public opinion in Egypt as regards the success of my enterprise. We mount our horses and accompany the Viceroy to a village, where we alight under the

shade of two sycamores, with a delicious carpet of greenery around us, for it is at this season that the wheat is green. I leave the Viceroy there and ride on to overtake Halim. Soon after reaching the magnificent river, which, we are told, has such an irresistible attraction for the stranger who has once drunk its waters, a boat takes us out to the yacht which the Viceroy's predecessor, Abbas Pasha, had built in England at a cost of £100,000. It is quite beyond me to describe the luxurious character of the fittings, the painting, and the furnishing of this vessel, with its doors in oak and citron wood, its locks and fastenings in solid silver, its medallions representing rivers and animals painted by distinguished artists, its staircases with silver balustrades, its divans lined with cloth of gold, its dining-room forty feet long, and its bedrooms like those of a palace. The Viceroy comes in soon after, and after again showing me this floating palace, says that of course he should never have committed such an act of folly as to build such a boat, but that as she is in existence he makes use of her. He places at my service during the two or three days we spend on the Nile to wait for the troops and despatch them to Cairo his ancient old steamer the *El Ferusi* (the *Turquoise*), assigning another boat to Halim Pasha. My quarters on the *Turquoise* consists of a saloon forty feet long, with a large divan decorated with handsome Lyons silk brocaded in gold, of a bedroom, a dressing-room, and a bath-room in white marble. Clot Bey,

Hassan Pasha, and two generals, occupy other rooms, and we dine in the saloon."

"ON THE NILE, November 21, 1854.

"I pay a visit to the Viceroy in the morning and read him my memorandum, striking out one or two passages of which he did not approve. I also read him the draft firman of concession, which he approves in its entirety.

"After a talk with Halim Pasha, he promises me to do what he can to effect the reconciliation of Achmet Pasha, the heir to the Viceroy, and the latter. We next go to see Mahommed Said, where we breakfasted. We arranged for a hunting party in a village close to Néguileh, and the Viceroy had the steam got up on his boat. Upon reaching the island, where we had been told that we should find wild boars, we saw plenty of traces of them, but they probably only came there of a night, so we returned to our previous anchorage. A steamer from Cairo, with passengers from Alexandria, landed Moustafa Pasha, a brother of Achmet Pasha, and a nephew of the Viceroy, who asked him to join us in our expedition. He also told him about my scheme and advised him to read my memorandum."

"November 22, 1854.

"Had a conversation with Moustafa about the canal. He is very intelligent and well-informed, and

speaks French like a Parisian. We breakfast on the Viceroy's yacht. His Highness informs me that the *Turquoise* will that evening take on board troops and start in the night for Cairo with all the other vessels except his own, which will leave in the morning. So I have my things moved on board."

" November 28, 1854.

" When I go early on deck, Moustafa begs me to read him my memorandum. He seems very satisfied with it, shows much enthusiasm for the undertaking, and says that he will put money into it. The Viceroy, who has joined us, himself opens the subject of the canal, asking me what engineer is to make the preliminary investigations upon the spot. I tell him Linant Bey, to whom Mougel Bey might also be adjoined, and that their report can then be considered by the English, French, and German engineers, whose researches will be submitted to the commission over which I shall preside, and which will decide as to the best route to follow.

" At night time we stop for an hour at the dams, which we see by torchlight, reaching Boulac at eleven and spending the night there."

" CAIRO, November 24, 1854.

" I rise at six and find the Viceroy has already gone off incognito to the citadel. He had told Zulfikar that I was to wait for a carriage which would come to take

me to the Palace of the Muçafirs (strangers), near the mosque of Setti-Zeneb (St. Zenobia), where apartments had been retained for me. At seven a large barouche with four horses and two chiaous (officers of the Viceroy's household) carrying their silver-headed canes drove up, and I made it halt near the Square of Esbekié, at the house of Linant Bey, who threw himself into my arms when I told him that his dream of the piercing of the isthmus was about to become a reality. I went up also to see Madame Linant, whose marriage I had when French consul at Cairo celebrated, but whom I had not set eyes on since.

“Lubbert Bey, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who lived in the neighbourhood, hearing of my arrival, came to see me. When I first visited Alexandria as student-consul in 1832, Lubbert was the friend and guest of my dearly beloved superior, M. Mimaut, one of the most distinguished diplomats ever in the service of France. I shall never forget how M. Mimaut, with the great work on the Egyptian expedition in his hand, gave me the first notion of the canal between the two seas, a subject of which up to that date I had not the faintest knowledge.

“I then go on to take possession of my new abode, and make a grand entrance between two rows of mamelukes and servants. The nazir (steward) of the palace, a worthy effendi with a grey beard,

reminding one of Francis I., rushes to the door of the carriage and holds me by the arm as I get out, and so escorts me to the apartments, followed by the chiaus and other servants. The Palace of the Muçafirs was the residence of the Egyptian Institute at the time of the French expedition, and it was there that the commission of savants who had been ordered to report upon the canal used to meet. It was a singular coincidence that after the lapse of half a century these same walls should witness the realisation of a work which had been thought out within them at the bidding of the greatest man of his century.

“I am informed that I have twenty horses at my disposal, ten for harness and ten for riding, a state coach richly gilt, a barouche, a landau, and a ‘my lord’! Breakfast was laid for twelve covers.

“The Viceroy had advised me to lose no time in going to see Mr. Bruce, the agent and consul-general of England, to tell him of his Highness’s intention to make the canal, and to communicate to him the documents relating to it.

“I have a conference of two hours with him, and he told me that though he could not speak for his Government, to whom he would report my visit, he did not hesitate to give me his personal opinion, which was that so long as there was no intervention on behalf of any foreign Power in the affair, and that the work was carried out by means of capital freely subscribed to an enterprise sanctioned by the governor

of the country, he could not foresee that any difficulty would be raised by England. I replied that I was of the same opinion, and that the question, formerly so serious, of the opening of the Suez Canal being now extricated from the political difficulties which had obscured it, became a mere matter of practical possibility and finding the money. As regards the practicability of the scheme, men of science had already pronounced in its favour, as others would do ; while as regards money, it is certain not to run short for a work which will not only enrich the trade of the world, but will, according to the most modest estimate, be a profitable speculation for shareholders. It is agreed that I shall send a letter to Mr. Bruce, enclosing a copy of my memorandum and of the firman, and the Viceroy expresses himself as satisfied with the course of this interview.

“König Bey, the former tutor to the Viceroy, who is now his private secretary, is ordered to translate the documents relating to the canal into Turkish.”

“CAIRO, November 25, 1854.

“The Viceroy had asked me, without giving any reason, to go to the citadel at 9 A.M., and upon entering the grand divan I find the Viceroy seated at the same spot where his aged father, Mehemet Ali, had often received me, and where he once told me the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes. All the functionaries came to congratulate the Viceroy upon

his safe arrival in his capital, and no sooner had they taken their seats on the divan than he publicly declared that he had resolved to open up the Isthmus of Suez by means of a maritime canal, and to entrust me with the formation of a company composed of capitalists of all nations to which he would cede the right to execute and work this enterprise. Then, speaking to me, he said, 'Is this not so?' I then spoke a few words, taking care to let the spontaneity and merit of the decision remain with him to avoid ruffling the susceptibilities of foreigners.

"The Consul-General of England was somewhat ill at ease, but the Consul-General of the United States, to whom the Viceroy had said, 'Well, M. de Leon, we are going to start an opposition to the Isthmus of Panama, and we shall be done before you,' had boldly spoken out and replied in what I could not but regard as a favourable sense.

"After the consuls had withdrawn, I told the Viceroy of the coincidence of my being lodged in the residence of the ancient Egyptian Institute, and it struck him as being so strange that he sent for several of his intimate friends to tell them of it. He was very satisfied at having made this declaration to the consuls. I told him that I should never have dared to advise him to do it, but that I thought he had taken the best course for cutting short a great many objections and difficulties by letting public opinion know of a project the general utility of which is incontest-

able. His reply was: 'I must admit that I had not thought of this; it was an act of sudden inspiration; you know that I am not inclined to follow ordinary rules, and that I do not like to do as other people do.'

"While I am conversing with the Viceroy, Solimon Pasha comes to see him on military matters, and I drove off in my state coach drawn by four white horses. The negro coachman drives very well, and goes at full trot or in a gallop through the narrow streets and bazaars of Cairo, though I must add that the footmen distribute, in spite of my admonitions, blows with their staves right and left to keep off the persons on foot, who stand close up against the walls and shops. These poor fellows do not complain, but on the contrary exclaim in a tone of admiration, 'Ah; there is a grand seigneur going by. Mashallah (Glory be to God)!' !

"Such is the East, such it has been from all time, and so it is described to us in the Bible, where we read that after Joshua had massacred the inhabitants of Jericho, even to the women and the asses, 'so was the might of the Lord made manifest.'

"In the course of the day I go to see the three sons of Ibrahim Pasha, the eldest of whom, Achmet Pasha, is a well-educated man who had distinguished himself at the French Polytechnic School. He is very well qualified, like his father, to administer his vast properties, and he argues very well in French upon all topics. He had been to see the Viceroy on the morn-

ing of his arrival, and had been very well received. He knew that I had helped to effect the reconciliation, and he was grateful accordingly.

“I have already alluded to Ibrahim Pasha’s third son, Moustafa, and as to the second, Ismael, I like him very much, and am delighted at his reception of me. He has handsome and distinguished features, and shows all the blood of Mehemet Ali. When he comes to think less of his pleasures, he will, I think, made his mark in the world. Although only five-and-twenty, he is already the father of twelve children. He inherited from his father the finest palace in Cairo, upon the banks of the Nile, and he has spent there more than £40,000 upon furniture which he has had sent from France. He showed me through his vast and splendid apartments on the ground floor, and part of those on the first floor, the rest being reserved for the harem. Passing through a large saloon, I could see the hangings heaving to and fro behind which the eunuchs were moving about. The banisters of the staircase are of carved rosewood, encrusted with silver, the balustrades being of Baccarat crystal.

“From thence I went to the house of Halim Pasha, who inhabits one of Mehemet Ali’s residences. There is an avenue leading up to it, a league in length, of large sycamores, which I remember as very fine trees when I first saw them, but which now form a dense roof of greenery. This avenue was planted by the French army in 1800. Halim received me very

graciously, and expressed himself as delighted at his brother's declaration with respect to the Suez Canal. He has all the vivacity and manners of a southern Frenchman, with a very pure Parisian accent.

"I also paid a visit to M. Huber, the Austrian agent and consul. He spoke to me of the interest his Government took in the opening of the Suez Canal, and said that he had been instructed to support the project very heartily when it came to be discussed. He afterwards came to dine with me, when he met Mr. Bruce, Baron von Pentz, consul-general of Prussia, Count d'Escayrac, a French traveller, Linant Bey, and others.

"Clot Bey has become my guest, the Viceroy having told Zulfikar to ask him to come and stay here. He has introduced to me M. Reynier, a young poet, who is tutor to his children, and whom he has brought from Marseilles. M. Reynier is two-and-twenty, and he has very charming features, with an open and candid air which has much prepossessed me in his favour. His father is librarian to the town of Marseilles, and he has very kindly placed himself at my disposal as secretary. After having made a few copies of my memorandum and firman he was able to write them off by heart."

"November 26, 1854.

"I receive a visit from Talat Bey, the Viceroy's first secretary for Turkish affairs, and Kœnig Bey,

who occupies the same post for European affairs, came with him as interpreter.

“At ten o'clock I go up to the citadel, where the Viceroy keeps me to breakfast, the conversation turning upon what he calls ‘my affair.’ It is arranged that Mougel Bey shall take part in the exploring which we propose to make with Linant. At first he made some objections as to the difficulty of keeping two engineers of one mind, but at last he agreed to my proposal, by which I set considerable store. Upon my return to Setti-Zeneb I receive a visit from Achmet Pasha, whom I like more each time I see him. Among other visitors was Arnaud Bey, who had just travelled 1,200 leagues up the Nile, or 300 further than anyone else. He gives us some very interesting details of the expedition, which had been organised by Mehemet Ali, who had given him a corps of 800 men. He could not go any further owing to the mutinous attitude of some of the officers. All the expenses had been defrayed by elephants’ tusks, which they brought back by water. Arnaud Bey spoke in high terms of the treatment which he had met with from the negro populations he had traversed, and which had never before seen boats with sails. None of his men had been killed by the natives. Remounting towards the Equator, to which he got within two degrees, the natives told him that navigation was possible up to the fourth degree beyond the Equator, that is to say for another 150

leagues. In the higher regions on both banks of the Nile there are immense forests full of elephants, lions, and animals of all kinds. His troops had sometimes fired into herds of hundreds of elephants, which went tranquilly on their way without looking round, and took no more notice of the firing than if they had been pelted with sweatmeats. Upon one occasion an elephant was surrounded, whereupon he rushed at one of the men, seized him with his trunk, and hurled him into the air; at last, by dint of firing at him at close quarters, the animal was killed.

*To Mr. Bruce, Agent and Consul-General of Her
Britannic Majesty in Egypt.*

" November 27, 1854.

"I have already had the honour of speaking to you about the Viceroy of Egypt's project for piercing the Isthmus of Suez. His Highness, who intends to make over to me his powers for the constitution of a Universal Company, to which would be conceded the making and working of the new route, has requested me to communicate to you a copy of the memorandum which he has asked me to draw up on this subject, in which he wishes to meet the wishes of England as well as of other nations. Anything which contributes to the extension of trade, industry, and navigation must be specially advantageous to England, considering that she takes rank before all other powers in the importance of her navy, her manufacturing products,

and her commercial relations. Only the unfortunate prejudices which, owing to political differences, have so long divided France and England could have accredited the belief that the opening of the Suez Canal, a work of civilisation and progress, would be detrimental to British interests. The frank and sincere alliance of the two nations which are at the head of civilisation, an alliance which has already proved the possibility of solutions heretofore regarded as impossible, will facilitate, among other beneficial results, an impartial consideration of this vast question of the Suez Canal, will enable us to form a true estimate of its influence upon the prosperity of all nations, and will prove that it is a heresy to believe that an enterprise destined to shorten by a full half the distance between the east and the west is not good for England, the mistress of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands,* Aden, and important establishments upon the east coast of Africa, India, Singapore, and Australia.

England, therefore, as much as and even more than France, must be in favour of piercing this narrow strip of land only forty leagues in breadth, which no one who gives a thought to questions of civilisation and progress can see on the map without earnestly wishing to wipe out the only obstacle in the way of the main route for the trade of the world.

“The communication of my memorandum, and of the powers which the Viceroy proposes to confer on

* Note of the Translator.—They have since been ceded to Greece.

me, obviate the necessity of my entering more into detail about an enterprise in which, as you will observe, there is no question of any special privileges for one state more than another, all that is intended being to constitute an independent company, which the shareholders of all nationalities will be able to join upon equal terms."

To Mr. Richard Cobden, M.P., London.

"CAIRO, December 8, 1854.

"As a friend of peace and of the Anglo-French alliance I send you a piece of news which will contribute to realise the saying 'aperire terram gentibus.' I refer to the Viceroy's concession of powers for making a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. Some persons assert that the project will excite hostility in England. I cannot believe it. Your statesmen are too enlightened for me to admit such an idea. What! England has herself one-half of the general trade with the Indies and China; she possesses an immense empire in Asia; she can reduce by a third the costs of her trade and reduce by one-half the distance; and she will refuse to do so, simply in order that the nations bordering on the Mediterranean may not benefit by their geographical situation to do a little more trade in Eastern waters than they do at present! She would deprive herself of the advantages to be derived materially and politically from this new mode of communication, merely because others are more favourably

placed than herself, just as if the geographical situation was everything, and as if, taking everything into account, England had not more to gain from this work than all the Powers put together. Then, again, we are told that England apprehends that the diminution by more than a third in the voyage to India would lead to a reduction in the number of merchantmen. The experience of railways has surely proved to an extent exceeding the boldest estimates that a shortening in the distance and an abbreviation in the length of a journey increases to an extent exceeding all calculation the business relations and traffic. It is wonderful that those who raise this objection do not advise the English Government to send ships to India by way of Cape Horn, as that would entail a still further increase in the number of ships, the distance being so much longer. If by any possible chance the difficulties with which we already are threatened should arise, I hope that the public spirit which is so powerful in England will soon override interested opposition and antiquated objections.

“Let me hope also that, should the occasion require it, I may count upon your support.”

“December 17, 1854.

“I pay a visit to Father Leonardo, superior of the Franciscan Monastery, who receives me in the room occupied by Murat during the French expedition. While making a cruise on the Nile Kœnig Bey shows

me a letter he had written to Mr. Bruce, asking him to come on board at eleven and bring Mr. Murray with him. The Viceroy had very reluctantly agreed to give Mr. Murray an audience, as he accused him of having instigated Abbas Pasha to persecute him in bygone years, but I advised him to do so rather than offend the English agent. The audience passed off very smoothly, and after the departure of Mr. Murray, with whom he shook hands, the Viceroy said laughingly to me, 'I shall not give my hand to a friend to-day, having done so to an enemy. I showed myself a good diplomatist, did I not, and said many things which I did not think?'

"The Viceroy has heard with much satisfaction from M. Sabatier, the French consul, that the Emperor has sent him an autograph letter, accompanied with the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour."

" December 18, 1854.

"I pay a visit to the Viceroy, who is returning to Tourah. He has heard that I had told Linant to draw money from my bankers to pay for the utensils and provisions required for our journey through the isthmus. He said that he could not allow this, and he very quietly chided me for having supposed that he would permit me to incur the least expense while I was his guest.

"At Setti-Zeneb this evening I gave a dinner of thirty covers, in the Viceroy's name, in honour of Mr.

Murray, who was invited, together with all the consuls-general, his late colleagues, several Englishmen and Egyptian functionaries."

" December 19, 1854.

" Kœnig Bey fetches me this morning to go and see the Viceroy at Tourah, where I spend part of the day in discussing our journey to the isthmus, which is definitely fixed for the 23rd."

" December 22, 1854.

" The reception of the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour took place to-day at the citadel, the presentation being made by M. Sabatier, to whose congratulations the Viceroy replied in a neat little speech delivered in very good French."

" December 23, 1854.

" We start at nine, M. and Madame Sabatier and a few friends accompanying me as far as Suez. We take with us two mounted couriers, one for the relays at the different stations, the other to accompany our carriages. There is a good macadam road from Cairo to Suez, and fifteen relays, or stations, and after dining and sleeping at the eighth we reach Suez at noon the next day, having done our thirty-three leagues in the desert as comfortably as if we had travelled from Paris to Orleans."

" SUEZ, December 25, 1854.

" The rising sun lights up my room, and, opening my window, I gaze in mute contemplation upon the Red Sea, whose rising waters lap the walls of the

should be in keeping with it, he had bought a fine gilt sword, a wand of office, patent leather shoes, and a very gaudy sash, but in order to pay for them he had taken the money he wanted out of my pockets and from other people's. So, without more ado, he had been turned out of the place and told to show his face no more."

"December 26, 1854.

"The journey by land from Suez to the Fountains of Moses takes more than two hours, so we embark upon a government steamer, which lands us there in half the time.

"M. Costa, the owner of the principal spring, accompanies us and tells us that he has had a breakfast prepared for us at which a sheep will be served whole. His wife and sister-in-law, attired in the richest of Oriental costumes, the eyelids and lashes painted, accompany Madame Sabatier. We had scarcely emerged from the narrow pass into the gulf before a very strong wind got up. The captain and pilot declare that it would be impossible to land, which we can quite believe when we see how the waves dash upon the shore. The road is covered with eddies of sand which would have made the drive most unpleasant for the ladies, so we have to give up the excursion, and M. Sabatier prepares to return to Cairo, taking with him all the persons who had accompanied us to Suez."

“ December 27, 1854.

“ We spend the day in a careful examination of the port of Suez and the mouth of the canal. When the tide is low, we go out to the islets and to what look like beds of rocks, but which we find to be remains of ancient masonry. We break off fragments at the spot which probably formed the floating-dock of ancient Chlysma. I intend to have it analysed by M. Le Play, sending him at the same time specimens of the stone and materials which may be taken from the neighbouring mountains. In a small island near the port the East India Company has formed a cemetery, but it has been found necessary to surround it with a wall, as the Arab women who had no children used to go and steal the bones of the Christians, which, worn as amulets, are considered to ensure child-bearing.

“ We dined with Mr. West, the English consul, and our dinner is composed of mutton from Calcutta, potatoes from Bombay, green peas from England, poultry from Egypt, water from the Ganges, wine from France, coffee from Moka, and tea from China.”

“ December 28, 1854.

“ We mount our horses at eight and ride off to the principal gorge of Mount Attaka, where St. Anthony is said to have lived in a grotto, which is no longer to be seen. When one leaves Suez, it seems as if the mountain is within half an hour's ride, but it takes us at least three hours.

"We follow the bed of a torrent which leads us to the gorge where we intend to make our collection of minerals, and we get together specimens of marble, calcareous marl, clay, &c., which we carry back with us to Suez, where M. Costa takes us to see the house in which Bonaparte lodged. The present owner, born in the same year, has commemorated the visit by decorating his salon with drawings of all the great victories gained during the First Empire."

"December 29, 1854.

"Early in the morning we go by steamer to the extremity of the Bay of Suez, to the shore where terminates the valley which begins at Cairo. M. Costa accompanies us, and he has written to his father at the Fountains of Moses to say that we shall dine and sleep there on our way back, returning the next day by road to Suez.

"The first part of our voyage went off very well, and at eleven o'clock we landed at the foot of the lofty mountain of Gene'be', situated at the extreme left of a broad bay of which the Attaka formed the extreme right. Opposite to us is the valley wrongly called that of Moses or of the going astray, for the Hebrews never passed that way. It is easy to follow on the map, between Lake Timsah and the basin of the Bitter Lakes, covered at that time by the Red Sea, the march of the Jews when they escaped with Moses from the army of Pharaoh, the very places having, as Linant

Bey has shown, retained the names used in Holy Writ. We are ten leagues from Suez, and as the boats from our steamer cannot go right to shore, we are carried over the intervening distance by the sailors. After reconnoitring the district, we find that the mountain is composed of strata of alabaster, marble, and other calcareous stones, while Linant Bey discovers that behind Mount Gene'be', to the south, there are fields of all the most valuable varieties of marble. We hope, upon re-embarking at two, to reach between four and five the Fountains of Moses, which really are one of the places at which the Hebrews halted after the passage of the Red Sea. But after we had got about half way an accident occurred to the boiler, and though no serious damage ensued we had to spend the whole of the night on board, and instead of enjoying M. Costa's dinner got back to our hotel at Suez at six in the morning."

" December 30, 1854.

" After we had had some breakfast we gave orders for our caravan of camels and dromedaries to be ready for a start, and though my companions were still suffering a little from the fatigue of the previous day and night, we went to our tents, which were put up between the gate of the town and the ruined citadel of ancient Chlysma, upon the sea shore, at the end of the port. It is here that will be the mouth of the Nile water canal, which is an indispensable auxiliary of the

maritime canal. Our encampment, which will remain the same for the rest of our expedition, consists of three round tents twenty feet in diameter, the first being for Linant and myself, the second for Mougel and the young engineer Aïvas, who acts as secretary to Linant, and who, having been brought up in Egypt, speaks Arabic like a native, and the third for the servants. There is a fourth tent which is used as a kitchen. Some twenty barrels of Nile water are placed between the first and second tents, and watched day and night, for upon them our safety depends during our expedition. Around the kitchen are cages containing poultry and pigeons, and I am surprised to find that though these cages are left open during the day their inmates make no attempt to get away. There is also a small flock of sheep and goats, thirty-three camels and dromedaries in the care of fifteen Bedouins who sleep among them, and a couple of asses for the use of Mougel, who cannot endure the motion of the dromedary.

“We agree to start early on the morrow, and M. Aïvas reads us the memorandum of M. Linant relative to the levellings executed under his direction in 1853 along the whole length of the isthmus from Suez to Pelusium.”

“December 31, 1854.

“Soon after daylight we are ready for a start, and find the dromedaries ready saddled and crouched down

for us to mount them. To get astride a dromedary is a task requiring no little adroitness, for as soon as you have thrown the right leg over their backs they rise, and those who rise the quickest are the best. The best way is to bring the body slightly forward and make just the opposite motion when the beast stretches out its hind legs. The dromedaries provided for Linant and myself are two very fine animals, and I soon get accustomed to the motion, and other dromedaries are bestridden by M. Aïvas, an Arab effendi, and an assistant-engineer. The Bedouin sheik Jaoudé acts as guide, and has been made responsible for our safety at the price of his life. Our little troop is made up of five messengers, who will carry letters to Cairo, and Linant's 'dusky' maître d'hôtel.

"For three hours we follow the bed of the ancient canal, the two banks of which are still in a perfect state of preservation, and before sunset we pitch our tents in the desert at a spot called Makfar (the Hollowed Place), where there is a little vegetation of a meagre kind.

"Opening my Bible, which is always of special interest to read when in Egypt, I am more than ever impressed by it now, for I am drawing near to the region where Jacob and his family established themselves, and from which, four centuries later, Moses led the Hebrew people out of servitude.

"After reading some passages in the Pentateuch, I went out to admire the beautiful sunset, and was

met by Linant and Mougel, who told me that they had just seen a luminous meteor shooting from the east like a rocket, and, after describing a semi-circle, breaking up into a shower of fire towards the west. I only just saw the tail end of the phenomenon, so if it had not been for the evidence of my companions I should not have ventured to record it. If we lived in the age of signs and miracles, I might compare this vision with that which I had seen on the morning of November 15th, the day when the final decision as to the Suez Canal was given. This one occurred on December 31st, the opening day of our voyage of exploring, during which we laid the first foundations of a union between the east and the west.

“ I got M. Linant to read his treatise upon the ancient geography of the isthmus compared to the modern, and upon the route taken by the Hebrews, so as to be able to profit by the impressions which I had just received from reading some of the principal passages in the book of Moses.”

“ *January 1, 1855.*

“ We are on the move by five o'clock, and go round in a westerly direction the basin of the Bitter Lakes, which formed part of the Red Sea in the time of Moses, but which is now dried up. One can see scattered over what was the bed of the sea lumps of saline composition which look like bits of ice after a thaw. We go over part of this ground, leaving to

our right swamps in which a traveller would be engulfed, horse and all, without the least chance of escape. About half a mile to our left are the Awebet Mountains, from which good building stone and limestone might be taken.

“We ascend a hill where we see blocks of granite which have composed what is called the Persepolitan monument, and one of these blocks is covered with cuneiform or Assyrian inscriptions, while upon another is a vulture with outstretched wings, and the ancient royal wand of Egypt at each corner.

“This monument is supposed to have been erected by Darius, the Persian conqueror, after his expedition to Egypt, either to mark a boundary of territory or to perpetuate the recollection of the reconstruction of the canal of the Pharaohs, which is attributed to him by Herodotus. The stone used for it is granite from Mount Sinai.

“We still follow the desert, leaving the basin of the Bitter Lakes to our right, and find the ground less hard than that which we had ridden over the day before; the sand is not so coarse, and preserves the footsteps of all the animals which have run over it. We notice the footsteps of hyænas, gazelles, foxes, and hares crossing one another in all directions. At four o'clock we encamp in the valley of the Akram, which is the name given to a certain kind of bush.

“In the evening our conversation turns upon the canal from Suez up to the point which we have

reached, and the result of our observations is that the maritime canal, at the entrance to Suez, would receive, in the course of twenty-four hours, a supply of ten million cubic metres of water from the Red Sea tides, and that with this as well as with the waters of the Mediterranean it will be easy to fill the basin of the Bitter Lakes, which is to form an immense reservoir holding two thousand million cubic metres of water. This mass of water will suffice to feed the canal, and will create, when the winds do not force it back, a slight current towards the Mediterranean."

"January 2, 1855.

"We start at six, the wind being cold and unpleasant. We visit a second Persepolitan monument erroneously called Serapeum, and we travel along the dyke of the old canal, which now forms a road. At two o'clock we reach the place where we form our third encampment, near Lake Timsah (the Lake of Crocodiles), against the bir (well) Abdullah. This place is called in Scripture Pi-hahiroth, which in Hebrew means the Valley of Reeds, and it is still called by a similar name in Arabic, *Oued-bet-el-Bouze*. We are in the midst of the land of Gessen (Goshen), and I may here quote the verses from the Bible relating to this country, which we shall visit to-morrow.

"*Genesis*, chap. 46, v. 28.—'And he sent Judah before him unto Joseph, to direct his face unto Goshen; and they came into the land of Goshen.'

“V. 33.—‘ And it shall come to pass, when Pharaoh shall call upon you, and shall say, What is your occupation ? ’

“V. 34.—‘ That ye shall say, Thy servants’ trade hath been about cattle from our youth even until now, both we, and also our fathers: that ye may dwell in the land of Goshen.’

“*Gessen* (Goshen) in Hebrew means Pasturage, and it is worthy of note that in Arabic it is *Guess*. In the old Ethiopian language *sos* means shepherd, and this is probably the etymology of Suez. Thus the land of Gessen, or Guess, and the Isthmus of Suez would be denominations applying to the same places. We know now that the dynasty of the Hiksos, which reigned in Egypt signifies the dynasty of Armed Shepherds.

“Chap. 47, v. 4.—‘ Now therefore, we pray thee, let thy servants dwell in the land of Goshen.’

“V. 6.—‘ The land of Egypt is before thee; in the best of the land make thy father and brethren to dwell; in the land of Goshen let them dwell.’

“V. 11.—‘ And Joseph placed his father and brethren, and gave them a possession in the land of Egypt, in the best of the land, in the land of Rameses, as Pharaoh had commanded.’

“*Exodus*, chap. 1, v. 7.—‘ And the children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty; and the land was filled with them.’

"V. 8.—'Now there arose up a new king over Egypt, which knew not Joseph.'

"V. 11.—'Therefore they did set over them taskmasters to afflict them with their burdens. And they built for Pharaoh treasure cities, Pithom and Rameses.'

"Chap. 8, v. 22. *The Plague of Flies*.—'And I will sever in that day the land of Goshen, in which my people dwell, that no swarms of flies shall be there.'

"Chap. 9, v. 6. *The Sixth Plague. The Plague of Boils*.—'And all the cattle of Egypt died: but of the cattle of the children of Israel died not one.'

"V. 26. *Seventh Plague. Rain and Hail*.—'Only in the land of Goshen, where the children of Israel were, was there no hail.'

"The inductions which I draw from these passages in the Bible are that the land of Goshen, which will be intersected by our subsidiary canal from the Nile, will become at least as fertile as it was in ancient times, and that its climate is most salubrious, seeing that in our day, as in the time of Moses, the few tribes of Arab shepherds who encamp there are generally exempt from epidemics, despite their coming in contact with the populations of Lower Egypt.

"Chap. 12, v. 37.—'And the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth.'

"Succoth in Hebrew means Tents. This place is now called by the Arabs either Oum-Riam (the Mother of

Tents) or Makfar (the Hollowed-out Place where the old canal passed).

“Chap. 13, v. 20.—‘And they took their journey from Succoth, and encamped in Etham, in the edge of the wilderness.’

“Etham, which is in fact at the edge of a vast wilderness bounded by the basin of the Bitter Lakes, where the Red Sea then reached, is a spot which we visited this morning, and where the second Persepolitan monument is to be found. The tribe which at certain seasons encamps there is known as the Ethamis.

“V. 22.—‘He took not away the pillar of the cloud by day, nor the pillar of fire by night, from before the people.’

“Moses having in his youth killed an Egyptian who was maltreating an Israelite, had to fly to Mount Sinai, where he married the daughter of Jethro, the priest of Midian, whose flocks he tended for forty years. His brother Aaron came to tell him of the death of the Pharaoh during whose reign he had slain the Egyptian, which period corresponds with the length of the reign of Rhamses II., the Sesostris of the Greeks. He was acquainted with the customs of the numerous caravans, which in our own day and at certain places are preceded some distance in advance by bearers of *machallahs* (torches), which produce a pillar of fire at night. They had passed over the fords of the last lagoons of the Red Sea, as is still

done by the Bedouins, who avail themselves of the low tide to cross the Red Sea near Suez.

“The generals of Pharaoh, like those of Said Pasha, were unaware of the existence of these fords.

“Chap. 14, v. 2.—‘Speak unto the children of Israel, that they turn and encamp before Pi-hahiroth, between Magdol and the sea, over against Baalsephon : before it shall ye encamp in the sea.’

“This place is, of a truth, amid the site of the old lagoons of the Red Sea, the level of which is below that of the sea, and which will become lagoons again when the maritime canal is open. The Israelites, favoured by the tempest which the Bible describes, will have crossed at night, when the tide was low, across the low-lying tract of land between the basin of Lake Timsah and that of the Bitter Lakes, between the long sandbanks which by moonlight would have looked like white walls, and the next morning, the wind having gone down, the Egyptian troops went in pursuit of the Hebrews, and were overwhelmed by the floods or engulfed in the quicksands of the valley.

“Chap. 15, v. 22.—‘So Moses brought Israel out of the Red Sea, and they went out into the wilderness of Shur ; and they went three days in the wilderness, and found no water.’

“V. 23.—‘And when they came to Marah, they could not drink of the waters of Marah, for they were bitter.’

“In the desert of *Shur* (the desert of Syria, the other side of the Timsah and the Bitter Lakes) is a spring

which is marked upon all the maps by the name of *Bir-Mara*, *Mara* signifying *bitter* in the Hebrew as well as in Arabic.

“V. 25.—‘But Moses cried unto the Lord; and the Lord shewed him a tree, which when he had cast into the waters, the waters were made sweet.’

“Linant tells us that this practice was taught him by the Arabs of Mount Sinai, with whom he spent a good deal of time, and that in order to diminish the bitterness of brackish water they throw into it the branches of a shrub called *arak*, a species of thorn.

“V. 27.—‘And they came to Elim, where were twelve wells of water, and threescore and ten palm-trees: and they encamped there by the waters.’

“Elim is the place now known as the Fountains of Moses, twelve in number, which we were twice disappointed in our efforts to visit.

“Chap. 16, v. 14.—‘And when the dew that lay was gone, behold, upon the face of the wilderness there lay a small round thing, as the hoar frost on the ground.’

“The Israelites exclaimed, ‘*Man-hu?*’ which in Hebrew means: ‘What is it?’ This is the etymology of manna. M. Linant saw the Arabs on Mount Sinai gather up the manna which falls in the morning at sunrise, when the temperature is at a particular point, from the leaves of the *tamaris*, which grows wild nearly all over the desert we have just traversed as well as upon the other side of Sinai. It is in fact a sort of jelly or white froth, which forms of

a morning upon the leaves of the tamaris, and which, melting when the sun begins to shine, falls drop by drop on the ground and forms a paste something like honey. The manna of Sinai is not disagreeable to the taste, and has not the aperient effects of the Sicily manna which is to be found in the chemists' shops.

"The researches of Linant will show that the country in which we now are is in reality the land of Goshen. Having reached our encampment in the Valley of Reeds (Pi-hahiroth) in good time, we avail ourselves of it to compare our observations upon the course of the canal from Suez to Lake Timsah, to study anew the maps and plans of Linant, to discuss the depth and width of the new canal, and to lay down the main lines of the report upon which Linant and Mougel have to agree.

"We are anxious also to form an idea—which can, however, be only an imperfect one—as to the cost. After a great many calculations, we arrive at a total of from six and a half to seven millions. The canal communicating with the Nile from Cairo to the inland port of the maritime canal, and which from that point will branch off into two irrigating and feeding canals, one going to Suez and the other to the Mediterranean port, is estimated at £800,000. All this, as you may imagine, will have to be revised and modified, but not, I hope, much increased, with all manner of documents and plans to bear it out."

"January 8, 1855.

"At eight we start to make an excursion to the ruins of Rameses, and we halt for a quarter of an hour upon the hill where was Succoth, the first station of the Israelites, and we reach the place whence they started on their journey. There can be no longer any doubt as to the site of Rameses since the discovery of the statues which Linant, as you will see, has sketched for me. The hieroglyphic inscriptions which are carved on the blocks of granite, and which have been translated, explain that the figures represent Rhamses II. (Sesostris) and his two sons. The ground is strewn with fragments of the ancient bricks the making of which rendered the lives of the Israelites so 'bitter with hard bondage' (Exodus, chap. 1, v. 14.).

"We breakfast in the presence of Sesostris, and return to camp after having followed a part of the ancient canal connecting the Nile and the Red Sea."

"January 4, 1855.

"We start at seven to go round Lake Timsah in a westerly direction. We mark the site of Baalsephon upon a hill at the foot of which the main canal will pass. The sky becomes covered with clouds and the sand begins to whirl around the bushes, and as we are threatened with a tempest similar to that under cover of which the Israelites escaped from the chariots of the Egyptians, we hasten back to camp."

"January 5, 1855.

"It has rained all night, and as the wind is rising still there is no possibility of moving outside our tents, while, looking in the direction from which the wind comes, we see that a violent khamseen is imminent. While we are discussing the question of the canal, a gust of wind more violent than those which preceded it very nearly blew us out of the tent, and upset all our things. The conversation is renewed when the mischief has been remedied, and we calculate that the Sweet Water Canal will be the means of bringing 250,000 acres under cultivation. Just at this moment a messenger arrives with letters from Cairo, one of them being from Admiral Jurien de la Gravière before Sebastopol, while Kœnig Bey sends me a copy of the Viceroy's reply to the letter from Napoleon III. when sending him the Legion of Honour. In this letter the Viceroy speaks very favourably of the prospects of our canal; while another letter from Señor Baguer y Ribas, Consul-General of Spain at Cairo, informs me that Mr. Wilcox, one of the directors of the P. & O. Steam Company, has arrived there, accompanied by a Spaniard, Señor Zulueta, both of whom will, he considers, be inclined to associate themselves in my work."

"January 7, 1855.

"The weather having at last cleared up, we leave Pi-hahiroth for the north of Lake Timsah, which is

the central point of the isthmus, and I can at once see how well advised Linant was in proposing that there should be an inland port here. This basin is surrounded by hills, and it forms a magnificent natural port, six times larger than that of Marseilles, and all the more useful because it can easily be placed in communication with the cultivated portions of the land of Goshen and the interior of Egypt, by means of a canal branching off from the Nile. The steamers which cast anchor there will find means of revictualing as well."

"January 8, 1855.

"We begin to descry to our left Lake Mensaleh, formed partly by a rising of the Nile and partly by the waters of the Mediterranean, the shore of which has several breaks between Damietta and Pelusium.

"We halt at noon to breakfast in an oasis, the trees of which have a very pleasing effect upon the eye amidst the boundless desert. I counted twenty-three date-trees in this oasis, which the Arabs name Bir-el-Bourj (the Well of the Tower), there being amid the date-trees a well of brackish water, and upon the hill the remains of what might have been a tower.

"We wait there for the passage of our caravan, and then we wend round the eastern limit of Lake Mensaleh, where we see a quantity of white lines formed by swans, pelicans, and flamingoes.

"We then reach the foot of a hill on which was built the ancient fortress of Magdol, of which the

Bible speaks, and which travellers call Magdolum. While our encampment is being prepared we visit the ruins of the fort. History tells us that this fort was burnt, and we can trace the effects of fire upon the stones, while in the distance to the right we see the shores of Pelusium, where Pompey met his death, and to the left Damietta, where St. Louis landed."

"January 9, 1855.

"We make for Pelusium, close to which are the ruins of the modern castle of *Tineh*, which like Pelusium itself signifies *mud*, and at this season the mud itself is covered with water owing to the inundation of the Nile, so we can only contemplate from a distance the ruins of what was one of the most important cities in ancient Egypt. So terminates our first exploratory, the result of which goes to assure us that our undertaking is practicable, and I hope that the reports of the two engineers who accompany me will prove this to be so.

"We pass the night at the oasis of Bir-el-Bourj."

"January 10, 1855.

"The cold is so intense that we walk some distance by the side of our dromedaries, which soon take us on in advance of Mougel when we once mount them, as the keen air has quickened them very much, while Mougel presents a very ludicrous appearance as he comes on behind with his donkey-driver belabouring

his mount in the hope of overtaking us, the poor fellow being in mortal fear of the Arabs whenever he is left a little way behind. As soon as Mougél has got up to us we resume our journey by the shores of Lake Mensaleh, instead of crossing the desert as we had done in coming. At five we reach El Guisr, and pitch our tents at the foot of one of the highest downs in the isthmus."

"January 11—14, 1855.

"We return to Cairo, and I find time to draw out a draft of a report for the engineers and read it to Linant and Mougél, who express their approval of its tenour, but suggest that I should strike out the passage in which I propose that, should they differ in opinion, they should give their reasons. But I decline to do so because, with this reservation made, their harmony, upon which I quite reckon, will have all the more weight."

"January 15, 1855.

"At eleven we start at a good pace upon our dromedaries for Cairo. To the left is the chain of mountains which, commencing at the Mokattan and finishing at the Attaka, skirts the road to Suez, while to the right we can distinguish, amid the palm-trees and a line of greenery indicating the course of the Nile, the minarets of Kanka. The morning was a singularly beautiful one, and the view unfolded before me is delightful. We have passed Abuzabel, and we

can see the obelisk of Heliopolis, the City of the Sun, where Plato studied for seventeen years the archives of the Egyptian priests. It is a mistake to suppose that this city was the residence of Joseph, the son of Jacob. The dynasty of shepherds, under whose sway Egypt at that time was, reigned at Suez, near Lake Mensaleh, where Potiphar, the first minister of the Pharaohs, also was, as the Scriptures tell us, chief eunuch, a circumstance which pleads in favour of Madame Potiphar and makes Joseph's attitude of reserve all the more meritorious.

"We pass close beside the pretty village of Matarié, surrounded by gardens, in the midst of which is to be seen the Virgin's Tree. We then pass Birket-el-Haggi (the Lake of Pilgrims), where the great Mecca caravan, conveying the sacred carpet to the tomb of the Prophet, meets every year.

"We see before us the massive palace of Abassié, built by Abbas Pasha, and in which there are 2,000 windows, while beyond it, upon the other side of the Nile, are the summits of the two great pyramids which have been in existence not for forty, as is generally said, but for sixty centuries. To the left are the lofty steeples of the mosque built of oriental alabaster inside the citadel by Mehemet Ali, which that great man had arranged should be his burial place. He was well entitled to have for his tomb a spot where he had annihilated the representatives of barbarism and which commanded the whole of the country which

he had regenerated. As I ride along I am struck by a coincidence which had not occurred to me before. My father in 1803 was French political agent in Egypt, and Bonaparte had instructed him to pick out from among the leaders of the Turkish troops a man of energy and ability who could be proposed at Constantinople for the hitherto nominal dignity of Pasha of Cairo. Mehemet Ali, who was a native of Macedonia, in command of a thousand Bashi-Bazouks, and who could neither read nor write, had become the friend of my father, who gave him good advice how to deal with the Mamelukes who were hostile to France, and it was Mehemet's name which, at my father's suggestion, was submitted to the Sultan and agreed to.

“And now after the lapse of half a century the son of Count Mathieu de Lesseps, being already the friend of the son of Mehemet Ali, becomes his adviser for the accomplishment of a work which cannot fail to illustrate his reign, and here in this same citadel which witnessed the elevation of Mehemet Ali, following upon the massacre of the Mamelukes, Mohammed Said effects a peaceful *coup d'état* which will complete the regeneration of Europe by announcing to all the Powers of Europe that he has resolved to join the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and open to the whole world the route to India.

“I am convinced that England will profit more than any other nation from the advantages of this

route ; but there is no use concealing the fact that the old egotistical policy of Great Britain receives a mortal blow, and this is why the partisans of the traditions of old are already in a great state of excitement. I was quite prepared for this, for I had had better opportunities than any one else, both from what my father had told me and from what I had seen myself, of following at various periods their course of policy in Egypt. Why did they spare no effort to make General Bonaparte's expedition a failure ? Why, after this, did they protect the Mamelukes, who were dividing the country, driving away foreign trade, and condemning the fertile valley of the Nile to sterility ? Why, in 1840, did they induce the whole of Europe to form a league against France and Mehemet Ali, the progress made by whom they endeavoured to arrest ? Why did they give their support and advice to Abbas Pasha, that fanatical prince so opposed to progress, whom Providence removed before he had quite time to complete the disorganisation and ruin of Egypt ? Why simply because there was a party in England anxious to reduce the Viceroy to the condition of those Indian rajahs who are encouraged to lead disorderly lives, until at last they are so debased and besotted that they have no alternative except to put themselves under the protection of England or to sell their states. Fortunately this opinion is not universal in England, there being in that land of liberty a

great many noble-hearted and intelligent men who, sooner or later, will carry public opinion with them.

“My letter to Cobden will be useful as a text when the time comes to carry on a crusade against the men who stand by the past.

“After this digression, excited by the reference to the Cairo citadel, let me return to our expedition, which halted for the last time near the tomb of Malek Adel, the cupola of which protects us from the sun. Malek Adel was the brother of the Sultan Salah Eddin (Saladin), who was the reigning Caliph in Egypt during the crusade of Philip Augustus; but Madame Cottin’s French romance makes far more of him than the Arab writers, according to whom he did not play any conspicuous part in the history of his day.

“From there we ride on into Cairo, and I again take up my quarters at the palace of the Muçafirs.”

Instructions to MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey, with reference to the Scheme for a Maritime Canal from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, and for an Alimentary Canal branching from the Nile.

“CAIRO, January 15, 1855.

“The exploring mission with which the Viceroy has entrusted us being just over, I think it well to direct the attention of MM. Linant and Mougel Bey to the principal points which should be present in

their minds when they draw up the preliminary project we have agreed to prepare, pending a more complete work accompanied by plans, maps, sections, estimates, and other confirmatory documents :—

“ 1. In regard to the entrance from the Red Sea —make it clear whether the present port will be used, what work will have to be done in the way of jetties, &c.

“ 2. Indicate the precise direction of the canal from the sea to the ancient basin of the Red Sea, called the Bitter Lakes.

“ 3. Explain in what way it is proposed to utilise this basin, and if in passing through it the maritime canal ought to have a continuous bank or none at all.

“ 4. Trace the canal to the basin of Lake Timsah, intended to serve as an inland port.

“ 5. Works to be executed in order to make Lake Timsah suitable for the object proposed. Give the length of the walls of the quay. In passing through Lake Timsah the canal will have to be much broader than at other points, so that vessels may be able to anchor there, or approach the quay without obstructing the passage. These quays are to be formed as near as possible to the Sweet Water Canal.

“ 6. Direction of the maritime canal from Lake Timsah to Lake Mensaleh.

“ 7. Works to be executed along the shores of Lake Mensaleh, or in the lake itself.

"8. Will the mouth of the lake upon the Mediterranean side be the mouth of the ancient Pelusium branch?

"9. Carefully define the character and dimensions of the work to be done in the way of jetties, moles, &c, so as to answer the objections made up to the present time as to the difficulties and supposed impossibilities arising from the alluvial nature of the coast and the silting up of the sand at the mouth of a canal to the Mediterranean. This part of the report should be based upon irrefutable evidence and examples.

"10. What is the mass of water which would enter at each tide from the Red Sea into the maritime canal?

"11. What advantage can be derived from the height of the tides, not only upon the course of the maritime canal, but on the basin of the Bitter Lakes and at the mouth of the Bay of Pelusium?

"12. Reckon for the maritime canal upon a breadth of a hundred metres (40 inches each) at the line of low water in the Mediterranean, with power to reduce it to 65 or 70 metres in the few parts where the clearance necessary to make it would be too great. The depth of the water is to be six, seven, or eight metres, calculated, of course, according to the low-water level of the Mediterranean, so that the company may be able to select, with a full knowledge of the cost, whichever depth seems best suited at

once to its interests and the necessities of navigation.

“13. Reply to the objections raised as to the difficulties of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Pelusium.

“14. Make a preliminary *maximum* calculation of all the costs, and indicate the time at which presumably the canal may be open for navigation.

“15. Add to the project of a maritime canal one for a communicating, feeding, and irrigating canal brought from the Nile, starting from a point between the damming of the river and Cairo, and proceeding by way of Ouadee to Lake Timsah, the dimensions of this canal to be so calculated that with its draught of water it will be capable of irrigating about 250,000 acres when the Nile rises. This canal should, when it reaches Lake Timsah, with which it is to be connected, branch off into two parts, one going to Suez the other towards Pelusium.

“16. Examine whether the sands of the isthmus are likely to interfere with the working of the canal, and what use can be made of them by means of the irrigating canal.

“17. Give a maximum estimate of the cost of the subsidiary canal and of the time required to make it.

“18. Point out the character, quality, and site at which are to be had easily, and with little cost of transport, the materials required for the works.

“19. Finally, give an estimate of the minimum

income which might be expected from the maritime and the Sweet Water Canals.

"I do not for a moment wish to confine their report within the limits indicated by this programme. Though I have been a witness of the harmony of their views and of the identity of their conviction as to the possibility of communicating between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean by a canal accessible to the largest vessels, I beg of them, in the event of their entertaining opposite views on any subject, to record the difference of their opinions, and give the reasons for them.

"Finally, this rough draft should be completed as quickly as possible and accompanied by an explanatory map."

The next thing was to go to Constantinople, in order to obtain the Sultan's assent to the scheme, and having first appointed my old friend M. Ruysenaers agent of the company at Alexandria, I found that the ground was clear.

Note for the Viceroy of Egypt and for Count Theodore de Lesseps, Director of Foreign Affairs.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, February 15, 1855.

"Upon reaching Constantinople I found the ground quite free. If no opinion had been expressed in favour of the project, nothing had been said against it. For the two first days I endeavoured to form an exact opinion of the situation. I had learnt that the

Ministers in general, and Reschid Pasha more especially, *entirely* approved of the scheme, and would be only too glad to oblige the Viceroy if they could do so without compromising themselves overmuch.

“But there could be no doubt that they are all here under the pressure of, not to say dependent upon, the English Ambassador, whom the public call Sultan Stratford, or Abd-ul-Canning.

“I assured myself of the support of Baron de Bruck, the internuncio of Austria, of M. de Souza, the minister of Spain, of Count de Zuylen, the chargé d'affaires of Holland, and of several other personages who were in various ways likely to be of use to me.

“I heard that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was personally very much opposed to the scheme, that he had received no official instructions from his Government, but that, when the occasion arose, he would act as if he had, in accordance with his arrogance and deep-rooted jealousy of all that is French, and his incorrigible and antiquated British egotism.

“It was doubtful, I was told, whether Reschid Pasha would dare to shake off the yoke, intolerable as it was beginning to be felt.

“M. Benedetti, our chargé d'affaires, whose local experience, tact, and prudence were to stand me in such good stead, saw that it would not do for him to put himself too forward, but he promised me to do all he could to facilitate the success of a negotiation by

which, as he knew, the Imperial Government set great store. From the very first he instructed M. Schefer to pave the way for an interview between Reschid Pasha and myself, and this interview took place at his house on the Bosphorus on the morning of the 12th. I handed the Grand Vizier a letter from the Viceroy, and a Turkish translation of my memorandum and of the firman of concession for which the Sultan's assent was sought.

"After carefully reading these documents, the Grand Vizier and myself conferred for two hours, and I felt that at the expiration of that time I had made some impression upon him by using the arguments which I have already quoted. I added that I was only there as a friend of the Porte and an agent of the Viceroy, not as an agent of the French Government, which had entrusted me with no mission of any kind.

"The next day, during a grand banquet given by Aali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, previous to the departure of Baron de Bruck, Reschid Pasha ventured to speak to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe about the object of my visit to Constantinople, and encountered the resistance which we had anticipated.

"It became necessary, therefore, to press for decision and act vigorously, so as to forestall the demands of the English Ambassador upon the Sultan. The Austrian Internuncio, to whom I reported how matters stood, assured me that I might count upon his private and official support, and that though his successor, who

was expected in a few days, would doubtless bring special instructions, he should not hesitate in the meanwhile to act on his own judgment and counter-balance the influence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe."

While the French Embassy was asking the Grand Vizier to obtain me an audience of the Sultan, I drew up the following note for the members of the Imperial Council.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 19, 1855.*

"It would be superfluous to dwell in detail upon the immense advantages of the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. The only obstacles which seem to stand in the way are the personal objections raised by a foreign representative, objections which, if they were allowed to prevail, would inflict a moral blow upon the highest authority in the land. I feel confident that this obstacle will not be allowed to prevail against the wishes which I have been charged to express, with all respect, upon behalf of an enlightened Prince who, as is his duty, does an act of deference to his sovereign, whose faithful and devoted vassal it is his pleasure to prove himself."

The Sultan granted me an audience and received me very graciously, and I was about to embark upon my return to Egypt, when I learnt that the influence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been strong enough to deter the Sultan from sanctioning the project out-

right, and so I determined to stay a few days longer and see what could be done.

The day following, at a dinner at the British Embassy to which I was invited, I sent Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the following letter:—

“CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 26, 1855.*

“I hasten to communicate to you the documents which, in accordance with the wish expressed by you, will enable you to form an opinion as to the enterprise which has brought me to Constantinople. I venture to hope that I shall no longer have to fight against the powerful opposition of the honourable representative of Great Britain.

“Your Excellency was pleased to tell me that you were anxious for information on the subject, and that up to the present time you had only given a personal opinion.

“The question has been submitted in due course to the Sublime Porte without any sort of foreign intervention. It would not be within my province, as the agent of Mohammed Said, to place it upon another ground, as your Excellency suggested. The Viceroy of Egypt was at liberty to place it upon this ground and keep it there. Just as he was unwilling to give it a purely French or Austrian complexion, in the same way he would not assent to give it an exclusively English aspect by transferring the discussion of it to London, and letting the solution of it depend

upon one Government. He is anxious that this affair of the Suez Canal should retain, above all things, its Egyptian and Ottoman initiative.

"Your Excellency is too enlightened a patriot and attaches too much importance to the alliance between our two countries—an alliance of which I am proud to be one of the warmest partisans—to allow a question of antagonism, in which it would be deplorable that the *amour-propre* of our two Governments should be involved, to arise in this connection.

"Your Excellency will not allow it to be said that England, which with justice declares that she has only drawn the sword against Russia in the interests of civilisation, of the freedom of the seas, and of the independence of Turkey, should be the only Power to place difficulties in the way of a work which essentially favours the realisation of principles which should be the consequence of the Anglo-Austro-French alliance, and which will assure the pacification of the East.

"I am pleased, my lord, to have had this conversation with you. It has had the effect of destroying impressions which, I do not hesitate to say, I had erroneously formed. I ask your permission to renew the conversation, and with that view I will call at the English Embassy about one to-morrow.

"P.S. The Viceroy has just informed me by a letter from Alexandria, under date of February 17, that up to that time Mr. Bruce had made no communication to him on behalf of his Government."

Reply of Lord Stratford to M. de Lesseps.

(Private.)

“HÔTEL D'ANGLETERRE, February 27, 1855.

“I write you at an early hour, not only to acknowledge the receipt of the documents which accompany your note, but also to ask you to defer till another day your proposed visit. Engagements which I cannot put off make it impossible for me to avail myself of your obliging proposal to-day.

“You are right in supposing that I am anxious for information, and especially in respect to this or to any other great enterprise which closely touches the interests of more than one State, and which, while being theoretically so seductive, causes a great division of opinion from the practical point of view.

“You are too enlightened and experienced to complain if I do not say more. The various considerations which you have touched upon in a manner at once delicate and flattering to myself, are at the same time of too high a political order to be entered upon here.

“In a position such as mine, personal independence has its limits, and cannot but yield at times to official eventualities.”

To Comte Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“SMYRNA, March 8, 1855.

“My note to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was translated into Turkish, and submitted on the 27th to the

Council of the Sultan, to whom my letter of the 24th, addressed to Reschid Pasha, had already been communicated. These communications produced the effect which I had hoped. It was proved, upon the one hand, that there was no reason for expecting any fresh explanations from the Viceroy, and, upon the other, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had received no instructions from his Government, which has nevertheless been in possession of Mohammed Said's determination for the last three months. It was also proved, by my latest correspondence with Egypt, that Mr. Bruce had not, up to the 17th, made any official representation, despite the intimation to the contrary of the English Ambassador.

"I was informed that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would strongly urge the Grand Vizier to await before replying conclusively to the Viceroy the instructions which he had applied for to London. The last phrase in his note of the 27th, referring to 'personal independence having to give way to official eventualities,' gave me to understand that his opposition would not be so easily disposed of. He knows that his position is threatened in England, and that several members of his Government are far from favourable to him. If he does not go so far as to believe that the absence of instructions is a trap set for him, he is not at all events inclined to allow an act to be accomplished which he thinks would be unfavourably received in England. Moreover, in view of the disasters which

the English arms have sustained in the Crimea, he is stiffening himself against anything which would tend to show that his omnipotent influence is waning, and this feeling, which one cannot at bottom bring oneself to censure, adds just at this moment a fresh force to his British exclusiveness.

“I was not therefore surprised to learn that on the morning of the 28th, upon which day the Council was to decide finally as to the Isthmus of Suez question, he had had a conference lasting three hours with the Grand Vizier, and that, in view of the impossibility of obtaining a negative solution from the Council, they had agreed upon a plan to gain time.

“Reschid Pasha is supposed, rightly or wrongly, to be the noble lord’s humble servant, and to be afraid that he will lose his place when the influence of which in private he complains very much, and says that he should like to shake himself free, declines. But, as a matter of fact, he always submits to the domination of which he complains, and which is becoming intolerable for the credit of France in the East. It would be unwise to put too much faith in his protests, or to be led astray by the approaching despatch of his son as ambassador to Paris. He seems to me to be of too undecided a character to raise up Turkey out of the abasement into which she has fallen, and to make a good use of the elements of vitality which, in my opinion, she still possesses. The result of the understanding between him and the English Ambassador was that the

Council deferred settling the question upon the pretext of the nomination of a commission of three, who, without concerning themselves with the Suez Canal itself, were to examine with me in detail the clauses of the Egyptian firman. This firman, drawn up under the inspiration of the Viceroy, almost with his own hand, one may say, already approved by the Cairo Divan, and communicated to all the European Cabinets, was the indispensable basis of the undertaking, and was not even under consideration. I could not follow my opponents upon this ground, and I had, moreover, been specially instructed not to discuss it, the Viceroy being quite resolved not to allow an act of deference towards his suzerain to be converted into a precedent which would accustom the Sublime Porte, often subject to the pressure of fanaticism or foreign influence, to hamper the action of the Egyptian internal administration. That intelligent Prince is anxious to set his country a wholesome example, and to create for himself resources as essential to the prosperity of the empire as they are to the real interests of the empire. Reschid Pasha seems to me to understand the danger of the course he was about to enter upon, and as he is very anxious to remain in the good graces of the Viceroy, he wants to cast all the responsibility upon the Council, behind which he is accustomed to shelter himself. I did not hesitate to tell him that this would not suffice, and that he would, in my opinion, be held entirely responsible not only by

the Viceroy, but by the Governments of France and Austria, both of which, as he knew, were in thorough sympathy with the enterprise. I added that I had made up my mind to return to Egypt, where the Viceroy was awaiting me to prepare the organisation of his scheme, pending the sovereign's authorisation of it, about which there could be no doubt in the end, and I congratulated myself on having, during my stay in Constantinople, contributed to define the question, while I carried with me the conviction that the Sultan and his advisers were well disposed towards a work the realisation of which seemed to me certain. I promised to convey to the Viceroy the intimation of these friendly dispositions, which would, I hoped, be soon followed by more practical results.

"In fine, my impressions, and those of the French Embassy, as to the date, more or less immediate, at which we shall obtain our aim are not unfavourable. The expediency of my departure was concurred in by Benedetti, who, I am glad to say, did all that it was possible for one in his position to do."

To the same.

"SMYRNA, March 10, 1855.

"My departure from Constantinople of course led to the dissolution of the Commission, which had not had time to meet. As the Turkish Government naturally does not like to admit that the delay deemed necessary before the Sultan comes to a deci-

sion is caused by the fact of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe having applied for instructions from London, I have just been informed that upon the proposal of Reschid Pasha the Divan has reverted to its original resolve of asking for some further explanations from the Viceroy. The Austrian packet on board which I am about to embark is doubtless conveying a second letter from the Grand Vizier to the Viceroy. My letters from Stamboul tell me that the British Ambassador has been endeavouring to alarm the Porte by dwelling upon the importance which this canal would give to Egypt and to the Viceroy, to the ideas of independence which it would foster, and to the danger of ships of war passing through. All this is very dastardly, and seems to show, among other things, that England, more than any other Power, is anxious to keep Turkey weak, in order to maintain the idea that she alone is capable of protecting her."

To the same.

"SAIDIE (ON THE NILE), March 18, 1855.

"A second letter dictated by Reschid Pasha to Kiamil Pasha, which the Viceroy only got yesterday, repeats in an aggravated form the original objections. This step, which is in contradiction with what the Grand Vizier told me, and with the message of which I was the bearer, is evidently the result of a plan arranged by him and Lord Stratford. It has made

Said Pasha very angry, and has only served to strengthen his resolve.

“I am very satisfied with the report of Linant and Mougel, though it is not quite finished. It is so clear and logical that it must carry conviction to every mind.”

To M. Hippolyte Lafosse, Paris.

“CAIRO, March 22, 1855.

“I asked you, through Madame Delamalle, to express my sincere thanks to M. Thiers for the way in which he has received the news of the Viceroy having granted the concession for the canal between the two seas. M. Thiers has always possessed in the highest degree the sentiment of patriotism, and one can always tell, when one hears him talk, or when one reads his writings, that his heart has not been desiccated in the wear and tear of business. It was he who twenty years ago entrusted to me the conduct of the French Consulate in Egypt. It was during that period that I made the acquaintance of the young prince, now Viceroy, and formed with him that intimate friendship which has procured for me the honour of being selected to carry out this great work. It would be a work beyond my strength if I could not count upon the sympathy and assistance of the men whose opinions carry universal weight with them. I have been anxious to say to M. Thiers how delighted I should be if he would advocate the cause

of the canal in his correspondence and conversation with English statesmen, over whom he exercises so deserved an influence. Give him, if you please, the enclosed copies of my letters to the representatives of Great Britain in Egypt and Constantinople. They will prove to him that our only difficulties proceed from England. It is upon England that we must concentrate our efforts, and if M. Thiers, with his wonderful talent for explaining his views, and with the grandeur which they always possess, will take up my cause, his opinion will carry great weight with it.

“There is one point of view which will not have escaped his notice. The opening of the Suez isthmus will be a very powerful safety valve for the boiler of European revolutions. In 1848 we had evidence of how necessary it was to find occupation for an exuberant population, and to provide some useful employment for the turbulent energies of those whom a rapid increase in the number of inhabitants had left in enforced idleness. It is, therefore, in the interests of all the nations of Europe to favour the junction of the two seas, which offers so vast a field to their present tendencies towards speculation and locomotion.

“England does not like to confess the motives for her opposition; but she must make up her mind to the fact that she can no longer claim the monopoly of the trade of the world, nor supremacy in all waters.

“Our continental wars and the weakening of all other navies have enabled her to establish well-selected points of vantage in every sea and to hamper the trade of other nations. But this is no longer possible. The dream of universal dominion has passed away, as the empire of the first Napoleon showed. If a nation, however powerful she might be, attempted to debar a means of communication which, by right of the respect due to the capital subscribed, would be the common property of all nations, she would very justly be banned by public opinion and would ultimately have to withdraw her pretensions. It will be wiser and more profitable for her to abandon her exclusive ideas of omnipotence and enter into partnership with other nations. Her share will always be the largest when it is a question of trade, industry, and navigation.

* * * * *

“You ask me upon what bases I propose to place the financial part of the company. I have, upon that point, only one principle, very firmly fixed it is true, but the means for carrying out which must be left to time and consideration. My object is that, *in all countries the largest possible number of small shareholders shall enjoy the fullest possible advantages.*

“Suppose I was to come to an arrangement with ten large bankers to make the concession over to them, what would happen? They would propose to divide so many millions; they would then distribute

to the 'vile multitude,' without spending a penny and with a high premium, five hundred franc shares, taking care to let it be known that, as is very likely to be the case, these shares will one day yield an interest of 20 or 30 per cent.

"Why should we not go direct to the public? The two latest French loans show what can be done with small capitals. When a principle is sound, its consequences are incalculable. You will say that the Canal Company will not inspire the confidence which a strongly-constituted Government enjoys. My answer is that the junction of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, teeming with such immense results, can be put so clearly before the public that the most prejudiced will be convinced that no speculation could offer a better chance of profit to those who take part in it, and that when it is found that the cream of the profit has not fallen a prey to a few brokers, there will be no lack of shareholders. When they see that the enterprise is entered upon without any preliminary corruption or promises, when they know that not a stiver has been spent in trying to obtain the concession, either in Egypt or Constantinople, and that, thanks to the generosity of the Viceroy, the preliminary investigations have cost nothing, they will regard all this as the best guarantee for the future.

"You reproach me for not having had recourse to your cash-box, which is open to me with a dis-

interestedness very consolatory to those who believe, as I do, that in this world there is, as a rule, more good than evil. You are aware that I have got together a certain number of friends, each of whom has paid in a sum of £200 to a common fund intended to defray the preliminary expenses. It was the privilege of myself and my family to lead the way. But for the royal hospitality of 'my prince,' you would be right in supposing that my expenses would be pretty heavy.

"I am obliged to you for having delivered my message to Barthélemy St. Hilaire; I hope that his beloved Aristotle will not carry the day, especially as he would not need to give him up if he lent me his aid." *

To H.R.H. the Duc de Brabant (now King of the Belgians).

"CAIRO, March 28, 1855.

"I have the honour to submit to your Royal Highness the documents relating to the Suez Canal, which you expressed a desire to see, and I venture to hope that you will call the attention of His Majesty the King of the Belgians to the importance of the scheme, and to the interest which the enlightened prince who governs Egypt attaches to it. At a time when we

* Note of the Translator.—M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, whom M. de Lesseps induced to come out to Egypt with him, was busy upon his famous translation of Aristotle, which is a work of great erudition and value.

have reason to fear that the undertaking will not be appreciated as it deserves to be by some few statesmen in Great Britain, the opinion of the king your father, whose great experience and wise spirit of conciliation have often rendered such service to Europe, may be of immense weight.

“His Highness the Viceroy, in a reply to a letter from Prince Metternich the other day, requested him to thank the Emperor of Austria for the official support which his internuncio at Constantinople had given to this enterprise, as one of universal benefit, and as one which could only be opposed out of narrow and egotistical motives. I beg of your Royal Highness to accept my thanks and my gratitude for the encouragement you have afforded me.”

*Confidential Memorandum to His Highness the
Viceroy.*

“BOURAJAT (LOWER EGYPT), March 26, 1855.

“Following upon a conversation between the Emperor Napoleon and the English Ambassador, in the cause of which the Emperor warmly advocated your Highness’s scheme for piercing the isthmus of Suez, the English Ambassador had an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and gave it to be understood that instructions had been sent to Constantinople to temporize only, and not to compromise the political situation of England with regard to France.

“It would appear, therefore, that the English Government, as we imagined, is not at all inclined to compromise itself if the Sultan gives his sanction to the scheme.

“It seems to me, in consequence, expedient that the firman containing my powers for constituting a Universal Company, which has up till now, at my desire, remained in your Highness’s possession, should be handed over to me.

“Your Highness is aware that the firman relating to the railway which England had asked for, under Abbas Pasha, had been granted in Egypt, without any previous authorization being demanded from Constantinople. England then maintained that such an authorization was not necessary. Upon the present occasion, you have deemed it well to act more guardedly, and you have done right; but prudence has its limits. Your Highness is convinced, moreover, that I shall not compromise you in any way, and that I shall make only a discreet use of the powers granted me. You have been pleased to recognise the fact that my mission to Constantinople had placed the question in a proper light, and had produced a good effect. We must now lose no further time. France, Austria, and the other Powers, support your Highness’s scheme. England cannot oppose it outright; all she can do is to endeavour to gain time. It would be dangerous to let her do this. I repeat, then, that the situation is excellent to enable us to do what we were

agreed upon, viz., to continue our onward progress, while your Highness keeps insisting upon the Porte giving its decision. It will be desirable that, in addition to the powers conferred under your Highness's seal, which I will retain in my possession, and only make use of in Europe when I have received permission to do so, I should be the bearer of replies to the special objections offered by Reschid Pasha and Kiamil Pasha."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"ALEXANDRIA, April 5, 1855.

"My last letter of March 28th announced my departure from Alexandria to go and meet the Viceroy on the Nile. I met him at Kaferleis, and we spent the evening on his yacht, returning by rail the following day to Alexandria. As soon as I saw him he began to complain very strongly of the attitude assumed by his brother-in-law, Kiamil Pasha, and the Grand Vizier, whose letters he had just read. He says that the most fastidious and exaggerated arguments have been used to alarm him and to intimidate his courage, which, as I perceived, was beginning to waver. He had even been threatened with the wrath of England, whose fleet, once the Black Sea question was settled, might come and attack him.

"He was told that he was very foolish to throw himself into the arms of France, whose Government and whose agents were very unstable, whereas the

English agents, on the contrary, are always backed up and supported, their rancour being, therefore, very dangerous. He was further told that the internal tranquility of France and her external influence are at the mercy of a pistol shot to which the Emperor Napoleon may at any moment succumb; and, lastly, he is warned that if he persists in his scheme, he will lose the good graces of the Sultan. I repeat what the Viceroy said word for word. Anyone who knew his character would be aware that such a system of underhand intimidation would produce the very contrary effect to that desired.

“Reschid Pasha, with the aberration produced by the terror which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe causes him, had not reckoned that Said Pasha had sufficient confidence in me to disclose to me all his unworthy devices.

“It must be allowed that the conduct of England in this matter has been pitiful in the extreme. One can understand that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his conversation with me should have sheltered himself behind official eventualities, though such an attitude, suitable enough at the time of the Egyptian firman being first granted, was scarcely applicable four months afterwards. But to say now that he is awaiting instructions is, as my cousin E. de Lesseps wittily put it, equivalent to asking for soup after dinner is over.

“Is it possible, then, that the English Cabinet, not seeing its way to oppose the project upon grounds that can be openly avowed, is reduced to offering,

through the mouth of its ambassador, who is supposed to be airing merely his personal opinion, an opposition as brutal as it is tortuous? Such an opposition, unworthy of men who call themselves statesmen, could only serve to delay a work which cannot be put back, to discredit a Government and eventually to immolate an able diplomatist who is destined to be sacrificed to the good harmony of two nations whose alliance is not always profitable to our good faith.

“I naturally made these observations to the Viceroy, and he asked me if I had heard of the arrival at Alexandria of a Turkish general from Constantinople, and if anything had transpired with regard to his mission. I told him that rumour had it that he had come to ask for money, horses, and grain.

“When we arrived at Alexandria, the Viceroy sent for this envoy, who was a general named Reschid Pasha. He handed a letter from Riza Pasha, the Sultan’s Minister of War, appealing to the Viceroy’s generous feelings, and asking him, in view of the extreme gravity of affairs, for an extraordinary subsidy in the shape of horses, mules, and grain. Two days after this, the Prince called me on one side and, with a very satisfied air, spoke as follows:—

“‘I replied to Riza Pasha that if his demand had come to me through the Porte, with which I had every reason to be dissatisfied just then, I should have refused point blank; but that desirous of making myself agreeable to the minister who had shown him-

self more favourable than any of his colleagues to the making of the Suez Canal, and who had not scrupled to advocate it in council against an opposition of which *some others* stood so much in dread, I was very much disposed to send him what he asked for ; but that as we must all of us look after our own interests, I should, for the present, only get the horses, mules, and corn together, and hold them ready to send back by the vessel which brought the Sultan's sanction to my scheme for making the canal.'

"The Viceroy also wrote a second letter to his brother-in-law, Kiamil Pasha, rebuking him in very round terms for his threats as to what the English fleet would do, and he displayed in the whole of this correspondence a ready wit and firm will, upon which I offered him my sincere compliments. He himself dictated the letter to Riza Pasha, in the presence of the envoy, and this will show that when I spoke in the name of the Prince at Constantinople I knew what his real wishes and views were.

"The letters which I received from all quarters prove how sympathetically the project of the Suez Canal is received in Europe. This is how M. Guizot writes to Count d'Escayrac :—

" ' I am very desirous that the canal should be made, chiefly for the benefit of the civilised world, and in a minor degree out of *amour-propre*. It will be the realisation of one of the designs which I have, I will not say dreamt of, but in a measure foreseen and

begun. The present Viceroy, by carrying out this great enterprise, will confer high honour upon himself, and will elevate in no small degree the rôle of Egypt in the affairs of the world. I cannot say, nor can any one else, what will be the fate of the Mahometan East as a consequence of the efforts which are now being made—whether to maintain it, or to transform—but, in any event, the great canal from the Mediterranean to the Suez will transform the relations of Europe and Asia. This is a result which is worth working for, and which may be attained amidst the storms and obscurities of the war now in progress.’”

To the same.

“ALEXANDRIA, April 8, 1855.

“M. Baude, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, advocates the roundabout route for the canal proposed by Talabot, and he bases his argument for it upon the statement that the delta and alluvial deposits on the east coast of Egypt are due entirely to the mud from the Nile, which will block up the entrance to the canal at the Mediterranean end. This is an erroneous view, which the subjoined report of Linant Bey and Mougél Bey will serve to dispel; and it will, I may add, be much easier and less costly to execute the works required for preventing any silting up of the kind than to make the canal by the roundabout route, which is two hundred miles long, and which would necessitate from eighteen to twenty-four locks and a very

light draught of water. The subjoined report I am having translated and reprinted in several languages.

Preliminary Report of MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey, dated Cairo, March 20, 1855.

“The Isthmus of Suez is a narrow neck of land, the two extreme points of which are Pelusium and Suez. It forms within a space of from thirty to forty leagues, a longitudinal depression, resulting from the intersection of the two plains, descending by a gentle slope, the one from Egypt, the other from the first hills of Asia. Nature herself seems to have traced this line of communication between the two seas.

“The geological conformation of the soil leads one to believe that in early days the sea covered the valley of the isthmus; for there are still several vast basins there, the largest of which, called the Bitter Lakes, preserves evident traces of the waters of the sea.

“This basin and that of Lake Timsah will, there can be no doubt, be of immense value in the formation of a canal. The Bitter Lakes, to begin with, present a natural passage which will require no cutting, and a reservoir of water for feeding it with, and superficies of 330 million square metres. Then, again, Lake Timsah, situated half way between Suez and Pelusium, becomes, in the event of the direct route being taken, the inland port of the canal, at which ships will find all they require in the way of revictualling or repairs, and which might, if needful, be a dépôt for their

merchandise. It seems certain that from Suez to Pelusium, the excavation will be made in loose earth, which can be moved by hand down to the water-line, and with dredges down to the bed of the canal.

“Some people are afraid that a canal cut through the isthmus would soon silt up, and would, therefore, be so costly to maintain, that it would have to be abandoned after it had been made. This objection is refuted by what we saw in December and January; for we could trace the encampments of the engineers who were at work in 1847, and, to go back many centuries, we may add that the banks of the ancient canal of the Pharaohs and the Caliphs are still visible.

“No doubt the tropical rains of twelve centuries have formed ravines through these banks, and in places have filled them, but nowhere are they buried beneath the sand, and there are still to be seen upon the surface vestiges of antiquity several thousand years old. It is only upon one part of the line of the canal, as we approach Lake Timsah, that the sand banks appear to undergo changes of shape rather than of position. All the sand hills which form a chain between the extremity of the lake and Pelusium have long since been settled permanently in their places by the different plants which have grown up beneath the influence of the moisture and the heat.

“The question which remained to be solved was that as to the mouth of the canal, both at the Mediterranean and the Red Sea end.

“ We had to consider whether the running out to sea of a double jetty thirty feet deep, with a canal between broad enough and deep enough to admit the passage of the largest vessels, would present insurmountable difficulties. We came to the conclusion that there was nothing to prevent the establishment of these jetties, adducing in proof the Cherbourg Jetty, which is more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles long, and goes down nearly 50 feet into the water; the Plymouth Mole, which is nearly seven-eighths of a mile long, and is 36 feet deep; and that of Lion Bay, Cape of Good Hope, which is 5 miles long and more than 50 feet deep.

“ All of these works have been attended with difficulties, arising from the force of the current and the depth of the water, which would not occur here. It has been asserted that the coast at Pelusium was subject to the alluvial deposits of the Nile, and that in these parts the sea was charged with such thick mud that it would soon block up the entrance to the canal. But we know as a matter of fact that Pelusium, or rather its ruins, is the same distance from the coast that it was in Strabo's time, 50 years B.C., that is to say, rather less than two English miles.

“ On the Suez side the process of silting up has got to be a very slow one, for when the plan of the harbour was taken in 1847 the soundings corresponded almost exactly to those of the French expedition in 1799, and both of these tally with Commodore Moresby's chart of the Red Sea.

“So that all that need be done on this side of the isthmus would be to make two jetties, to form a canal, and take it up the gulf to a point where there would be sufficient water for navigation.

“The roadstead of Suez is protected from all winds, except from the south-east, and the ill-effects of this might be guarded against by prolonging the eastern jetty to the south. Moreover, even as it is, all the vessels which come into the Suez roads are quite safe in bad weather, and the corvette store-ship of the East India Company, which has been there for two years and a-half, has never sustained any damage.

“Having thus ascertained the possibility of making a canal through the isthmus, it is essential to show Egypt can be put in communication with the maritime canal. Near Lake Timsah the longitudinal depression of the isthmus is joined, at right angles, by another and not less remarkable valley, which is called in Arabic Ouadée-Tomilat. It is at present an uncultivated desert, but this desert was formerly the fertile land of Goshen, and the valley receives, throughout its whole extent, the overflow of the Nile's lateral canals, and seems thus to furnish a natural line of communication between that stream and the maritime canal.

“Our proposal is to cut through this valley a canal which would serve not only to irrigate the soil, but for internal navigation, while it would also be useful

for conveying sweet water to the men employed on the isthmus.

“There would be two secondary branches of the Sweet Water Canal above Lake Timsah, one towards Suez, the other towards Pelusium. The expenses of the project are estimated at seven and a-half millions.

“The last question examined by us is as to whether the capital invested in this work would yield a fair return, and this, leaving out of consideration all general considerations as to the rapid extension of traffic in all parts of the world, can be answered in the affirmative upon more special grounds according to the most recent statistics. The total value of the exchanges between Europe and North America upon the one hand, and the countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn on the other, exceed a hundred millions sterling, and this total is certain to be still higher by the time that the canal is open. These goods represent, at the very moderate estimate of £24 a-ton, six million tons, and it is fair to imagine that nearly the whole of this freight will, in a very short time, go through the canal. But if we take only half of it and put the charge at ten francs a ton, we shall find that there will be still a great saving for ships using the canal; and we are so convinced that the above estimates will be rapidly exceeded that we suggest that the company shall insert in its statutes a clause providing that the rates of charge should be lowered as soon as the dividend reached 20

per cent., so that the trade of the world should have its share in the advantages of this great and useful enterprise."

To Madame Delamalle, Paris.

"ALEXANDRIA, April 21, 1855.

"You tell me that several financiers are trying to put themselves forward in connection with the canal; but what makes me so independent of them is that the position is that of being charged with the exclusive powers of the Viceroy, whom I have always at my back, as being after all master in his own household, whereas if he had given me the concession before the formation of the company, he would, so to speak, have abandoned his rights, and I should not have been so strong to resist the importunings of speculators and governments.

"When I conceived the idea of asking for powers instead of a concession, I did not know that the same thought had occurred to Prince Louis Napoleon at the time when he was bestowing a good deal of attention upon the means of making the Interoceanic American Canal. In 1842, while a prisoner at Ham, he gave a great deal of consideration to this question, and he afterwards asked an officer of the French navy who was starting for Central America to examine the ground and let him know whether the scheme was a practicable one. The officer did so, and his report was embodied by the Prince in a very interesting

pamphlet, which was published in London, though only a very few copies were printed.

“In 1846, the Prince received while still at Ham a letter from M. de Montenegro, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nicaragua, who officially conferred upon him, ‘all the powers necessary for organizing a company in Europe,’ and further informed him that the Government of that State had determined that the new route should be called the *Canale Napoleone*.

“The French Government did not even reply to a letter from the Prince, who asked that he might be allowed to leave for America to undertake this mission, and I have reason to believe that he was on the point of going there from London when the Revolution of 1848 opened the gates of France to him.

“Those who, like myself, did not rejoice at his accession or vote for the Empire, cannot fail to perceive, when travelling in foreign countries, how much he has raised the name of France, and must admit that the good sense and instinct of the people were better to be trusted than their own feelings of repugnance.

“I have in my hands a memorandum which the Prince wrote in English, and of which I translate you a few extracts:—

“‘Central America (if I substitute Turkey the Prince’s argument will hold good of the Suez Canal) can only hope to emerge from its languor by following the example of the United States, that is to say by borrowing hands and capital from Europe.

“ ‘The prosperity of Central America concerns the interests of civilisation at large, and the best way of labouring for the good of humanity is to break down the barriers which divide nations, races, and individuals. It is the course indicated to us by Christianity, and by the efforts of the great men who have appeared at intervals upon the world’s stage. The Christian religion teaches us that we are all brothers, and that in the eyes of God the slave is the equal of his master; so in the same way the Asiatic, the African, and the Indian are the equal of the European. Upon the other hand, the great men of the earth have, by means of the wars which they have waged, mingled together different races, and left behind them some of those imperishable monuments, such as the levelling of mountains, the clearing of forests and the canalizing of rivers, which, by facilitating communications, tend to bring nearer together and to knit in friendship individuals and nations. War and commerce have civilised the world. Commerce is still following up its conquests. Let us open a new route for it. Let us bring Europe closer to the peoples of Oceania and Australia, and enable the latter to share in the blessings of Christianity and civilisation.

“ ‘In order to carry out this great enterprise, we appeal to all men of religion and of intelligence, for it is one worthy of their zeal and sympathy. We invoke the assistance of all statesmen, because every nation

is interested in the establishment of new and easy communications between the two hemispheres; and, finally, we appeal to capitalists, because, while sharing in a glorious enterprise, they have the certainty of deriving great pecuniary advantages.'

"I am about to decide in the course of a few days with the Viceroy about my return to France."

Confidential Note to the Viceroy.

"ALEXANDRIA, April 28, 1855.

"As a guide to our conduct with regard to the canal, I send your Highness confidentially the private information which has reached me from Paris and Constantinople.

"Let me begin with Paris. The first intimation of your Highness's project was conveyed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a telegram from Marseilles on December 13th. M. Thouvenel, the Political Director of the Ministry, sent word of this to my brother, the Director of Commercial Affairs in the Ministry. The next day M. Drouyn de Lhuys received a visit from Lord Cowley, the English Ambassador, who came in a great state of mind to ask for explanations as to what was being done in Egypt, and to inquire whether there was any previous understanding between the French Government and myself. M. Drouyn de Lhuys told him the simple truth, when he said that he was entirely ignorant of what was being done in Egypt, that he did not see

me before I started, and that it was a well known fact that since my mission to Rome, I had had no dealings with the Emperor or his Government. He added, with much dignity, however, that if the report which he had just heard for the first time turned out to be a fact, he should personally be very delighted, and should be fully prepared to support the undertaking.

“Lord Cowley then addressed himself to the Emperor, whose attitude of reserve was interpreted as being favourable to the views of the English cabinet. One of my friends, feeling somewhat uneasy on that score, instituted inquiries, and he writes me: ‘The Empress asks me to say that, upon her again questioning the Emperor, the latter told her not to be alarmed, adding these words, “The affair will be carried through.” She insisted on being allowed to keep the letters and documents, and said that she was anxious to peruse them all and thoroughly understand the whole question.’

“The Emperor, who has also transacted business with M. Thouvenel, in the absence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, spoke in very favourable terms on the subject. He instructed M. Thouvenel to write to Count Walewski in London, so that he might explain the matter to the English cabinet, and give them to know how much he was interested in it, with the intention of himself discussing the subject in higher quarters when he goes to England with the Empress, as he will do shortly, on a visit to the Queen.

"A letter from Constantinople which I have just received is to the following effect:—

" ' M. Benedetti has been shown the correspondence between Kiamil Pasha and his brother-in-law the Viceroy, and he has succeeded in obtaining the notes written by Reschid Pasha himself, and which served as data for this correspondence. He first of all sought for a direct explanation from the Grand Vizier, whom he charged with having inspired the letter in which the Emperor's name is made such an improper use of. The Grand Vizier defended himself as best he could—that is to say, very badly—laying all the blame upon Kiamil. Instructions were asked for from Paris, the Sultan was made acquainted with what had occurred, and, after several ministerial councils had been held, Reschid Pasha has been dismissed out of deference to the just susceptibilities of the French Government.'

"The upshot of all this is that we shall be left in peace so far as Constantinople is concerned for some time to come. I am therefore free to return to France to carry on my propaganda, and to act in accordance with the programme to which your Highness has been pleased to agree."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"ALEXANDRIA, May 19, 1855.

"Before embarking for France I have had a conversation with Mr. Bruce, the British Consul. He

himself opened the subject of the Suez Canal, and told me that he had not received a line from his Government, which had not even acknowledged receipt of the documents I had submitted to him. He expressed a hope that my approaching visit to Paris and London would contribute to bring about an understanding, if necessary, between the two Governments, especially since the Viceroy had determined to carry the railway as far as Suez, as this step, very favourably received by public opinion in England, removed, he thought, all pretext for opposing the scheme of a canal. Our conversation took place in presence of Lord Haddo, the Earl of Aberdeen's eldest son. I am much afraid that if Mr. Bruce is sincere in what he says he will not long be the representative of the English cabinet in Egypt.

"I shall find in M. Walewski, our new Minister of Foreign Affairs, a very cordial partisan of the Suez Canal, for in a recent letter from London he promised me his heartiest support for an enterprise of which he had himself spoken to Mehemet Ali when in Egypt fifteen years ago."

*Note addressed to Count Walewski, Minister of
Foreign Affairs.*

"PARIS, June 7, 1855.

"I beg of Count Walewski to be pleased to ask the Emperor for instructions as to my journey to London, whither I am ready to start at once.

"I am of opinion that the wisest plan will be to let the Suez Canal Scheme retain its private character and not allow it to be dependent upon the will of a government which might not be favourable to the project.

"Should I be called upon to reply to any objections or proposals which should be made, may I say that the Imperial Government would be disposed, concurrently with England, to declare without further delay that at no period should the commercial navigation be interfered with by a belligerent Power?

"In order not to ruffle foreign susceptibilities, it is essential to point out, whenever the opportunity arises, that the concession of the Suez Canal has not been granted to a Frenchman, or to a French company. M. de Lesseps, as a friend of the Viceroy, has received exclusive powers from him to form a Universal Company, to which *only* the concession will be granted."

Note for the Emperor.

"PARIS, June 9, 1855.

"In the audience which your Majesty was pleased to accord me you advised me to proceed at once to London, and to get into communication with *The Times*.

"I have the honour to inform your Majesty that I am ready to start, and that Mr. O'Meagher, the correspondent of *The Times* in Paris, with whom I

was on very friendly terms during the risings in Barcelona, and when I was Minister at Madrid, was sending to the manager of *The Times* the enclosed letter, which embodies his own views as to the Suez Canal Scheme.

“*The Times*, June 13th, 1855.—‘The project for cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Suez begins to occupy so much the attention of the public, notwithstanding the absorbing interest attached to our operations in the Crimea, that it may not be considered out of place to say a few words respecting it. It appears that in November last the Viceroy of Egypt communicated to the Consuls-General accredited to him a firman, in virtue of which M. Ferdinand de Lesseps was authorised to organise a “Universal Company,” to which the concession of the construction of the canal should be accorded. The terms of the firman exclude the idea which had been entertained, that the said concession was exclusively granted to a single French subject, or even to a French company. It was granted to an association of shareholders of every country, to be constituted by the person already named as the representative or negotiator of the Viceroy. M. de Lesseps at the outset gave complete explanations to Mr. Bruce, her Britannic Majesty’s diplomatic agent and Consul-General in Egypt. In the letter addressed from Cairo, on the 27th of November, to that gentleman the negotiator expressed his earnest desire to avoid everything which could

give the slightest umbrage to national jealousy of any kind. It is, moreover, affirmed that he contributed in no slight degree to the completion of the railroad from Cairo to Suez, the consequences of which have been so beneficial. M. de Lesseps proceeded to Constantinople, and placed himself in friendly communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and, through the Grand Vizier, delivered to him from the Viceroy of Egypt an official letter, in which the construction of the canal was described as most useful. He abstained from pressing for the ratification of the Sultan the moment he perceived a shadow of opposition on the part of the English Ambassador.' ”

“ *PARIS, June 14, 1855.*

“ M. Thouvenel was yesterday received in audience by the Emperor prior to his departure for Constantinople, where he has been appointed ambassador, and the Emperor, in handing him his written instructions, verbally told him to lose no time in informing the Porte and the Sultan that it was his wish that the ratification should be sent direct to the Viceroy, and in expressing his dissatisfaction should Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's efforts to prevent this being done succeed.

“ The Emperor's private secretary has informed me that I shall be able to leave for London towards the end of the week, so you see that everything is progressing very favourably. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire

has begun to lend me his aid. I enclose you a note which I have received from Baron James de Rothschild, to whom I was enabled to render some little service while I was Minister at Madrid. I have had the interview with him which in his note he proposes. He asked me what my intentions were with regard to the financial organization of the scheme. I told him frankly that I did not intend to enter into any positive engagement, that the matter was under careful consideration, and that I did not intend to bring it forward until all uncertainty with regard to the execution of the scheme had been cleared up, but that as soon as ever circumstances allowed he would be one of the first persons whose co-operation I should seek. He said that he thought I had chosen a very wise course, and offered to assist me in any way that lay in his power. Hearing that I was going to England, he gave me the following letter to his London house, which, considering how great is the perspicacity of this prince of finance, I regard as a very favourable symptom.

“ ‘We have the pleasure to introduce to you M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, who has just arrived from Egypt, where he has, as you know, been busily engaged in studying the question of making a canal through the Isthmus of Suez.

“ ‘We do not doubt that you will be very pleased to see M. de Lesseps, who proposes to discuss this subject with you. We beg to commend him to you

most favourably and request you to give the utmost attention to his interesting communications, the importance of which will be as apparent to you as it is to us.'

"Upon the other hand, M. Thiers informed me this morning that Lord Ashburton, a partner in the great banking firm of Baring Brothers, who is now in Paris, had written to his firm as well as to his friends in the most favourable terms of the Suez Canal, and that I shall be very cordially received by them."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"LONDON, June 25, 1855.

"I am in a position to give you a slight sketch of my first proceedings and of what has come of them. To begin with, I have had two very long consultations with the principal manager of *The Times*. He considers that England has no serious objection to offer against the proposed canal, that those hitherto raised rest on no solid basis, and that as the article sent from Paris by Mr. O'Meagher, which appeared in *The Times* of the 13th, presented the question in a very clear and favourable light, we might agree to choose the time most suitable for recurring to the matter. In the meanwhile he has promised me—and that is the essential point—not to take part against the project, and as several letters from an English correspondent at Alexandria, written in a spirit hostile to the scheme, had been sent to the paper, this corre-

spondent is to be communicated with and asked to examine the question without prejudice, and ascertain if it is really believed in Egypt that the project is practicable.

“Then again Mr. Reeve, one of the Secretaries of the Queen’s Privy Council, who has great influence with *The Times*, to which he is a frequent contributor, though he does not admit the soft impeachment, was very explicit. I was specially recommended to him by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, his intimate friend, in whom he has the utmost confidence. He told me that I might be certain of not encountering any preconceived opposition, and he added—

“‘It would be degrading that England should have an interest in rejecting a scheme which would be beneficial to the whole world. Upon the contrary, we should derive more benefit from it than anyone else. All that you have to do is to show the public that it is feasible; that English capital, as well as that of other nations, will be allowed to share in it; and that there will be no special privileges for any one nation.’

“By the advice of Lady Tankerville, a friend of Lady Palmerston, I called upon Lord Palmerston one morning, with a letter of introduction from Paris. He received me at once, but I thought that I could see at once that his mind was made up on the subject. I entered upon it at once, and asked him if he could spare the time to discuss it with me openly, and not scruple to tell me what his objections really were. He

repeated, word for word, the remarks contained in Lord Clarendon's despatch to Lord Cowley, which had evidently been dictated by him, or at all events drawn up under his inspiration. The subject was a familiar one to me, so I was at no loss to reply more in detail than I could to the note which was shown me in Paris the day before I left. I could not hope in a first conversation, prolonged though it was, to modify or shake the conviction of a man of Lord Palmerston's character, but I was pleased to find that my arguments were unanswerable; that, despite his facility of speech and lucidity of intellect, he had no serious reply to make. He evidently had in reserve other objections which had not yet been produced. With an air of *bonhomie*, he went on to say:—‘I do not hesitate to tell you what my apprehensions are. They consist in the first place of the fear of seeing the commercial and maritime relations of Great Britain upset by the opening of a new route which, in being open to the navigation of all nations, will deprive us of the advantages which we at present possess. I will confess to you also that I look with apprehension to the uncertainty of the future as regards France—a future which any statesman is bound to consider from the darkest side, unbounded as is our confidence in the loyalty and sincerity of the Emperor; but after he has gone things may alter.’

“I then asked Lord Palmerston to examine at his leisure all the questions relating to the political side

of the affair, with the conviction that from an impartial and unprejudiced consideration of them, it would be clear to him :

“1st. That England was more interested than any other nation in the route to India being shortened by more than three thousand leagues.

“2nd. That if in the remote probability of its ever unfortunately happening that France and England should be embroiled, it would be easy to prove that the opening of the Suez Canal would not be a cause of weakness to Great Britain, mistress as she is of all the important passes and maritime stations between the metropolis and India. It must also be borne in mind that, since the introduction of steam, the conditions of a war between the two countries are different, and that the French, a people who do not travel much, would not attack England in India when she was within two hours of their coast. I added, moreover, that if at some future time the execution of the canal was deemed possible by engineering science, and if the free capital of all nations saw therein a source of material profit, irrespective of all political influence, the Governments of France and England were upon sufficiently intimate terms to agree upon such measures as would guarantee their mutual interests ; that I had no mission to treat of this subject, and that my sole object in coming to London, as delegate of the Viceroy, had been to ascertain for myself the state of public opinion on the Suez Canal, and to endeavour

to give in all good faith all the information in my power, both as to the possibility and advantages of the undertaking, as well as to the universal principle of satisfying all the interests which were entitled to consideration in the matter.

“This first conversation was only preliminary. It was very deferential on my part, and conducted with much courtesy by Lord Palmerston, who gave me more of his time than I could have expected that he would. A few hours later I received an invitation from Lady Palmerston to spend an evening at her house.

“I have not yet spoken to you of M. de Persigny, our ambassador, but I may tell you that we seem likely to work in complete harmony with each other, and that I met him the same evening at Lady Palmerston’s. Yesterday I dined with Mr. James Wilson, Secretary to the Treasury, a very distinguished economist, who has offered me his services, as has Mr. Edward Ellice, a friend of M. Thiers, and one of the most influential members of the House of Commons. Mr. Ellice has introduced me to several of his colleagues, and he has asked me to dine with him on the 2nd of July, and meet several political and financial personages who will be of use to me. His handsome residence is close to where I am staying, and I have a general invitation to go and breakfast with him in his study at nine every morning. I have had an interesting conversation with M. de Pannizzi, the librarian of the British

Museum, with reference to a work in English which I am preparing, and which it is generally thought will be of considerable use."

To Baron de Bruck, Minister of Finance at Vienna.

"LONDON, June 28, 1855.

"My journey to Vienna will be somewhat delayed by my prolonged stay in London, where I have to meet difficulties and objections arising from a mistaken appreciation of the affair. I must not fail to tell you that the reports and speeches of Mr. Robert Stephenson, a member of the company formed for studying the question in 1847, and the recent article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in favour of a roundabout route, by means of a bridge canal carried along the two branches of the stream and fed by the water of that river, have contributed in no small degree to create erroneous impressions in the public mind, and to make some people believe that the piercing of the isthmus is an impossibility, and to make others believe that it can only be executed at a cost of labour and money out of all proportion to the revenue to be derived from it.

"The Viceroy still defrays all the expenses of the preliminary experiments, and it will not be until the commission of engineers, well versed in hydraulics, to which he proposes to entrust the drawing up of the definite scheme, has reported upon the matter, that we shall proceed to organise the company and open a subscription for shares."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“LONDON, June 30, 1855.

“I yesterday had an interview with Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who certainly has no preconceived hostility to the project, like Lord Palmerston. I think that the best thing I can do is to give you the substance of the conversation which took place, by putting it in the form of a dialogue, though I may add that we began by having a chat over our friends in Spain, where we first met in 1848.

“*Myself.*—Entrusted by the Viceroy with the preparations for organising a Universal Company for the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, I was desirous of ascertaining for myself the state of public opinion in England, and of explaining to any one who was anxious to be enlightened on the subject:—1st, That the affair has not been undertaken by any government, or to the exclusive profit of any nation. 2nd, That the enterprise is materially practicable—that is to say, that the estimated expenses will be proportional to the profits accruing from the traffic. 3rd, That there is no intention of soliciting the intervention of the British Government, or of making at present any appeal to investors. 4th, That the most able of European engineers will be called upon to decide as to the possibility of the work being carried out, and as to its cost. 5th. That when once the enterprise has been found to be practicable, investors, large or small,

will be at liberty to subscribe without any regard to politics. 6th, That the Viceroy, having completed the railway from Alexandria to Cairo, at the cost of the Egyptian treasury, and being now engaged in making the final section from Cairo to Suez, had been anxious to give full satisfaction to England. And 7th, That the Suez Canal, having been of his own free will made over to private enterprise, there was no fear of the resources of the country which he ruled being imperilled, and that his only aim was to further the interests of Egypt and of his Suzerain. All that I now ask you is to examine the question calmly and impartially, being convinced that a mind so enlightened as yours will not admit it to be possible that an event so profitable to the moral and material interests of the whole world can be detrimental to the power or commercial relations of England.

“*Lord C.*—I will not conceal from you that the tradition of our Government has, up to the present, been hostile to the making of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. I have myself, since I have had to deal with this question, been compelled to conform my opinion accordingly, and I confess it is not favourable to the scheme.

“We then discussed the objections raised in Lord Cowley’s note.

“*Myself.*—It seems after what has been said by yourself as well as by me that the opinion which you may have formed before you were acquainted with

the new aspect of affairs is open to modification or, at all events, that, if you admit that the subject is one deserving examination, your opinion must be based upon reasons and arguments of a higher kind. It is easy to understand that a time when the two governments of France and England ordered their agents to oppose one the railway and the other the canal, each of them should hold to its opinion, however unreasonable it may have been. There was in that case a *parti pris* on either side. But a great change has taken place since then. The intimacy and the sincerity of the alliance between the two countries does not admit of this antagonism existing, especially in matters of progress and of general interest which are beneficial to the whole world. Consequently, the French agents, far from running counter to the English agents in regard to the Egyptian railway, have, as you must know, cordially supported them. Surely England will not cling to the remnants of an antagonism which has been loyally and entirely foresworn by France. The sentiments of the members of the English Cabinet are too well known for us to doubt what their decision will be. Therefore, as I repeat, all that I ask of you is to give an impartial consideration to the affair.

“*Lord C.*—I am much obliged to you for speaking to me so frankly, and what you say deserves to be taken into careful consideration. You may rely upon my doing as you wish, and examining the question deliberately, without the slightest prejudice.

“Lord Clarendon then went on to speak of Constantinople, and said that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe complained very much of Benedetti, to which I replied that this was a case of the wolf complaining of the lamb. As he told me that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had not originally taken any action against the project at first, I told him how Reschid Pasha himself had confided to me the difficult position he was placed in, owing to the active steps taken by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the one hand, and the passive attitude of Benedetti on the other.

“‘I may tell you,’ added Lord Clarendon, ‘that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe speaks in the highest terms of the excellent personal relations he has had with you. To revert to the present relations of the French and English cabinets, I can assure you that my colleagues and myself consider ourselves members of one and the same Cabinet. Our confidence in the Emperor and Count Walewski, whose loyalty has done much to tighten the bonds between the two countries, is complete and unrestricted.’

“I am pleased to find that Lord Clarendon, in speaking thus, is expressing the unanimous opinion of all classes in this country.

“The only fear seems to be lest the very sincere desire which exists for an alliance should not be shared by public opinion in France, and fashionable people who have been in France, and passed some time in Paris society, help to accredit this hesitation. This

is the real cause of the mistrust with which so many English politicians regard the future. I assure them that they are mistaken, that the alliance of the two countries is quite as much a national alliance in France as it is in England, that the ancient party feelings have ceased to find any echo, and that the hesitations or doubts produced in English policy through the mistrust of the future can only serve to give arms to the adversaries of the alliance, and eventually, perhaps, to deprive it of its national character."

To His Majesty the Emperor, Paris.

"LONDON, July 4, 1855.

"The interest which your Majesty has deigned to take in the great enterprise for opening the Isthmus of Suez, has emboldened me to lay before you the result of my preliminary steps in London.

"The Queen's Ministers have shown a disposition to examine the question carefully. They have made a point of declaring that their objections were raised in good faith, and without any feelings of mistrust towards your Majesty's Government. The editors of the *Times* and other newspapers have assured me that they were well disposed. I have met with sympathy, promises of support, and even active assistance, from a great many men of influence in politics, science, industry, and commerce. Among them I may mention Lord Holland, that old and tried friend of France ;

the Duke of Northumberland, Lord Seymour, Mr. Edward Ellice, M.P.; Sir Richard Gardner, M.P.; Mr. Rendel, the leading hydraulic engineer in England; Mr. Charles Manby, secretary of the Institute of Civil Engineers; Mr. Reeve, secretary of the Queen's Privy Council; Mr. James Wilson, secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Morris, manager of *The Times*; Mr. Oliphant, one of the managers of the East India Company; Mr. James Welch, captain in the Royal Engineers, secretary of the Admiralty, and author of a treatise on 'The Advantages of the Suez Canal from a British Point of View;' Mr. Pannizzi, librarian of the British Museum; Mr. Thomas Hanley, governor of the Bank of England; Mr. Powles, secretary of the Dock Company; Messrs. Anderson, Wilcox, and de Zulueta, directors and founders of the P. and O. Steam Company; Sir W. G. Ouseley, minister plenipotentiary, Mr. Thomas Wilson, author of the project for a 'Canal from the Danube to the Black Sea;' and the chiefs of the foreign embassies and legations.

"None of the enlightened men with whom I have discussed the question have been prepared to say that an event which would be profitable to the interests of the whole world could be injurious to the power or the commercial relations of England. They dismiss all idea of a preconceived hostility to the scheme; upon the contrary, they assert that, if it is practicable, their country has everything to gain by it, and they would be very sorry for it to be supposed in France that

what would be beneficial to other nations would not be equally so to England.

“In fine, I have acquired the conviction that the enterprise of the Suez Canal, far from troubling in the smallest degree the relations of France and England, will contribute, upon the contrary, after the exchange of frank and open explanations, to bring out in a very clear light the sincerity of the alliance between the two countries.

“The favour with which the question was received by public opinion, the publications which are being prepared, the influence of the interests of trade and navigation, and the desire to give a mark of confidence in your Majesty, cannot fail to bring over those members of the English Cabinet whose opposition might, a short time ago, have justified the idea of an energetic resistance on their part, which there seems no longer any reason to apprehend.”

THE QUESTION OF THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ SUBMITTED
TO ENGLISH PUBLIC OPINION.

“LONDON, July, 1855.

“Aperire terram gentibus.

“In October, 1854, I left Europe for Egypt, upon the invitation of the Viceroy, Mohammed Said, with whose friendship I had been honoured for twenty years. I had no mission from my Government, and it was in the course of a journey with the Prince, from Alexandria to Cairo, across the Libyan Desert, that the

question of piercing the Isthmus of Suez was first discussed between us.*

"I have come to England to place the matter clearly before the eyes of the public. I appeal to the interests and am content to rely upon the judgment formed by the East India Company, the traders with Australia, Singapore, Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay, the merchants of the city, the shipowners of London and Liverpool, the manufacturers of Manchester, the ironmasters, the makers of machinery, the P. and O. Steam Company, the managers of banks and other large businesses, the commercial associations, and the owners of coal mines who in 1854 exported nearly four and a half million tons of coal, representing a value of £2,147,156, and who, by the opening of the Suez Canal, would find these enormous exports considerably increased.

"It has been objected that the Turkish Government ought to concern itself about this project; but as in every question where the principles are just, the foreseen consequences are inevitable. No matter from what point the enterprise of the Suez Canal is considered, it will be found to be of advantage to all the world.

"Turkey can only shake off its present state of torpor by obtaining from Europe capital and intelli-

* Note of the Translator.—The greater part of this letter describes the preliminary steps taken by the Viceroy and M. de Lesseps to ascertain the nature of the work and its cost, the account of which will be found in the preceding pages.

gence. The prosperity of the East is now dependent upon the interests of civilization at large, and the best means of contributing to its welfare, as well as to that of humanity, is to break down the barriers which still divide men, races, and nations."

*Circular to the Members of Parliament, Merchants,
Indian Shipowners, &c.*

"LONDON, August 8, 1855.

"I have the honour to send you a copy of my work relating to the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. I hope that, after having perused the various documents submitted to your notice, you will favour me with your views as to the advantages of this important undertaking, in the successful accomplishment of which I believe Great Britain to be more interested than all the other nations.

"The alliance which exists between our two countries induces me to attach great importance to the views of the most enlightened Englishmen concurring with those which prevail in France on this subject. You will observe that the project of the engineers of the Viceroy of Egypt is to be submitted, before being carried into effect, to a Commission selected from among the most celebrated engineers in Europe. Mr. Rendel, well known for the remarkable works executed by him in English ports, will be a member of this Commission.

"I shall be obliged if you will address your reply

either to my Paris residence, 9, Rue Richepance, or else to Messrs. Baring Brothers, or Messrs. Rothschild in London.*

“The Commission spent upwards of six weeks in Egypt, and after examining carefully the Isthmus of Suez and the various plans proposed for tracing the canal, submitted the following summary report to the Viceroy:—

“ALEXANDRIA, *January 2, 1856.*

“Your Highness summoned us to Egypt to examine the question of the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. While supplying us with the means of deciding, *de visu*, as to the merits of the different solutions proposed, you requested us to lay before you the one which was the easiest, the safest, and the most advantageous for European commerce. Our exploratory, favoured by magnificent weather, facilitated and shortened by the ample material means placed at our disposal, is completed. It has revealed to us innumerable obstacles, not to say impossibilities, for taking

* Note of the Translator.—It may be added that this scientific commission was not finally completed until the beginning of October, among the members appointed being, in addition to MM. Renaud and Lieussou, for France, M. de Negrelli, for Austria; Mr. Rendel, for England; Herr Conrad, Inspector of the Waterstat, and President of the Society of Civil Engineers, for Holland; and the Privy Chancellor Lentze, for Prussia. MM. Linant Bey and Mougél Bey came over from Egypt to meet them in Paris, the first meeting being held at M. de Lesseps's residence on the 30th of October, and left Marseilles for Alexandria on the 8th of November.

the canal by way of Alexandria, and unexpected facilities for establishing a port in the Gulf of Pelusium.

“The direct canal from Suez to the Gulf of Pelusium is, therefore, the sole solution of the problem for joining the Red Sea to the Mediterranean; the execution of the work is easy and the success assured. The results will be of immense importance for the trade of the world. We are unanimous in our conviction upon this point, and we will develop our reasons for it in a detailed report, reinforced by hydrographical charts of the Bays of Suez and Pelusium, outlines showing the relief of the soil, and borings indicating the nature of the soil through which the canal will pass. This is a long and minute work which will occupy several months; but in the meanwhile we beg to acquaint your Highness with our conclusions, which are as follows:—

“1st. The route by Alexandria is inadmissible, both from the technical and economical point of view.

“2nd. The direct route offers every facility for the execution of the canal itself, with a branch to the Nile, and presents no more than the ordinary difficulties for the creation of two ports.

“3rd. The port of Suez will open on to a safe and large roadstead, accessible in all weathers, and with a depth of about thirty feet of water within a mile of the shore.

“4th. The port of Pelusium, which according to the

draft scheme was to be at the extremity of the Gulf, will be established about seventeen miles further to the west, at a point where there are 25 feet of water within a mile and a-half of the shore, where the anchorage is good and getting under way easy.

“5th. The cost of the canal, and of the works connected with it, will not exceed the figure of £8,000,000 given in the draft scheme of your Highness’s engineers.

“The members of the International Commission of the Suez Canal.

(Signed) CONRAD, *President*.

A. RENAUD, DE NEGRELLI, McLEAN,*
LIEUSSOU, *Reporter and Secretary*.

“A copy of this report was sent to the following supporters of the enterprise from Alexandria on the 4th of January:—

“Jomard, member of the Institute (Paris); Morris, *The Times* (London); Thouvenel (Constantinople); Brusi (Barcelona); Erlanger (Frankfort); Couturier (Marseilles); Charles Manby (London); Theodore Pichon (Smyrna); Edmond de Lesseps (Beyrout); Revoltella (Trieste); Flury-Hérard (Paris); Count Th. de Lesseps (Paris); Count Walewski (Paris); Damas-Hinard (Paris); De Chancel (Paris); Marcotte (Marseilles);

* Note of the Translator.—Mr. McLean was the English Commissioner in place of Mr. Rendel, whom illness prevented him going out to Egypt.

Senior (London); Ellice (London); James Wilson (London); Thiers (Paris); Archduke Maximilian (Vienna); Baron de Bruck (Vienna); H.R.H. the Duke de Brabant (Brussels); Lord Holland (London).

“As the principal opposition to the scheme still came from the English Government, I determined to pay a second visit to London, and while in Paris, on my way from Egypt, I had a long conversation with Lord Clarendon, at the close of which, after hearing all I had to say, he held out the hope of our being able to come to an understanding, adding, ‘As you are going to London, please repeat to Lord Palmerston the substance of our conversation. We can discuss the matter together again, for we shall meet in London in a few days.’”

To M. de Negrelli, Vienna.

“LONDON, April 17, 1856.

“I enclose you the text of an important conversation I had with Lord Clarendon just before I left Paris, and this will explain to you the motives of my journeying to England. Having been here a week, I have not yet had an opportunity of discussing matters with Lord Palmerston, owing to the sudden death of his stepson, Lord Cowper. But I have not been idle, and I am carefully preparing to form an English committee composed of eminent men who will render the same success which you and Baron de Bruck do in Austria.

“It appears from all I can gather that there is not, as I had foreseen, much help to be expected from official diplomacy, and that we must rather look to the accomplishment of facts which in due course will receive the sanction of diplomatists, because it will then be their interest to concern themselves with what has been done. In the meanwhile you may rest assured that it would be dangerous rather than otherwise for a spontaneous diplomatic intervention, which might have the effect of alarming the Viceroy, and lowering his situation in Egypt under the pretence of taking guarantees against him. There was already some talk of taking these guarantees at the conferences which have been held, upon the ground that the making of the canal would increase his power. Therein, I repeat, resides, to my mind, the most serious difficulty which we have to foresee and take into serious consideration. As matters stand, the object which we have to keep in view is to induce the European Governments, that of England in particular, to place no obstacle in the way of the ratification which the Viceroy has asked for from the Sultan, and which the latter is disposed to grant him. This once obtained, we are masters of the situation, and we avoid the danger which I have pointed out to you. Talk the matter well over with Prince Metternich and Baron de Bruck. You may be certain that if the Viceroy saw that any Power had the least idea of lowering his regular authority, he would give up all idea of getting Europe to assist in

the making of the canal. I, for my part, am too sincerely his friend not to follow him in this course. Our basis and our principal supports are in Egypt. If in the course of the last fifteen months I had looked elsewhere for support, I should have done nothing, and matters would not have reached the point they have.

“Whatever progress the matter has made, it only remains with the Viceroy to prevent it being carried any further. I need not, therefore, dwell further upon this subject, the full gravity of which you who know the character of Mohammed Said, and who are so well acquainted with Egypt, will at once understand.

“I break off this letter to go and meet Lord Palmerston. While confirming what Lord Clarendon said to me in Paris, he persists in his opposition, and did not make any secret of the fact that Lord Stratford will continue to oppose us, not now in the interests of England, but in the alleged interest of the Ottoman Empire. This tactic shows that the enemy of the canal is driven to his last retrenchment, and I am going to prepare my parallels and pursue with prudence, but with more perseverance and vigour than before, my appeal to public opinion in England. One campaign the more will not discourage me, and in the meanwhile the matter will ripen and assume a consistent shape, which will add to our force.

“Mr. McLean is fully convinced as to the success of the enterprise. I have arranged with him and with Mr. Rendel that, in accordance with the wish expressed

by all the other members of the International Commission, the general meeting should be held in Paris."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"LONDON, April 7, 1856.

"I found Lord Palmerston just what he was in 1840, full of mistrust and prejudices with regard to France and Egypt. He was very polite, and was in some respects very frank, but after hearing me read the *résumé* of my conversation with Lord Clarendon, he spoke to me, with regard to the Suez Canal, in the most contradictory, the most incoherent, and, I will even add, the most senseless fashion imaginable. He is firmly convinced that France has long pursued a most machiavelian policy in Egypt against England, and that the fortifications of Alexandria were paid for by Louis Philippe or his Government. He sees in the Suez Canal the consequences of this policy. Upon the other hand, he persists in maintaining that the execution of the canal is materially impossible, and that he knows more about it than all the engineers in Europe, whose opinions will not alter his. Then, regardless of the fact that he had just proved the scheme to be impracticable, he indulged in a long tirade upon the drawbacks which would result for Turkey, and for Egypt herself, from the Viceroy's concession and the realisation of the enterprise. Finally, he declared that he should continue to be my adversary without any sort of reticence. I could not help ask-

ing myself now and again whether I was in the presence of a maniac or a statesman. There was not one of his arguments which would hold water for five minutes in a serious discussion. I replied to all his objections as best I could, but I saw that it was only a waste of time to prolong the discussion. Seeking as I do to have the ground clear, I am not at all sorry to know how things stand, and I shall prepare my batteries accordingly.

"Please report all this to M. Thiers, and let me know what he thinks. I should not be surprised if Lord Palmerston, his old opponent in 1840, believed him to be the author and the continuer of the machiavelian policy in question."

To M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

"LONDON, April 21, 1856.

"We now know the true motives of Lord Palmerston's opposition. It is that he is afraid of favouring the development of Egypt's power and prosperity. Fortunately, this is not the kind of motive likely to discourage the Viceroy in the pursuit of his noble enterprise.

"I suspected this to be the case some time ago, and I pointed it out to his Highness last year when speaking to him of a despatch of the ex-Governor of India, in which he said, that if England should ever succeed in obtaining a footing in Egypt, as she had done in India, she would be the mistress of the world.

Nor will his Highness forget that in a document of 1840, published by Mr. Urquhart, First Secretary of the British Embassy at Constantinople, the English Ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Grand Vizier, that the policy of England and the Porte should be to drive Mehemet Ali and the whole of his family naked into the desert. There can be no doubt that although this idea, now impossible of realisation, is only now to be found in a few very wooden old heads, it is desirable to guard against the irritation which the approaching execution of an enterprise destined to have the very opposite effect will provoke. As long as a partisan of the policy which consists in weakening Egypt is at the head of the English Ministry, it is necessary to paralyze its evil intentions by acting with extreme prudence, by continuing to enlighten public opinion, by marching prudently and without undue hurry towards the achievement of the fact. The Viceroy will see in my advice and my conduct the best proof of my desire not to compromise him. If I thought more of the canal than of him, nothing would be easier for me than to make the affair over to large capitalists, who would carry it through much more rapidly; but I am determined that he shall remain the master of it, and that it shall serve to consolidate and fortify his political situation.

“Even if there had been no canal scheme, the Viceroy may rest assured that there are certain Englishmen who would have found some excuse for

attacking him in the same way, and soon it will be the canal which will act as a lightning conductor for him.

“Since I have been in England I have been constantly rectifying the erroneous ideas which are kept alive about Egypt, and which are for the most part propagated by certain ill-disposed journals.

“Mr. McLean entertained me the day before yesterday at a somewhat important banquet given at the Trafalgar Hotel, Greenwich. He had got together about thirty guests, included among them being the most celebrated engineers in England, manufacturers, merchants, and bankers. Mr. McLean, in proposing my health, spoke of the hospitable way in which he and his colleagues of the International Commission had been received in Egypt, and expressed, upon his own behalf, as upon behalf of his friends, the hopes that England entertained for the realisation of the scheme and for the success of my efforts. This toast and my reply to it were received with loud applause. My object is to bring public opinion in England to pronounce in favour of the Isthmus of Suez, so that the English Government may be led to follow the same policy as France.

“A gentleman named Wyld, geographer to the Queen, formerly a member of Parliament and owner of ‘The Great Globe,’ Leicester Square, gives ocular demonstration, three times a day, at this latter establishment, of the advantages which navigation will derive from passing through the Isthmus of Suez

instead of going round by the Cape. He is now having made a large relief plan of the same dimensions as that of Sebastopol, which attracted a great many people. This popular mode of propaganda is excellent. In my conference with Lord Palmerston, described in my letter to M. B. St. Hilaire, the Prime Minister admitted that the English Ambassador at Constantinople had maintained that the Viceroy of Egypt did not require the authorisation of the Sultan for the railway from Alexandria to Suez, but that the situation was different in respect to the canal. My reply was that I saw no difference except that the English Government wanted the railway, and does not want the canal.

“In short, tell his Highness that this ill-will will eventually be paralyzed, and that with his perseverance and continued help, the obstacles and the difficulties encountered will only serve to aggrandise his position and render the success more complete.”

To M. Thouvenel, French Ambassador at Constantinople.

“LONDON, April 22, 1856.

“The following information, upon the exactitude of which you may rely, will interest you, and may perhaps be of some use to you.

“After the banquet given by the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of the Paris Congress, Aali Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, came up to His Majesty and asked him what he thought of the Suez Canal ques-

tion. He added that his master attached very great importance to it in every way, but that he was anxious to know what the Emperor's views were. Napoleon replied that he took the greatest possible interest in this scheme, which seemed to him beneficial for everyone, that he had studied it in all its aspects, that he had made himself acquainted with all the documents bearing on it, and that he wished it every success; that the enterprise, noble as it was, had given rise to certain resistances and objections, especially in England; that for his part he could not see that these objections were founded, and that he hoped to see them removed; but that at the same time he would not hurry on things, for fear of compromising their success, and that, relying upon the happy alliance which united the two peoples, he looked to the future, and to a very near future, for an agreement upon this question. Aali Pasha said that his master would be very pleased to hear of the sympathies expressed by the Emperor, and that he was himself favourable to the affair, despite certain divergencies upon secondary points and certain precautions to be taken in the interests of the Suzerainty of the Porte; but, irrespective of these objections on points of detail, the Porte none the less looks with favour upon this great work, which will be so profitable to Egypt, and in which she also hopes to have her share of profit.

“The Emperor, who seemed to acquiesce in all Aali

Pasha said, then moved away and called upon Lord Clarendon, and asked him what he thought of the Suez Canal, relating to him what Aali Pasha had just said, and what he had said in reply. Lord Clarendon, somewhat taken by surprise, replied that the affair was a very important one, that he had not thought over it sufficiently to give an off-hand reply, that he must refer to his Cabinet, and that, moreover, the execution of the scheme was impossible. The Emperor, while admitting that the affair was one demanding reflection, maintained that the execution was possible, and that science had pronounced definitely on that score. As Lord Clarendon held to his view, the Emperor said that, admitting the execution of the scheme to be practicable, and reasoning upon this hypothesis, what was England's view? Lord Clarendon then declared that, from the point of view of English trade, there could be no objection, and that England would benefit considerably, but that as regarded the relations of Egypt and Turkey, the matter was a very delicate one, and that the Viceroy had no right to make the canal without the authorisation of the Porte. The Emperor reminded him of the favourable dispositions of the Porte, and there the conversation ended. I must say that it seems to me to be decisive of the matter, and the conclusions to be drawn from it are as under:—

“1st. To treat with the utmost deference the susceptibilities of the Porte, ascertain precisely what are

the objections of *detail*, in which, of course, will be traced the inspirations of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

“2nd. To show equal deference for the susceptibilities of the Viceroy, whom the adversaries of the canal would be glad to bring into conflict with his Suzerain.

“3rd. The opinion expressed by the Emperor will carry great weight with the Porte and even in England.

“4th. According to this declaration of Lord Clarendon, English public opinion must be appealed to and English interests engaged in the enterprise.”

To M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

“PARIS, May 6, 1856.

“I prolonged my stay in London and only arrived here two days ago. My campaign in England will bear fruit. I have formed some very excellent acquaintances. I was presented to the Queen, and I also had a very long conversation with Prince Albert, who took me to his study and got me to inform him exactly of what the projected works on the canal were. He told me that the Duc de Brabant, who was interested in the enterprise, had already recommended it to him. I was received in the kindest way possible by the Duke of Cambridge, who expressed to me very freely, and without the slightest reserve, his sympathies with the project. Moreover, I have availed myself of every possible opportunity for saying what I thought, so that no confidence should

be placed in the systematic vilification of the Viceroy, in which certain journals have recently indulged. I have quoted positive facts which show the situation in its true light, and allow of Mohammed Said being judged as he deserves to be judged, notwithstanding errors difficult to avoid in a country the administration of which is not yet completely in working order. I have been treated to a very significant demonstration from the Geographical Society of London, which, as you know, is composed of very influential men. First of all, I was invited to dinner by the Society at their club, Lord Sheffield taking the chair. My health was drunk in a toast which referred in eulogistic terms to my efforts to bring about the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. Mr. Gladstone, a cousin of the Minister,* then said, speaking in excellent French: 'M. de Lesseps, if in this country we have not been so prompt as other nations to welcome your enterprise, it is because of our character and habits. But once we are convinced, we go further and sometimes show more perseverance than any of our neighbours. For my own part, I entertained at first considerable doubts, which are not yet entirely dissipated; but I am only too anxious to be persuaded, and I heartily wish you success.'

"I thanked my hosts for their interest, which I

* Note of the Translator.—I leave the responsibility of the statement as to Lord Sheffield and Mr. Gladstone being cousins to M. de Lesseps.

was glad to find expressed by so distinguished a company of travellers and savants, in the success of an enterprise certainly destined to enlarge the domain of geographical science and facilitate its discoveries. As I had been told that many of the members present would not be able to remain for the meeting of the Society, I entered into some detail with regard to the explorations of the International Commission and to the result of its labours. Questions were put to me with regard to the danger of an accumulation of sand and the objections urged by the *Edinburgh Review*, and my replies seemed to satisfy my questioners. I was then taken to the meeting of the Society, which was presided over by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Roderick Murchison, and after several speakers had dwelt upon the importance of opening prompt and easy communications with the various nations of the earth, he called upon me. The meeting was a very crowded one, and included a great number of ladies. My rising was the signal for loud applause, and I was again heartily cheered at the conclusion of my speech, which, at the request of the secretary, I afterwards wrote out and sent to him for publication in the Society's journal. It was as follows:—

“ ‘Captain Fitzroy, speaking of a project for making a canal through the Isthmus of Darien, told you just now in eloquent terms how the realisation of many great enterprises which seem almost chimerical till they come to be studied, becomes apparent to all the

world after they have been carefully examined upon the spot. I hope it will be so for the interoceanic canal in question, and as regards the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, upon which the chairman has requested me to address you, I can assure you that the enterprise is perfectly feasible.

“ ‘The majority of the Commission, comprising the most eminent engineers in Europe, which was appointed to study the question, went to Egypt, and was unanimous in declaring that the canalising of the Isthmus of Suez, and the creation of two ports on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, were easy and certain operations.

“ ‘The roadstead of Suez is vast and safe. More than five hundred vessels could ride there at the same time. It has a depth of from 16 feet to 42 feet, with a very good bed of mud for anchorage. The English corvette *Zenobia* has been there for three years as a coaling ship for the East India packets; she is stationed in the part most exposed to the wind, and during these three years she has never dragged her anchor, her cables have never been broken, and her communication with land has not once been cut off—which is more than can be said of many very good ports. There are two clean and deep channels, broad enough to wear ship in any weather, and with a depth of from 50 to 65 feet, by which ships can reach the anchoring ground. The Commission has been able to conclude from this that

the Suez roadstead has all the qualifications required for forming the head of the canal from sea to sea.

“‘Along the whole course of the isthmus, from Suez to Pelusium, the International Commission encountered no difficulty in the way of digging the canal, nor for keeping it open, the ground being very level and the geological composition of the soil very favourable. The soundings, which the Commission verified, established the fact that the soil of the isthmus is in most places formed of a first stratum of agglutinated sand, of a second stratum of clay, and of a third stratum of calcareous marl, until the plastic clay is reached at a depth of from 36 to 40 feet below the level of the seas.

“‘During our excursion in the isthmus the Viceroy had sent the steam frigate *Le Nil* into the Gulf of Pelusium, where M. Larousse, the engineering hydrographer, had been making numerous soundings and taking a hydrographic chart of the bay. It was found that outside the line of coast there is a zone of fine sand, similar in description to that of the shore, which has a depth of 33 feet, beyond which begins a zone of mud offering excellent anchorage, and extending right out to the deep water of the Mediterranean. The part of the bay in which there is the deepest water is that opposite Tannis, where there is a depth of over 25 feet within a mile and a-half of the shore, along a distance of thirteen miles, from the mouth of Oum-Fareg to that of Gemileh. That

is the part selected by the Commission for the Mediterranean entrance of the canal. There is nothing unusual in jetties of from one to two miles long, and at the points which they will occupy there is every facility for vessels anchoring and making sail.

“ ‘I am about to bring out a pamphlet which will give the text of the Commissioners’ report, as well as a reply to the *Edinburgh Review*, which has published some very erroneous information as to the practicability of the enterprise. The errors into which the *Review* has fallen are excusable, because at the time when it treated the question, it had not before it the result of the investigations made by this Commission.

“ ‘In a country where there are no bounds to the freedom of public discussion, good causes always triumph in the end.

“ ‘The English publication referred to above is about to appear, and before leaving London I arranged for the formation of a local committee composed of a member of the East India Company, a member of the Bank of England, two financial notabilities in the city, Mr. Powles, Secretary-General of the Docks Company, and two English engineers on the International Commission. But this committee is not to act until the Sultan’s ratification has been obtained.

“ ‘We must now await the meeting of the Commission of Engineers and the movement of opinion in the city before launching the affair upon a fresh phase: the soil being well prepared, we need only arm ourselves

with a little patience until the harvest ripens, watching in the meanwhile the seed which we have sown.' ”

To His Highness Mohammed Said, Viceroy of Egypt.

“ PARIS, May 20, 1856.

“ Although I never fail to let your Highness know by each mail any facts likely to be of interest to you, I cannot refrain from writing to say how much I was touched by your affectionate letter of April 26th, though I had no need of this fresh evidence that I might count upon the continuance of a friendship in which my confidence knows no bounds.

“ I had for a long time observed that the adversaries of your Highness were instinctively the adversaries, either open or secret, of the canal. This being so, I was not astonished at the campaign which they instituted as soon as I had left Egypt. But it is sometimes wise to profit by the conduct of one's enemies, and when those who occupy an exalted position are not afraid to hear the truth, when they have sufficient intelligence to examine calmly the attacks levelled against them, and sufficient good faith to be able to distinguish between what is criticism and what is calumny, your enemies, instead of injuring you, have rendered you service. Criticism, even if ill-natured, is to be met by repairing the errors to which it points, while calumny is always to be confounded by the evidence of positive facts and perseverance in conduct free of reproach.

"I can assure your Highness that all the good you have done is appreciated in Europe, and that you must not judge public opinion by the grotesque observations of a few discontented and untruthful persons, who have attempted to form in Egypt a committee for calumniating and denouncing the Government. The truth is making itself more and more apparent every day. Some flatterers might tell your Highness that you need not condescend to justify yourself; but it is always wise to give full publicity to facts, for else the good-for-nothing people, who are as a rule very active, would have things too much their own way with honest people, who are not inclined to put themselves out of the way and do not suspect evil. I have arranged so that the press of all countries shall be kept well informed, and the relations which have been established towards this end are entirely disinterested."

SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTIONS AGREED TO BY THE
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION SIX SITTINGS
HELD ON THE 23RD, 24TH, AND 25TH JUNE.

*Transmitted to various Correspondents in all countries,
pending the drawing up and publication of the report
entrusted to a Special Commission.*

"PARIS, June 25, 1856.

"1st. The Commission has rejected the system of indirect routes through Egypt, and has adopted the

principle of the direct route from Suez to the Mediterranean.

"2nd. It has rejected the plan for supplying the maritime canal with the Nile water, and has adopted the plan for supplying it with salt water.

"3rd. It has discussed the advantages and drawbacks of a canal with continuous banks from one sea to another, and has in the end decided that there shall be no banks where the canal passes through the Bitter Lakes.

"4th. As the interposition of the Bitter Lakes left open will have the effect of deadening the tidal currents, the Commission was of opinion that locks at the two extremities of the canal would not be necessary, subject, however, to the possibility of having to establish them afterwards.

"5th. The Commission has adhered to the breadth of 325 ft. at the water line and 150 ft. at the bottom for the whole of the distance ($12\frac{1}{2}$ miles), which is to be walled in between Suez and the Bitter Lakes, reducing it by one-fifth in the remainder of the canal.

"6th. The outline of the preliminary project of the engineers appointed by the Viceroy is retained.

"7th. Entrance from the Mediterranean (Port Said).—The Commission adopts for the port of Port Said the proposal for jetties made by those of its members who went to Egypt, except that the width of the channel shall be 440 yds. instead of 550 yds., and that a second basin shall be made.

"8th. Port of Suez on the Red Sea.—The Commission accepts the site and direction of the canal, but the breadth to be 330 yds. instead of 440 yds., and a second basin to be made.

"9th. The Commission is of opinion that the coasts both of Egypt and the Red Sea should be provided with first-class lighthouses against the opening of the canal.

"10th. A port for revictualling and repairs and graving dock to be formed in Lake Timsah.

"11th. With regard to the auxiliary canals of sweet water derived from the Nile, the Commission declares that it leaves the selection of the best mode of execution to the judgment of the engineers who may be appointed to superintend the works, by arrangement with the Egyptian Government.

"12th. Lastly, that it appears from the detailed information given by officers of the Navy who have sat upon the Commission that the navigation of the Red Sea is as good as that of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and his opinion, accepted by the Commission, sums up in so many words the judgment of Captain Harris, who has made the voyage from Suez to India twenty times."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"VIENNA, July 8, 1856.

"After the International Commission had closed its sittings, it was my duty to go and report to the

Viceroy the definite results of its deliberations. But, at the same time that I submitted to his Highness the scientific consultations of the engineers, I deemed it advisable to let him have the political consultation of the Nestor of European diplomatists.

“Please communicate to Count Walewski the opinion of Prince Metternich, which I committed to writing after my interview with him, and to the accuracy of which he was pleased to testify.”

Opinion of Prince Metternich.

“His Highness the Viceroy had the right to decree the making of the Suez Canal. All the measures taken by him merit the assent of the statesmen of Europe; but in a question of this importance, on which it was to be expected that foreign policy would have something to say, he was well advised in applying for the ratification of the Porte.

“The official approval of an enterprise so manifestly beneficial to the interests of the Ottoman Empire, as to those of all other nations, cannot fail to be given, now that science has pronounced in its favour, and that sufficient capital is ready to carry it out.

“Admitting, then, that the Sultan, to begin with, is with one accord with his vassal, the Viceroy will place himself in a very favourable posture as regards Europe, if, in order to prevent any further difficulties between the friendly Powers themselves or with Egypt, he asks the former to designate plenipotentiaries to

Constantinople for the purpose of regulating by means of a convention the perpetual neutrality of the passage through the Suez Canal, the principle of which, in so far as regards the Ottoman Empire, is already set forth in Clause 14 of the Act of Concession.

“In this way the internal question of the execution of the canal is kept separate, as it should be, from the external question of neutrality. The prerogatives of the territorial sovereignty remain intact, and the Ottoman Empire, assuming for the first time since the conclusion of peace the influential position which it has a right to occupy in a negotiation of public European law, satisfies the political and commercial interests of all the Powers, while it at the same time obtains, by their accession, a fresh guarantee of its integrity and independence.

“The Viceroy of Egypt, who has so faithfully served his Suzerain during the war, will have rendered, by his conduct in regard to a work of peace, a not less signal service, and thus will be fulfilled the prediction of Napoleon I. at the beginning of the century, that the execution of the canal from sea to sea would contribute to the glory and to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.”

To Mr. Richard Cobden, M.P., London.

“CAIRO, November 22, 1856.

“Five years ago I informed you that the Viceroy of Egypt had determined to make a maritime canal

through the Isthmus of Suez. It was a time when our two countries were united in war that I called your attention to a work of peace, of progress, and of civilisation. I invoked the aid of your enlightened influence in case some members of the aristocracy, masters of the course of affairs, should be blinded by inveterate prejudice and narrow sentiments of exclusiveness and rivalry to oppose the execution of a work of universal interest. Since then I have had the opportunity of discussing with you personally this interesting question. I told you that the resistance which I had foreseen had become a fact, but that in a country of free discussion like yours I considered that the main point was to enlighten public opinion, still but partially informed, and to clearly demonstrate the feasibility of the undertaking.

“This appeal to public opinion has been made. The most experienced engineers in Europe have visited the scene of operations, and have published their final report; capital has been subscribed to commence the work; the Viceroy himself has placed himself at the head of an enterpriso which has the unanimous and hearty support of the press in Europe and America; and, finally, the adhesion of the different governments has kept pace with public opinion.

“One only difficulty has arisen, and that is the opposition of your Government, which, through the influence of its ambassador at Constantinople, has succeeded in obtaining the suspension of the formality

of the ratification asked for from the Porte by the Viceroy in favour of a concession which he had legally granted. In so just a cause I shall not be at a loss for means to overcome this obstacle, against which I have deemed it useless so far, to struggle, because it could not up to the present hinder the march of the enterprise, and because all the preliminary investigations not being yet terminated, we were not yet in a position to put the work practically into execution.

“In a short time the situation will have altered, and in order to avoid if possible the drawbacks which would result from a conflict, you will not be surprised to find me still appealing to the good sense of the public. My opinion is that all this business is calculated to revive ill-feeling between France and England, whereas it would be desirable to see the sincere union of the two peoples succeeding the uncertain and already weakened union of the two Governments. If, upon the one hand, the country which has proclaimed freedom of trade is so inconsistent with itself in a question relating to the freedom of commercial transactions, and if, upon the other hand, France becomes persuaded that her former ally has two weights and measures, it is clear that all the efforts of sensible men will one day fail before a fresh explosion of the ancient prejudices which have so long separated the two nations.

“For how can it be imagined that people on the Continent will believe in the sincerity of England, in

her zeal for universal progress, civilisation, and public wealth, if it is seen that England, where public opinion reigns supreme, allows her Government to continue its incredible opposition to the Suez Canal, a private enterprise, in the origin, constitution, and object of which there is nothing to awaken any suspicion of political rivalry? How can the apostles of free trade and open competition propagate their doctrines when the two leading members of the Cabinet, who recently figured in their ranks, will not agree, through fear or horror of competition, to the suppression of a narrow neck of land which divides the two most opulent of seas, and stands as a feeble barrier against all the navies of the globe?

“One of your greatest ministers spoke as follows at a sitting of the House of Commons, when a vote was taken which has reflected so much glory upon him:—

“‘You have to choose between progress towards liberty and a return to prohibition; you have to choose the motto in which the commercial policy of England will be made manifest. Will it be: “Advance,” or “Go back”? Which of the two words best suits this great Empire? Consider our position, the advantages which Providence and nature have conferred upon us, and the destiny which awaits us. We are situated at the extremity of Western Europe, the principal ring, as it were, which connects the Old World and the New. The discoveries of science and the improvements in navigation have already brought us within ten days

of St. Petersburg, and will soon bring us within ten days of New York. A larger stretch of coast, in proportion to our population and the superficies of our soil, than is possessed by any other nation, ensures for us maritime superiority and force. Coal and iron, the nerves of industry, give our manufacturers great advantages over those of our rivals. Our capital exceeds that of which they dispose. In inventive power, in skill, and in energy we are second to none. Our national character, the free institutions under which we live, our liberty of thought and action, an unfettered press, which rapidly spreads abroad discoveries and progress—all this places us at the head of the nations which naturally develop by the free exchange of their produce. Is this the country to dread trade, a country which can only prosper in the artificial atmosphere of prohibition? Choose your motto, “Advance,” or “Go back”?’

“It was on March 27th, 1846, that Sir Robert Peel made this speech, and when the Free Trade Bill subsequently came back to the House of Commons, having been passed by the House of Lords, he added:—

“‘The name which must and will be placed at the head of this achievement is not that of the noble lord (Lord John Russell) who leads the party which has voted with us, nor my name; it is the name of one who, by the purity of his motives and his indefatigable energy, has appealed to the reason of us all, and who has compelled us to listen to him by force of an

eloquence all the more admirable because it was without pretence or ornament—it is the name of Richard Cobden.’

“To you it now belongs, armed with the experience of the last ten years of progress and prosperity, which have been assured to the British Empire by the triumph of your system, to maintain the principle of free competition abandoned by some of your former companions-in-arms, and to place before your fellow-countrymen once more the alternative of progress or retrogression. The force of your convictions and of public opinion will not fail to secure for you a success in which the honour and profit of England are alike involved.

“I have no doubt that the question will be brought before Parliament. If you will consent to take up its defence, my friend and fellow-worker M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, a Member of the Institute, will give you all the information which you may desire. He will shape his course as you may advise, and, at the time you may think proper, he will put himself in concert with you and other friends. I have asked him to hand you this letter, and to establish with you the relations which you will, I am sure, be happy to form with so distinguished and honourable a man.”

END OF VOL. I.

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RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS.

VOL. II.



RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS


BY
FERDINAND DE LESSEPS

TRANSLATED BY C. B. PITMAN

IN TWO VOLUMES

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RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS.

CHAPTER IV.—*Continued.*

THE ORIGIN OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

Journey to the Soudan.

I.

“AS soon as an International Commission of Engineers had fixed the mode of making the canal, and pointed out the preliminary works which should be undertaken before entering upon the enterprise itself, the British Government showed itself hostile to the project, and made overtures at Constantinople for a change in the order of succession, representing Mohammed Said as bereft of his senses. The Prince got wind of this, and confided to me how uneasy he felt. So, in order to escape the worrying of the English agents, he suggested that I should go with him to the Soudan. He was anxious to deliver that country from the misery and oppression by which it had been weighed down since the conquests and administration of Mehemet Ali. During our absence the investiga-

tions and preliminary works were to be continued in the desert of the isthmus, more than twenty leagues from any dwelling-place or travelling route, without regard to any protest from London or Constantinople.

“ A flotilla of ten steamers was soon ready for his Highness, his ministers, his staff, two battalions of infantry, and a few guns. I was to start afterwards, and the Viceroy was to wait for me at Siout. My steamer was still moored to the quay at Boulak on the 26th of November. About midnight I had gone to my cabin on deck, and was just getting into bed when a candle set fire to the mosquito curtains and enveloped me in the flames. I endeavoured to put them out, as I could not open the door at first, owing to the bolt being so rusty, and failing in this, and fearing that I should be suffocated, I summoned all my strength and managed to burst open the door. I rushed on deck, ordered the captain to cut off all communication with the land, and to start at once. Part of my body was one large wound, and there were several lesser burns upon my legs. I was carried on to a bed, and there, after having had applications of tallow placed upon the flesh where the skin was gone, I made the attendant pour the beneficent Nile water over the sore places. Thanks to the care and company of my travelling companions, Dr. Abbate, physician to the family of the Viceroy, the French engineer, Motet Bey, and my secretary and interpreter,

Vernoni, I did not even have an attack of fever. But when, on reaching Siout, the Viceroy came to see me, I found it impossible to rise. I told him that my accident was of good omen for the rest of the journey, as we had acquitted our debt to ill-luck. We had a long and interesting conversation upon the results anticipated from our distant excursion. He was anxious to abolish slavery in the centre of Africa, and prepare in Ethiopia a trade which would be beneficial to the Suez Canal. He wished to appear as a sovereign benefactor in the region where his brother, Ismail Pasha, had been massacred with all his staff.

“It was forty years since Mehemet Ali, after having delivered Egypt from the oppression of the Mamelukes, had sent his second son Ismail to the Soudan, keeping his eldest son Ibrahim in Egypt to commence the formation of a regular army, with the aid of a French officer, Sèves, who, under the name of Soliman Pasha, became celebrated in the campaigns of Eubœa, Morea, and Syria. Prince Ismail required at the outset of his campaign that a thousand slaves, a thousand camels, a thousand measures of wood, a thousand loads of hay, etc., should be brought to his camp.

“The inhabitants were obliged to submit, but while they brought him the tribute they were at the same time conspiring to rid themselves of him. One day, while he and his staff were enjoying a luxurious

repast, the insurgent chiefs surrounded his camp with a belt of faggots, to which they set fire in the middle of the night, and the Egyptians who endeavoured to escape were massacred by the Soudanese.

“Vengeance for this was entrusted by Mehemet Ali to his son-in-law, the Defterdar, who committed atrocities the very description of which makes the blood boil. I am told that he was equally cruel to those of his soldiers or servitors who were lacking in discipline.

“Upon one occasion, at the request of a woman of the country, who came to complain that an Egyptian soldier had stolen some milk, he sent for the man whom she accused, having first warned her that he would have her ripped open if she had told a falsehood. The soldier was then ripped open, and as his stomach was found to contain traces of milk the woman was dismissed with a largess. Upon another occasion, as his horse was badly shod, he sent for his *sais* (running groom) and had the horse’s shoes nailed to his feet.

“The Defterdar scattered terror and desolation throughout the Soudan, leaving nothing but ruins behind him, and bringing back to Egypt a hundred thousand slaves. It is easy to imagine how miserable and oppressed were the populations which had remained since then beneath the military authority of the rapacious Turkish governors.

“Such is the country which Ismail’s brother and

the brother-in-law of the Defterdar is about to take me through. When he left Siout with his suite it was arranged that I should rejoin him on the 18th December at Korosko, between the first and second cataract, but as my wounds were not entirely healed he went on in advance, and arranged to meet me at Berber, above the last cataracts of the Nile.

II.

“Upon December 24th I was still unfit to walk, but I got myself hoisted on to my dromedary, to cross in six days this same desert of Korosko. We had to guide us on our way the skeletons of the camels which had long since been abandoned by passing caravans. The entire bodies of the camels which had been left behind during the passage of the Viceroy, though quite dried up, still were in the same position as that in which they fell beneath their burden. Birds of prey were seen creeping out of their bodies, and jackals were patiently waiting in the distance until the vultures had done their meal to come and finish up the remains. We halted for half a day near a well in the middle of the desert. This point is the only one from which, at this season of the year, the four stars of the Southern Cross could be seen in the Southern hemisphere, and the North Star in our hemisphere. While waiting to observe these stars, which were not to be visible till between two and three in the morning, I amused myself by getting the Arab chiefs to

tell some of their Eastern stories. One of these struck me very much, because of the very delicate sentiments which it expressed as to the superior morality of woman. Here it is very prosaically translated:—

“ ‘A moth was in love with the light. Incessantly attracted towards it, the moth flew close up to it. But no sooner had the tip of its wing been slightly scorched than it flew off again, throwing itself at the feet of the cruel one, filling the air with its plaintive cries.

“ ‘In the meanwhile the light was dying out; before throwing out its last flicker it said to its lover: “Moth, you have made much ado about a slight singeing of your wings; you have reproached me unjustly; I have loved you in silence; my flame is about to expire; I am dying. Adieu. Fly to other loves!” ’

“Our caravan started again at an early hour, after having had the satisfaction of contemplating in all their splendour the Southern Cross upon the one side and upon the other the North Star, an old friend who had often guided me in my voyages through the desert. Having reached the banks of the Nile at Abu-Hamet, on January 1st, 1857, I was anxious to get to Berber before nightfall, in order to wish a happy new year to the Viceroy. I hurried my dromedary forward, and did seventy-five miles in the day. I found the Prince alone in his tent, crying bitterly.

I asked him what was the matter, and he said that his generals had just put the same question to him. 'I told them,' he went on to say, 'that the music had affected my nerves; but I will confide to you that I am weeping over this unfortunate country, which my family has made so wretched; and when I think that there is no remedy for all this it afflicts me sorely.' I endeavoured to console him by pointing out to him that, on the contrary, there were remedies which he, with his spirit of justice, would be able to discover and apply.

"The next day we started for Shendy, the very place where his brother Ismail had been burnt to death. The Viceroy had appointed this as the place where all who had presented petitions to him in the course of his journey were to meet; and upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand natives were assembled there. In the presence of this vast multitude the prince was informed that, despite his formal injunctions, an aged Turkish chief had detained a female slave chained up in a cave. He gave orders for master and slave to be brought before him, had the chains transferred from the one to the other, and thus excited extraordinary enthusiasm. Carried away by the popular applause, he told the people to remove the cannon from the citadel and cast them into the Nile; but on my whispering to him that perhaps this was trusting them too far, he said to me, 'The guns are too old; they were placed there in my

father's time, and are incapable of firing a single shot.'

"The Viceroy then declared that he intended to send all the Turkish functionaries back to Egypt; that he should leave them to govern themselves; and that he intended to establish among them municipalities, which had from the beginning of the world been the principal element of all organised society.

"I was instructed to remain a few days at Shendy to assist his Highness's Ministers in the creation of the municipalities, which were formed by election from among the heads of families.

"Boats were got ready to take us up to Khartoum, where we arrived on the evening of January 10th. The name Khartoum signifies the two branches of the elephant's trunk, because the town is situated between two tusks, as it were—the Blue and the White Nile. I am met on arrival by the Viceroy, who is waiting for me at the entrance to the audience chamber in the palace of the Governor-General of the Soudan. He tells me that he had been greeted, as mentioned by me in a previous chapter, on his arrival by a band of music such as he had never heard before, the wind instruments in which, dating from the time of Mehemet Ali, had been mended with soap plaster borrowed from the regimental chemist.

"I embarked upon my voyage up the White Nile with Arakel Bey, a very amiable and intelligent young man, who had been brought up in France at the

Collège de Sorrèze,* and who was very ambitious to be of service to his country. As we went along the banks of the Blue Nile in order to enter the White Nile, we saw long files of dromedaries coming in from all directions, mounted by men of every shade of colour, from chocolate to ebony black, who had hurried to Khartoum from the most remote districts to thank the great prince whose fame had traversed the desert, and who came to bring freedom to the oppressed.

“In the first bark there were, in addition to Arakel Bey and myself, M. Heuglein, Austrian Consul at Khartoum, and a very learned explorer and naturalist, and Senhor Popotani, Consul-General of Portugal in Egypt, for whom the Viceroy had a great liking. In the second bark were some of our services, the provisions, and the cooking apparatus. We were becalmed all night at the junction of the two streams. The next morning a brisk wind took us up to about the 15th degree, to the south of Mount Oueli. The White Nile is at this point two or three times as broad as the river is in Egypt or Nubia. Its banks are not steep—that is to say, the river is not embedded between two high banks—and the ground covered with timber slopes gradually down to the edge of the stream. M. Heuglein tells us that the river, with its numerous islands, was much the same up to the fourth

* Note of the Translator.—This was the college founded by Père Lacordaire.

degree, which is at present the extreme limit known. We encountered flocks of waterfowl—the sacred ibises, which are no longer to be seen in Egypt, royal cranes, grey cranes, Nile geese, and pelicans. At about two o'clock, the wind having dropped, we let our barks drop down stream, and while they were running down, we landed on the right bank, about two leagues to the south of Mount Oueli. We made for the direction of the mountain, following some very densely-wooded paths, and Arakel Bey and myself went up the mountain while the two others were shooting game. From this height and in so clear an atmosphere we saw, for a distance of ten or twelve leagues all round us, plains covered with forests, and natural vegetation which could, with the facilities for irrigation, be made of enormous value.

“Upon coming down from the mountain, we all assembled at an encampment of the *Bindja* tribe. The sheik and his family received us very cordially, and the most elegant of the cocoa-nut mattings were taken down from the walls and placed at our feet. We were treated as personages belonging to the suite of the Viceroy, whose deeds of benevolence are already known throughout the country, and who is called the ‘Father of the Unhappy.’ The women—who, despite their colour of Florentine bronze, are very handsome—bring us milk and fruit. Old men, surrounded by their families, sing the praises of the Effendinah (our

master), and pray aloud for him, prostrating themselves on the ground, and exclaiming that God had sent him to deliver them from their misery.

“At eight o’clock the barks came to fetch us at the place where they saw the fires alight. While we were having supper, as I happened to praise the taste of the excellent Bindja milk, M. Heuglein made me feel rather uncomfortable by telling me that upon the Upper Nile the tribes which have no salt mix the cows’ urine with milk. He added, however, that this custom only commenced with the tribes about a hundred leagues higher up the river.”

III.

“January 18, 1857.

“Upon the morning of the 16th we were still only ten leagues from Khartoum. There was a very slow current and no wind, so the boats went slowly up stream. In the afternoon we landed and walked through some woods and some bean fields in flower, which emitted an odour which was very pleasant at first, but soon became too strong. The geese, cranes, and herons swept down upon the banks of the river, and looked in the distance like flocks of sheep, but they would not let us get within gun-shot of them. I was walking on ahead, accompanied only by the boatman, when, as we approached a small creek, we noticed two sharp points floating on the surface of the water and making for land. We saw, as we got nearer, that these were the muzzles of two crocodiles

which were swimming about on the look-out for some prey. When about fifteen paces off I fired at one with a rifle, but the bullet sounded on the animal as on a piece of wood, and the beast did not move. My boatman told me that if any woman or child, or even a man alone, came to fetch water just then, he or she would incur a great risk of being seized. He added that when a crocodile attacks it begins by taking the victim under its claws and squeezing it tightly, dragging the body off to devour it upon some neighbouring island.

“He went on to tell me that, being one day in the water and swimming about with his brother, one of their comrades who was on shore called out to them to be careful, as he had just seen a crocodile. The two swimmers at once made for shore, but their comrade incautiously had advanced close to the edge of the water, and the crocodile, making a prodigious bound, seized him by the left arm, plunged into the stream and came up on the other side, where my boatman distinctly saw him devour the body of his unfortunate comrade. He also showed me a wound which a crocodile had made in his leg. He once met one which had gone ashore and was waddling back to the Nile. He and his companion tried to stop it, but the crocodile came at him, and with its open jaw inflicted a bite which threw him to the ground. Fortunately, he had the time to seize the dagger which the natives wear in the form of a bracelet, and with this he suc-

ceeded in wounding the crocodile in the vulnerable part of the neck, which has no scales, whereupon the animal made at once for the Nile. He told me that there was another way to make the crocodile let go of you if he seized you in the water, and that was to push your fingers into his eyes, if your position allowed you to do so.*

“We re-embark and continue our journey down the river, remaking several traces of the hippopotamus. It is evident that we are in the region frequented by these amphibious creatures, and we soon see in mid stream a sort of floating island, blackish in colour, and with its surface shining in the sun. This was the back of an enormous hippopotamus. We soon saw another one not so large. When we got quite close to the larger one, the sailors shouted in a peculiar manner, and we saw the hippopotamus rapidly plunge to the bottom, and then come up again to the surface and expose all the upper part of his body and the hind legs. We were told that this was a family party, and that the mother, believing her young to be in danger from the boats, had sprung out of the water in this way to see what her enemies were and, if necessary, defend herself.

“This reminded me of a story which had been told me, upon my arrival at Khartoum, by Father Knoble-

* Note of the Translator.—This must be almost as effective a mode of self-preservation as putting salt upon birds' tails is of catching them.

cher, superior of the Catholic Mission upon the White Nile. On one of his voyages the boat in which he was travelling having separated the mother from her young, she jumped furiously out of the water, and as Father Knoblecher's cook happened to be leaning over the side of the boat, he was struck by the enormous beast as she fell back and dragged him with her into the stream.

“ We reached Khartoum at nine in the evening of the 17th, and the next day the Viceroy informed me that he had dictated during my absence his ordinances for the administration of the Soudan. These curious documents remind one at once of the ancient ordinances of the French kings, and the patriarchal traditions of the Bible. A few fragments of them are worth quoting:—

“ Order of His Highness the Viceroy to the new Governors of the five provinces of the Soudan: Sennaar, Kordofan, Taka, Berber, and Dongola.

(Translated from the Arab.)

“ KHARTOUM, January 26, 1857.

“ ‘ You have heard what my heart yearns for, and how I desire the prosperity of the land and the welfare of the population. You know also how I have sought to form a right understanding of whatever is calculated to develop their fortune, to spare them suffering and place them beyond the reach of persecution, so that they may reach the height of

prosperity by the removal of injustice and of the abuse of power.

“ ‘ When I reached the Soudan provinces and saw the misery in which they were plunged, owing to the excessive sums levied upon the lands, I decided, moved by the spirit of justice, that all this system should be abandoned, and I desire that henceforth the taxes shall be distributed according to the means of the inhabitants, so that all fears may be calmed, that the land may prosper, and that there may be no further cause for complaint or exasperation.

“ ‘ When I reached Berber I asked the sheiks and inhabitants who came out to meet me what could insure their tranquillity, and how much they could afford to pay. They replied by asking that each sakié should pay an import of 250 piastres ; but as my love for my people makes me desirous of giving them the utmost possible prosperity, and as I am anxious to restore confidence to those who have expatriated themselves and induce them to return, I have decided that they shall pay only 200 piastres for each sakié. I then arrived at Khartoum to meet the other sheiks and notable persons, and if these latter had arrived promptly, they would have experienced, by the effect of my presence among them, the marks of a generosity which they had never yet experienced. But as I have made you Mudir of this province, you must above all things concern yourself with the welfare of the populations, with all that can ameliorate their position and

tranquillise their minds ; and you are to act in regard to them with all possible solicitude.

“ ‘ You will collect the taxes at the time of the most profitable crops—that is to say, that every year you will call together an assembly during the three months when there is no labour to be done in the fields. At this meeting you will divide the payment of the taxes into monthly sums, so arranged that they will not be burdensome to the inhabitants or leave arrears behind. This assembly is to be composed of from twelve to twenty-four notables of the province, according as you shall deem best for the general good. In your position as president of this assembly it will be your duty to see as to the division of the taxes, the best means for increasing the general welfare and tranquillity, so as to render the state of the towns and villages very stable. Your decisions are to be communicated to me from time to time. . . .

“ ‘ Whatever the Government may require in the way of food, camels, or labour is always to be paid for at the rate of two per cent. over what the inhabitants pay for the same things ; and even if it should happen that the value and the hire of the articles increased, the Government is always to pay the extra two per cent. ; and in order to guard against the sheiks, with the view of showing that they are watching over the interests of the Government, not declaring the truth for the price and hire of labour, you shall not take anything except with the free consent of the owners,

so that in this way prosperity may increase, and that others, seeing the price paid by the Government, may be led themselves to pay more, which is the way to increase the welfare of the country. You will take no man or camels for *corvées* (forced labour); you will advise the inhabitants to sow wheat, indigo, cotton, and sesamum. You will do all that is necessary to see that the cottons are properly pressed and the indigo well made so as to facilitate their export and increase their value. You will also encourage the inhabitants to extract sesamum oil, for that is in their interests. There are also many forests which contain an immense quantity of wood suitable, some for building, some for boat-making, some for firewood. It would be easy to send this timber down to Egypt on a raft when the Nile rises. You must let the inhabitants understand this and encourage them to do it, for most of them have little to do, and this would be a fresh source of profit for them. . . .

“With regard to the mountains which are taxed, as their inhabitants live like savages, and as it is necessary to bring them to a state of humanity, so that they may no longer be inclined to revolt, I have decided to forego two-thirds of their taxes. You will explain to them that they are not slaves, but free. These persons are in the habit of sowing some of the land on the slope of the mountains. You must encourage them and make them understand the advantages of life in towns; exhort them to increase their cultivation, and en-

deavour to convince and attract them. Explain well to them that if they heartily devote themselves to agriculture I will dispense from payment of the tax which I now reduce, and thus they will only have to pay the tax of the lands which they actually cultivate, even if this tax should be less than what they pay for their mountains; and you will treat them in this manner for their tranquillity, and so as to draw them into the path of civilisation. If even, in your conversation with them to explain this and to prevail upon them to do it, they ask you to remove this tax, provided that they promise to devote themselves to agriculture, paying only the land tax, you will consent and will refer the matter to me, so that I may act with them according to their desires, with the sole object of inspiring them with the love of comfort of life in the towns, and to safeguard them from the vicissitudes to which they are exposed.

“When I arrived at Berber and at Shendy, I appointed the sheiks and notables according to the wishes of the inhabitants and at their choice. The sheiks of some villages did not come. You will arrange things in the same way for the province of Dongola, and complete them also for the villages in the provinces of Berber and Gaulein, where they have not been done. You will select as sheiks and muluks those who have been chosen by the inhabitants, and you will give them your wise counsels, so that they may behave properly and avoid, thanks to your care,

anything which might alienate the inhabitants. Examine all affairs submitted to you; do justice to all men without partiality and in all equity. If any man deserves imprisonment for any misdeed, you will have the matter tried at once, so that the culprit may not remain long in prison; for even when it is necessary to punish a man for a bad action, so that he may not again fall into evil, my pity and clemency would not have him remain in prison longer than is absolutely necessary. Although, considering all that I have just done in favour of the inhabitants of this country, either by diminution of the taxes and the abolition of forced labour, or by preventing injustice and oppression, it does not seem necessary to maintain troops there, inasmuch as the inhabitants will necessarily be compelled, for the preservation of their properties, to defend themselves against attack, I have nevertheless quartered a sufficient number of regiments in the different localities. Be on your guard, therefore, to repel whomsoever attacks you, and if it is necessary that the provinces should come to one another's help, let this be done so that no harm may befall any of those under your charge.

“‘It is always a matter of urgent necessity, and it is also my desire, that you should keep me constantly informed of the condition of the country, and of anything which occurs in it. You must therefore organize a postal service for the Gheziré (Sennaar), Kordofan, and Taka, from Gheziré to Abu-Khama. At each

interval of ten hours' march by camel, or about five hours' by dromedary, you will establish stations for two dromedaries, the riders of which will hand on the despatches from one to the other. You will get ready sheds in which they can be kept, and you will provide means for feeding the messengers as well as their dromedaries. You will establish three stations between Abu-Khama and Korosko—the first at Abu-Khama, the second at Marat, and the third at Korosko, so as to facilitate the arrival of your despatches. You will also provide ten dromedaries for the mudir's service.

“‘If in the event of any one of you being compelled to assume the offensive, and of his enemies being so numerous that he requires help from Cairo, send me word at once, and I will send him the where-withal to make their hearts faint within them, to destroy and to disperse them; and I will myself come and punish those who have created disturbance and done evil.

“‘Be well assured that the necessary preparations will always be ready at Cairo, and that I will make an example of those whom I find to be guilty. Be convinced also that if I learn that the inhabitants have been oppressed by you or by the sheiks, not one of you will be spared punishment. Lay this well to heart and act accordingly, for such is my order and will.’”

Second Order of His Highness.

“ ‘In the order which I gave to you for the regulation of the tax, and for the carrying out of other instructions, it is stated that the tax is fixed upon this basis since the solar year 1272 (Zilkedje 1273), that the sum which the inhabitants may have paid since the beginning of the year till now was to be deducted from this year’s tax, and that, out of my love for my people, you were not to claim from the inhabitants the arrears due up to the end of the year 1271.

“ ‘But as all this was not very clearly explained, and as the inhabitants of these countries are uninstructed, I fear that they may think that the arrears are still due from them; so I issue this order to set their minds entirely at rest, that their joy and happiness may be full, and I explain to them more clearly my wishes.

“ ‘The sums which have been collected since the beginning of 1272 until now will be deducted from the tax of the current year, after the accounts of the *serafs* (surveyors of taxes) have been closely verified.

“ ‘With regard to those who are creditors up to the end of 1271, for the excess which they have paid on the tax which they owed, although in equity this surplus should be made good by the arrears, yet in my justice I do order that my subjects lose nothing of what is due to them, and therefore you will compensate out of the tax] of the current year all those

who are found to be creditors for such sums duly proved.

“‘It is also necessary to be well acquainted with the limits of each village, and to compel the sheiks and notables to respect these limits and to appoint proper guardians, who will be responsible for any murder or theft committed within the boundaries of their village, and who will be bound to produce the murderer or thief, failing which they will be held personally responsible. This is done with a view to secure the safety of the road, and to prevent them shifting the responsibility from one to the other, which would render the process of trial a very long one, and make it very difficult to discover the truth.

“‘You will therefore take the necessary steps to fix the boundaries of each village; you will make the sheiks understand what a serious responsibility rests upon them. . . .

“‘Up till now the thieves and murderers sentenced to penal servitude for life have been sent to the galleys in the Soudan; if, instead of that, they had been removed to galleys far away from their families and villages, the knowledge of this would probably have prevented them from committing the crime. I have consequently decided that those who are condemned to penal servitude for life shall be sent to the galleys in Egypt to undergo their punishment, and that those who are condemned to a like penalty in Egypt shall be sent to the Soudan.

“ ‘The accounts were formerly submitted to the Governor-General. But now that each province is independent you will send your accounts every three months to Cairo.

“ ‘You will communicate the contents of this order to all the sheiks and notables ; you will make them well acquainted with it, so that they may conform to it.

“ ‘Such is my will.’ ”

“ Arakel Bey had begged me to ask the Viceroy to let him remain as Governor-General of the Soudan, so I took this opportunity of pointing out to him that it was no use to have good laws unless they were administered by suitable persons, and recommended Arakel Bey to him. The only objection he raised was that he feared the climate of the Soudan might be fatal to him, and he urged me to point this out to him, and to say that during the last few days low fever had killed half of the seventy Albanians who formed his escort.

“ Despite this, Arakel Bey told me that he was anxious to have the honour of carrying out the noble ordinances of the Viceroy, and that it was the height of his ambition to be entrusted with this important mission. We were encamped near Khartoum, and upon my communicating Arakel Bey’s decision to him, the Viceroy, who was always very prompt in his actions, at once sent for his ministers and generals, and addressed them as follows :— ‘ You are aware that we are about to quit this terrible country, the climate

of which has already cost us so many valuable lives. You are all men who have been enriched by my predecessors and by myself; you have palaces at Cairo; you have families and every comfort; there is not one of you who would have been foolish enough to ask me to leave him here as governor of a country which has been ruined. Well, the only one who has aspired to this post is a Christian, Arakel Bey; he really wants a straight waistcoat.' Then one of his ministers, Hassan Pasha, acting as buffoon of the Court, seized Arakel and went through the pretence of tying him up to the pole of the tent. When this scene was at an end the Viceroy made a sign and every one withdrew, leaving us alone.

" 'Well,' he said, speaking in excellent French, '*le tour est joué*' (the trick is played). 'If I had been compelled to appoint a personage in my train to act as deputy for me in this important Government, with all the external signs of my authority, my own tent, my horses, my carriages, my palace, and all my absolute powers, at a distance of six hundred leagues from my capital, it would have been impossible for me to fulfil my promise, on account of Arakel's religion, as there is no precedent in the whole Ottoman Empire of a Christian having occupied a like position. Now you can go and tell Arakel that his request is granted, and that he can come and see me.'

" *January 19.*—I go to see M. Heuglein, whose geographical information about the interior of Africa is

full of interest, and I meet there M. de Malzac, who had arrived the day before from the Upper Nile. He had been secretary to Count de Rayneval, French Ambassador in Rome, and he had abandoned diplomacy for the adventurous and perilous life of an elephant hunter in the Djours' country, between the 6th and 7th degree, ten days march inland, to the west of the White Nile. His cargo of ivory will bring him in about £1,600.

IV.

“Upon the 20th of January the Viceroy orders preparations to be made for a start, and we are to commence the journey in a week, traversing the vast desert of Bayuda, on the left bank of the Nile, as far as Dongola. This desert is much less inhospitable than that of Korosko, and we are to follow at the foot of the lofty mountain chain a series of valleys which are well cultivated, watered, and inhabited. It seems indeed as if this vast tract, described as a ‘great desert,’ upon the map, is not a desert at all.

“In the meanwhile we propose to make an excursion of two or three days up the Blue Nile, five or six leagues above Khartoum, to visit the ruins of Sheba, an ancient city of Ethiopia, perhaps the capital of the famous queen whom Solomon wished to have as his 301st wife.

“I advise the Viceroy to send for horsemen from a tribe in the province which, as I had been told, had armour and equipments for their horses similar to that

used by the French crusaders. Carriers were sent out on dromedaries and soon returned, bringing with them a dozen horsemen arrayed in coats of mail and helmets, carrying long swords, the hilts of which were in the shape of a cross, and riding horses richly caparisoned from the head to the tail with very gaudy cloth on a thick backing of cotton. They performed some very clever feats of arms in our presence.

“Towards the end of January the Viceroy started in advance of my caravan, as it was desirable not to have too many people together in case the supply of water at the wells should run short; but we arranged to meet from time to time at certain halting-places fixed before starting.”

To Madame Delamalle.

(Continuation of the Diary.)

“CAIRO, March 6, 1857.

“I have at last arrived here safe and sound after my long journey, having done the distance from Khar-toum to the second cataract, which is about nine hundred miles, in twenty-two days on an excellent dromedary, which, however, was so tired during the last week that he made a great many tumbles, and tried my gymnastic abilities very highly. A steamer was waiting for me at Ouade-el-Alpha* (the second cataract), and the reason why I am a week behind the Viceroy is that I was obliged to stop awhile in Dongola

* Note of the Translator.—Wadi-Halfa, as it is better known to English readers since the Soudan campaign.

and attend the doctor whom he had told off for me. The doctor was very ill with low fever, and despite my want of experience in medicine, I succeeded in bleeding him and bringing him round.

“You are aware that, instead of returning by Korosko, upon the right bank of the Nile, we changed our itinerary so as to avoid the windings of the stream and five of its cataracts, and that we took the other route on the left bank of the river, through the so-called desert of Bayuda. I did not meet with a single accident or adventure in the course of this journey through a land occupied by supposed barbarian populations. Upon quitting the banks of the Nile and making for the country to the south-west of Khartoum, we traversed the tribe of the Hassanieh, the women of which, who are very handsome, are allowed complete liberty one day out of four.

“My caravan was always well supplied with provisions, while that of the Viceroy, which preceded mine, often ran short. The Prince asked me once how this was, and I answered him as follows: ‘This is not at all to be wondered at. Your Government has so maltreated this country that, after you have passed through, I have to be very patient before I can overcome the mistrust of the inhabitants. Seated alone in front of an abandoned hut, and, letting my caravan get well out of sight, I have to wait an hour, or perhaps two, before the children will come near me. Children are always sent on in advance to reconnoitre.

If they hesitate to approach me, I throw them some small coins, some shells, or glass trinkets. They are sure then to go and tell their mothers what they have seen, and then the women come up, not as a rule the young ones. They surround me and ask me why I have made presents to the children, and I reply that I am a man of ease travelling for my pleasure, and for the good of the country in which I am sojourning. Then they all ask me at once if there is anything that you want. I tell them that, on the contrary, if they require provisions I have plenty at my encampment, which is an hour's march, and to which I invite them to come. It is when one has the appearance of requiring nothing that everybody is ready to furnish you with what you really do want. As soon as the old women had gone to fetch me the provisions, the young women and girls arrived, full of curiosity, very pretty some of them with their complexions like Florentine bronze, and they were soon followed by the young men. In short, a whole crowd of them came to our tents with sheep, goats, dates, and milk, and all that we could require. Curiously enough, they would never take any money, and yet these very same people would perhaps have killed me if I had come to them armed.'

"Another day the Viceroy said to me: 'You are very lucky, it seems. I had a fine service of china, but it is broken to bits.' I told him that if his china had been entrusted to men who were better looked

after, it would not have happened. Soon after this he pretended that the camel which carried mine was tired out, and when the frisky one which he had put in its place kicked up and broke the handsome service, a gift of his own, he was delighted. Fortunately, I had in reserve what I call my silver service, made of tin and used by me while surveying for the canal, even when princes do me the honour of accepting my hospitality. To-morrow I am going to rejoin the Viceroy at one of his residences upon the Damietta branch of the Nile.

“It will be as well to give here the memoir which was read at the meeting of the Académie des Sciences in Paris on April 27th, 1857, by M. Elle de Beaumont, and which embodied my observations relating to the Soudan. These observations, which I put in the form of a letter, were as follows:—

“*‘Monsieur Le Secrétaire Perpétuel,*

“‘Having received during my stay in Khartoum last January the questions and instructions of the Académie des Sciences, drawn up for the use of travellers seeking the sources of the White Nile, I communicated them to the Europeans, who were staying in or passing through Khartoum, and handed a copy to Arakel Bey, the Governor-General of the Sennaar provinces, who, by his education, fine feelings, and real worth, will not fail to exercise over these still barbarous countries a most salutary influence. I

requested this high functionary of the Viceroy to establish at his residence in the capital of the Soudan, and in accordance with the questions sketched out by the Académie des Sciences, a standing inquiry among all travellers, tourists, savants, traders, and pilgrims, whether native or European.

“Circumstances favoured my commencing an inquiry of this kind myself, and I had several opportunities during my three weeks stay at Khartoum to question, either together or independently, MM. de Malzac, Thibaut, and Vayssières, French travellers; another of our compatriots, Dr. Peney, who has been living for the last ten years in the Sennaar; M. Heuglein, the Austrian consul, and a very learned geographer and naturalist; and Don Ignacio Knoblecher, the worthy chief of the Apostolic Mission in Eastern Africa.

“I am very pleased to lay before the Academy the results of my investigations, and trust that they may be deemed of interest.

“Since the expedition of M. d’Arnaud, which did not get beyond $4^{\circ} 42' 42''$, no one has been further up the river than Don Ignacio Knoblecher, Don Angelo Vinco and Don Bartholomeo Mosgan. These hardy missionaries navigated for a period of a fortnight beyond the point reached by M. d’Arnaud, that is up to the third degree. They formed at Gondokoro, in the land of the Barrys, in $4^{\circ} 35'$, latitude north, and $28^{\circ} 47'$, longitude east (M.P.), an establishment which is still flourishing despite the death of its first founder,

Don Angelo Vinco, and which is now almost as important as the mother house at Khartoum.

“The mission has lost within the last eight years twelve of its members out of thirty-six. It is at Khartoum that the climate is the most fatal to foreigners, owing to the prevalence of low fever. In 1839 Mehemet Ali lost in a week thirteen of the sixty persons who accompanied him, and the Viceroy the other day lost half of his escort of seventy Albanians who were encamped outside the town. They all died in the space of three days, during which the sun had been very hot.

“The outskirts of Khartoum need being drained, as the stagnant water which accumulates in the low ground after rain is the chief cause of mischief to Europeans. The city, founded by Mehemet Ali forty years ago, has now between 35,000 and 40,000 inhabitants. It is the centre of an important trade, and the very wise arrangements which the Viceroy has just made will certainly add to its salubrity and prosperity.

“M. Heuglein has ascertained it to be 1,060 feet (French) above the level of the sea, and its latitude you know. Khartoum, in Arabic, means elephant's trunk, and the name is derived from the comparison of the two branches of the Nile which meet here being like the two cartilages or snouts at the end of an elephant's trunk. The waters of the two rivers do not mix directly after their junction, those on the

eastern side being for some distance clear and blue, while those to the west are muddy and of a whitish hue.

“‘In going up the White Nile from Khartoum to the 10th degree the bed of the river is very broad and slopes but very little, the result being that its current is very slow, little more than half a mile an hour, while with a north wind there is scarcely any. The banks are not at all steep, and are formed by a narrow sort of shore which divides the river from the immense plains which are in many cases below its level. The land is very well cultivated near the river, but beyond it is covered with wild plants, woods, and bush. At the 14th degree begins the Archipelago of the Chulucks, up to within a day’s journey of the mouth of the Saubat, an affluent running from the east between the 10th and 9th degrees.

“‘From the 10th to the 6th degree the White Nile flows through marshes where travellers are much plagued by insects. M. de Malzac, who last year killed seventeen elephants with his own gun, has formed an establishment in the land of the Djours, between the 6th and 9th degrees, a hundred leagues to the west of the Nile. From that point he has put himself in communication with several other tribes, all of which speak different languages. He already employs five native interpreters to conduct his exchanges of glass and other trinkets for ivory,

and as his relations are extending every year, he told me that he should soon require at least five fresh interpreters. To illustrate the necessity of this, he told me that an elephant is called *akou* by the Kilches, *keddé* by the Djours, and so on. Yet all these tribes have one word for the serpent, and that is *python*, the coincidence with the Greek being somewhat singular.

“A short time ago five hundred blacks came with M. de Malzac from his station to the banks of the Nile, carrying on their backs a cargo of elephant tusks which he was bringing down to Khartoum. This journey lasted a week, and the men passed over marshy land which beasts of burden could not have traversed. M. de Malzac had informed his men before he engaged them that as his stock of glass and trinkets was exhausted he could only pay them on his return. But this did not prevent them coming down to the river with their heavy load, and from returning home full of confidence in his promise.

“A fact like this shows that the inhabitants of these countries are not by nature hostile to strangers. Most of the tragedies which have recently occurred are due to the greediness and, in some cases, to the actual cruelty of certain traders.

“The *Niébor*, called in the Soudan the “Bahr-el-Gazal (Stream of Gazelles), is not, according to MM. Malzac and Veyssières, the principal part of the Nile, but only one of its affluents, and perhaps the most

important. Among the Dinkas and the Chulucks the White Nile is called Kyr, and among the Barrys the *Churifry*. Father Knoblecher states that when going up the river beyond Gondokoro he noticed upon the left bank at 4° 9' a granite mountain 500 feet high, which the natives call *Logouat*. While he was going up this mountain he felt a sharp shock of earthquake. The negroes who accompanied him, throwing themselves upon their faces to the ground, were very much terrified, and exclaimed that the spirits of the dead were coming back. Father Knoblecher having asked them what they meant by these spirits, they told him that there had formerly been a great battle in the neighbourhood, that the dead had been buried at the foot of the mountain, and that ever since their souls made occasional efforts to escape. The missionary took the opportunity, while combating their prejudices, to explain to them that the notions of the immortality of the soul, which they asserted were unknown to them, in reality came natural to them, and that it would never occur to them that the spirit of an ox or an ass could survive.

“ ‘A few lights to the south of Mount Logouat, on the right bank of the river, is a stream which is navigable for three days’ journey, and which appears to have its source at the foot of a lofty mountain called Lologouchi. Further on, eight leagues from Logouat, commence the rapids, which are studded

with islets and which extend for a hundred leagues, over which distance the river is not navigable. Father Knoblecher managed to pass through the first islets, but he was obliged to go on foot to a rock which is a hundred feet high, and from this elevated point he traced the Nile, as far as the eye could reach, flowing southward between two tall mountains called *Merek-Rego* and *Merek-Wigo*. It would appear from what is related by him and all other travellers, that beyond the rapids the river again becomes navigable as far as the 4th or 5th degree of south latitude, and that there it forms a bend towards the east, afterwards coming back towards the north, and having its source between the 1st and 2nd degree of latitude south, at the foot of a large chain of mountains called by the Somalis *Kaenia*, the tablelands of which nearest to the sources are called by the natives *Kali-Mandjaro*, or White Mountain. These, then, would be the silver-capped mountains, or the mountains capped with eternal snow, described by the Monbaz Protestant missionaries, as well as by the English navigator Short, who came from Zanzibar.

“ ‘ Along the course of the White Nile, at the point where the rapids are met with, the two banks of the river are so close that the natives say they can shake hands across them. The Catholic missionaries have remarked that at several points a large tree is thrown across the river by way of a bridge.

““The rising of the river begins in February or March. Sometimes the river will rise and fall again within the twenty-four hours, and this was what happened to Father Knoblecher when he was passing between the islets of the first rapids. He was afraid on one occasion that he should not be able to get back to Gondokoro, as his boat had stranded ; but the next day the water rose and floated it, this movement of ebb and flow occurring several times in succession. The Barrys, amid whom is situated the Catholic establishment of Gondokoro, belong to a numerous and powerful tribe, which is descended from a chief named Zangara, and from his sons, Karchiouk, Bepo, Pilza, Wany, Watavy, and Manabour. They were formerly in regular communication with a very distant tribe inhabiting the south-east, but the caravan which used to come to them every year has not been seen anything of for several seasons, owing to the hostile attitude of the intermediate tribes.

“‘ETHNOLOGY.

““The population is very dense all along the course of the White Nile wherever the land is productive. The arms used are lances, darts, large double-edged swords, ebony clubs, and tridents with three sharp blades, which the natives project with the hand. I send with this one of these tridents for the Academy’s inspection, and two spades manufactured by the Djours out of the iron of the country.

“ ‘None of the tribes are able to write. They can count, and their system of numerals is similar to ours; and I append a tablet of the numerals, as supplied me by M. de Malzac, in use among the Kidgs, the Ajars, the Ocools, the Dinkas, &c.

“ ‘The dwellers along the White Nile live principally upon cow’s milk, doura grain, sweet sorghum, rice, beans, earth-nuts, and sweet potatoes. The married women are partially clothed in sheep-skins, but the men as a rule go quite naked. The Djours, however, enclose their generative organs in a panther-skin bag, while the women wear a belt of leaves round their loins.

“ ‘The habitations in the rainy regions are round huts with conical roofs; in the regions where no rain falls they are square, and have flat roofs. The Barrys invoke a divinity whom they call the great rain (*Dendit*). At a time of drought they sacrifice a white ox in order to obtain rain, and when there is too much rain they sacrifice a black ox to obtain sunshine. This sacrifice is, moreover, in very general usage among the tribes of the White Nile.

“ ‘When two enemies become reconciled, each of them puts to his lips a piece of iron, which is the token of peace, and which is at once buried in the ground at the spot where peace was made.

“ ‘The bodies of all those who die are cast into the Nile by the tribes who live on the banks; but the dead of the inland tribes are buried in front of their houses, in a sort of sitting position, which is only

made possible by breaking the thigh-bones after death. A lance is thrust into the ground to indicate the tomb of a man, while on the tomb of a woman is placed the vessel which she has used for bruising the doura seed.

“ ‘Every evening the people meet to dance and sing. The singing is not so monotonous as that of the Arabs ; the tunes are lively and varied, and the singers have as a rule pleasant voices and keep time.

“ ‘Although the law is that of the strongest, the manners are for the most part very gentle. Theft and murder are rare, except in time of war, between family and family, or between tribe and tribe. Robbery is punished by the person who has been robbed, murder by the family of the victim. The leader of each tribe, the chief man of the family, is the one who is richest—that is to say, who has the most wives and stock. Polygamy is universal ; prostitution does not exist.

“ ‘The people consult soothsayers to obtain rain or heat ; but the calling is not always a lucrative one, and if the predictions do not come true the soothsayer is sometimes put to death by having his stomach opened. It will be easily believed that the soothsayer does not always await the return of his customers when his predictions have not been realised, and that he loses no time in disappearing when he is likely to be called to account in so shocking a fashion. The only public trade is that of blacksmith.

“ ‘ ANTHROPOLOGY AND ZOOLOGY.

“ ‘ I consider that from the Mediterranean to the fourth degree, and even farther, the populations along the Nile banks descend from races in which all the races foreign to Africa have been absorbed. The populations belong to two types quite distinct, but which are in some instances fused in the same locality, the Ethiopian and the negro types. The Ethiopian type dominates up to the tenth degree, but beyond that one encounters only the pure negro race, with its thick lips, flat nose, and woolly hair.

“ ‘ It has often been asked if the Ethiopian populations have degenerated. I believe myself that they have remained stationary. They were probably during the splendour of the Egyptian and Ethiopian kings what they are now. It is the might of the kings and of the great which has perished with their palaces and their monuments. If you except these, with the royal tombs hewn in the rock or elevated on the pyramids, the private dwellings, the manners, the customs, the furniture, the arms, and the clothing were the same that they are to-day. The study of the monuments of ancient Egypt led Champollion to the conclusion that the valley of the Nile derived its first inhabitants from Abyssinia and the Sennaar, and that the ancient Egyptians belonged to a race of men very similar to the Barabras who inhabit Nubia at the present day. Diodorus of Sicily was also of that opinion, remarking

that even in his day the Ethiopians affirmed that Egypt was one of their colonies.

“ ‘The tribes of the Upper Nile still plait their hair as the ancient Egyptians did theirs. The sandals found in the Egyptian monuments are the same as those still used by the natives, and this holds good of the wooden head-rests, the lances, the javelins, and the shields.

“ ‘The children are comparatively light-skinned at birth, the colour gradually deepening. The age of puberty commences at about twelve or thirteen, and the women do not bear child after they are forty. The peculiarity of confinements in the Sennaar country is that the women are placed in an upright position against a wall, and that they are often suspended by ropes passed under the armpits, and swung to and fro or well shaken.

“ ‘None of the travellers or natives whom I have consulted has ever heard of any men having a salient coccyx.

“ ‘I have heard of some fellatah tribes of a swarthy or reddish colour, supposed to be of Malay origin, and living to the south and west of Darfour.

“ ‘I shall have the honour of presenting to the Academy very shortly, on the part of M. Heuglein, the complete notice which he has promised me on the zoology of the White and Blue Niles. In the meanwhile, I append to this a manuscript map showing the routes followed by M. Heuglein in his recent

voyages along the Nile in Abyssinia. M. Heuglein is a very keen observer; he uses the most improved instruments, and he may be fully trusted as regards all the geographical points which he has fixed. He verified the absolute accuracy of the geographical observations of Bruce, especially with respect to the position of Lake Tana, which is traversed by the Blue Nile and just below its source.

“ ‘ HISTORICAL REMARKS UPON THE EMPIRE OF
MÉROÉ.

“ ‘ No one has ever yet been able to say what was the extent of this empire, so rare are the remarks of ancient authors upon this subject. According to M. Heuglein, who has studied the question very closely upon the spot, the ancient Empire of Méroé was the Sheba of Scripture. It comprised Upper and Lower Ethiopia—that is to say Abyssinia, the Peninsula of Sennaar between the Blue and the White Nile, the Kordofan, the Peninsula of Méroé, between the Nile and the Athara (Astaboras), the provinces of Berber and of Dongola with Taka. He derived this opinion from the inscriptions of Axoum and during his investigations of Ethiopian monuments. He discovered pyramids at six leagues from Rosérès (Sennaar, Blue Nile), at Debbah, and at the mouth of the two tributaries of the Blue Nile, the Yabous and the Taumat, to the south-east of Fazoglu.

“ ‘ Besides the ruins of Méroé, discovered by Cail-

land in 1819, M. Heuglein has pointed out the existence in the peninsula of those of Ouad-Benaka, Wady-Safrah, Wady-Okateb, of Sheba, the royal city on the right bank of the Blue Nile, five leagues from Khartoum, and those of Khamlim ten leagues further inland to the east.

“ ‘M. Heuglein has shown me a pen-and-ink map which was recently sent him by Mr. Rehman, a Protestant missionary residing at Moubar, on the Zanguebar coast. This missionary appears to have collected a good deal of information about an inland sea called *Uniamesi*, of which there has been no little talk recently, which is said to occupy an area of from twelve to thirteen degrees north to south, and which would in this case be larger than the Black Sea.

“ ‘The existence of this sea was certified to me during my stay at Khartoum by a pilgrim from Mecca, who inhabits Central Africa, and who gave Mahmoud Pasha, one of the Viceroy’s ministers, particulars corresponding to those upon Mr. Rehman’s map. This pilgrim added that he had seen larger vessels on the *Uniamesi* than that in which he had sailed down the Red Sea.

“ ‘I beg to place before the Academy a specimen of india-rubber from the Djours country, which was brought me by M. de Malzac, and this is, I think, the first which has been discovered in any part of Africa. I also send a fragment of colossal *convolvulus* which sometimes reaches a length of thirty feet, a new

species of convolvulus named *djaugal*, which grows horizontally underground, and some *convolvulus gnocchi* growing upon stems, a kind of bean called *mangha* and fruit of the butter tree. These three kinds of convolvulus taste, when cooked, like our potato.

“ ‘ MEDICAL PART.

“ ‘ Dr. Peney, who has collected some very interesting information during his long residence in the Soudan with regard to the maladies prevalent in the country, has undertaken to prepare a medical treatise in reply to the questions raised by M. Jules Cloquet in his report of November 10th, 1856, and this treatise will be presented to the Academy. I may in the meanwhile communicate to the Academy a copy of the ordinances issued by the Viceroy for the reorganisation of the Soudan provinces, for these ordinances, so sensible and so liberal, while settling many important points, also bring to light a number of details relating to manners which are of a nature to interest the Académie des Sciences and which have a bearing upon several of the ethnological questions which are mentioned in its instructions.

“ ‘ It may be said without exaggeration that from the issuing of these ordinances civilisation has been established and is feeling its feet in these remote countries, from which it seemed for ever excluded. I do not dwell upon the political consequences which these measures may have for the people to whom

they apply. I only refer to the more or less scientific consequences. It is clear that the centre of Africa, hitherto almost inaccessible, will be much less so in future. The starting point will be Khartoum, placed beneath a Christian governor at the sixteenth degree, instead of Alexandria or Cairo, and it may be taken for granted that in a near future great explories will be made and great discoveries will be the infallible consequence. The researches, rendered more easy, will bear more fruit. Commerce will gain not less than science, and everything will be ready for a vast development of these fertile countries when the opening of the Suez Canal brings the coasting vessels of the Mediterranean into the Red Sea, and especially along the east coast of Africa. In these various ways the ordinances issued by Mohammed Said at Khartoum on the 26th of January open safer and more speedy roads to science, while they at the same time mark a decisive era in the amelioration of those lands.' "

" RESIDENCE OF THE VICEROY AT MIT-BIRÉ,
" (DAMIETTA BRANCH),

" March 7, 1857.

" His Highness was awaiting me at Mit-Biré, where we at once set to work giving orders for the continuance of the preparatory investigations and surveys. During our absence all the orders had been duly carried out, and as the master was absent no one dared say a word. Captain Pheligret, employed

to take soundings in the Gulf of Pelusium, between the Damietta branch and the ancient Pelusian branch, did his work admirably. His vessel, despite the bad weather, held very well in the bay with only one anchor, and I intend to publish his observations.

“The course of the sweet-water canal has been carefully considered by Conrad and Linant Bey, and the plans are finished. The Viceroy is once more full of hope, and no one has attempted to shake this confidence.

“It appears that he has spoken to his family about my showing him real affection, for the princess his wife has thanked me in a letter written me at her dictation by Madame Stephan Bey, wife of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Here is my answer:—

“*To Madame Stephan Bey, Cairo.*

“MIT-BIRÉ, March 7, 1857.

“‘I told you when passing through Cairo how deeply grateful I felt for the gracious message which you were charged by the Vice-Queen to transmit to me; but I avail myself of the first moment which I can command to express to you my thanks in writing. Nothing could be more flattering than to receive this mark of high esteem from a princess known not only in Egypt but throughout Europe for her elevated character and intelligence, as well as for her acts of kindness and charity.

“‘What touched me most was to find that my feel-

ings of devotion towards the prince, who has since his boyhood honoured me with his friendship, are appreciated by the person who would be best able to divine their nature, for gifted women have an almost supernatural instinct for picking out, almost without having seen them, the friends or the enemies of those to whom they are attached. Their views are rarely mistaken ; and there is no man, of those blessed with a faithful and disinterested companion, who has not occasionally had cause to regret not having followed the advice or given heed to the presentiments to which his vanity prevented him from paying attention.

“ ‘ The Viceroy deigned to speak to me, during our voyage to the Soudan, of the high opinion which he had of the clear and straightforward judgment of his august spouse. This gives me a reason the more for rejoicing in the confidence which she is pleased to place in the sincerity of my attachment for a prince who may count upon ever receiving from me the free and respectful affection which his goodness of heart and, as I may venture to call it, his fraternal affection cannot fail to elicit.’ ”

Note to His Highness the Viceroy.

“ MIT-BIRÉ, March 9, 1857.

“ As I count upon returning very shortly to Egypt, I would ask of your Highness to provide Linant Bey and Mougel Bey with the means for continuing the preparatory works upon the sweet-water

canal, in accordance with the plans agreed upon with M. Conrad, President of the International Commission. The number of workmen, which is now four hundred, can then be gradually raised to a thousand, pending the date for commencing the main works, which will be fixed later on. It will also be advisable to get together the material and the tools, of which a list has already been drawn up ; and no time should be lost in arranging for the making of bricks, the excavation of stone, and the supply of wood."

To the same.

"PARIS, March 31, 1857.

"Upon my arrival I had the honour of an interview with the Emperor, and informed him that I was not yet in a position to solicit the support of his representative at Constantinople. I was also able to give him many details, which he listened to with much interest, about your Highness's journey to the Soudan, and the excellent results which would accrue from it. The documents relating to the measures which you decreed have been published here, and have been made the subject of very favourable comment.

"I then proceeded to London, where I found that the Suez Canal question had, in the course of the last few months, made extraordinary progress. The leading merchants and bankers of the city received me most cordially, and gave me letters of introduction to the principal merchants, manufacturers, and ship-

owners in the fifteen largest towns of the kingdom. The Chambers of Commerce, the merchants, the manufacturers, and the shipowners of these towns have been informed that I am going to commence a series of visits to them all about the middle of April, and nothing will be left undone to render this tour decisive of the question so far as England is concerned. My object is to collect signatures and declarations to the effect that the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez will be beneficial to English interests, as well as to those of other nations, and that no government has any right to put obstacles in the way of the work.

“In this way your Highness’s glorious enterprise will be based upon public opinion in England, as it already is upon that of the European continent and America. While using all my efforts to attain that end, I do not forget my promise—I may add, my duty—to avoid anything which might be calculated to disturb your Highness’s friendly relations with all the Powers.

“After what I have myself seen in Paris and London, and from what M. de Negrelli writes me from Austria and Signor Palescopa from Italy, everyone praises your Highness for having commenced the sweet-water canal; and I can confidently assure you that you can continue the work without the least cause for uneasiness, if the weather, the requirements of agriculture, and the government resources admit of your doing so.

“In any event, your Highness is certain to decide for the best; and when my English tour is ended, and I am prepared to go to Constantinople, I will first come to Egypt to take your orders.”

MEETINGS.

The months of May and June, 1857, were devoted to going to the principal towns in England, Scotland, and Ireland. The resolutions passed at these meetings were unanimously in favour of the execution of the canal, that which was carried at the London meeting (June 24th, 1857) being similar in terms to the rest:—

“At the public meeting of merchants, bankers, shipowners, &c., held at the London Tavern, Wednesday, June 24th, 1857, Sir James Duke, Bart., in the chair, it was proposed by Mr. Arbuthnot and seconded by Captain Harris, of the P. and O. Steam Company, ‘That the canal through the isthmus of Suez having been declared practicable by competent engineers, and all nations having been invited to take part in the enterprise, which will not be placed under the exclusive protection of any government in particular, this meeting, being quite satisfied with the explanations given by M. de Lesseps, is persuaded that the success of the canal will be eminently advantageous to the commercial interests of Great Britain.’ Carried unanimously.

“JAMES DUKE, Chairman.”

The account of all the meetings, beginning with that at Liverpool on April 29th to that at London on June 24th, was published in English, and it was dedicated to the members of the Houses of Parliament in the following terms :—

“I dedicate to you individually, and I submit to your illustrious assemblies, the following pages, which embody the resolutions and deliberations of the principal towns in the United Kingdom, the commercial and municipal corporations of which have formally expressed their opinion upon the interests of the trade, the navy, and the colonies of Great Britain, as they would be affected by the opening of the canal through the isthmus of Suez.

“Reassured as I now am as to the competent opinion of the traders, the manufacturers, and the shipowners of Great Britain, and being about to pursue the execution of the work upon behalf of which I do not ask for the protection or the exclusive help of any government, I appeal in all confidence, in order to put an end to the opposition of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, to the political bodies of a free country which, in other circumstances, have already had the glory of placing above every consideration of private interests or national rivalry the great principles of civilisation and free trade. This pamphlet, addressed to politicians, would be regarded by them as incomplete unless I passed in review the elements of the political questions which have been raised in connec-

tion with the enterprise. It has been said that the opening of the African isthmus would threaten the power of England in India, and in this connection an effort has been made to revive the ancient distrust of England for France.

“The Suez Canal has also been represented as calculated to loosen the bonds between Turkey and Egypt, and to bring about the independence of the Egyptian Viceroy. Instead of avowing a hostility which it is no longer possible to conceal, this hostility was masked beneath such reasons as the so-called interests of Turkey, or was attributed to members of the Divan, who have repudiated it altogether, either in letters which have been shown to me or in their conversation with the representatives of the various governments which have not scrupled to express their unrestrained sympathy with the undertaking.

“Of these three questions of the relations between France and England relative to the Suez Canal, of the respective situations of Egypt and Turkey, and of the interests of Turkey in the piercing of the isthmus of Suez, the first was discussed in a letter which I wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at the outset of the enterprise, and the two others in the subjoined notes which I submit to the impartial judgment of my readers:—

““The enlightened Turks, far from being alarmed at them, see, upon the contrary, in the consequences of the opening of the Suez Canal a guarantee of

security for the future. What they dread above all else is the risk of being exposed to any dangerous eventualities upon the part of one or other of the European Powers. They will always wish that Egypt should be exceptionally governed by Mussulman princes of Turkish origin, who are connected by so many common political and religious ties to the metropolis of Islamism.'

"With regard to the Viceroy of Egypt, in his communications with Turkish statesmen, speaking of the attempts made to raise a prejudice against him, he said: 'In the present state of things a ruler of Egypt who had any secret idea of aggrandizing his position would not allow the Suez Canal to be made. The whole of the coast, from Damietta to the first ports of Syria, is at present beyond the reach of any foreign surveillance, as it is outside European navigation. Nothing stands in the way of the Viceroy arming a fleet or collecting troops without exciting notice, and of throwing them into Syria before any one could interfere. When the canal is made the whole situation will be altered. Moreover, the important possessions of Turkey in Arabia can easily be reduced by starvation, as Egypt has the supplying of them with corn. There always exists in these provinces slight elements of rebellion, which it would be easy for Egypt to keep alive and increase, and which she alone, with the existing means of communication, could alone put down. Experience has shown that the distance and the diffi-

culty of transport prevents Turkey from sending to Arabia enough troops to ensure her the preponderance of power. Then we are told that the canal would create a barrier between Turkey and Egypt. Anyone who knows the country must be well aware that, in a physical sense, a vast desert without water is a far greater barrier between them than would be the maritime and the sweet-water canals, around which large numbers of Syrian and Egyptian cultivators would gather.'

"This language is not less remarkable for its outspoken honesty than for its striking truthfulness."

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 7, 1857.

The Isthmus of Suez Canal.

Mr. H. Berkeley asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether her Majesty's Government would use its influence with his Highness the Sultan in support of an application which had been made by the Viceroy of Egypt for the sanction of the Sublime Porte to the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez, for which a concession had been granted by the Viceroy of Egypt to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, and which had received the approbation of the principal cities, ports, and commercial towns of the United Kingdom; and if any objection were entertained by her Majesty's Government to the undertaking, to state the grounds of such objection.

Lord Palmerston:—Her Majesty's Government cer-

tainly cannot undertake to use their influence with the Sultan to induce him to give permission for the construction of this canal, because for the last fifteen years her Majesty's Government have used all the influence they possess at Constantinople and in Egypt to prevent that scheme from being carried into execution. (Hear.) It is an undertaking which, I believe, as regards its commercial character, may be deemed to rank among the many bubble schemes that from time to time have been palmed off upon gullible capitalists. (Hear and a laugh.) I believe that it is physically impracticable, except at an expense which would be far too great to warrant the expectation of any returns. I believe, therefore, that those who embarked their money in any such undertaking (if my hon. friend has any constituents who are likely to do so) would find themselves very grievously deceived by the result. However, this is not the ground upon which the Government have opposed the scheme. Private individuals are left to take care of their own interests, and if they embark in impracticable undertakings they must pay the penalty of so doing. But the scheme is one hostile to the interests of this country—opposed to the standing policy of England in regard to the connection of Egypt with Turkey—a policy which has been supported by the war and the Treaty of Paris. The obvious political tendency of the undertaking is to render more easy the separation of Egypt from Turkey. It is founded also on remote speculations with regard

to easier access to our Indian possessions, which I need not more distinctly shadow forth because they will be obvious to anybody who pays attention to the subject. I can only express my surprise that M. Ferdinand de Lesseps should have reckoned so much on the credulity of English capitalists as to think that by his progress through the different counties he should succeed in obtaining English money for the promotion of a scheme which is in every way so adverse to British interests. (Hear, hear.) That scheme was launched, I believe, about fifteen years ago as a rival to the railway from Alexandria by Cairo to Suez, which, being infinitely more practicable and likely to be more useful, obtained the pre-eminence; but probably the object which M. de Lesseps and some of the promoters have in view will be accomplished, even if the whole of the undertaking should not be carried into execution. (Hear and a laugh.) If my hon. friend, the member for Bristol, will take my advice, he will have nothing to do with the scheme in question. (Hear, hear.)

To the Members of the Chambers of Commerce and of the Commercial Associations of Great Britain.

“PARIS, July 11, 1857.

“I cannot pass over in silence the assertions which the First Lord of the Treasury has thought fit to make with reference to the Suez Canal scheme at a recent sitting of the House of Commons. Replying to Mr. Berkeley, he expressed himself hostile to the making

of the canal upon commercial, technical, and political grounds, making use of personalities for which I prefer not to seek an appropriate designation. With regard to the first point, that relating to the commercial advantages of the canal, I find an answer in the unanimity with which the eighteen principal commercial and industrial towns of the kingdom pronounced in its favour. You have been unanimous in declaring that this canal, abridging by one-half the distance to India, would be advantageous to British commerce.

“With regard to the second point, I answer Lord Palmerston by the mouth of the International Commission, composed of eminent engineers and mariners of all nations, England included, who, after two years of minute study and careful exploring of the ground, decided in the name of science that the making of the canal would be not only possible but easy. I answer Lord Palmerston with the sanction given to the opinions of the engineers and their plans by the Académie des Sciences in Paris.

“You will decide, gentlemen, between the authority which this verdict, emanating from the leaders of European science, carries with it and the unknown authority to which Lord Palmerston vaguely alludes. Without dwelling at length upon the contradiction involved in treating the project as chimerical, and at the same time denouncing it as dangerous, I come to the third point. The political arguments of Lord Palmerston seem founded upon the imaginary dangers

which the Suez Canal would create for India, as well as for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The English press has already declared, of its own accord, that the masters of India have nothing to fear from the Mediterranean Powers as long as they are in possession of Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, and have just taken Perim. Turkey is at least as much interested as Lord Palmerston in seeing that Egypt is kept within the limits assigned to her by treaty. Now, the Divan is so far from regarding the canal as a cause of separation, that the English Ambassador is obliged to bring his full weight to bear in order to defer the ratification of the project. It is clear to the Porte, as it must be to all reflecting minds, that the opening of the isthmus, guaranteeing, as it will, Egypt against all foreign ambition, will add a fresh force to the integrity of the Empire, and be fraught for Turkey with religious and economic consequences of the highest importance.

“If a systematic yet unavailing opposition is persisted in, the enterprise may be beset with difficulties which will aggrandize rather than weaken it, but its execution will be resolutely gone on with, and the universal support accorded it will render its success infallible. In the meanwhile, it will be for the commercial classes of England to decide whether, in opposition to the views they have manifested, the obstacles are to be raised by their own Government. It will be for them to say whether they will allow a policy so

contrary to the principle of free communications and free trade, which their nation has proclaimed in the face of the world, to be carried out in their name, and whether further efforts shall be made to prevent the joining of two seas which lead direct to India and to China, while in other ways they are doing all they can to bring these vast countries into contact with civilised peoples.

“I now come to the personalities, and I will endeavour, in replying to them, to observe the rules of moderation, considerateness, and dignity, which have scarcely been adhered to by making an attack upon me in an assembly where I could not be heard in defence. Lord Palmerston thought fit to state, in terms that I will not stoop to repeat, that I had come over to England with designs upon the pockets of his countrymen, and in order to take advantage of the credulity of any capitalists who might be weak enough to believe in a chimerical enterprise. You know, gentlemen, whether I have said or done anything to justify imputations of this kind. Have I made a single appeal for subscriptions? You will remember that, upon the contrary, I have several times told you that I had come to ask you, not to subscribe for shares, but for an expression of your opinion. If, in the allotment of a capital of eight millions, England, like France, is ultimately to have a fifth share, I made this proposal out of deference to a powerful commercial nation directly interested in the opening of

the new route. But the enterprise of which I am the promoter stands so little in need of English capital that if the share allotted to England was not accepted in its entirety by her, it would be at once snapped up by demands coming from all parts of the globe.

“Such, gentlemen, is the simple and, as I believe, irrefutable answer which I have to make to Lord Palmerston, and which I address to the heart and conscience of all honest men. You will do me the justice of allowing that, in my reply, I have had proper regard to what is due to the age and political standing of the First Lord of the Treasury. I should, moreover, deem it inconsistent with my own dignity, and with the respect which I entertain for you, if I allowed myself to speak of him in such language as he has applied to me. I owe you these explanations because of the kind esteem you have shown me, and for which I feel profoundly grateful.”

Note for the Emperor and Count Walewski.

“PARIS, July 15, 1857.

“I have the honour to enclose a letter which I have written to the British Chamber of Commerce, in reply to Lord Palmerston with reference to the Suez Canal.

“It had been agreed, as a matter of principle, that M. Thouvenel should be free to take action in favour of the canal in case Lord Stratford de Redcliffe should

make any hostile move, but that, pending an agreement between the two Governments, their respective agents should maintain a neutral attitude with regard to an enterprise due to private initiative.

“ Lord Palmerston now publicly declares that ‘ H. B. M.’s Government has, up to the present time, used all its influence to prevent the project of the Suez Canal being carried out.’ In view of such an avowal, based upon inveterate mistrust of France—a mistrust which it is no longer thought worth concealing—need we really await Lord Palmerston’s leave to make a formal demand upon the Sultan for the ratification of the Viceroy’s act of concession, especially when we know that the Sultan is disposed to grant this demand ? When we remember that the British Government, without troubling itself as to what an allied government might think of it, has obtained from Constantinople several important concessions, among others that of the Euphrates Railway, officially supported as being the English military road to Asia, and that it has recently seized Perim, a dependency of Turkey, without even so much as notifying the fact ; and when we further remember that the opinion of the commerce of Great Britain is unanimous in favour of the canal, who could venture to complain if the representative of France was authorised to protect, in agreement with the representatives of the principal Powers who are in favour of the scheme, the interests of the holder of the concession, who is a Frenchman, and who has, moreover,

but one interest to serve, that of opening a commercial route profitable to the whole world.

“I, of course, understand that the Imperial Government must choose its own time. I will await that time, going on in the meanwhile with the preparations for the project; and if the matter is allowed to drag on very long, all that will remain to be done will be to formally recognise an accomplished fact.”

To His Highness the Viceroy.

“July 19, 1857.

“I beg to forward to your Highness the note which I have just handed to the French Government, and with it I enclose extracts from English newspapers referring to the debate in the House of Commons on the 7th inst. I am not called upon to say what I think of Lord Palmerston’s language, which is severely condemned by several important organs of public opinion, among others *The Advertiser* (Bristol) and *The Daily News* (London).

“*The Advertiser* says:—

“THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ CANAL.

“Two great works have for some time been proposed to be undertaken. They would both, if accomplished, take the shape of grand ship canals, the one piercing the narrow strip of land that connects North and South America, the other slitting up the Isthmus of Suez, and thereby joining the waters of the Medi-

terranean with those of the Red Sea. The construction of the former is now more problematical than it was some years ago, the surface of the land having been found to be difficult, with many alternations of hill and plain. Circumstances may hereafter, in the pressure of commercial necessity, compel the work to be done, but at present interested speculators are content with patched routes, partly by rail and partly by water, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The country which forms the Isthmus of Suez is understood to be much more favourable for the construction of a canal, and that operation many are hopeful will be carried to maturity.

“ ‘ If it be so, it will not be the first time that the isthmus has been channelled. A canal connecting the Red Sea with an arm of the Nile was commenced about 2,500 years ago, and was (according to Herodotus) completed by Darius. It is now as dry as the desert, although numerous traces of its ancient direction still appear in different places. The increased traffic with China in recent years, and the gold discoveries, and consequent expansion of commerce in Australia, have naturally caused the attention of inquiring minds to be directed upon any available means of shortening the distance between Europe and those distant lands ; and, inasmuch as the projected canal across the American isthmus of Darien gradually fell into a state of quietude, it occurred to the mind of M. Lesseps, a French engineer, that the sandy plains

of the Egyptian isthmus might be so operated on as to effect nearly the same object. Cut a ship canal between the Mediterranean and Suez at the head of the westernmost of the two arms or gulfs in which the Red Sea terminates, and by a short water route of 92 miles across the isthmus about 5,000 miles would be saved in the voyage between this country and India, China, and Australia. Now, could such a saving be effectually accomplished, the advantages which it would confer on commerce would be enormous; and shipowners and commercial men generally should lend the project every aid of which it is found to be deserving. It is probable that few engineering difficulties would be experienced in cutting a canal through the isthmus, for the material to be excavated consists generally of sandstone lying in horizontal strata, or of sand, the consequence of disintegration of the sandstone. The main difficulty would probably be found in the Red Sea, with regard to its capability of allowing the passage of "the largest ships" throughout its entire length of about 1,400 miles. We observe that at the meeting on the subject held last week in Bristol, Mr. D. A. Lange said "experiments had been made which showed that the bed of the sea was singularly adapted for dredging," which countenances the apprehension that the waters of "this sea" are in parts comparatively shallow, however deep generally; and it will be only common prudence to ascertain all about the necessity of

“dredging” a sea before investing eight or ten millions sterling in the formation of a ship canal capable of accommodating vessels which might by possibility be stopped at Suez or somewhere in the long navigation that ensues before the Straits of Bab-el-Mendeb are left behind. To ascertain the actual state of the variable Red Sea should be a chief object of preliminary survey, for its navigation is as yet comparatively obscure, although the port of Suez is the point of communication between Europe and India in connection with the Overland Mail.

“The resolution moved by Mr. R. P. King, after stating that the projected ship canal would be of the greatest importance to the commerce of the whole world, added, “And would afford facilities which no railway could present.” This is a cut at a rival scheme for shortening the route to India, and for generally facilitating the intercourse of Europe with Asia, which has been devised, we believe, by Colonel Chesney, who proposes to carry a railway from the Mediterranean into the valley of the Euphrates, to follow the course of that river south-eastward, and thence proceed to Hindostan by way of Persia and Belochistan. It really does appear that such an undertaking would be more formidable than cutting a canal 92 miles long through sand and sandstone. Much, however, as already said, depends upon the character of the navigation of the Red Sea—its winds, its coral reefs, &c.; and if it be correct that M. Les-

seps's project has received high engineering testimonials in its favour, it must not be forgotten that Colonel Chesney has carefully surveyed the entire route from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, and the course of that river to the Persian Gulf, and is himself a practical engineer of the highest possible authority.

“ ‘Supposing that no insuperable material difficulties are found in the way of M. Lesseps, and that money is obtained to form the canal, a trade revolution would be effected calculated to surprise the world. In that case Europe need not care about the ultimate proceedings in the Isthmus of Darien, and the navigation of the stormy Cape would be almost forgotten. The resources of Arabia and Eastern Africa would be developed, as far as they are capable of development, and the voyage to India, Australia, China, &c., be shortened by about a third.

“ ‘We think, consequently, on the whole, that the merchants and shipowners of Bristol have done well to accord to M. Lesseps their frank and cheering countenance, as a preliminary, mayhap, to their pecuniary support. No national jealousy should exist in such a case. And if we have seen some ground for suggesting caution, we should have done the same had Colonel Chesney patronised the canal and the Arabian Gulf, and the French engineer had projected a railway through Asia Minor, and so on to the regions of the far East.’ ”

To Mr. Robert Stephenson, M.P., Engineer.

“LONDON, July 27, 1857.

“I enclose you a copy of the speech, as reported in *The Times*, delivered by you in the House of Commons on the 17th inst., and I shall be obliged if you will inform me whether this report is a correct one. The engineers of the International Commission, who have all their lives long devoted their studies to the construction of ports and canalisation, can best answer the technical part of your speech; but there is one point to which I venture to call your attention, because it concerns me personally. You said, according to *The Times*, ‘I agree with the First Lord of the Treasury.’ Now, Lord Palmerston, who holds a position which prevents me from addressing myself to him personally, had just spoken as follows:—‘I do not think, therefore, that I am far wrong in saying that the project is one of those chimeras so often formed to induce English capitalists to part with their money, the end being that these schemes leave them poorer, though they may make others much richer.’ I ask you, sir, for a written explanation of what you mean, either furnished by yourself or by two of your friends, whom you will please put in communication with me. I do not doubt that you will at once give me these explanations. I have come over from France on purpose to ask you for them. I have the honour, sir, to place myself at your disposal.”

Mr. Charles Manby to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps.

“LONDON, July 28, 1857.

“Mr. Stephenson returned this morning, and I at once gave him your letter, which I had translated word for word. He repeated what, as I had already told you, he had said—viz., that his remarks about the canal were based upon the ideas he had formed in the course of his two journeys to the desert, and that he had only expressed his opinion in the House when appealed to by Lord Palmerston and several members who had your pamphlet in their hands. He has expressed his extreme regret that you should have supposed that he meant to make any attack upon your personal character, or that he endorsed any expressions of Lord Palmerston which might be taken to have this meaning. Upon the contrary, he has always held you in high esteem, and has invariably spoken of you in that sense.

“Moreover, he has gladly written you the enclosed letter which, I hope, will convince you that he merely expressed a technical opinion upon a matter being publicly discussed. Mr. McLean agrees with me that Mr. Stephenson had not the slightest intention of saying anything personally offensive to you.”

Reply of Mr. R. Stephenson to M. F. de Lesseps.

“LONDON, July 28, 1857.

“Dear Sir,—Nothing could be further from my intention, in speaking of the Suez Canal the other

night in the House of Commons, than to make a single remark that could be construed as having any personal allusion to yourself, and I am confident no one who heard me could regard what I said as having any such bearing. When I said that I concurred with Lord Palmerston's opinion, I referred to his statement, that money might overcome almost any physical difficulties, however great, and that the undertaking, if ever finished, would not be commercially advantageous.

"The first study which I made of the subject, in 1847, led me to this opinion, and nothing which has come to my knowledge since that period has tended to alter my view.

"Yours faithfully,

"ROB. STEPHENSON."

To Mr. Charles Manby, Secretary of the Society of Civil Engineers, London.

"LONDON, July 29, 1857.

"I have received your letter of yesterday, together with that of Mr. Stephenson. While satisfied with his explanations, so far as regards myself, I am still very much astonished that an engineer should have allowed himself to express himself in the House of Commons so dogmatically with regard to an enterprise which he has not been in a position to examine either upon the spot or in his study, especially when he fails to give at the same time the grounds upon

which his opinion is based. The eminent engineers who form the International Commission will answer him in a very short time. He will then have to speak very explicitly upon the technical question, and I shall be very well satisfied if the ancient or recent studies of Mr. Stephenson shed any new light upon an enterprise which has for the last three years been under the attentive examination of all the *savants* in Europe."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"LONDON, July 30, 1857.

"I shall not leave London till I find that there is nothing more for me to do.

"I am thankful that I was not there when the questions were put by Messrs. Berkeley and Darby Griffith, as I could not have prevented them, and it would have been risky to have asked our supporters in Parliament to get up a debate when Lord Palmerston has so large a majority. This majority would, in order to keep him in office, have voted against us, which, as matters stand, it has not done, thus leaving Lord Palmerston alone responsible, in the eyes of Europe, for the use of language all the more violent and absurd because there was no one to answer him, and for a policy which is generally condemned, even in England.

"We had thought that it would be very advisable to get public opinion in France to express itself in

some legal form with regard to the Suez Canal. The Councils-General are summoned to meet next month ; Lord Palmerston's attacks have stirred public feeling ; the French press of all shades of opinion, with true patriotic feeling, has strongly condemned them. We ought to take advantage of this state of things. I send you the draft of a circular, which might also be sent to the Chambers of Commerce, whom we will ask to pass resolutions in favour of our enterprise."

To M. Thouvenel, Constantinople.

"LONDON, August 2, 1857.

"After Lord Palmerston's declarations I am more certain of success than ever. When the time comes the financial co-operation of France may be counted upon without a doubt.

"No one here has ventured to stand by the First Lord of the Treasury ; he has been condemned by the leading men in the country, even by those who, in the critical position now occupied by England, think it their duty to keep him in office. I had been told of this by letter while in Paris, but I thought it best to come over here and satisfy myself that such really was the case. I may add that my own observations, to say nothing of the exceptional warmth of my greeting, fully confirm this view.

"I agree with you that the Constantinople press should be very prudent, and I have already urged my friends to treat the position of the Porte, powerless

though it is, with the utmost tenderness and deference. But in due course the Divan will certainly, in presence of the universal wishes and support of other Powers, be bound to assert its independence and dignity before the world. I may add that the accomplishment of these duties will be a source of strength rather than of embarrassment. This is the opinion of Prince Metternich, one of the oldest and most trusty friends of Turkey.

“They must be beginning to see at Stamboul, especially since the seizure of Perim, that if a certain great Power wishes to close the Red Sea, as she succeeded in doing more than a century ago, by a decree of the Porte, it is with a view to her sole profit, and not in the interest of the Ottoman Empire, for whom rapid communication with the holy places of Arabia is almost a matter of life and death. It is not very long since *The Times* declared that Great Britain was ‘the first Mussulman Power.’ It was hitherto supposed that Turkey was. I know who wrote that article, and you may be sure that it was only a feeler. According to this system the seizure of Perim would be only the first step in a more complete invasion.”

To His Highness the Viceroy.

“PARIS, August 12, 1857.

“The manifestations of the commercial bodies and of the citizens of all countries day by day condemn more strongly Lord Palmerston’s declarations, but I

cannot affect to ignore that these declarations, which will serve as a guide to the diplomatic agents of England, will cause your Highness a good deal of annoyance, which I should wish to spare you. You can put upon me all responsibility for the preliminary works on the canal, and with this view I have informed MM. Renaud and Lieussou, who have been appointed to survey for the making of the sweet-water canal, that I was about to propose to your Highness not to execute the work at your own cost, but to leave it in the hands of the Universal Company, which will doubtless be organized very shortly.

“If we look back to what occurred in regard to Egypt during the years 1839-40 we find that there is a good deal of analogy between then and now. Thus among the grievances alleged by the Porte, at the instigation of Lord Ponsonby, the English Ambassador, to justify the armed intervention against Mehemet Ali, was one to the effect that he had attempted to interfere with Great Britain’s communications with India, by way of Egypt and Syria. The only foundation for this charge was in the following opinion, confidentially expressed by Mehemet Ali in a despatch to the Grand Vizier :—

“ ‘That the opening of the passage from Europe to the Indies, by way of Egypt and Syria, ought to be made for the benefit and with the concurrence of all nations, and ought not to constitute a monopoly for the profit of England alone, a monopoly

which would be very dangerous for the rights of the Sultan.'

"This question was referred to in the French Chamber, in the course of a debate upon the negotiations which followed the battle of Nezib, and M. de Lamartine spoke as follows:—

" 'Nature is stronger than these wretched national antipathies. Europe and India will communicate, despite all you may do, by way of Suez. You will but have delayed this great and beneficent act of Providence; the two worlds will join hands, and gather new life as they do so, by way of Egypt.'

"We have now the Indian mutiny, which will supply the English press with a new and powerful argument against Lord Palmerston, and against the reluctance to make use of the route through Egypt. An Englishman writes as follows to *The Daily News*:—

" 'The *last* news of the mutiny in India reached England on June 17th. Since then a body of 2,000 men might have been despatched from England every fortnight, and have reached India by way of Egypt in six weeks. Why does not the Government send troops to India through Egypt? The Government has refused to answer. It is because of its reluctance to furnish the promoters of the Suez Canal with an argument the more.'

"In the meanwhile the mutiny is running its course, and costing the lives of many brave men, who were looking for more prompt relief than that sent by way

of the Cape. More than this, Nana Sahib, in a proclamation addressed to the Mahometans of India, tells them that the Sultan, in a firman addressed to the Viceroy, has ordered him to close Egypt, 'which is the route to India,' to the British troops, that in consequence there was no need to be afraid of their approaching arrival, and that on receipt of this news Lord Canning, the Governor-General, 'was overwhelmed with despair, and was beating his head.'

"This Indian insurgent little knew when he invented this piece of news that it was the reverse of the truth, and that the able and enlightened ruler of Egypt was preparing for the opening of the Suez Canal, which the Prime Minister of England and her ambassador at Constantinople were opposing.

"The English journal which publishes Nana Sahib's proclamation adds, *Fas est ab hoste doceri.*"

To the same.

"LA CHÉNAIE, September 10, 1857.

"I forward to your Highness copies of the resolutions addressed to the French Government by the Councils-General and the Chambers of Commerce, together with several letters of foreign Chambers of Commerce, among which that of the Barcelona Chamber deserves special mention.

"The English Government has at length made up its mind to send troops to India through Egypt. Your Highness is too high-minded not to favour in every

possible way the despatch of these troops intended to ensure the triumph of civilisation over barbarism.

“Lord Palmerston’s conduct is still very severely condemned, and one journal says: ‘Let us hope that he will see by this what a blunder he has made, and how dangerous it will be for him to persist in it.’

“But this is not all, for, in addition to the Councils-General, the Chambers of Commerce of the thirty-seven largest French towns have sent resolutions to the Government expressing their concurrence in the project for making the canal, while the Paris Chamber of Commerce has placed itself at the head of these manifestations which are only just beginning. With less obligation to be guarded in their attitude than the Councils-General, the Chambers of Commerce also protest against the attitude of Lord Palmerston, and urge the Government to intercede and ensure the execution of a project which will be one of the glories of the century.”

To Mr. Darby Griffith, M.P., London.

“PARIS, September 15, 1857.

“I have read with much interest the speech which you made in the House of Commons, and of which you have been kind enough to send me a copy.

“You expressed with force and eloquence the most noble and just ideas as to the true policy of England in this important question. I feel, like you, very certain that Lord Palmerston is making a most unfor-

tunate blunder in thus opposing a work which will be more useful to British commerce than to all the rest of the world. This course is all the more ill-judged because it has no chance of succeeding, and if, in the eyes of some politicians, the end justifies the means, Lord Palmerston's conduct, in his deplorable campaign against the Suez Canal, has not even the chance of succeeding.

“Permit me to make some minor criticisms with regard to certain details of your remarkable speech. No doubt what you say about the workmen in Egypt holds very true of the time when you were travelling through the country. But since the accession of the new Viceroy there has been a great change. The cleaning out and the enlargement of the Mahmoudie Canal in April, 1856, prove that at the present time public works are carried out with due humanity, and that the task set the workmen is neither beyond their strength nor fatal to their health. Out of 115,000 men assembled for a full month, not more than five or six per thousand fell ill. I doubt whether we could show a better average than this in Europe. In making the Suez Canal, it will be very easy to bring the Nile water as far as Lake Timsah, in the centre of the isthmus, which it reaches even now when the river rises. This region, now barren and uncultivated, formerly had a considerable population, and we discovered there the ruins of many cities. It was the land of Goshen spoken of in the Bible.

“As to the practical difficulties, whether at Suez or Pelusium, they are not nearly so great as might have been imagined previous to the survey made by the eminent engineers who spent some time in the isthmus, and the very conclusive observations made in the Bay of Pelusium.

“To conclude, I may add that you seem to me to be too well versed in economic questions not to be led, after careful examination, to the conclusion that the enterprise will be financially remunerative, if you cast your eye over the official statistics which show how enormously European trade is increasing in Asiatic waters, the English figures for 1856 showing an increase of 181,000 tons over the previous year.”

To His Highness the Viceroy.

“*LA CHÉNAIE, September 28, 1857.*

“At a sitting of the House of Commons, reference being incidentally made to the Suez Canal, Mr. Gladstone expressed himself in favour of the most recent project, and condemned the Government for opposing the manifest wish of the nation to participate in the execution of this enterprise. He said:—

“‘There is no one who, casting his eyes over the map of the globe, can deny that a canal through the Isthmus of Suez must be a great step towards the welfare of the whole world. This project commands the assent and sympathy of all the governments of Europe, especially that of France, our great ally.

Nothing, therefore, can be more deplorable than this conflict at Constantinople between the Ambassadors of France and England with respect to the canal.'

"*The Daily News*, in a leading article of the following day (September 10th), says:—

" 'This pretended right to keep the East for ourselves and exclude the rest of Europe from the Red Sea is the survival of an antiquated policy of which Lord Palmerston remembers far too much. This is a senile piece of nonsense on his lordship's part which ought to be got rid of for good, as it doubtless would have been if there had been twenty members present in the House who understood the question. For what have we to gain by excluding the European Powers from Asiatic waters? France has aided us in our negotiations with Persia. Her co-operation is still more desirable in the war with China. Perhaps in the last century it might have been prudent and practicable to act alone in the affairs of the East, but at the present time there is no Power which does not stand in need of allies either in Europe or Asia. We need hardly point out that our best ally is France. The policy of the Cabinet, or rather that of Lord Palmerston, during the past year, has been to defy all Europe, France included, as regards the Suez Canal, and to declare, "The Red Sea is mine; you shall not enter it." ' "

"Referring to the transport of troops over the Isthmus of Suez, *The Daily News* of October 2, 1857, said:—

“‘Thus the English Government admits that the Suez route is the best for communication with India, and after stubborn resistance, broken down by necessity, resolves to send by this route some of the troops which are being despatched to the relief of our gallant soldiers in India. Nothing could be a more complete avowal of the utility of M. de Lesseps’s scheme; and this action of the Government is the implicit condemnation of Lord Palmerston and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who have hitherto opposed the scheme. It would seem as if Providence had set itself to inflict upon them the chastisement which they deserve, by making them, so to speak, responsible before public opinion for the difficulties which their country is experiencing in putting an end to the calamities which are so preying upon its interests, its affections, and its power. . . . Lord Palmerston and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe have not seen or foreseen anything of this. . . . Lulled by a false sense of security, they have yielded to their inclination for making themselves disagreeable to others.’”

Note for the Emperor Napoleon.

“PARIS, October 20, 1857.

“The facility with which the Suez Canal can be made has been proved beyond all cavil by the International Commission of Engineers. The hearty and unflinching concurrence of the Viceroy and the free offer of capital ensure the success of the financial

operation. The unanimous wish of the various nations, expressed with remarkable unanimity by the voice of the press or the deliberations of official bodies, has acquired for the enterprise the sympathy and support of their governments, and the conclusive resolutions passed at twenty meetings in the principal manufacturing and leading towns in England, together with the manifestations of the Councils-General and Chambers of Commerce in France, have testified to the harmony of the two allied nations, and have isolated the egotistical opposition which in vain attempted to create discord between them.

“This being so, it is now my duty, as holder of the concession for the work, to proceed to Constantinople and negotiate with respect to the Sultan’s authorization, which was not, strictly speaking, necessary, according to the principle laid down by the British Embassy *à propos* of the railway from Alexandria to Suez, but which the Viceroy thought it right to solicit, in order to show his deference for his Suzerain, and to avoid giving any pretext to those who were ill-disposed for justifying their opposition. I may reckon upon being supported at Constantinople by the legations of Austria, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, the Hanseatic towns, Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, Tuscany, the Two Sicilies, Greece, and the United States.

“In order to maintain the universal character of the enterprise, I shall address myself to the repre-

sentatives of these Powers, as well as to the French Embassy, should Lord Stratford de Redcliffe use his influence to hamper the liberty of the Divan.

“It may be that this influence will not be exerted now that Lord Palmerston has been compelled by the attitude of Parliament and public opinion to modify the violence of his original declarations, especially since the occurrence of the horrible events in India, which have shown that ‘there is no security for the future if the Government does not take effective steps for bringing the mother country nearer to her Eastern colonies, and unless the first of these steps is to secure the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez.’

“I do not ask the Imperial Government to take any initiative, or to abandon the wise reserve which it has hitherto observed; but if during my negotiations at Constantinople I should have occasion, in my quality of a Frenchman and holder of the concession for an enterprise in which France is interested, to claim the intervention of the French Ambassador, as well as that of the representatives of other Powers, I hope that M. Thouvenel’s protection would be accorded me, and that the Emperor will be pleased to instruct him to that effect.”

To H.I.H. Prince Napoleon.

“PARIS, October 12, 1857.

“In compliance with your kind suggestion, I have the honour to enclose you the note for the Emperor,

explaining the present state of affairs relating to the Suez Canal. I trust you will say all you can in support of the request that instructions may be sent to M. Thouvenel. The following are those already sent to the representatives of Austria at Constantinople and Alexandria:—

“By reason of the keen interest which the Austrian Government feels in the enterprise of the Suez Canal, the demands made by the Viceroy of Egypt in this matter are to be supported as efficaciously as possible by the Austrian agents in the East, acting in harmony with the French diplomatic agents.’

“Upon the other hand, I am assured of the support of the United States Minister, as the Washington Government regards opposition to the opening of the maritime canal as an infringement upon the freedom of the seas.”

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“PARIS, November 8, 1857.

“I have just seen Prince Napoleon, upon his return from Compiègne, and he assures me that the Emperor is very favourably disposed and sees no objection to my claiming the support of M. Thouvenel within the limits of my note of the 20th ult., which Count Walewski has had before him. I am both inclined and advised to act with prudence, and I shall be careful to avoid any cause of conflict.

"I am personally very grateful to the Emperor for what he said to Prince Napoleon about me. He made no secret of his hearty wish for the success of the undertaking."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, December 18, 1857.

"I yesterday made my first visit to Reschid Pasha, who was reappointed Grand Vizier a short time ago, and to other Ministers and functionaries, and the first dragoman to the Embassy, who accompanied me, informed them all that he was instructed by M. Thouvenel how much interest his Government attached to the success of my negotiations with them.

"Reschid Pasha seemed very pleased at this resumption of relations with the French Embassy, and in two or three days Aali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will give a grand dinner, to which M. Thouvenel, Reschid Pasha, and myself will be invited.

"Reschid knows perfectly well that the French Embassy is going to give his temper and disposition a fresh trial, and he is too anxious to remain in office to compromise himself if he can help it. I shall not commence my parleys with him and the other ministers until after this dinner of reconciliation. However, I am not losing any time, and am preparing my ground in all directions, for there is in all countries, even in Turkey, a public opinion of which

account must be taken, and in neglecting no opportunity, great or small, of obtaining partizans, I help the work on."

To Count Th. de Lesseps.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, December 25, 1857.

"Yesterday I had a conference, extending over two hours, with Reschid Pasha in his house at Emerghian, on the Bosphorus. I did not fail to say all I could think of as likely to strike him, and show him the advantage of a favourable solution emanating from the initial action of Turkey herself.

"Reschid brought me back in his steamer, and as we were alone we were able to carry on the conversation. He readily made me formal promises, and I was even astonished to find how very strongly he expressed himself in favour of the canal.

"I gave him to understand that I set less store by his promises than by the manner in which he carried them out, either upon his own responsibility, or at the orders of the Sultan or the Cabinet, in the event of his not caring to take the personal responsibility of the matter. I learnt that upon leaving me he lost no time in submitting to the Ministerial Council a memorandum which I had previously shown to M. Thouvenel and of which he expressed his approval. I send you a copy of it for Count Walewski. Previous to my conference with Reschid I had a separate interview with each member of the Council, and I did all I could to

win their ear in favour of the enterprise. I have also had one or two important conversations with Nedgib Pasha, whom the Sultan had recently sent to Egypt. He is a sort of steward of the Harem, and he is in such favour with his sovereign that the ministers have to keep on good terms with him.

“My arrival at Constantinople was very opportune, as the intrigues of the English Embassy, which have been at work for the last three years, were beginning to tell, and threatened to take root.

“You can tell the minister that M. Thouvenel never goes too far, and is not at all likely to compromise himself; but few ambassadors could do what he can in a country of this kind, so long as he is left free to act in his own way. The representatives of the foreign powers continue to aid me with their advice and influence, and I have communicated my memorandum to each of them. *The Times* correspondent is sending it to his journal.

“I have now something confidential to tell you which will explain why Lord Stratford de Redcliffe went on leave before my arrival. I learn from a foreign source that during the visit of the Emperor and Empress to Queen Victoria, at Osborne, the Suez Canal question was discussed at a conference attended by Lord Palmerston and Count Walewski. As the Prime Minister could not get the French Government to use its influence here against the canal, the only thing done was to renew the agreement that the

diplomatic agents of both countries should remain neutral in the matter. This was equivalent to admitting that the neutrality had been violated, as indeed Lord Palmerston had already declared in public. In any case, this principle is again to be adopted in theory, but if in practice we are weak enough to carry it out I am ready to prove now that the English will not. In order to have the appearance of doing so, they have sent Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on leave and put in his place Mr. Alison, his first secretary, who is not less devoted than himself to the Foreign Office, while in Egypt the honest and trusty Mr. Bruce is replaced at the Consulate-General of Alexandria by Mr. Green.

“Count Walewski, who was present at the Osborne conference, will be able to tell you whether I am right.”

Memorandum to Reschid Pasha.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, December 29, 1857.

“I have the honour to request your Highness to apply to the Sultan for an Iradé authorizing the Commercial Company, of which I am the representative, to execute the works intended to effect a junction between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by means of a maritime canal.

“At the time of my first visit, three years ago, to Constantinople, during which your Highness was kept duly supplied with all the preliminary documents, you were pleased to write me a letter (March, 1855) in

which you spoke of the enterprise as being ‘most useful,’ adding, ‘in conformity with the Imperial order relating to this interesting undertaking, the question is now before the Cabinet Council.’

“Since then, in order to facilitate the examination and decision of the Sublime Porte, I have endeavoured to clear away the objections urged as to the possibility of the enterprise, or the fear of its being inimical to the legitimate interests of foreign powers. The first objection has been disposed of by the report of the International Commission of Engineers, and the second by the unanimous expression of public opinion in all countries. The adhesion of the Continental governments has been not less explicit, and with regard to England I think it well to mention the last official statements made in the House of Commons on August 14th ult., subsequent to the resolutions adopted by the Associations and Chambers of Commerce, and by the many meetings held in the principal towns of Great Britain.

“At this sitting of the House, Mr. Gladstone expressed himself as follows:—

“‘The House ought to treat the Suez Canal scheme, as well as the Euphrates Railway and the telegraph schemes, as a purely commercial question, acting upon the assured principle that the best judges of a commercial speculation are those who have undertaken to put capital into it. If this question should ever be converted by the Government into a political one,

there would be every danger of a break in that European concert and agreement which are of such capital importance as regards our Oriental policy. Yet no one can look at a map of the world and deny that a canal through the Isthmus of Suez would, if it were practicable, be of great service to humanity. This project has been approved and found excellent by all the governments of Europe, especially by France, our great ally. What could be more unfortunate, therefore, than to find quarrels arising on this subject between the ambassadors of our two countries at Constantinople? Bearing in mind our Indian possessions, do not let us give room in Europe for the belief that, for the maintenance of our rule in India, it is necessary that we should oppose measures which are advantageous to the general interests of Europe. Do not let us allow so deplorable an inconsistency to take root, for this would weaken our power in Hindostan more than ten such mutinies as that which has just occurred.'

"Lord Palmerston replied :—

" 'The chief and only motive that we have urged upon the Turkish Government against accepting the proposed plan is not the injury caused to England, but the injury caused to Turkey, the danger of impairing the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

" 'The whole question, therefore, is now confined to a right understanding as to what the interests of the Ottoman Empire really are. It is clear that this

can only be known to the Government of the Sultan, to which I appeal with the conviction that the careful examination which it has already made will have demonstrated to it the many advantages which Turkey must derive from the execution of the Suez Canal. In explanation of this it is only necessary to remind you that the route from Constantinople to the Indian Ocean will be abridged by 4,800 leagues, that the Ottoman possessions of Arabia and the East Coast of Africa will be brought within touch of the metropolis, and that the easy access to the Red Sea will be an inestimable advantage for the Mussulman pilgrims to the holy places.

“When the Imperial Government has given the opinion which it deems suitable to its interests, it will also be free to declare that the maritime canal is to be open at all times as a neutral passage to all the merchant vessels going from sea to sea, without any exclusive destination, or any preference as regards nationality. The accession of the foreign Powers, whom the Sublime Porte will doubtless invite to give their adhesion to its declarations, will be no more than the outcome of a fact which the Porte has already decided to accomplish in keeping with its competency and rights. This was the opinion expressed by Prince Metternich in the course of an interview which I had with him, and which was communicated by me to the different cabinets in Europe and the United States, whose representatives at Constanti-

nople have received instructions to support my action.'

"These considerations will form the elements of our negotiations, and I am at your Highness's disposal and at that of the Sublime Porte for any further information or explanations which may be deemed necessary. I am convinced that at a moment when the most enlightened men in the Ottoman Empire are happily united in order to carry out the liberal intentions of their sovereign, the project for piercing the Isthmus of Suez will, after having been consecrated by science and public opinion, meet with a favourable reception from the councillors of the Sultan."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, January 11, 1858.

"Here is an unfortunate occurrence which will probably have an awkward effect upon the negotiations relating to the canal. I refer to the sudden and unexpected death of Reschid Pasha. I had seen him the day before, and he was in excellent health. I am told that after drinking a cup of coffee he was seized with convulsions and vomiting, and soon expired. In order to put an end to all the rumours in circulation, a commission of European physicians was appointed, and though they were unable to make a *post-mortem* examination, they issued a report that the death was due to natural causes. The people of the East are

very slow to believe this when a great personage disappears. Be this as it may be, I regret his death in a double sense: in the first place, because it is a personal loss; and, in the second place, because he seemed to have shaken himself pretty free of English influence in regard to the canal.

“His successor, Aali Pasha, is beyond all question the most upright and best informed man in the Empire, but he is extremely timid, and reluctant to take any initiative. The threats of Lord Palmerston after the Congress of Paris will always be ringing in his ears. In any case, I shall be on the best of terms with him personally, and he will have the wish, if he has not, as I fear, the power, to keep his promises.”

To M. Thouvenel, Constantinople.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, February 6, 1858.

“I had a long conversation this morning with Aali Pasha, and explained to him our mutual situation with the utmost frankness, and communicated to him the reports which I had received from Paris, London, and Egypt. Finding that I did not wish to press him too closely, and that I took into account the difficult position in which he was placed, he made no secret of the fact that he was desirous of awaiting the result of the questions which were going to be put in the House of Commons. I handed him the extract of the instructions which the Viceroy of

Egypt had sent me, and he expressed his hearty concurrence in the friendly sentiments which Mohammed expressed. I also read him the following letter, which I had received from Cairo under date of February 6th:—

“‘The day before yesterday the English Consul, Mr. Green, went to see the Viceroy and read him a letter from Lord Clarendon, thanking him on behalf of the British Government for the facilities afforded in the transport of troops to India. But he added that none of the news sent by M. de Lesseps with regard to the progress being made at Constantinople in carrying the canal scheme through was in keeping with his information; that Mr. Alison, the English Chargé d’Affaires in the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had shown Aali Pasha letters from Lord Palmerston in opposition to the canal, and that Aali had signed an agreement not to grant the firman without the assent of England. These details were repeated almost publicly in front of the Viceroy’s palace, in the presence of several persons, by Mustapha Bey, the Viceroy’s nephew. The Viceroy is said to have very sensibly replied that, so far as he was concerned, he had granted the concession for the canal three years ago; that he was no longer in a position to interfere; that the matter rested with the Divan; and that if England had anything to say she must address herself to the Porte.’”

To Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, February 24, 1858.

“As it may be useful that you should know the impression of foreigners, especially of Englishmen, as to the Suez Canal, I think it well to communicate to you the contents of a letter which I have received from an Englishman in London. Many of the remarks made in this letter, which I will ask you to return me, are full of common sense, frankness, and verity.

“It is, in truth, quite time for Turkey, in the interests of her own dignity, to come to a decision. I quite understood, as I told you yesterday, that circumstances would not admit of your keeping the promise which you made of obtaining this decision by March 3rd; but allow me to remind you that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for me, in view of the instructions which I showed you, to wait beyond the 15th of that month. It scarcely seems to me that the colds from which several of your colleagues are suffering will be a sufficient reason for adjourning this matter, which has been under consideration for three years; and it is one in which the Grand Vizier alone is responsible for the decision, right or wrong, which may be come to. I wrote yesterday to the Viceroy to inform him that your Highness distinctly denied having allowed any foreign Power to fetter your liberty of action, and that you had made no declaration, either *verbal* or *written*, to any foreign diplomatist.”

The following is an extract from the London letter and the article which accompanied it:—

“Letter :

“‘Are they so blind at Constantinople as not to see that they are making over their dependency to England, who deceives them, frightens them, and consequently despises them. If the Sultan acts according to his own responsibility, England will respect him in consequence, but will never do him any injury. When will the Turks wake up and issue the firman ? They have been asleep long enough.’

“Article :

“‘Under Lord Palmerston’s Ministry threats were addressed, both in London and at Constantinople, to the higher agents and functionaries of Turkey. They were told that if the Porte showed itself favourable to this enterprise, it would earn for itself the lasting hostility of England, and that, in addition, it would probably bring about a struggle between France and England by which Turkey would be the sufferer.

“‘When Lord Derby succeeded Lord Palmerston in office, the Porte thought to avail itself of the change to grant the firman which the Viceroy had asked for, and a telegram was sent to Musurus, the Turkish Ambassador in London, requesting him to inform Lord Malmesbury (who was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Lord Derby’s Ministry) that the Government of the Sultan, not wishing to take any

action in this matter *unknown* to the British Government, would be glad to know his views on the subject. Lord Malmesbury replied that he and his colleagues shared the opinion of the previous Ministry, and that they should continue to oppose the undertaking. He added that he noticed with pleasure, in the communication from the Porte, that nothing would be done without *the consent of England*. This was how he was pleased to translate the word “unknown” (*insu*).

“ ‘ This reply excited considerable astonishment at Constantinople. The Divan lost no time in instructing Musurus to declare that they had never dreamed of alienating their liberty of action in a question of internal administration, or of making their decision dependent upon the *fiat* of a foreign government ; and, finally, that if, out of deference for an ally, they had announced their intention of taking no action *unknown* to that ally, they had no idea of allowing the solution to depend upon the *consent* of the British Government.

“ ‘ Such, from the diplomatic point of view, is the present condition of affairs between the two governments. What you may regard as quite certain is that the Turkish statesmen, finding that the English Cabinet does not dare to admit openly in Parliament the steps taken by its diplomatic agents, sees how puerile and useless is an opposition which cannot face a public debate.’ ”

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, March 30, 1858.

“M. Thouvenel has written me this morning as under :—

“ ‘I have seen Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, and I find them both of the same way of thinking that they were,—viz., very favourable to the canal, and anxious to make it clear to the world at large that the Porte does not of itself raise any difficulty in the way of your great enterprise. Aali spoke in a firm and decisive tone which augurs well for us, and he was very pleased at what I had to tell him.’ ”

To Mr. D. A. Lange, Agent of the Suez Canal Company in England.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, April 15, 1858.

“I conveyed to you briefly, in my telegram of the 11th inst., my views as to the reply made by Mr. Disraeli in the House of Commons. This telegram was as follows: ‘Mr. Disraeli talks of the sanction of England. Such a pretension is absurd. No one wants any sanction of the sort. The only question is, does Lord Derby intend to go on threatening Turkey, which wishes the canal to be made, as Lord Palmerston did?’ ”

“I hope if fresh questions are put and a debate follows, no more such disingenuous side issues will be raised, for they do not redound to the credit of

your Parliament. But the success of our enterprise cannot be compromised by an opposition of this kind, and the affair, I am thankful to say, has now reached a point which makes us independent of the antiquated policy of some of your statesmen.

"I have attained a situation which, thanks to the forces placed at my disposal, enable me to withstand the efforts of my opponents. I will repeat here what I said last year at a meeting in London, my remarks commanding unanimous assent: 'My enterprise will not be carried out by those who are against, but by those who are for it,' and as the latter are more numerous and stronger than the former, and as, moreover, they are in the right, I shall take the liberty of going forward, and of taking practical action, doing without those who stand in my way.

"The Porte, which *stoutly repudiates any common share in the opposition of the English Government*, is awaiting the public explanations which Lord Derby's Ministry promised to make touching its policy in this matter. If these explanations are ambiguous, or if they are openly hostile, the Canal Company, armed with the Egyptian concession, to which the Sultan cannot offer any opposition, will take its own course and enter upon the work with the capital which it has at its disposal. This will be the most effectual mode of replying to the ceaseless objection that the enterprise is impracticable."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, April 17, 1858.

“The intentional dodging and backing-out of the question which characterises the action of the English Cabinet are not likely to stop much less to turn me back. I look upon them merely as so many posts which I leave behind me as I go on, and which will soon serve to measure the distance which I have travelled over.

“I do not understand why some politicians, whose advice I generally follow, regret that I am here instead of in London. They will not adhere to this view if they will compare the present position of my enterprise with what it was when I left Paris four months ago. Lord Palmerston had then publicly stated that the question was one for Turkey, not for England. It became necessary, therefore, to cut off the retreat on Constantinople which he was keeping open for me, and from which he would have beaten me, for, with the threats of the English agents and the passive attitude of ours, I am now more than ever convinced that but for my presence here Lord Palmerston or his successors *ejusdem farinae* would have wormed out of the Porte some declaration fatal to the making of the canal.

“Such a stratagem has now become impossible, because I am able to keep a look-out for, and to ward off, the blows aimed at us. At the present time,

Turkey unequivocally repudiates any solidarity with the English opposition, and this it is which constitutes my strength and will enable me to go forward unmoved towards my end, whatever may be the result of the explanations Mr. Disraeli is to offer in the House of Commons.

“The Porte has promised to send this very day a telegram to M. Musurus, instructing him to inform the English Cabinet that it repudiates all solidarity in this opposition to the Suez Canal.”

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, April 22, 1858.

“When we have made it clear that Lord Derby’s Cabinet has succeeded in eluding or in burking a parliamentary debate upon the Suez Canal, or if the Government makes a positive declaration of hostility to it, we shall be in a position to send to all our agents and correspondents the following memorandum, which please submit to my brother for translation, telling him that I will keep it back if necessary, but that my mind is made up. Lord Palmerston, by throwing the responsibility for the opposition on Turkey, had already contributed to advance the question of making the Suez Canal.

“‘Mr. Disraeli’s declarations have decided the execution of our great work. Statesmen who represent neither the ideas of their age or country have dared to publicly denounce as chimerical a project elaborately

worked out by very competent engineers, agreed to by the principal men of science in Europe, and accepted by all the great commercial and maritime towns, including those in England.

“‘As there is no more serious resistance than this to be encountered, and as English statesmen have no better reasons than these to justify the hostile action of their agents at Constantinople for the last three years, all that we have to do is to prove that the so-called chimera is a reality.

“‘The Universal Company of the Suez Canal, armed with the regular concession of the Viceroy, to which the Sultan offers no opposition in so far as concerns his Suzerainty and the interests of his Empire, will, however, be too prudent to provoke a conflict between the policy of progress and that of retrogression, or to give its opponents an excuse for playing upon prejudices; while so as to avoid all misunderstandings in an affair which should retain its general and commercial character, the Company will not ask for the assistance of any of the governments of whose support it was assured. But it is about to organize itself in a definite form; it will march resolutely forward and complete its work, backed up by the investments of its shareholders of all nations, and by the public opinion of the whole world.

“‘The Scientific Commission will meet about the end of June, and its report will settle the conditions under which the works are to be executed, in order to

open the first section of the canal. A temporary board of administration will then decide how much capital is to be issued; the shareholders will receive intimation of when they are to pay their calls, and every arrangement will be made, so that by the end of the year the work may be put thoroughly into hand, and carried on without interruption.'

"I sent Aali Pasha a letter of the 15th, containing a copy of your capital answer to Mr. Disraeli. I conferred with him yesterday, and read him a copy of the above circular. He quite understands that I have no other course open to me, and he prefers that I should admit that Turkey does not oppose our enterprise, so far as concerns her interests, than that I should be constrained to record the fact that she submits, and without any counteracting good, to foreign pressure.

"We are, therefore, quite agreed, and I am glad, taking everything into account, that I resolved not to ask, for the present, of Turkey more than she can, as she is situated, well agree to.

"It is no use deceiving oneself as to the situation, which I think that I can see very clearly.

"When it is a question of despoiling others for the common benefit, the English give each other a hint, and leave the Government to do as it pleases. So they will be banded together against us in this business. Continental governments, which often struggle with one another upon questions of existence—a situation of which an island power like Great Britain

profits largely—will not care to create external embarrassments for themselves, and will not hold out a helping hand to us if we are unable to get along by ourselves. I have shown you how things stand with Turkey. Egypt has done all she can be reasonably asked to do. She is not in a position to support alone any longer the responsibilities of the enterprise. Admitting that the Viceroy were disposed to do so, I should not advise him to take such a responsibility on himself. The incessant intrigues of the English agents would eventually kill him, or, with his nervous and irritable temperament, would drive him out of his mind. The course which I have decided upon is therefore the only one possible, and we must gather up all our energy, and that of our friends, in order to march on to the goal, and not to allow ourselves to be deterred from our course.

“The English policy has been to have a double shot, by seizing Perim and opposing the canal. If the policy of the Western Powers and of Turkey is powerless as concerns Perim, our company is not going to haul down its flag. It will be stronger than Lord Palmerston and Mr. Disraeli.

“What I have decided upon will be carried out by the end of the year, except in the improbable event of Lord Derby’s Cabinet declaring *explicitly* that England renounces all opposition and leaves Turkey full liberty of action.”

To M. de Negrelli, Vienna.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, April 24, 1858.

“I have received yours of the 14th, and I have read as usual with extreme care the particulars of your recent conversation with Prince Metternich, whose great ability and rectitude of judgment are unimpaired. He is quite right; our enterprise is ripe, and we must not be any more disheartened by what Mr. Disraeli says than we were by the utterances of Lord Palmerston; while we must, at the same time, calmly consider the position in its true light, without being too sanguine, but also without hesitating or taking a single step backwards.

“You will see by my enclosures that I have acted in accordance with these precepts, and have taken the only course which in the circumstances was open to me. This being so, it would be imprudent to thrust France into the foreground. To do so would be almost an act of political antagonism.

“Our affair is, to my mind, in the best possible position. My agreement with the Turks enabled me to go steadily forward, and you will see that eventually every one will follow in our wake when it is found that we are not to be intimidated.

“When the time arrives for securing subscriptions we shall be overwhelmed with applications, whatever may be the case with other financial operations. In France, the opposition of England will be the chief

source of attraction for us. You may rely on me that this will be so. You know that I am not prone to exaggeration, but as all the information relating to this undertaking is centred in me, I know that we have even more power than the most sanguine of my friends can imagine."

To M. Thouvenel, Constantinople.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, April 28, 1858.

"I received, last night, the following telegram:—

" 'Questions will shortly be asked by Roebuck. It will then be seen that, despite the tactics of Lord Malmesbury and *The Times*, England wishes the canal to be made. Try and come.' "

To Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, April 28, 1858.

"I beg to forward to your Highness the original of the telegram I have just received from London, and I also enclose, in order to keep you posted in the action I am taking, copies of a letter to M. de Negrelli, at Vienna, and of the instructions sent by me to M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, May 12, 1858.

"My object, which was that of showing that I am resolved to go on in spite of all opposition, having been attained here by the communication of my pro-

posed circular, and in England by my letter to Mr. Lange, we can now await the first discussion which is to be raised in the House of Commons.

“This debate, and the resolution which is to be moved in connection with it in the beginning of June, as Mr. Lange writes me, are, moreover, facts which must modify my plans. Instead of remaining here until after the debate, I have determined to go to England, taking Paris on the way, and then to return here previous to constituting the company, with or without the Sultan’s ratification. I have just advised the Viceroy of my intentions.”

To M. de Negrelli, Vienna.

“ATHENS, May 21, 1858.

“As I had advised you was my intention, I sailed on the 19th for Marseilles, and shall probably be in London by the end of the month. I will telegraph you what is done. I allow our great undertaking to be guided by the course of events, and when the wind changes it is necessary for one to shift one’s sails, heading as much as possible for one’s destination.

“I expect to be back in Constantinople in a month. If the English Ministry renews its declaration of hostility in Parliament, I shall be obliged to agitate anew in England and elsewhere. I shall publicly announce my intention of forming the company, in conformity with the plan which I described to you after the previous declarations made by Mr. Disraeli.”

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

“PORT FIGARI (SARDINIA), May 27, 1858.

“As we were leaving the Straits of Messina, a storm and the breaking our screw placed us in a state of peril for three days, and we should probably have been driven ashore but for a small steamer which carries the mails between Genoa and Cagliari, and which, despite the heavy seas, pluckily came to tow us in here, where we arrived after great difficulty. This accident will prevent my reaching London in time to be present at the debate. Tell Lange that if our supporters fail to stop the opposition of the Government, it will be powerless to impede the progress of a private enterprise, and will create everywhere a very bad feeling against England.”

*To M. de Negrelli, Vienna; M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria;
and to M. Charles Aimé de Lesseps, Constantinople.*

(By Telegraph.)

“LONDON, June 8, 1858.

“The debate in Parliament, which made an impression very favourable for us upon public opinion, will be followed by fresh motions. The Ministry will be beset with questions until the end of the session. The ability and persistent energy of our partizans ensure a moral success. The general opinion is that the onward progress of the company cannot be arrested, and that the opposition will be unable to

hold its own. I shall very shortly return to Egypt and Constantinople."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"LONDON, June 9, 1858.

"I send you the substance of my conversation with our ambassador, the Duc de Malakoff:—

"1st. The marshal is very well disposed towards our enterprise.

"2nd. He has no instructions to take any action here.

"3rd. He seemed relieved when I told him that I had come to London upon business relating to the canal, and had no need to ask for his intervention.

"4th. My assurance and the declaration which I made him of my intention of following up the enterprise and carrying it into *execution*, despite the opposition of the English Government, created a very favourable impression upon his mind, and upon his attitude towards me, as he expressed the hope that he might live to assist at the inauguration of the canal.

"At a large dinner and evening party given by Mr. Hankey, M.P., governor of the Bank of England, several members of the house who were formerly opposed to the scheme, assured me that I had *converted* them.

"In short, after having heard many opinions, I judge the situation in England to be pretty much this:

"The sixty-two members who voted for Mr. Roe-

buck's motion have quite made up their minds on the subject, and will always vote in our favour. The remainder, who form the docile ministerial majority, have reserved their opinion with regard to the canal, at the request of Mr. Disraeli, in order to gain time to acquaint themselves with its merits before voting for or against it. A large proportion of this majority is, according to what Mr. Roebuck himself told me, systematically hostile to the canal, because it is *systematically hostile to France*. Lord John Russell, Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. Roebuck, and others are going to come to an arrangement for enlightening the House by means of fresh resolutions, so as to force the Ministry in their stronghold. The following is the telegram which I have sent to Vienna, Alexandria, and Constantinople, defining our position :—

“ ‘With regard to the communications of France and England concerning the canal, it had been agreed in principle that, in view of the fact that the two governments held different opinions, the enterprise should be allowed to take its own course, the more so as it did not demand the assistance of any government. The French and English diplomatic agents at Constantinople and Alexandria were to remain neutral, and abstain from bringing their influence to bear.’

“It is, then, most dishonest to assert that France does not take any interest in the canal, because the French agents have been true to the principle of neutrality which they were instructed to observe, and

because the English have been untrue to it both in Turkey and Egypt."

To Mr. D. A. Lange, London.

"CORRU, June 28, 1858.

"The communications I made to you in London demolished the arguments of our adversaries as to the *alleged* indifference of the French Government; the latest revelations made at Constantinople prove that the second assertion as to the opposition of the Porte is equally false, and that it is the English Government, the representative of a loyal, powerful, and civilised people, which has not scrupled to employ the arms of the weak and the barbarous—that is to say, hypocrisy and cunning—and to conceal its opposition behind a door (*porte*) which it thinks it can open and shut as it pleases.

"I may now proceed to dispose of the third assertion, touching the connivance of Austrian diplomacy with the hostile manœuvres of the British Cabinet.

"I saw, while passing through Vienna, several of the Emperor's ministers and various personages who told me how things stood in Austria. I shall be glad if you will communicate the information to our friends in the House, but do not make it public.

"It is evident that the House of Commons was led astray in the debate of June 1st, not only by Stephenson, but by the utterances of ministers. The majority, obtained by underhand intrigue, despite the

admirable speeches of the minority, must not lead the English Ministry to suppose that it can continue practices at Constantinople which I am determined most resolutely to withstand, and which, if they were resumed next month during my negotiations with the Porte, might lead to a deplorable conflict.

“I beg of you expressly to let your fellow-countrymen clearly understand that I am not to be blamed for any such conflict should it arrive, and that I have forewarned all my English friends of the many embarrassments which the absurd and unbearable policy of their Government in this matter of the Suez Canal would probably bring upon their country.

“While showing every readiness to go on with the negotiations, I am making my preparations to get the company in working order, and commence operations before the end of the year.

To M. Thouvenel, Constantinople.

“CORFU, June 28, 1858.

“While on my way here I met Fuad Pasha, who saw the Emperor during his stay in Paris. He could not forget the wholesome rebuke of the Emperor about ‘a firman relating to Egypt,’ and he asked Count Walewski what this rebuke meant, but our minister declined to give him any explanation. I thought it my duty to tell him as a *friend*, and as one holding no official position, that if the Emperor was vexed it was doubtless because he thought that in a matter of this

kind Turkey ought to have displayed more initiative and vitality, instead of attempting, as she seems to have done, to *create a political question between France and England*. For upon what ground does the Porte consider itself bound to consult England about the Suez Canal, when she did not consult France with regard to the concession of the Euphrates Railway? One may, without being unduly susceptible, resent this conduct of having two weights and measures.

“I have received the following letter from London, under date of June 22nd :—

“‘You are strongly advised not to delay commencing the execution of your work. Your course will be watched with the keenest interest by the members who wish you *every success*, and even by some of those who voted against Mr. Roebuck’s motion. It is the universal opinion that the political question will be settled by the common sense of the English people, and you may be sure that as soon as it is seen that you are about to begin making the canal there will be a very great change.’”

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

“ALEXANDRIA, July 9, 1858.

“I was with the Viceroy when the news of the terrible massacre at Jeddah arrived. Upon my expressing my indignation, he quietly observed : ‘What! you, who have known the East so much longer than I, are surprised. But your experience ought to have

told you that when fanatical and barbarous populations are not kept tightly in hand they are certain, one day or another, to indulge in the most deplorable excesses. Even here there are many people who greet you with respect who would tear your heart out if they dared. English policy wrested the administration of Syria from my father, and there will be other examples of what unbridled fanaticism is capable of. But as to Jeddah and Arabia, *our canal* will put a stop to all that, and Arabia will inevitably be brought into line with Europe.'

"These very pertinent observations are worth recording.

"It may be of interest to give you some particulars about what occurred at Jeddah. I have them from Mdle. Elise Eveillard and from M. Emerat, who escaped from the massacre, though they were very severely maltreated, and are still suffering from their wounds.

"Five thousand rioters swooped down upon the French and English consulates. The English consul was literally cut to pieces, while two of his dragomans and an Indian servant had their throats cut. The French consul, M. Eveillard, was stabbed and hacked to death; his wife was killed by a stab in the breast, after having killed one native and wounded another. His daughter, while this terrible scene was being enacted, had her father's head, cut open by two sabrestrokes, resting against her knees; and seeing M. Emerat, the chancellor of the consulate, who had

already received three wounds, engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with one of the rioters, she had the courage to make a spring at him, bury her nails in his face, and bite him in the arm until he dropped his weapon, which M. Emerat was then able to pick up and use against fresh assailants, until at last he fell exhausted and bleeding. Mdlle. Eveillard had her cheek cut open by a yatagan, and had sunk to the ground. The assailants, thinking that they were both despatched, proceeded to pillage the house, and Mdlle. Eveillard covered herself and the bodies of her parents with the cushions of the divan in the hope that they would all escape notice. Soon after a fresh band of rioters came into the room, and seeing legs emerging from the coverings of the divan, gave several sword-thrusts at them to see if the bodies to which they belonged were really lifeless. Mdlle. Eveillard had the fortitude to make no movement, and the men went away. But even then her sufferings were not over, for the men came back, and in order to see if a large cupboard, at the foot of which she was lying under the cushions, contained any valuables, four or five of these wretches stood upon them. It may be imagined what her agony of body and mind must have been. At length this band of savages, drunk with blood and pillage, made off.

“ There then arrived a young negro, who had been sent to her rescue by the ladies of an adjoining harem to whom Madame Eveillard and her daughter had a

few days before taken some medicine. This young negro, alone amid so many bloodthirsty enemies, had been obliged to play a passive part until the sun had gone down, when he made Mdle. Eveillard understand by signs that he had come as a friend. He rescued her from the living tomb in which she lay, and after many hairbreadth escapes brought her in safety to the harem, where she was very hospitably treated.

“M. Emerat had been rescued by an Algerian Musulman who had served for twelve years in the French army, and who had fallen upon the rioters with great pluck when he saw them cut down the consular flag-staff and trample the tricolour under foot. He succeeded in conveying M. Emerat to a place of safety.”

To M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, July 28, 1858.

“We have every reason to be satisfied, for I have just raised the curtain upon our last act. It was no use wasting precious moments with the Turks, but, taking advantage of their declarations, I have put on record the fact of their tacit adhesion, and have placed my interests and those of the company under the irrefragable protection of the Emperor of the French.

“Baron de Prokesch, ambassador of Austria; M. de Boutenieff, ambassador of Russia; General von Wildenbruck, minister of Prussia; Señor de Souza, minister of Spain, and the other diplomatic representatives at Constantinople approve of my determina-

tion, will inform their respective governments of it, and will if necessary co-operate with the ambassador of France.

“Please inform the Viceroy of what I have done.”

To M. Thouvenel, Constantinople.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1858.

“The conversation which I had with Aali Pasha on my arrival convinced me that, owing to the continuous action of the English Embassy, as well as to the discussion in the English Parliament on June 1st, the Sublime Porte is so situated that it feels the necessity of having a counterpoise which would enable it, without exposing itself to formidable difficulties, to go through the official formality of accord-ing a sanction which it has already given in principle. It undoubtedly exaggerated these difficulties, for had it followed its own inspirations it would not have created for itself more embarrassments than its vassal the Viceroy, whose conduct in this matter has won him universal sympathy, has had to face.

“But you know better than anyone how Turkey is situated, and will therefore understand her passive attitude in the matter.

“As the ministers of the Porte had often declared to you that they were favourable to the canal scheme, and that their government did not raise any difficulty in the way of its realisation *proprio motu*, it seems to me that there were no further negotiations to be

pursued with them. I then discussed the state of affairs with Sir Henry Bulwer, whom I had formerly known personally well enough to admit of my explaining my views to him with regard to the false and equivocal position in which his government in my eyes placed itself. The English Embassy, I said, had hitherto shown itself very hostile to my enterprise, and yet had not taken any official or ostensible step to justify its opposition upon the ground of English interests being imperilled. Mr. Disraeli's utterances in the debate of June 1st are a proof that what I say is true.

"I have informed you of my conversation with Sir Henry Bulwer, and I now send you a copy of the letter which, at his request, I wrote to him on the 28th inst., and in acknowledging its receipt he tells me that he is about to transmit it, together with the documents I sent him, to his government, and will await their instructions. It will therefore be for the Imperial Government to protect my rights and those of the company.

"I shall continue, for my part, to do all that lies in my power to secure the aid, if we shall require it, of the other governments from which I have received the most favourable assurances of good will."

To M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Paris.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, August 18, 1858.

"I have just made arrangements at Odessa for appointing agents of the canal company in Russia. I have advised all the foreign embassies of my depar-

ture on the 21st for the purpose of constituting the company, and I have sent them copies of my letters of the 28th and 30th ult. to Sir H. Bulwer and M. Thouvenel. As the political question with regard to England has been left to our government, and as the tacit adhesion of the Porte has been made sufficiently clear, there is no reason for delaying any further the organisation of the company.

“ M. Thouvenel approves of my plans, and sees no further need for me to remain here ; for, as I have pointed out to him, if I awaited here the decision of the Imperial Government, I should be obliged to submit to the delay which is certain to occur in the negotiations between Paris and London, whereas I am anxious to get our board of directors together.

“ Mr. Stephenson admits, in a letter to *The Times*, that he only visited a part of the isthmus. I know what part that is, for I myself saw the tracks of his carriage wheels, which did not extend more than a league beyond Suez. He omitted the most essential part of the excursion—viz., to the Bitter Lakes, from Lake Timsah to Pelusium and the Mediterranean coast, for that is where the only difficulties were to be met with, difficulties which ill-will and ignorance have been pleased to exaggerate. With regard to the substance of his letter, it seems to me to contain only bare statements, without any argumentative reply to the reports of the International Commission, or to the scientific observations of Messrs. Paleacapa, de Ne-

grelli, Conrad, and Dupin, the reporter of the commission of the Académie des Sciences."

To M. de Negrelli, Vienna.

"PARIS, September 14, 1858.

"Since my return here I have been devoting my whole time to the establishment of agencies for the company abroad and in France, as well as of scheduling the private subscriptions which have been sent to me, and which already reach £3,200,000. The adversaries of the enterprise, our faithful allies over the water, have already lost their two first campaigns as to the impossibility of making the canal and the hostilities of the Porte. All their efforts are now directed to deterring their compatriots from subscribing to it, because, in their innate pride and insular ignorance, they believe that their example will prevent other nations from investing money in it. We are now in course of destroying their last illusions.

"The Emperor is in favour of subordinating the political question to the organisation of the company, which will be strong enough to withstand opposition, and which the Continental governments will be in a position to support if needful. This seems to me very prudent, and is quite in keeping with my view as to government intervention, which should follow if the necessity for it arises, and not precede the execution of a commercial and industrial enterprise.

"The main thing is that I am assured that my

government will support me should I require such support, and even now, while the ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to advise the Porte in favour of the enterprise, Count Walewski informed Fuad Pasha, previous to his departure for London, that the Emperor took particular interest in the Suez Canal, and was anxious to see the Sultan give a token of initiative and independence in the matter, and that the course which Turkey had so far pursued in the matter was, in fact, felt by France to be ground for just complaint."

To M. de Regny, Interim Agent in Egypt.

PARIS, January 1, 1859.

"The constitution of the financial company, which will carry out the making of the Suez Canal, has brought the year 1858 to a very satisfactory close, but we must be prepared for a struggle even more severe than any of those which have gone before, for the hostility of the English Government seems to have been exacerbated by the success of our subscription. Our adversaries are beginning to reproach me with having composed the administration exclusively of relatives and friends, to the exclusion of great financiers, but my reply to this is that one gets on best in business with friends and not with enemies, and that to fight these latter I could not well select my colleagues to suit their convenience.

"Then, again, they are trying to undermine the confidence of my supporters by dwelling upon the

risky character of a company which has not got that wonderful firman which England alone prevents being issued, and by asserting that the company is irregular in its constitution because Great Britain and other countries are not among the subscribers.

“ My report to the Viceroy, dated December 31st, 1858, has given him a full account of the board meetings held since the constitution of the company was duly declared. His Highness having wished that the French investments should not much exceed one-half of the whole, in order that the company might, so far as possible, maintain its universal character, we have fixed the total number of shares as follows :—

Name of Country.	Number of Shares.
France	207,111
Ottoman Empire (inclusive of the Viceroy's personal investment)	96,517
Spain	4,046
Holland	2,615
Tunis	1,714
Piedmont	1,958
Switzerland	460
Belgium	824
Tuscany	176
Naples	97
Rome	54
Prussia	15
Denmark	7
Portugal	5
Sums held in reserve for the subscriptions from Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and the Uni- ted States, which the Viceroy authorizes me to guarantee for him should they not be taken	85,506
Total number of Shares forming the capital of the Company	400,000

"Thus it is made very clear that I have not attempted to monopolise for France and Egypt the merits of the subscription which, despite all that may be said or done, will not fail to be universal in its results.

"My last news from England is to the effect that we shall get no money from there. The utterances of Lord Palmerston and Stephenson, the engineer, have told. But as we shall go forward, despite the policy of our dear allies, I am not sorry to succeed without their financial assistance, and notwithstanding their hostility, just to take down a little of their insular presumption, accustomed as they are to regard everything impossible which has not their support.'

"I forward you the summary remarks of the engineers of the International Commission to the declarations of Mr. Stephenson. With regard to those of Lord Palmerston, totally devoid of reason as they are, his successors will persevere in the same hostile course. I know, through my friends in the foreign corps diplomatique at Paris, that since the success of our subscription the English Cabinet has made redoubled efforts to create difficulties for us with other Powers.

"Thus, for instance, the Marquis de Villamarina, Sardinian Minister in Paris, has been asked by the English ambassador to inform Count Cavour that the English Government was still very opposed to the canal, and that, as matters stood between England

and Piedmont, it would be very detrimental to the future of the latter state if it compromised itself by running counter to English policy.

"I know, too, through Italian friends, that the same intimation was made direct to Count Cavour through the British agent at Turin.

"According to a letter from New York, I must not now count upon any shares being taken in the United States. It will probably be the same in Russia, owing to the financial embarrassment of that country.

"With regard to Austria, the information sent by Bruck and Revoltella, continues to be favourable, despite the death of our good and trusty friend Negrelli. I propose to visit Vienna and Trieste on my way to Egypt next month."

M. de Regny to M. de Lesseps.

"ALEXANDRIA, January 2, 1859.

"I send you a brief account of an interview which has just taken place between the English consul in Egypt and the Viceroy. The importance of this interview cannot be exaggerated, for just when an effort is being made to get the world to believe that he is unfavourably disposed towards the enterprise, he replied with remarkable firmness to the English agent that this was his work, and that he was resolved to go on with it, as the Hatti-Sherif of 1841 unquestionably gives him the right to do. We shall see whether the action of the consul is countenanced by his

government. It is entirely out of character with the principles of humanity and commerce, of which the English claim to be the principal exponents.

"The facts are as under. Mr. Green went to Cairo on December 11th, and pointed out to the Viceroy that by having granted M. de Lesseps the concession he would find himself exposed to much annoyance, and that M. de Lesseps, upon the strength of this declared that he had your mandate, and had constituted a company. The consul added that no doubt his Highness would repudiate this statement as to your having his mandate.

"Said's reply was: 'People are mistaken in Europe if they attribute the piercing of the isthmus to M. de Lesseps alone, for I am the promoter of it. M. de Lesseps has merely carried out my instructions. You will ask me perhaps what my motive has been, and I will tell you that it has been to bring honour on my name and serve at the same time the interests of the Ottoman Empire. I have acquired by this means the sympathies of all the nations of Europe. You are aware that most of the great Powers are interested in the making of the canal.' The consul replied: 'May I point out to your Highness that if it has been approved of by France and other Powers, it has been strongly opposed by the English Government as contrary to its interests.' The Viceroy said that he was resolved to do all he could to accelerate a work which was generally desired, and gave Mr. Green

permission to report their conversation to his government.

“The Viceroy was all the more justified in making this outspoken reply to the irregular step taken by Mr. Green, seeing that he has just completed for the benefit of England the railway from Alexandria to Suez. He deserved some better return for the outlays he has made in English factories and workshops, notably in those of Stephenson, and for the rapidity with which the works were carried out.”

To the Duc d'Albuféra, Vice-President of the Suez Canal Company.

“VIENNA, February 21, 1859.

“I have already had a long conversation with Baron de Bruck and his colleagues in the Ministry. We are quite agreed as to the subscription for shares being announced in all the towns of the empire, under the patronage of government. Each country has its usages, and it appears that here a public appeal for funds would not answer. I am going to-morrow to Trieste, where deputations are to wait on me, and where I shall arrange with M. de Revoltella for realising the Austrian subscription for shares.

“The venerable Prince Metternich greeted me, as was his wont, with extreme good nature, and complimented me upon my ‘manipulation de l'entreprise de Suez,’ to use his own words, adding that if we went on steadily and prudently, the irresistible force of truth

made our success certain. I am going to jot down our conversation, which was a very interesting one, in my journal."

To the same.

"ALEXANDRIA, March 7, 1859.

"I have presented the deputation from our board to the Viceroy, and handed him the declaration, of which I enclose you a copy. After the customary compliments, I had a private audience with the Viceroy, being anxious to see what impression the recent visit of the English consul had produced upon his mind. I found him as kind as ever for me, and thoroughly resolved to pursue, *or perhaps rather to let me pursue*, the enterprise of the canal. He confirmed the accuracy of the report of the interview sent us by M. de Regny, but added that the consul had at the same time thanked him for the completion of the railway, which, to use the expression contained in a letter of congratulation from the P. and O. Company, 'so happily realises to the advantage of England the wished-for communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.' The Viceroy afterwards asked the French Consul-General whether he would, if necessary, support the operations of the canal company? M. Sabatier replied that he had no instructions, but would apply for them if required. The Viceroy's secretary then went to see M. Sabatier, and officially requested him to inform his government of the step which had been taken by his English colleague,

and of the embarrassment which he felt in consequence of this persistent pestering. M. Sabatier has asked for instructions by this post, but in the meanwhile has not thought it right to give the Viceroy any advice, for which I do not blame him, considering that I, though in no official position like him, have not thought it right to ask his Highness to intervene, no ostensible act of hostility against the company having yet been committed.

“The Viceroy informed the Austrian consul and myself that *no difficulty had been raised by the Porte*, to which he was about to report what had occurred, but that the opposition came entirely from the English agent. At the same time, I am about to proceed, by arrangement with the Viceroy, to carry out the decisions of the board so far as concerns the continuation of the preparatory survey, works which would in any case have had to be done first of all.

“The other questions are settled in principle, but we must, of course, wait to see what attitude the French consul will be ordered to assume.”

*To M. Damas-Hinard, Private Secretary to the
Empress of the French, Bayonne.*

“LA CHÉNAIE, October 7, 1859.

“Our ambassador at Rome writes:—

“‘I am following with intense interest the grand enterprise to which you are so patriotically devoting your persevering efforts, and I sincerely trust you

will succeed. I know of no more national or useful work than yours.'

"This will give an idea of what our diplomatists think of the Suez Canal. It may be added that the Duc de Gramont, in writing thus, is the mouthpiece of the Roman Court, and the whole of the Catholic clergy is deeply interested in the execution of the work. Only the other day, the Bishop of Orleans, in a pastoral letter, expressed his most ardent wishes for its success.

"The army has, with its usual spirit, taken up our enterprise, and many officers of all ranks are among our shareholders.

"The intervention of the Emperor, which now becomes a question of life and death for us, will certainly increase his popularity at home and his influence abroad. All the governments are ready to support him against the isolated opposition of the antiquated policy of England. This homage rendered to the Emperor's political ascendancy reminds one of that paid to Charles VIII. when a battle was about to be fought. The nobility opened their ranks, and, leaving him the foremost place, said: 'To your Majesty be left the honour of making the first thrust with your lance.'

"I said at the last meeting of our board that the Empress had been our guardian angel, and that she would be for the union of the two seas what Isabella, the Catholic, was for the discovery of America. We

have therefore chosen the 15th of November, the feast of St. Eugénie, for our first general meeting of shareholders."

To the same.

"LA CHÉNAIE, October 18, 1859.

"I learn that the Porte, yielding to the pressure of the English ambassador, has despatched Muktar Bey, the Minister of Finance, to advise the Viceroy as to what course he should pursue in regard to the Suez Canal. If I am rightly informed, his instructions are to discourage rather than stimulate the Viceroy. You will observe that our adversaries, whose motive is easily guessed at, select the time when the general meeting of shareholders has been announced as about to be held, to carry out a threat which will, as they hope, have the effect of shaking the confidence of our friends and create us fresh difficulties. My letters from Alexandria tell me, in fact, that our adversaries, advised beforehand of Muktar Bey's mission, do not make any secret of their belief that *it is all over with the canal, with which the Imperial Government will not have anything to do, leaving the field free to the opposition of the English agents.*

"As her Majesty the Empress will readily see the significance and gravity of these fresh complications, I shall be very much obliged if you will submit this letter to her. She will see how indispensable to me just now is the support she has already so freely given me."

To Mr. D. A. Lange, London.

“LA CHÉNAIE, October 15, 1859.

“The *Isthme de Suez* newspaper will give full particulars about the mission of Muktar Bey to Egypt. It is due, beyond all doubt, to the intervention of Sir H. Bulwer, and I have information to that effect, which comes from the fountain-head. The French ambassador at first remonstrated against this mission as hostile to the Suez Canal, but the action of the English ambassador was of such a character that a grave conflict might have ensued; so the French ambassador, in compliance with his general instructions, which are to avoid anything of the kind, left the field free to his English colleague. You may rely upon this information, and the occurrence is a fortunate one for us, as no doubt that was what the Emperor was waiting for, to inform Lord Cowley that he intended to support us, and that the demands of the company must be complied with. In fact, a despatch to this effect has been sent to our ambassador in London, requesting him to communicate it to your government.

“I regard our cause as won, seeing that the Emperor takes it under his protection.”

To M. de Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

“PARIS, October 24, 1859.

“I am pleased to inform you that we were received by the Emperor at St. Cloud yesterday. M.M. Elie de

Beaumont and Baron C. Dupin, our honorary presidents, joined us, and we were most kindly greeted by the Emperor, who was aware of the object of our visit, and who, speaking to me, said, 'How is it, M. de Lesseps, that so many people are against your enterprise?' To which I replied at once, 'Your Majesty, it is because they think you will not stand by us.' The Emperor, twisting the tips of his moustache with his fingers, as he is in the way of doing when he is thinking of what he shall say, observed, after a brief silence, 'Well, do not be uneasy. You may count upon my assistance and protection.'

"Speaking of the resistance of England, and referring to a recent reply of the London Cabinet, which he called a 'startling' one (*raide*), he added, 'It is a gust of wind. We must take in sail.'

"We then asked him to authorise us to announce to our shareholders that as *negotiations were in progress the general meeting would be adjourned*, as otherwise we should be obliged to refund them their money. He assented to this, and also to our letting it be known in Egypt that he had already given his Minister of Foreign Affairs orders that our rights and operations were to be upheld. We thanked him for it, but we complained of the conduct of the French Consul-General in Egypt, who had entirely failed to protect our interests, and handed a written memorandum in support of our statement. Thinking it time to leave, I made a sign to my colleagues, and finally

observed that I thought it desirable that I should go to Constantinople and Alexandria, to which the Emperor replied, 'It is very important that you should do so.'

"My colleagues then retired, but having remarked that the Emperor wished to speak to us, the Duc d'Albuféra and myself remained behind. The Emperor then said to me in a very friendly tone, 'What do you think we should do now?' I replied, 'Your Majesty, I think it would be wise to recall the French Consul-General, who, being a man of great capacity, could be sent to some other post.' 'Well,' remarked the Emperor, 'if that is all, it is easily done. You can tell Walewski so.'

"I lost not a moment in writing to Count Walewski, to tell him what had passed, and I ended my letter by saying:—

"'The practical result of this audience seems to be that, while reserving the political question, which can be left for diplomatic settlement, M. Thouvenel should be instructed to ask the new Grand Vizier (who is, I believe, favourable to the enterprise) for a letter to the Viceroy, authorising him to continue the preparatory works as defined in my letter from Corfu on the 3rd of March to the Grand Vizier, and, secondly, that M. Sabatier's services should be utilised anywhere else than in Egypt.'

"It is very fortunate that I happened to be in France, and not in Egypt, during the mission of Muktar Bey, which has occasioned you so much

annoyance, and in connection with which you have given so many proofs of your tact and devotion to the interests of the company."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, November 28, 1859.

"Our minister was well advised in sending me here, for though at first Thouvenel was rather alarmed, for fear that some complication should arise in the midst of his Montenegrin negotiations, I regard my stay at Constantinople as being most opportune just now. I should add that, owing to bad weather, the letters which ought to have arrived a week before had only just been delivered when I came, so that Thouvenel had scarcely had time to read them, and feared that it would be very difficult to bring about a sudden change of front. But this also I regard as a fortunate circumstance, and, moreover, we soon got on capitally. But he must be well backed up from Paris. Don't let them be afraid of the struggle with Sir Henry Bulwer, who, though a personal friend of mine, thinks it his duty as a good Englishman to serve his government, right or wrong, for which I cannot blame him. He was confined to his bed with fever when I arrived, but my presence had the effect of a good dose of quinine on him, for he was busy at work the next morning. His method of proceeding is to show the Turks letters from London, in which are described imaginary conversations between Lord Cowley and

Count Walewski in Paris, according to which the latter had promised England not to support the canal scheme, and this *subsequent* to the Muktar Bey mission. There cannot be a word of truth in this, which is a very old dodge. The dragomans of the English Embassy are instructed to alarm the ministers of the Porte by telling them that their assent to the canal may give rise to a war between France and England, which, whatever its result, would be fatal to Turkey. I endeavour to make them see that, on the contrary, if the Porte hesitated to come to a decision there would be far more danger of France and England being brought into conflict.

“There is another point to which I would also fain draw Count Walewski’s attention. When the French ambassador here opens the attack, and is seconded, as he will be, by the representatives of Austria, Russia, &c., it is essential that all our forces should be concentrated on the one point we are endeavouring to attain, and that all other questions should be deferred.

“The dragomans of the English Embassy tell the Porte that Lord John Russell’s instructions betoken quite as much hostility to the canal as those of preceding foreign secretaries.”

To the same.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, November 30, 1859.

“I receive a letter from Paris in which I am told: ‘Your enemies—and you must not think that you have

not plenty of all sorts—have endeavoured to compromise you in high places with reference to your alleged political opinions. There has been a talk of intimacies, relationships, and even affiliations.’

“I confess that accusations of this kind do not trouble me much, but, on the contrary, I am rather pleased to find that those who have an interest in injuring one who has never done an injury to any man, are obliged to have recourse to such weapons of the imagination. For my official career for the last thirty-four years, and my private life, of which an august personage happens to know a good deal, put me beyond the reach of such wretched calumnies.

“My whole life has been spent in the service of my country, nor have I ever meddled in home politics. I have never once set my foot, even out of curiosity, in a public political meeting of any kind. During my thirty years’ consecutive employment abroad I was only four times on leave in Paris, and I was not present at the revolutions of 1830 or 1848. Put out of active employment, upon my own demand, in 1849, and receiving no pay or pension, I devoted myself entirely to my family, and succeeded in making good the inroads upon my small fortune caused by the expenses of my latest missions abroad.

“Sustaining in 1854 a very severe domestic affliction,* I set myself to work upon a project which theoretically had engaged my attention for many years.

* Note of the Translator.—M. de Lesseps is referring to the death of his first wife.

Since then there has been no secret about a single one of my actions, and there is nothing in my sayings, writings, or doings, to justify an attack which I should not condescend to notice, but that I was afraid of its just now being detrimental to the success of our enterprise. Read this to Count Walewski, and communicate it, if you think fit, to M. Damas Hinard, for the Empress. She knows that though I did not vote for the empire, I am no factionist, and that though I am a lover of liberty, I am not one of those who would seek to overthrow the order of things which my country has raised up."

To M. Ruysenaers, Alexandria.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, December 7, 1859.

"After several ministerial councils, which resulted in considerable discussion owing to the innumerable steps taken by Sir Henry Bulwer, the Porte agreed to the demand made by the French ambassador. That is to say, a reference will be made to the Powers to cover the political responsibility of Turkey in regard to the canal, and to settle the international questions arising out of it. All that now remains is to decide in what form the reference shall be made. I of course leave M. Thouvenel to take action in his own way, and have not made any move personally. Sir H. Bulwer sees so clearly that this appeal would put an end to all possibility of further resistance that he is moving heaven and earth to prevent it being made.

"If all terminates as I hope, I shall hand to the heads of each Legation a memorandum which I have prepared with confirmatory documents appended."

To Chevalier Revoltella, Trieste.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, December 10, 1859.

"There have been two councils within the last three days, and there will be another to-morrow. The Porte is still hesitating, for Sir H. Bulwer has held out threats of war, but we have made the Turkish ministers understand that this is only bluster, and that he would look very foolish if asked to put this in writing."

To M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, December 24, 1859.

"M. Thouvenel has informed me that at last the agreed reference to the Powers has been drawn up, after sixteen ministerial councils. This reference, the terms of which were so long discussed, has been communicated to M. Thouvenel, and by him sent on to Paris.

"The Sultan sent, the day before yesterday, for the Grand Vizier, as well as for Fuad Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to congratulate them upon their conduct of the negotiations.

"Yesterday afternoon, we were thunderstruck to hear that the Grand Vizier, Kuprisly Pasha, had been dismissed, and I was afraid at first that there had been a change of front in Turkish policy. But I was at

once reassured upon hearing of the nomination of Ruchdi Pasha, whom I lost no time in going to see, and who appeared most friendly.

To the Duc d'Albuféra, Paris.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, December 28, 1859.

“The change of Grand Viziers has not in any way affected the situation as I described it to you in my previous letters. The Sultan gave his full approval to what had been done by the ex-Grand Vizier, so I leave to-morrow for Alexandria, where I shall not remain long, as all I want to do there is to see the Viceroy.

“M. Thouvenel is anxious that I should get to Paris as quickly as possible.”

To the same.

“ON THE NILE, BETWEEN MONFALOUT AND SIOUT,

“January 6, 1860.

“The Viceroy was waiting for me at Monfalout previous to going up the river to Siout. We had a very interesting conversation, and I can assure you that we are perfectly agreed. He is very anxious that we should, without making any fuss about it, at once proceed to the setting up of our dredging apparatus, to the excavating of our service trench (*rigole de service*) as far as Lake Timsah, and to the preliminary works in the inner fort.

“He is very satisfied with the result arrived at at

Constantinople, without his rights having been infringed upon or called in question, and he admits that his rights are our rights.

"I explained to him how his running account stands, and left him a copy of it to examine.

"The Viceroy assured me in the most gracious manner that at no time had his confidence in me ever been the least shaken, and that he was sure he could say the same of me. He repeated what he had already said at our last interview, that we can understand each other thoroughly even when parted. He is very pleased that the French consul has been changed. After our conversation we went up to Siout, each on our separate steamer, and he told me that he would not hear of my leaving."

To M. Ruyssenaers, Alexandria.

"ALEXANDRIA, January 11, 1860.

"In handing the Viceroy his account with the company, which he found correct, I pointed out to him that his Treasury had not included in its advances several large sums which his Highness declined to receive, and I thanked him on behalf of the shareholders. These sums related to the surveys made several years ago, the salaries of all the engineers placed at our disposal, the cost of the International Commission during its journey through the isthmus, and many other items."

To His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt.

“PARIS, January 26, 1860.

“I arrived here four days ago, and I hasten to send to your Highness, as promised, a copy of the communication made to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Turkish Ambassador. There is no need for me to tell your Highness that this note, which is symptomatic of how the Porte sways to and fro between France and England, does not effect any precise settlement. It is no more than a mere official subterfuge, and it, in short, leaves to time and to the course of events to bring about a definite arrangement which the Porte has not ventured to make. This is a political burial of the question which enables us to act and to force on the solution afterwards. This is what the Spaniards call *cubrir el expediente* (saving the appearances).

“The Emperor has received M. Bécлар, the successor of M. Sabatier, and has specially commended to him the interests of the company.

“In agreement with M. Thouvenel, I have obtained from the committee the vote of the resolution of which I enclose a copy, so that your Highness may not be in any way troubled by inquiries with regard to the works we are executing for the creation of Port Said and of the inland fort at Timsah.

“I have seen King Jérôme and his son Prince Napoleon and the Ministers, but I have waited until

fully informed on all points before asking for an audience of the Emperor, which I shall do to-day or to-morrow. I send your Highness the model of an apparatus for letting the captains of ships know when the lighthouse at Port Said is lighted. This lighthouse will be very useful for vessels plying between the coasts of Egypt and Syria."

To the same.

"PARIS, May 16, 1860.

"I have the honour to inform your Highness that I shall leave Marseilles on the 18th to lay before you the resolutions passed at the general meeting of May 15th, and to point out to you the satisfactory results which this meeting will have upon the realisation of our enterprise."

To His Excellency Kœnig Bey, Secretary to the Viceroy.

"ALEXANDRIA, June 27, 1860.

"I send you a letter from Constantinople, which please read to the Viceroy, whom I shall not see to-day. The best answer we can make to our adversaries is the arrangement we have concluded with Ragheb Pasha, which, far from being a cause of financial embarrassment, will strengthen the Viceroy's credit.

"This letter, dated June 10th, is as follows:—

"'The *mot d'ordre* of the English Embassy, in

public and in society, with reference to the Suez Canal, is this: "As M. de Lesseps and his shareholders are indifferent to the ruinous impossibility of the work, which *The Times* has pointed out, so much the worse for them. It is not England's business to preserve them from the consequences of their own folly. It would be absurd to oppose the execution of a thing which is not possible; and if, by dint of money expenditure and by ruining two or three generations of shareholders the canal is made, so much the better for England—which will derive more benefit from it than anyone else—and for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, from which Egypt, rendered inviolable by the universal interests attached to the canal itself, will be in no risk of being separated."

"Is this a more or less honourable mode of beating a retreat, or is it not rather, as I believe, an expedient for putting the French Embassy to sleep, and for making a redoubled attack against the Viceroy? It is represented that he has wasted and ruined the finances of Egypt, and that it is desirable to replace him. Not being able to attack the canal outright, an endeavour is being made to discredit the financial position of the Viceroy with respect to the work, which will, however, cost him much less than the railway to Suez. Be this as it may, I know that the Embassy is upon its guard, and that despite the good will for Sir Henry Bulwer with which Turks said to

be in the confidence of the Viceroy are credited, nothing will be done either against his Highness or yourself. It is always well, however, to keep one's weather eye open.

"M. de Lavalette seems very easy in his mind, and I am bound to believe that he has his reasons for this. One thing certain is that he is determined, if necessary, to display great zeal in an affair in which so many legitimate interests are involved."

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

"ALEXANDRIA, December 28, 1860.

"It may interest the Minister of Foreign Affairs to hear something about our relations with Abyssinia, a country which, now so far off, will, when the Suez Canal is open, be the nearest to Europe of all those on the east coast of Africa. Our consul at Massowah transmitted me a letter from the King of Abyssinia, which has already been published;* but I enclose you the translation of a second letter from him, in reply to what I wrote in answer to his first letter:—

*Second Letter from King Nikas Negoussié to
M. Ferd. de Lesseps.*

" "Peace be with you!

" "Your letter duly reached me, and I thank you

* Note of the Translator.—This letter is included in the chapter on "Abyssinia." See Chap. XI.

for the good wishes you express towards me and for the prosperity of my people. I am convinced that, despite my earnest efforts to remove from my country the barbarous customs introduced into Abyssinia during the last few centuries, I shall never succeed in entirely changing the ideas of the people, and regenerating them until European genius, uniting the waters of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, has opened our country to European commerce and Christian civilisation.

“ ‘When, by the grace and will of God, I have brought all the rebels into subjection, and established my kingdom upon a more solid basis, I shall send my ambassadors to all the Christian kings of Europe, and I shall say to them: “My brothers, I am like you a servitor and a son of Jesus Christ. Receive me, therefore, among you and enter into relations with me. Then the men of Europe will come among us, they will teach us your arts, and Abyssinia will become what it was before. If you are my friends, and if you desire the good of humanity, you will doubtless aid me in this work.”

“ ‘In order that my acts should correspond to my words, I have forbidden the mutilation of the killed or wounded in battle; I have prohibited the slave trade, and this odious traffic is now suppressed in the Tigré, Semen, and all the subject provinces upon the coast of the Red Sea.

“ ‘Permit me to repeat to you in conclusion that

you can count upon me for anything which is calculated to advance the work of the canal.

“ ‘May the good Lord keep you.’ ”

“ ‘DENEAT AXOUM, 8 *Lasoli*, 1852.’ ”

“I beg you also to hand to Count Walewski, together with my correspondence with King Nikas, my *Abrégé de l'Histoire d'Abyssinie* as likely to be useful for purposes of reference in the political relations which will certainly follow the opening of the Suez Canal to navigation between Europe and the east coast of Africa.”*

My Journal.

“17th, 18th, 19th, 20th January, 1868.

“Having left Ismailia on horseback in order to reach Kantara more quickly than I could by water, I cross the desert, followed by my faithful Hassan, the night being dark and there being nothing but the north star to guide us. After two hours' repose, I am awoke by a courier, and on opening the despatch I find that Mohammed Said, who was very ill when he reached Alexandria, is in a very critical state, and that if I wish to see him again there is not a moment to be lost. I have a horse saddled, and, instead of taking the desert route, I determined to

* King Nikas's intentions were not carried into effect, for he was treacherously betrayed to the Pretender Theodoros, who had him cruelly put to death, and governed Abyssinia until his barbarity to foreigners led to the English expedition, under Lord Napier, the capture of Magdala, and his suicide.

follow the banks of the canal and gain time. There are several solutions of continuity, but my horse gets me out of all the difficulties, and I arrive at Ismailia at break of day. I had telegraphed in advance to have a bark got ready, with two dromedaries to draw it along the banks, but just as I reached Tel-el-Kebir, I meet another bark which was bringing up Jules Voisin, who had been sent by M. Guichard, director of our domains at Ouady, to tell me that the Viceroy had died on the morning of the 18th. I am grieved to the heart, not on account of my enterprise, in which I have the most serene confidence, despite all the difficulties which may arise, but because of the cruel separation from a faithful friend who for more than a quarter of a century had given me so many proofs of affection and confidence. As I travel on to Alexandria, I go over in my mind all the circumstances connected with our youthful friendship, his careless and easy life as a young man, and his beneficent reign. Before seeking a little repose I ask permission from the noble and estimable princess, his widow, to allow me to enter the family mosque in which his body had just been lodged. I remain there an hour quite alone, with my head resting upon the dead man's turban. His servitors, whom I afterwards question, inform me that towards the close of his illness their master used a stick which I had given him while we were on an excursion together, and that he had it at his side when he died. I have every search

made to discover this relic, but it is nowhere to be found. I have a description of it given to the police, who eventually discover it in the hands of an Arab as he walked along the street. It was restored to me, and the history of this interesting souvenir is as follows:—One day Mohammed Pasha, upon my return from England, showed me two sticks, the one which I had given him and one which was a present from an English admiral, and said: ‘You sometimes mention the canal business to me in the presence of persons who might repeat our conversation at an inconvenient moment. To obviate this, whenever you come to see me and you notice that I have the English stick, you will remember that nothing is to be said about the canal; but you can say as much as you like when you see that I have your stick.’

“After remaining three days at Alexandria, and giving time for the official congratulations offered to Mohammed’s successor to be got over, I start for Cairo, where the new Viceroy, far from being offended, expressed himself much pleased at the regret which I expressed and felt, and of his own accord assured me that he would treat the widow, son, and household of his predecessor as if they belonged to his own family.”

To the Duc d’Albuféra, Paris.

“CAIRO, January 24, 1868.

“Summoned by telegraph when the Viceroy was dying, I reached Alexandria from Kantara in twenty

hours, but too late to close the eyes of one who had ever been for me a firm and fast friend. The new Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, has been pleased to give me his assurance of goodwill towards our enterprise, as I telegraphed to you; and I am now, after having had a long and confidential conversation with him, in a position to assure you that we may feel quite at ease both as regards the progress of our works and the regular payment of the sums for which the Egyptian Government has made itself responsible. Ismail Pasha is opposed to the idea of a loan, if it can possibly be avoided, and he is anxious, if possible, to have all the instalments paid in succession, so as to enable the company to meet all its expenses without having any need to make a further call upon its shareholders until the whole debt of the Egyptian Treasury has been paid off. We intend to draw up a plain agreement to this effect on the Viceroy's return from Constantinople, where he is about to go to receive his investiture from the Sultan. Until then it is easy to understand that Ismail Pasha cannot do more than let things remain in the state in which they were left by his predecessor, but I am assured by him and his intimate friends that he understands how important it is for the glory of his reign to bring the enterprise of the Suez Canal to a successful conclusion.

“The Duc de Brabant, who has returned from an excursion in Upper Egypt, has expressed to me his wish to visit our works in detail, and I am starting

with him this morning, the Viceroy having ordered a special train for us from Cairo to Samanoud and a steamer from Samanoud to Damietta. I have telegraphed to M. Voisin to meet us, for before I knew of the Duc de Brabant's proposed visit we had arranged to inspect our works together.

"The Viceroy will return from Constantinople in about three weeks, and we shall then make our financial arrangements previous to my starting for France, and he has repeated to me several times, 'I don't wish you to reach Paris until the company is completely satisfied.' He made a similar declaration to our consul, and also told him that he intended to effect the payment of his shares in such a way as to obviate any necessity for making a fresh call upon the French shareholders.

"His Highness informed me a few days ago that he had steamers to bring contingents of workmen from Upper and Middle Egypt for the month of Ramaden, during which period there is not, for this once, to be any suspension of labour. It was very desirable that such should be the case, as an interruption of the work would certainly have been misinterpreted, and this the Viceroy saw.

"These facts confirm, therefore, the favourable dispositions which his Highness manifested from the first, and our affairs in Egypt are going on as well as possible."

To the same.

“ALEXANDRIA, March 10, 1868.

“I took care to be at Alexandria upon the return of the Viceroy from Constantinople, and I was one of the first to see him. He told me in confidence all that had occurred during his visit to the Sultan, as you will learn from my brother Theodore, whom I have requested to communicate them to you before informing M. Drouyn de Lhuys of them.

“The Viceroy’s voyage has produced the best possible results for us, and, to use his own words, he said to me, ‘If you had been Viceroy of Egypt as well as president of your company, you could not have done better in the interests of the Suez Canal scheme.’

“There need, therefore, be no fear now as to the rapid progress of our works, and the discharge of the debt due from the Egyptian Treasury. The Viceroy started yesterday for Cairo, after receiving the new French Consul-General, my old friend M. Tastu, who will do all he can for us, though we must not forget the services rendered us by M. de Beauval.”

To Count Th. de Lesseps, Paris.

“CAIRO, August 28, 1868.

“I have just received from an intimate and devoted friend in Paris the following letter:—

“‘I think it right to let you know what I have

just heard, and you will be the best judge as to what it is worth. I can see no harm in letting you know this, for if there was the slightest foundation for it, it would be very unfortunate if you were not forewarned. The information was given to me on the express condition that I should not disclose to you the source from which it came. It appears that a head engineer of the Ponts-et-Chausées was sent to Egypt by a statesman now in power, with the mission to inspect the works on the isthmus, and address him a report upon the results of his inspection. I am told that this person expressed himself very unfavourably as to what he had seen in the course of his visit, and that he was very severe upon your engineers. It is considered certain that his report will be very hostile, and that he will draw the conclusion that the affair cannot possibly be carried through under present conditions. It is anticipated that this report will be handed to the statesman in question, and that he will submit it direct to the Emperor. Armed with this report, the person who presents it will endeavour to persuade the Emperor that the affair is being badly managed, that the capital of the shareholders is in danger, and that the honour and success of the enterprise is at stake ; while, by way of fresh arguments to use with the Empress, from whom more difficulty is anticipated than from the Emperor, an effort will be made to alarm her and to persuade her that, in *your interest*, it is desirable to save you from the diffi-

culties which you are heaping up for yourself. The object is to bring about the liquidation of the present company, and substitute for it another which is already in course of formation. There is some talk, in addition, of another company composed of large bankers.'

"If I were in Paris my first step would be to show the statesman in question the letter I had received. I should ask him to request the engineer if he had made any observations more or less favourable to the course of our works, which had been directed by his colleagues of the Ponts-et-Chaussées, to communicate these observations, so that we might have them controlled and verified by four of the most distinguished of his colleagues, MM. Tostain and Renaud, inspectors-general, and the engineers MM. Pascal and de Fourcy, who are just coming out to Egypt.

"With regard to the inheritance of the Suez Canal, it is not upon the point of being divided; we have given sufficient proofs of being alive, and we are, thank God, in pretty good health. Our first steps were attended with difficulties, and our childhood was a stormy one, but we have reached the age of manhood. We intend to prove that, if we have been able to constitute ourselves financially, without the assistance of great capitalists, so, with the help of able engineers, we shall be able to complete our work, without delivering ourselves to great speculators, who would not be sorry to absorb a part of our share-

holders' money. We have laboured and sown; we intend to reap the harvest.

"These fresh intrigues, if they really exist, will share the fate of the financial and political intrigues which have preceded them.

"I tell you what I think, and must leave you to decide as to whether it is expedient to inform the Empress of the matter."

*To His Highness Prince Ismail, Viceroy of Egypt
and Ethiopia.*

"CAIRO, September 1, 1868.

"Monseigneur,—A letter from the Grand Vizier was addressed to your Highness in the early part of August with reference to the Suez Canal.

"The French Embassy at Constantinople having succeeded in obtaining a copy of this letter, and communicated it to me, I have lost no time in drawing out a memorandum on the subject, in which I venture to call your close attention. I may at once say that I am of the same opinion as the French Government, which has never, it is true, had occasion to take any initiative in regard to the Suez Canal, and which has rightly refused to make a political question of it, but which is firmly resolved to uphold, together with your rights, those of the company in which French capital has been legitimately invested.

"It will be for the representative of the Emperor at your Highness's Court to give you, with more

authority than myself, the same assurances, and to encourage him, upon the other hand, not to permit any interference in the internal administration of Egypt contrary to the arrangement of 1841, which constituted the Egyptian Power in favour of the line of Mehemet Ali.

“I trust that your Highness, whose protection and aid have been so freely accorded me since the beginning of your reign, and who is more interested than anyone else in the success of the enterprise at the head of which I have the honour to be, will appreciate the obligation which is incumbent upon me to scrupulously discharge all my duties, and that you will help me to employ the necessary means for completing as promptly as possible the work from which you will derive so much glory and profit.”

Such is the origin of the work of the Suez Canal.

With regard to the celebrated firman which provoked so many international negotiations, the company went on its way without concerning themselves any more about it, and without a day's delay.

The tranquillity of the president was to a great extent due, especially during the last few years, to a fact which has remained unknown to the public.

When Napoleon III. arrived at Marseilles, on April 30th, 1865, to embark on his yacht, the *Aigle*, on his way to Algeria, the Grand Vizier, Fuad Pasha, who had come to the south of France to recruit his

health, was among the crowd of notables who were grouped around the Emperor, who took no notice of him, and did not reply to his bow. He then came up closer and asked the Emperor if his Majesty had any cause of complaint against him or his government. The only answer he got was an expressive gesture accompanying the single word "the firman."

This firman was in the end granted. The grand inauguration of the canal took place on November 17th, 1869, in presence of the Empress Eugenie, the Emperor of Austria, the Prince Imperial of Germany, the Prince of Orange, General Ignatieff, representing the Emperor of Russia, and the ambassadors of all the Powers from Constantinople. The number of vessels which went through the canal from Port Saïd to Suez was sixty, and the multitude of guests—men of science, men of letters, and artists, from all countries—were treated by the Khedive Ismail with a magnificent hospitality unexampled in history.

This is a homage which I am proud to pay him after the painful occurrences which have afflicted Egypt and removed him from power.

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CHAPTER V.

A QUESTION OF THE DAY.

IT will, I think, not be out of place if I supplement this chapter with "a question of the day" (*actualité*), in the shape of a letter which I addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1855, with reference to an eventual seizure of Egypt, either by France or by England.

"CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 28, 1855.*

"There are questions which it is necessary to face openly, in order to solve them aright, just as there are wounds that must be probed before they can be healed. The straightforward way in which you met my preliminary observations with reference to an affair, to the gravity of which I am fully alive, emboldens me to submit to your consideration one point which, as it seems to me, it is desirable to keep in view with reference to the Isthmus of Suez. Owing to the great influence which your character and your long experience enable you rightly to exercise in the decisions of your government in all Eastern questions, I am specially anxious to omit nothing which

may assist you in forming your opinion in full knowledge of all the facts.

“The results already obtained by the ultimate alliance of France and England show very clearly how advantageous their union is in the interests of the equilibrium of Europe and of civilisation. It concerns, therefore, the future and the happiness of all the nations of the universe to maintain intact, and to preserve from any shock, a state of things which, to the lasting honour of the governments which have brought it about, can alone, with the aid of time, ensure to humanity the blessings of progress and of peace. Hence follows the necessity of getting rid, without delay, of any possible cause of rupture or even of coolness between the two peoples. Hence, in consequence, it was our bounden duty, with a view to future contingencies, to search out what are the circumstances calculated to awaken the secular feelings of antagonism, and to provoke, either upon the one side or the other, any of those emotions against the force of which the wisest of governments is powerless to contend. The motives of hostile rivalry show a tendency gradually to give way to that generous emulation which engenders great achievements.

“To look at the situation from a general point of view, one fails to see upon what ground, and *à propos* of what, the struggles which have so long caused the world to reek with blood, are likely to be renewed.

Are the two peoples divided by financial and commercial interests? Why, the capital of Great Britain, invested in all manner of French enterprises, and the immense development assumed by international commerce, establish between them ties which grow closer every day. Are political interests or questions of principle at stake? Why, the two nations have but one and the same aim, but one and the same ambition—the triumph of right over might, of civilisation over barbarism. Is there any petty jealousy with regard to territorial extension? Why, they both recognise now the fact that the globe is large enough to offer to the spirit of enterprise which animates their respective populations land to be cultivated and human beings to be redeemed from barbarism; and, moreover, so long as their flags float side by side, the conquests of the one benefit the activity of the other.

“At first sight, therefore, one can see nothing in the general aspect of affairs which can affect our friendly relations with England. Nevertheless, looking at the matter a little more closely, there is one eventuality which, seeing how the most moderate and enlightened cabinets are impelled to share popular passions and prejudices, is capable of reviving ancient antipathies, and of compromising the alliance and the benefits deriving from it.

“For there is one point of the globe, upon the free right of way through which depends the political and commercial power of England, a point which France,

for her part, in centuries past, had the ambition to possess. This point is Egypt, the direct route to India—Egypt, which has been more than once dyed with French blood.

“It is superfluous to go into the motives which could not allow England to see Egypt fall into the hands of a rival nation without offering the most desperate resistance; but a fact which must be also taken into full account is that France in her turn, though not so materially interested, could not, in obedience to her glorious traditions, and under the impulse of other sentiments more instinctive than logical—and for that very reason all powerful upon her impressionable inhabitants—allow England to take peaceable possession of Egypt. It is evident that as long as the route to India is open and safe, that the state of the country guarantees facility and promptitude of communication, England will not voluntarily create for herself the gravest difficulties in order to appropriate to herself a territory which, in her eyes, is only valuable as a transit route. It is equally clear that France, whose policy for the last fifty years has consisted in contributing to the prosperity of Egypt, as well by her counsels as by the assistance of a great many Frenchmen distinguished in science, in administration, and in all the arts of war and peace, will not, for her part, attempt to realise the projects of another age so long as England does not set foot there.

“But should one of those crises which have so often shaken the East occur, or any circumstance arise which should compel England to take up a position in Egypt, in order to prevent any other Power forestalling her, it is certain that the alliance would not survive the complications which such an event would bring about. And why should England consider herself forced to make herself mistress of Egypt, even at the risk of breaking up her alliance with France? For the simple reason that Egypt is England’s shortest and most direct route to her Eastern possessions, that this route must be constantly open to her, and that upon this vital point she can admit of no compromise. Thus, by reason of the very position which in nature she occupies, Egypt may again be the subject of a conflict between France and Great Britain, so that this chance of a rupture would disappear if by some providential event the geographical conditions of the Old World were altered, and the route to India, instead of traversing the heart of Egypt, was put back to its limits, and, being open to all the world, could no longer be the privilege of any one nation in particular.

“Well, this event, which must be in the designs of Providence, is now within the possibility of human accomplishment. It may be achieved by human enterprise, and may be realised by piercing the Isthmus of Suez—an undertaking to which nature offers no obstacle, and to which the capital of

England, as well as of other countries, would certainly contribute.

“Let the isthmus only be pierced, let the waters of the Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean, let the railway be continued and completed, and Egypt, acquiring greater value as a country of production, of internal trade, and of general transit, will lose its perilous importance as an uncertain or contested route of communication. The possession of its territory, no longer being of any interest to England, will cease to be a possible cause of contention between her and France, the union of the two countries will become henceforward unalterable, and the world be saved from the calamities which would attend a rupture between them. This result offers such great guarantees for the future that the mere indication of it will suffice to command the sympathy and the goodwill of the statesmen whose efforts are bent upon placing the Anglo-French alliance upon immovable foundations. You are one of these men, my lord, and you have such a predominant part in the discussion of great questions of state that I am most anxious to acquaint you with my views and aspirations.”

CHAPTER VI.

AFTER THE WAR OF 1870-1871.

IN the year which followed the conclusion of peace with Germany, the public administrations had to undertake multifold and contradictory duties, which created great complications, and entailed expenses which it is difficult to measure until one comes to examine them in detail. It was necessary both to disorganise the war services, to reorganise the peace services, and to make good the disasters which had broken up all the machinery of ordinary government. The first obstacles in the way of a return to a normal state of things having been cleared away, an immense amount of labour remained to be done in order to consolidate the work of peace.

Public and private interests had been so profoundly troubled by the ten months of war and internal disturbance, so many transformations were rendered necessary by the new order of things, the re-establishment of the country was so ardently desired, that an immense number of laws, decrees, and administrative measures were passed day after day, so to speak.

There would be a real interest and a patriotic duty in making a compilation of all the acts which were accomplished with the common object of raising the prestige of France, of getting together the scattered documents upon which it would be easy to lay hands to-day, but which will be forgotten to-morrow.

A work of this kind would be not merely the diplomatic history of the peace with Germany, but the history of the reconstruction of our country. When fate involves a nation in disaster, such as the war of 1870 was, there are two phases through which it passes before resuming its rank in the world: the diplomatic phase of the treaties which regulate peace and its direct and immediate effects; and the longer phase during which the wounds of the war are closing, order is being restored in the country, the truncated limbs of the amputated territory are being tended, the administration and finances are being reorganised, and, in a word, the political equilibrium of the country is being restored.

History has related the main outlines of the events of 1870, and has also revealed certain anecdotal and dramatic details of special interest. The publications which have hitherto appeared have done little more than register diplomatic documents, and a few official letters, &c., so that I may say a few words about the results of the conventions of 1871.

The diplomatic work done in 1815 was so great and so complicated that it has of itself absorbed the atten-

tion of public writers, for the re-arrangement of territory which took place at that period extended to the greater part of Europe, and something like a fresh equilibrium of the Western world came into existence. In 1870 we had to treat with Germany alone, the rest of Europe being content to look on. The diplomatic agreements were, no doubt, less numerous than in 1815, but the political reconstitution of France, which was recovering, not only from a foreign war, but from an internal revolution and a formidable insurrection—one, it may be said, without precedent in her history, *plus quam civilia bella!*—necessitated an immense number of operations connected more or less directly to peace. As a case in point, let me instance the making good of the damages arising from the invasion. Of course, it was impossible to indemnify everyone, and most of those who received pecuniary grants did not recover all that they had lost. The whole of the public fortune would not have sufficed for that, and, moreover, there are losses which no money can make good. But the sacrifices which France has made since 1871 for the victims of the war is the best proof of the progress of civilisation and of national harmony which have been exhibited since the beginning of the century. In previous wars, and after those of the First Empire, it never occurred to anyone that the citizens of a country, being inter-dependent the one upon the other, were in duty bound to form a sort of mutual assistance fund for those who had suffered the

most. The victor alone turned his triumph to account, making the vanquished compensate his subjects for what they had lost. It was thus that in 1870, as in 1815, France was crushed by the weight of the ransoms which she had to pay, but the difference between the two epochs is that in 1870, despite the enormous liabilities which defeat had entailed, the country did not forget the provinces which had felt the full weight of the invasion, and repaired, to the best of its ability, the damage which had been done there. The State showed itself liberal in its dealings with foreigners as well as Frenchmen, both alike being allowed to profit by the laws relating to indemnities. This example will not, it is to be hoped, be forgotten by any foreign countries which may be subjected to a like trial, and in which Frenchmen may be residing and may have suffered loss, either from foreign war or internal discord. For, it must be remembered, indemnities were granted as well for the losses occasioned by the German war as for those due to the Communist insurrection. These indemnities were not confined to individual losses, but were extended to collective and corporate bodies. So it was that large grants were made to railways; that departments and parishes were reimbursed for their expenses in connection with the mobilisation of the National Guard; and that the road bridges destroyed during the war were rebuilt at the cost of the State. The total amount spent in this way exceeded £34,000,000.

The two hundred millions paid by France to Germany were in part applied to indemnify the Germans for their losses. From the statements in the German budget, it appears that a sum of £58,200,000 was paid for losses incurred by the war, while a further sum of £58,376,500 was granted to German ship-builders, which may be taken as representing the losses which our navy inflicted upon the maritime trade of the enemy.

The indemnity allowed for bombardment in Lower Alsace amounted to about two and a-half millions, nearly the whole of which was paid in Strasburg. The further employment of the war indemnity which we paid reveals some interesting details. Thus we find that the imperial fortresses received £10,800,000—those of Alsace £6,450,000. The Invalides received £28,033,800, while an imperial treasure of £6,000,000 was created, and nearly half-a-million sterling was spent in rewarding distinguished services. The pensions for soldiers invalided during the war exceeded two millions sterling, while the total losses which the Germans incurred during the campaign amounted to 129,250 in killed, wounded, and missing, of whom 5,153 were officers, 11,095 non-commissioned officers, 1,292 musicians and trumpeters, 595 volunteers, and the remainder private soldiers. There were 44,996 killed; the losses during the first part of the war (July to September) being 74,786, and in the second part (September, 1870, to May, 1871) 54,484.

The battle in which the Germans lost the most men was Gravelotte, where 4,500 were killed and 16,175 wounded or missing.

Reverting to the mode in which the two hundred millions were spent, we find that after deducting the various sums laid out as above, the amount remaining for division between the various German States was £118,411,550, of which the North German Confederation received £79,114,200, Bavaria £13,468,800, Wurtemberg £4,248,200, Baden £3,050,000, and Southern Hesse, £1,400,000.

The payment of the war indemnity to Germany constitutes, with the loans which it entailed, the largest financial operation ever carried out. It was part and parcel of the evacuation of the territory, which was conducted concurrently with it. To form an idea of the manifold constructions and contrivances to which the Treasury had to resort in order to effect the payment of the indemnity, one must read the report of the Budget Committee of 1875, which M. Léon Say presented to the National Assembly. The Bank of France rendered invaluable services in this arduous juncture, but the most remarkable feature of the operation was the international character which it assumed, this being quite a novelty in the economical history of Europe.

All the efforts of all the banking-houses in Europe were concentrated upon this one object. All other business was suspended in order to facilitate the com-

pletion of the French loans and the transmission of the sum abroad. The French Government did not pay to Germany in cash more than £21,840,000 in gold and £10,920,000 in silver, the rest being in letters of credit and bills. The cost of conversion was rather more than £500,000, and the only point which has not been cleared up, and which it would be interesting to ascertain, is how, after having despatched from France the sums of money collected in so many other countries, they were then remitted to Germany, which could only have been done by converting all the other foreign securities into German securities. It appears that this operation was in a great measure facilitated by the fact that during the years 1871-73 Germany was largely indebted to England for the balance of trade. But the report of the National Assembly does not give any further details upon this point.

Another large operation, resulting from the payment of this indemnity, was that which involved the reconstitution of our war material, and this forms a chaos into which it is no easy matter to throw any light, the schemes of the Government and of the financial committees of the Assembly having varied a good deal owing to the uncertainty as to what was the best way to go to work. It is certain that at the termination of the war, when it was necessary to replenish our emptied arsenals and stores, to reconstitute our new frontier and our army, there was no means

of including these expenses in the ordinary budget. In 1873 it was decided that the maximum of the expenses to be included under this special heading should be £30,920,000, but this was soon exceeded, and the account was divided into two parts. The first was paid off in 1875, at £36,587,000, while the second, comprising the years 1876-79, absorbed more than £56,000,000. It was only in 1879 that this special estimate could be incorporated in the budget, where it forms an item by itself called, "*Dépenses sur ressources extraordinaires.*" This estimate has necessitated an enormous number of documents, reports, and discussions, which make it very difficult to understand.

One need have a special gift for financial business to make head or tail of it, and M. Villefort's book on the subject may be consulted with advantage, particularly in regard to the accounts of the territory ceded to Germany. At first sight it may appear as if the cession of territory, after a war of conquest, is a matter of public concern only, but we must not forget how many private interests are affected by it and have to be indemnified.

The Franco-German Commission at Strasburg took eight years to effect this settlement, and from their accounts it appears that France paid to Germany for the debts peculiar to Alsace-Lorraine £1,680,000, and received from Germany only £600,000.

The annexation entailed other arrangements, such as

the remodelling of the French frontier departments from the judicial and administrative point of view, and this is not the least interesting part of the whole story. But the main fact, which sums up all the rest, is the total account of what the war cost us. The figures, which tell us this themselves, testify to the financial power and vitality of our country.

The total of this cost, excluding, of course, the losses sustained by the various branches of industry and trade during and immediately after the war, exceeds £1,460,000,000. In this total, extraordinary war expenses are put at about £80,000,000, war indemnities at £36,000,000, and the maintenance of the German troops at £14,000,000. The cost of the different loans is estimated at £25,240,000, and the net loss from the territory annexed at £2,640,000, while the reconstruction of our war and naval material is given at £80,000,000.

The question as to whether the State is responsible to the inhabitants of the country for the damage caused by war is a very important and complex one. Theoretically, it excites the liveliest controversy, and from a practical point of view it forms the subject of constant demands upon the Government. Various views were expressed in the National Assembly, but the majority did not make any exceptions or distinctions which in strict justice could be repudiated. As I have already said, foreigners as well as Frenchmen were allowed to benefit by the beneficent measures

adopted, and these measures applied alike to the damage done by the French or the German forces.

The new French frontier has, owing to the division of territory, made necessary a reorganisation of the military and religious services, and here again the various interests which had to be conciliated were most complicated. One of the most difficult matters was the reconstitution of the documents bearing on the identity of the soldiers who had disappeared, and the regulating of their successions, while arrangements had to be made for keeping in order the burial-places of the two armies. The two governments, with much good feeling, agreed that these burial-places should, without distinction of nationality, be kept in a proper state; and at the present time the various spots where the dust of 87,000 Frenchmen and Germans lies mingled together are marked by a funereal monument.

The dead who sleep upon foreign soil should ever remind us of the danger of war to which a State is constantly exposed. This is why a complete military organisation is the best security for a country in these days of gigantic armaments. The re-establishment of our means of communication and the formation of reserve forces are the objects to which patriotic prudence should tend—objects which are not unfortunately yet reached. It is certain, however, that we have obtained since 1870, despite difficulties of a political, financial, administrative, and military order, the required elements for our national defence. That

dreadful war, by which were torn from us territories which Germany has not yet assimilated, was perhaps so far beneficial to France as to warn her of the dangers of an adventurous policy. While it has inflicted upon us a loss in money of so many hundreds of millions, and has necessitated a complete renewal of our whole system of government, it has at all events been a terrible lesson for all governments, and especially for France.

CHAPTER VII.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL AND THE CONGRESS OF 1879.

WHEN the Isthmus of Suez was made we were merely realising the aspirations of the early masters of Egypt, for, according to the Arab historians, the Pharaoh who reigned in the time of Abraham had already conceived the idea of dividing the African isthmus, in honour of the visit of the patriarch and his wife Sarah, so as to establish communication by water between Egypt and Arabia.

We may ask, therefore, if it be true, as the old proverb has it, that there is nothing new under the sun, and that our ancestors discovered everything that required doing, and merely left to us, their descendants, the task of carrying out their designs? But even if this is so, we have no reason to be less proud, for is it not a glorious thing for us to be able to carry out the vast projects which they had conceived but were unable to realise, thus affirming the progress made by our race and age, in which all obstacles seem to have disappeared. The other day it was Suez, the isthmus of which was pierced, and

the writer of these lines may be pardoned for recalling with pride how the year 1869 marked the realisation of a scheme which was desired by the Pharaohs of the sixtieth century before Christ, of a work which the men who built the Pyramids and drained Lake Moeris were unable to accomplish.

A like work is now being undertaken upon the American continent, upon the narrow neck of land which divides North and South. The idea is not a new one, for while America was discovered in 1472, and Balboa ascertained the existence of the Pacific Ocean in 1513, an attempt was made to unite the two oceans in 1514. When the Spanish adventurers ascertained that there was no natural passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific, they conceived the idea of cutting a canal through the spurs of the Cordilleras. Just as it is certain that nature abhors difficulties and encourages their overthrow, so it is certain that the maritime trade of the globe ardently desires the creation of a navigable zone which will enable it to make the tour of the world, getting rid of the circuit of Cape Horn as that of the Cape of Good Hope has already been got rid of.

The creation of a canal to unite the Atlantic and the Pacific having given rise to much discussion, I have thought it interesting to summarise what has been said on the subject.

I.

The writings of the Spanish conquerors had, for more than two centuries, been consigned to the oblivion of the archives at Madrid, when the project of piercing the isthmus was revived. As soon as the impetus was given, there was a general outburst of enthusiasm among the hardy mariners and explorers who were eager to open a new route to the world's commerce. I should occupy too much space were I to quote all the names attached to this wonderful enterprise, but I cannot pass on without saluting the most famous among them, including Nelson, Childs, Lloyd, and our fellow-countryman Garella, and, above all, Thomé de Gamond, who was the first to propose the making of a tunnel between France and England, and he lived long enough to see it at all events begun. There can be no higher reward for those who devote their lives to the pursuance of useful truths than to witness the commencement of the enterprise upon which their hearts are set. From the year 1780 down to the present day a host of projects have been put forward for piercing the isthmus, some of them very carefully thought out and others purely fancy schemes. But the last few years have produced more than the whole of the previous period. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 produced a complete revolution in the commercial relations of the whole world, and I have no doubt that this event had a considerable influence

upon the researches into the piercing of the American canal. For it is within the last fifteen years that so many bodies of explorers have gone out to investigate the nature of the work, and have come back loaded with valuable information calculated to throw light upon this intricate question. All honour to them for their zeal in assisting science to make this great step forward. At the same time, geographical studies which had been so much neglected in France, had, as a result of the war of 1870, which showed how necessary they were, again occupied public attention, and the learned societies which had inscribed geography in their programme commanded plenty of support.

Thus at the Antwerp International Congress, General Heine propounded the interoceanic scheme due to M. de Gogorza, and at the Paris Congress in 1875 the same subject occupied several sittings when I was in the chair. The information necessary for discussing the question in detail was not then forthcoming, and all that could be done was to express approval of the principle and convoke for a near date a special congress, or, it should rather be said, an international jury, to collect and collate all the necessary documents, and to form a definite opinion, after full deliberation, as to the technical and financial possibility of the work.

This resolution had the effect of giving a fresh impetus to the explorers and the authors of the scheme,

all of whom were anxious to submit to the Congress complete and accurate plans. So that as soon as the proposed congress was announced, two companies were formed for making fresh expeditions, one of which visited Nicaragua, following the original route of Thomé de Gamond and Blanchet, while the other, under the conduct of General Türr, explored the more southern regions of Darien and Panama, marching in the steps of Garella, Lacharine, and Selfridge. The three years between 1875 and 1879 were fruitful in active researches and energetically conducted exploration. At the same date the expeditions set on foot by the United States were brought to a conclusion, and the able officers in command, Collins, Hull, Shufeldt, and especially Selfridge and Menocal, had left no part of the isthmus unexplored, while the documents which they brought back with them were calculated to facilitate the labours of the Congress very materially.

When the time arrived, and all the details relating to the recent expeditions were in my possession, I summoned the Congress, applying to all the savants, engineers, and sailors of the Old and New World, as well as to the chambers of commerce and the geographical societies, whom I asked to appoint delegates.

Few assemblies have included so many illustrious names as this great tribunal, which consisted of the leading representatives of science, politics, and indus-

try. The first sitting was held on the 15th of May, 1879, at the meeting place of the Geographical Society, nearly every country being represented at the Congress. Mexico sent the engineer, F. de Garay, and China the mandarin Li-Shu-Chang. The United States were represented by Admiral Ammen, whose wide knowledge was of great service, Commander Selfridge, and the engineer, Menocal; while the countries of Europe had sent their leading geographers and engineers, such as Sir John Hawkshaw, and Sir John Stokes, Commander Cristoforo Negri, Signor de Gioià, the engineer Dirks, who cut the Amsterdam canal, and his colleague Conrad, President Ceresole, Colonel Coello, Dr. Broch, Admiral Likatcheff, Colonel Wouwermans, M. d'Hane Stenhuys, and many others whose names I ought perhaps to add, including all the most eminent scientific men in France. With an assembly thus composed, it was quite certain that the discussion would be frank, open, and luminous, and that the Congress would not separate until it had found a solution for the problem which was set before it.

The labours of this assembly will occupy an important place in history, and it will not, therefore, be thought that the space which I devote to the subject here is more than its importance deserves. In order to expedite its task the Congress was subdivided into five committees, each of which undertook to investigate one division of the very complex subject which

we had to discuss, and it is these commissions which we have to thank for enabling us, by their scientific labours and lucid discussions, to come to a speedy conclusion.

The first, presided over by M. Levasseur, was a statistical one, its task being to estimate the probable traffic of the canal—that is to say, to go through the customs' returns of all the ports of Europe and America, and see what tonnage would in all probability pass through the canal. I had had an opportunity of saying that the best course for the Panama, as it had been for the Suez Canal, would be to prosecute the work by means of public money, and ask for nothing from any of the governments, leaving the enterprise its purely industrial character, and avoiding anything like dabbling in politics. The question, therefore, was to know whether the capital invested would obtain a sufficient return by the traffic passing through the canal. This was what the first commission had to calculate.

The second commission supplemented the work of the first, and was called the Economic Commission. After having calculated how many tons of merchandise would pass through the interoceanic canal, it remained to be seen what income the traffic would yield, and calculate, therefore, what tariff could be charged vessels passing through. Then it was necessary to estimate what would be the consequence of the cutting of the American isthmus, what influence

the canal would have upon the trade and industry of each nation, and what new markets it would open to the trade of the whole world. The second commission, for which M. Simonin acted as reporter, was charged with the examination of the economical and financial results of the enterprise. The province of the third section was a more technical one, and it was composed of sailors, who discussed the influence of the canal upon shipbuilding, elucidated the regime of the winds and currents near the various canal routes submitted to the consideration of the jury, and pointed out under what conditions the safety and facility of the passage through the canal could be secured. This commission made an estimate of the speed of the vessels in proportion to the draught of water, and gave its opinions as to the effect of locks and tunnels in a canal intended to be used by the largest ships in existence.

The fourth commission was appointed to report upon the different routes for the canal submitted to the congress by their respective authors. Differing in this respect from the other sections, its functions were of a more general kind, as it had to discuss each project from an engineering point of view, to indicate the advantages and drawbacks of each, and fix what each would cost, both for construction and annual maintenance. The fifth commission was known as that of ways and means, and its duty was to complete, by entering into more details as to figures, the work of the second commission, and to name definitely the

tariff which it would be desirable to charge, having regard to the probable earnings of the canal and the capital employed in making and working it.

The main object which we kept in view when forming these commissions was to draft as far as possible the most competent men into each of them. Thus the economists and geographers were placed in the two first sections, the naval men in the third, the engineers in the fourth, and the financiers in the fifth. They were all requested to be very reserved in their appreciations, and only to offer an opinion after the most careful scrutiny, so that the public might rest assured that there had not been the slightest tendency to take too optimistic or enthusiastic a view of the undertaking.

The general results of the discussion are preserved in the reports of the public sittings, and more especially in the striking reports of the various commissions, which will remain an imperishable record of the history of the American Canal, and which must be read in detail in order to appreciate the lucid and learned information which they placed before the Congress. The most prejudiced will be constrained to admire the laborious efforts which enabled a hundred men, ardent in the pursuit of science, to place such a mass of evidence before the Congress during its brief session.

I propose to briefly review their labours, first of all examining the general considerations which were

submitted to the international jury, and received its approval.

II.

The base of the problem to be solved was, as I have already said, the maritime traffic which it was necessary to attract.

In the Statistical Commission, the principal representatives of the American States and the administrators of the great maritime companies met under the presidency of Signor Mendès Leal. They first proceeded to examine the results of the working of the Suez Canal, which had then been open for ten years, and they asked for a report on this subject from M. Fontane, the Secretary-General of the Suez Canal Company, whose report made a deep impression upon the Congress. M. Fontane proved, figures in hand, that an annual traffic of six million tons was only possible in a canal through which fifty ships could pass in the twenty-four hours. "This was why it was necessary," added M. Fontane, "in making the Suez Canal to adopt the system of a canal on one level without locks or drawbacks, to the exclusion of several very ingenious and bold plans presented by engineers of great repute." These views, which were the outcome of long and well-grounded experience, could not but have a marked effect on the minds of the members of the Assembly in respect to the choice which they had to make among the various systems submitted to them.

After having laid down this first and very important consideration, the Statistical Commission pursued their task and prepared a voluminous report, the work of M. Levasseur, whose scientific authority was a sure guarantee against his giving reins to his fancy. The plan which he adopted was proof against all criticism, as he first sought to determine, by an examination of the official returns of all the States, what tonnage would take the route of the interoceanic canal. After long and careful calculation, based upon the returns for 1876, he estimated this traffic at £72,000,000, or 4,830,000 tons of merchandise. Taking into account the annual increase in commerce, which for the years 1860-1876 was six per cent., he arrived at the conclusion that, with a much slower increase, the tonnage would reach 7,249,000 tons by the time of the probable opening of the canal in 1890. This was the minimum traffic of the canal as estimated by the commission, and these figures are in no way surprising when the Pacific railway carries more than a million tons, while the trade of Cuba exceeds 2,000,000 tons, and California alone produces 1,200,000 tons of grain. Our figures are well within the mark, I am sure, and they do not include, moreover, the transport of passengers, nor the large and small coasting trade, which, at present quite insignificant, will develop with surprising rapidity in the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies.

The above-mentioned tonnage will show what an

important influence upon the history of the globe this new route will have. The labours of the second commission, presided over by Mr. Nathan Appleton, of Boston, completed this first report by showing what new markets would be opened, what new traffic would be created, and what advantages the traffic already in existence would derive from the cutting of the American isthmus. M. Simonin, the reporter of the commission, summed up these advantages in a very able report, which shows the distances that would be saved to navigators. From France and England, that is to say, from Liverpool, Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the distance to San Francisco, round Cape Horn, is 5,000 leagues, whereas by Panama it would be only 1,500. For Valparaiso the distance would be reduced from 3,000 to 2,000 leagues. The saving in time for sailing vessels would be sixty days to San Francisco and thirty to Valparaiso. To this must be added the fact that steamers and sailing vessels alike would avoid the dangerous passage round Cape Horn. Thus the distance and the time in going from one part of the globe to the other would be materially shortened, and there would be such a reduction in the rates of assurance and freight that maritime intercourse would soon double itself, and that many markets now closed to European commerce would be opened, and provide it with fresh openings for import and export trade.

The New World will send us its woods, its indigo,

its coffee, its rice, its sugar, its india-rubber, and much of the mineral wealth which at present is only partially developed. Produce which at the present rate for freight is not readily carried, such as corn and fruit, will then be easy of export; and as produce is only exchanged for produce, the industry of Europe, receiving a fresh impetus, will send its manufactured articles all over the American continent.

The task of the Commission of Navigation, much shorter and more technical than that of the two first, was presided over by Dr. Broch, a former minister of the navy in Norway. It comprised several distinguished naval officers, such as MM. de Togorès, Linden, and de Marivault, and the heads of several great French and foreign shipping-houses. The report of its investigations, drawn up by M. Spément, a director of the Suez company, reviewed the probable influence which the cutting of the Panama Canal would have upon the transformation of shipping. He considered that the opening of the canal would favour sailing vessels even more than steamers, owing to the advantages derived by the former from the permanency of trade winds in the Gulf of Mexico. Speaking from another point of view, he recalled the fact that among the many schemes proposed, some involved the making of a tunnel, others that of locks. "As regards the tunnel," concluded the report, "the vessels would have to go through with their mainmasts up, and as the largest vessels, such as the *France* and the *Annamite*,

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have very high masts, they would require an altitude of nearly a hundred feet above the level of the water. With regard to locks, they must be sufficiently numerous to admit of fifty vessels going through in a day. This is the total which has been reached at Suez, and there is no reason why it should not be equalled, and even exceeded, by the Panama Canal. It would be necessary, therefore, to have double locks, side by side, one for vessels going west and the other for vessels going east, and the construction of these would entail special arrangements. In conclusion, therefore, I would say that a canal with locks ought only to be accepted if a canal on the level is proved to be impossible. So with regard to the tunnel, which should only be adopted if it is found that, owing to technical difficulties or excessive cost, the canal cannot be made without one."

III.

Thus far I have been explaining how three of the commissions, without taking into account questions of places, persons, or special schemes, treated the general and theoretical part of the subject. To them it was a matter of indifference whether the canal was by Thuyra or the Bayano, by Nicaragua or Panama. In either case the traffic would be the same, and the nations of the east and of the west would derive the same advantages from the making of the canal. The technical commission had quite an opposite task to perform, having to go

closely into the details of the subject, taking one after another the numerous projects presented to the conference by their authors, to study them in detail so as to bring out their commercial or technical advantages, as well as to indicate their drawbacks and cost. This first work achieved, the technical commission had at its command the necessary elements for comparing all the projects, and selecting the one which it would advise the Congress, at its plenary sitting, to adopt. M. Daubrée, member of the French Institute, was president, and Voisin Bey, formerly director of the works of the Suez Canal, reporter. The commission comprised the most eminent specialists of all nations, and it is quite certain that a decision ratified by the names of Messrs. Hawkshaw, Dirks, Pascal, de Fourcy, Favre, Couvreux, Lavalley, and Ruelle, who carried as much moral as they did scientific weight, would be beyond the reach of criticism. Who better than the creator of the Amsterdam Canal could treat of the question of large locks? Who better than the lamented constructor of the St. Gothard Tunnel could discuss the question of the immense tunnel in Panama, and the difficulties which would be entailed in making it? Who more competent than Messrs. Lavalley and Couvreux to speak of the cost of dredging and of excavating, both on dry land and under water? Then, again, all the engineers who assisted me at Suez had assuredly acquired the experience necessary for settling the questions raised by the

examination of the various American projects for the canal.

The authors of all these projects appeared before the commission—viz., Messrs. Ammen, Menocal, Selfridge, de Garay, Blanchet, Belly, Wyse, Reclus, Mainfroi, and de Puydt—and expounded their plans, and met the objections which were advanced. This first operation, which occupied several long and interesting sittings, having been completed, the discussion began. Two important sub-committees were formed, one, which consisted of MM. de Fourcy, Voisin Bey, and five other members, being instructed to appreciate from a technical point of view, the character of the various routes; while the other, upon which MM. Ruelle, Favre, Lavalley, Couvreur, and Cotard sat, undertook to make an estimate of the cost of each plan, and to fix the probable earnings of it, based upon an identical scale of prices for each kind of work. It was between the reports drawn up by these two commissions that the Congress as a whole would be called upon to decide, and by making a summary of their investigations I shall best be able to give my readers an idea of the various schemes submitted to the opinion of the jury.

In order to explain them properly, I must say a few words as to the geography of the American isthmus, which extends a distance of 1,437 miles from the north-west to the south-east. Only the coasts and the banks of some of the principal rivers are

inhabited, the interior of the country being so scantily peopled that the total population is only three millions, while France, covering the same area, has a population seven or eight times as large. There are next to no roads, and what few exist are very badly kept. Excepting these, the only means of communication are the rivers, and many of these are very difficult to navigate, as they are intersected by rapids, which the Indian avoids by carrying his canoe overland. The climate is a very torrid one, while it often rains for six months in the year, the annual rainfall at Panama exceeding ten feet. It is not surprising that, with such a high temperature and so heavy a rainfall, the vegetation develops with wonderful rapidity. Thus the organic life of the isthmus is very exuberant, and the virgin forests, with their gigantic cactus and cocoa trees, and their undergrowth, athwart which the native cuts a path with his axe or knife, form an inextricable network. It would almost seem as if all the venomous inmates of Noah's Ark had been emptied here, the country swarming with serpents whose bite is fatal, monstrous spiders, scorpions, and jaguars; but, upon the other hand, it lends itself admirably to cultivation and industry, by means of which it would soon be completely transformed.

The ground is mountainous, the chain of the Andes rising to a height of over 13,000 feet, and presenting a striking contrast of volcanoes and of summits capped with snow. This is the land in which the

canal is about to be cut; it is upon this wide causeway, which separates North and South America, that the weak point in the armour has been found to effect a breach between the two oceans.

Let us begin with the north and go southward, following the report of the sub-committee. We come first to the isthmuses of Tehuantepec and Honduras; next to Nicaragua, then to Panama, San Blas, and Darien, each of these passages corresponding to one or more schemes for a canal, either on the level or with locks.

Señor de Garay, the Mexican delegate, dwelt with great force and sincerity upon the advantages offered by Tehuantepec for the tracing of the canal, but he met with little support. His scheme entailed a canal 150 miles long, with a maximum altitude of 975 feet above the level of the sea, to reach which 60 locks upon each slope would have been required. The cost of constructing these 120 locks and the fact that vessels would have been twelve days passing through the canal led to the immediate rejection of this project.

Seven or eight engineers, among them Messrs. Blanchet, Lull, and Menocal, brought forward plans for making the canal by way of Nicaragua. The geographical position of Nicaragua is, as a matter of fact, a very favourable one for the purpose, as in the centre of the isthmus a fine lake, 110 miles long by 35 broad, occupies the plateau which is 125 feet above

the level of the Atlantic. This lake receives the waters of some forty streams, and flows into the Atlantic through that noble river, the San Juan. Unfortunately this stream is intersected by several cataracts which render navigation impossible. One of the worst of these cataracts is human handiwork ; for the inhabitants of the colony, to protect themselves from the fillibusters who ravaged the West Indies in the seventeenth century, obstructed the course of the San Juan by sinking vessels in it with trunks of trees and large masses of rock. The water being driven back found a fresh outlet at the side of the San Juan, and this outlet, now known as the Rio Colorado, has never been stopped. In order to improve the navigation of the San Juan it would be necessary to canalize it by means of seven or eight locks, and to regulate its course by an immense embankment twenty-eight miles long upon the other slope. It would further be necessary to intersect the Rivas with a deep trench, make seven more locks, and create at the two ends of the canal Greytown and Brito, harbours upon coasts which are very unsuited for the purpose. The partizans of these projects urged in their favour the superiority of the climate, the abundance of materials in the country, and the relative density of the population ; and it was very clear that if the canal was to be one with locks, this would have been the best of them. The total length of the canal, including the 55 miles of the upper lake,

would have been 182½ miles, and the time occupied in going through it four days and a-half.

The Americans, through the mouthpiece of Admiral Ammen, were very much in favour of this project, which was admirably conceived and propounded by one of their engineers (Menocal). A French engineer, M. Blanchet, proposed to amend it by prolonging the summit-level of the Valley of San Juan, and by substituting for the seven locks which formed part of the American scheme a large work with 105 feet difference of level, which had been designed by MM. Ponchet and Sauterean, and which one of our most distinguished constructors, M. Eiffel,* was to have carried out. The gates of this lock were to have weighed nearly 1,000 tons, and to have been 23 feet thick.

Two officers in the French navy, Messrs. Wyse and Reclus, who had explored the country with great perseverance, presented a scheme for cutting a canal on the level through the Isthmus of Panama, and before they had proceeded far with the explanation of their scheme, it was clear that they had made a deep impression upon the members of the Commission, and that herein lay the solution of the problem. If objections were raised at first, this was rather, it seemed, with the view of disposing of them, so as to

* Note of the Translator.—M. Eiffel is now erecting the iron tower, 1,000 feet high, which is to be one of the features of the Paris Exhibition in 1889.

be free to consider, with perfect freedom of mind, all the advantages which the project presented. The Wyse canal was to follow the thalweg of the river Chagres, pass under the Cordillera by means of an immense tunnel, and reach the Pacific slope by the valley of Rio Grande. In the course of the discussion the authors of this scheme, in obedience to the advice given them, agreed to substitute for the tunnel a deep cutting in the mountain, and the Mexicans, it may be added, have set the example in this respect, the cutting at Desague being 220 feet through, while that of Panama will not exceed 290 feet. Two objections had struck the Technical Commission, and it was, I think, very striking evidence of the advantages which the Panama project possessed in the eyes of the experienced engineers sitting upon it, that it was they who urged the authors of the project to overcome their objections.

The first of these objections bore upon the sudden risings of the Chagres River. This river rises so rapidly that it has been known to rise more than twenty-five feet in a single night. The question was how to get rid of the waters, the irruption of which would have been dangerous in the making and working of the canal. M. Wyse first proposed to form a vast reservoir of the overflow of these waters, in immense excavations which would admit of an outflow of over 330 cubic yards a second. But this did not satisfy the Commission, which urged that it was no

trifling affair to create an artificial lake of this kind, and to maintain such a mass of water suspended 100 feet above the canal. Why not free the canal entirely and make a separate bed for the river? This was the solution upon which the authors of the scheme eventually agreed, at the instant advice of the Commission.

The second objection was that the Pacific tide is 19½ feet at Panama, while the Atlantic tide at Colon is only two feet. This would cause currents running four or five knots an hour in the canal, and create a danger to navigation. The remedy for this will be to create a tidal gate at Panama, and place at the entrance to the canal a waiting basin, where ships can pay the customs and transit dues while waiting for a suitable hour to enter the canal.

If to this we add that the Panama Canal passes within half-a-mile of the railway, that the latter will be most useful for bringing labourers and materials to the works, and that the length of time occupied in going through the 47½ miles of canal will be only thirty-six hours, the words of the sub-Commission need no further justification:—"The Panama canal on the level technically presents itself under the most satisfactory conditions, and ensures every facility, as it gives every security, for the transit of vessels from one sea to another."

I must say a word about the San Blas Canal. Advocated by Messrs. Appleton and Ralley, this canal had in its favour the fact of its being shorter than any of the

others, its length being only 33 miles, but of this nine miles were tunnel, while the river Bayano had to be diverted from its course, so that the Technical Commission felt bound to reject it.

Upon the other hand, the Commission examined with the utmost care and interest the remarkable researches of an officer of the American navy, whose name I have already mentioned, Commander Selfridge. The Selfridge scheme followed the Darien Isthmus and the Atrato River, which it was to canalize for a distance of 150 miles, and it then made a sharp bend southward, and reached the bay of Chiri-Chiri by a cutting and a tunnel two and a-half miles long. But the question was, whether this Atrato River, the mouth of which formed a vast and marshy delta, could be so deepened as to ensure over twenty-five feet of water at its bar, and, if so, how this depth of water was to be maintained? Then, again, it was difficult to see how the risings of the Atrato were to be foreseen, and their effects alleviated, so that the Commission felt compelled to reject Commander Selfridge's scheme.

The Commission also examined, just as it was about to break up, a scheme which its author, M. de Puydt, produced without any documentary evidence to back it up, and which proposed to cut the canal through Darien, from Puerto Eseondido to Thuyra. The watershed by this route was the pass of Tanela Paya, the slope of which, according to M. de Puydt, is only

150 feet, so that the canal could have been on the level. The author's figures were, however, given without anything to support them, and were directly contradicted by other explorers; and it was only in order to show its absolute impartiality that the Commission thought right to examine his project.

When all was done, two projects alone were before the Commission: one for making the canal through Nicaragua, the other through Panama.

The first, which was the less costly, as it was estimated to involve an expenditure of £32,000,000, while the latter was to exceed £40,000,000, was at the same time more limited in its scope, and longer in point of distance and time. The objections to it were its sixteen locks, its reaches, which the vegetation of the tropics would cover with terrible rapidity, its works of art, which the slightest shock of earthquake might destroy, and the care and deliberation which the handling of so much delicate apparatus would entail. There was nothing of this kind to apprehend with the Panama Canal, which was a fourth shorter than the other in point of distance and a third in point of time, while it did not entail any works of art, or set any limit upon the number of ships which could pass through it in the twenty-four hours. This was surely sufficient to justify the decision of the Technical Commission.

Upon the proposal of the engineers of the Suez Canal, the Commission decided by a large majority against

the system of locks, and declared strongly in favour of an open canal on the level, the feasibility of which seemed quite clear if the Colon-Panama line was followed.

But compelled by its mission to make a choice between the various schemes submitted to it, the Commission was nevertheless desirous of testifying to how carefully most of them had been thought out, and to the talent of their authors. "More especially," to borrow the exact words of the report, "to the eminent American engineers and explorers whose admirable researches will remain as a monument in the history of this gigantic undertaking." The Technical Commission also pointed out how the canal should be made, that the curves should not be under $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles, that it should be 72 feet wide and 28 feet deep, and that there should be only one canal as at Suez, but with numerous sidings to admit of ships passing one another, all the details of execution having been carefully foreseen and discussed at this Congress, from which those who are now making the canal cannot fail to derive most useful lessons.

When the Technical Commission had terminated its works and fixed the figures at which it estimated the cost of making and maintaining the canal, and when, upon the other hand, the Economic Commission had laid before the Congress all the elements required for calculating the transit, the fifth section,

that of Ways and Means, was able in turn to accomplish its part with these data for its guide. M. Cérésolé, the ex-president of the Swiss Confederation, was the president, and M. Chanel, the delegate of Martinique, was reporter, the judgment of the section being: "We are convinced that the sum of the elements of transit, already amply sufficient to defray the cost of the canal, is destined, as the work develops, to expand to an incalculable extent."

The report went to show by what series of calculations the Commission had been led to fix the transit dues at fifteen francs (12s.) per ton.

Going on to calculate the cost of construction, the payment of interest, the annual cost of working and of maintenance, and deducting the participations reserved by the Act of Concession granted by the Government of Colombia, the reporter, and with him the Commission, estimated the net annual profit of the canal at £1,680,000. And, finally, "to guard against the risks and chances of the unknown," the Commission expressed their hope "that, even at the cost of more time and money, the canal might be made without locks or tunnels."

It is a very remarkable fact that the five Commissions of the Congress should, without any pre-arranged understanding, have expressed the same wish and displayed their aversion for a canal with locks. But this agreement of views simplified the remainder of the proceedings. When, according to the mode of

procedure agreed upon, the five Commissions had communicated the result of their deliberations, all that the bureau of the Assembly had to do was to co-ordinate these conclusions, in order to draw up and submit to the Congress the resolution which was to be the outcome of them.

IV.

“The Congress is of opinion that the cutting of an interoceanic canal with one level, so desirable in the interests of trade and navigation, is possible, and that this maritime canal, in order to give the indispensable facilities of access and use which a passage of this kind must be supposed to give, should go from the Gulf of Limon to the Bay of Panama.”

Such was the form of resolution adopted by the bureau and reinforced by the presidents, secretaries, and reporters of the five Commissions. It was put to the vote on May 29th, 1879, and out of ninety-eight members present seventy-eight voted in its favour and eight against, the twelve others abstaining. Such was the majority which declared in favour of the canal, recompensing the bold and persevering efforts of our compatriots, Wyse and Reclus. If we examine the nature of the voting, we may see that there was something like unanimity, for among those who voted against the resolution, or did not vote at all, were the representatives of the Northern States of Central America, whose local sentiments were enlisted in

favour of the Nicaragua Canal. These included the able constructor, who had been selected to make the large lock of Nicaragua, and the president of the association for cutting that canal, yet both of them cheered the announcement of the vote.

It is characteristic that among those who gave in their adhesion to the scheme were the Dutch engineer, who had constructed the Amsterdam locks, Commander Selfridge, who explicitly declared that his countrymen would accept the decision of the Congress without any reserve or afterthought, the engineers of the Suez Canal, and many others whose statements were enthusiastically cheered by the public.

The course which the Congress approved was that which had been traced by Lloyd, Totten, Garella, Wyse, and Reclus. It strikes the Isthmus at the ninth parallel, between the Bay of Limon upon the Atlantic and the Gulf of Panama on the Pacific. It is not half as long as the Suez Canal, being only $45\frac{1}{2}$ miles long instead of 101; it has two excellent ports at each end, is close to two good towns and to a district thickly inhabited, and has a railway in full working order. Such is the country which the canal will traverse, transform, and enrich.

Carrying my mind back a few years, I cannot but remember how many people—including several eminent men, too—formerly treated the Suez enterprise as impracticable. They said that it was madness to try and create a port in the Gulf of Pelusium, to traverse

the mud of Lake Mensaleh and the entrance to El-Guisr, to pass through the sand banks of the desert, and form workshops twenty-five leagues away from any village, in a land which had no inhabitants, no water, no roads, to fill up the basin of the Bitter Lakes, and to prevent the sand from silting up in the canal.

Yet all that was accomplished, at what a cost in labour and perseverance I well know; and I maintain that the Panama will be easier to make, easier to complete, and easier to keep up than the Suez Canal.

Nothing has occurred since 1879 to alter the aspect of affairs from a material point of view, and it is not for me to discuss here the motives of the eleventh hour opposition, raised in order to prevent the success of the subscription which, after the vote of the Congress, it seemed to me opportune to open.

I will merely repeat what I said at the Académie des Sciences:—

“The line from Colon to Panama can easily, according to the latest data of science, be utilised for the cutting of a salt-water canal on one level in preference to any other route necessitating locks fed with fresh water. The experience of the Suez Canal has shown that, in order to ensure a considerable amount of transit navigation, you must have a maritime canal as free as a natural Bosphorus, and not a river canal, subject to stoppages more or less lengthy, and only fit for internal navigation.”

To this I may add what I said in a circular which was published at the time:—

“The arguments of the opposition may be summed up as follows: Upon the one hand the expenses have been exaggerated and the receipts under-estimated, in order to show that if the idea of opening a new maritime route to trade and to civilisation is good in itself, the enterprise is financially bad. Upon the other hand, an effort has been made to create uneasiness by representing the United States of North America to be hostile to the scheme. The first argument has been met by the able contractor who removed the bed of El-Guisr, at the entrance to the Suez Canal. M. Couvreux and his associates, who are responsible for the regulating of the course of the Danube, and for enlarging the ports of Antwerp, are at this moment engaged in investigating, at their own expense, the work required for making the new canal. They have determined to undertake to execute the work either by contract or for a royalty, as I may prefer, and thus to leave no doubt as to the real amount of the expenses. With regard to the second objection, I shall solve that myself by an early voyage to America.”*

Heer Dirks, the Dutch engineer who cut the canal which connects Amsterdam with the sea, has expressed his surprise at what he terms “the malignant attacks and anonymous notes inserted in various

* Note of the Translator.—This circular was issued several years ago—in fact, before the work of cutting the canal had been begun.

papers," and adds: "All anonymous attacks are worthless and condemn themselves, whereas a frank and open opposition is of service to those who deserve it."

I may add that I have never been alarmed by the obstacles thrown in the path of a great enterprise, nor by the delays which discussion and contradictory arguments entail, my experience having taught me that what is accomplished too quickly has no deep roots, and that "time hallows only that which he has himself made."

CHAPTER VIII.

STEAM.

THE expansive force of steam has long been known, but its perfected use is of contemporary application. In 1830, the French fleet which took part in the Algerian expedition included 500 sailing vessels of an average burden of 500 tons for a body of 30,000 men, and one steamer, the *Sphinx*, of 160 tons.

In 1880, the number of vessels which went through the Suez Canal, carrying 100,000 soldiers and as many civilians, was 2,025, and they were of 4,344,465 tons burden, or 2,145 tons each.

After centuries of war and destruction, steam and electricity seem likely to open an era of unlimited progress, by multiplying the means of pacific communications between the peoples of the earth. Let us go back for a moment to the origin of the invention of steam power and its various applications.

I.

England, as regards maritime navigation, and the United States as regards fluvial navigation, having

anticipated France in the perfected use of the locomotive and the steamer, we are inclined to forget that the real invention of machinery as applied to navigation is due to two Frenchmen, Denis Papin and Claude Jouffroy.

Aristotle and Seneca seem to have been the first to suspect the expansive force of steam, for they attributed earthquakes to the transformation of water into steam by the subterranean fires, a theory which quite fits in with the present teachings of science. Seneca, more explicit still than Aristotle, compares the volcanoes to boiling water running out over the sides of a vessel under the action of fire. Four hundred years after Aristotle, Seneca, in chapter vi. of his *Natural Questions*, wrote:—

“Certain philosophers, while attributing earthquakes to fire, also ascribe to the latter another action. Fire, they say, when lighted in several places at once, carries with it abundant vapours, which, having at first no outlet, communicate to the air with which they mingle a great expansive force. If the air, thus charged, acts with great energy, it breaks down all obstacles; if it is more moderate in its power, it merely causes the ground to quake.

“We see water boiling upon the hearth, and we may be sure that if this limited phenomenon takes place inside a vessel, it assumes tremendous proportions when vast fires are acting upon vast masses of

water. These vaporised waters overcome all obstacles and overturn everything upon their passage."

Hero of Alexandria, surnamed the Ancient, who lived about 200 B.C., composed several works on physics, only three of which are extant. The reacting engine is defined and represented in the treatise entitled, *Spiritualia, seu Pneumatica*.

Description of the Eolipylus (Gate of Eolus).

BY HERO OF ALEXANDRIA.

This, after the fragment translated into French by M. Egger, is described as follows:—

"A vessel being heated from underneath, a sphere is made to turn upon its pivot. Or else a vessel containing water, and with a lid over the orifice. To this lid should be adjusted a tube bent so that one end of it may be embedded in the side of a hollow sphere. Opposite the end of the tube, and following the diameter of the sphere, should be a pivot rising over the lid; let the sphere be fitted with two small bent ajutages fixed to its side, according to a corresponding diameter, and bent the reverse way the one from the other. Suppose for a moment the elbows of the ajutages upon the vertical plane. Thereupon, the vase being heated, the vapour, ascending into the sphere through the tube, will escape through the ajutages of the elbows above the cover, and will make the sphere move upon its axis, as is done with persons asleep."

It is probable that Hero of Alexandria imitated the procedure of the priests of ancient Egypt, who, it is said, caused inanimate objects to move, or doors to open and shut at their bidding, by means of tubes let into the passages. Many tourists have seen the colossal statue of Memnon, which emitted sounds when struck by the sun's rays in the burning plain of Thebes. The escape of the vapour caused by the damp which had found its way in through the interstices, and had been produced by the radiation of the cold at night as well as by the abundant morning dew, quite explains this phenomenon. At the base of the monument may still be read inscriptions in prose and in verse testifying to the wonder of the Greek travellers.

There is now in the head of the Colossus a fissure through which an Arab, for a small fee, will, after having managed to climb up, pass his arm and produce a metallic sound, by striking the hollow space inside with a stone.

By way of a connecting link between the Greek engineer Hero and modern authors, we have the following passage from Rabelais, which Littré quotes in his Dictionary :—

“Eolipylus, gate of Eolus. It is a closed instrument with an opening through which, if you place water and put it near the fire, you will see wind constantly pouring forth.”—(Rabelais, notes on Book 4, chapter xliv.)

The Spanish archives of Simancas contain the following document :—

“Blasco de Garay, sea captain, submitted, in 1543, to the Emperor and King Charles V., a machine for propelling ships and large boats, even in calm weather, without oars or sails. Despite the obstacles and difficulties which the project encountered, the Emperor ordered trial to be made of it in the port of Barcelona, which trial took place on the 17th of June, in the said year 1543.

“Garay would not entirely divulge his discovery. But it was observed at the time of the trial that his machine consisted of a large cauldron of boiling water and of revolving wheels attached to both ends of the vessel.

“An experiment was made on a 200-ton vessel called the *Trinity*—Captain, Peter de Scarzo—which had just arrived from Colibra with a cargo of wheat. By order of Charles V., Don Henry of Toledo, the Governor Don Peter of Cardona, the Treasurer Ravajo, the Vice-Chancellor, and the High Steward of Catalonia assisted at these experiments, and in their reports to the Emperor they spoke approvingly of the invention. The Treasurer Ravajo, however, who was opposed to the project, said that the vessel would not travel more than two leagues in three hours, that the machinery was very complicated and expensive, and that there was a great danger of the boiler bursting. The others affirmed that the vessel put about as readily as a

galley manœuvred in the ordinary way, and went at least one league an hour. After the trial Garay took away the whole of the machine, leaving only the wood-work in the Barcelona arsenal. In spite of the opposition of Ravajo, the invention of Garay was approved of, and but for the expedition in which Charles V. was engaged standing in the way, he would no doubt have favoured its adoption. As it was, the Emperor raised him a step, made him a present of 200,000 maravedis, and ordered the Treasury to pay all his expenses."

Arago, referring to this in his lecture to the students of the Polytechnic School, said, "As Garay would not show his machine to anyone, not even to the commissioners appointed by the Emperor, it is of course impossible, after the lapse of three centuries, to say of what it consisted. The document, exhumed from the archives of Simancas, in 1825, must be put on one side, first, because it was never printed; second, because there is no evidence that the motive power of the Barcelona boat was steam; and thirdly, because if a Garay locomotive ever existed, it was to all appearances the Eolipylus described in the works of Hero of Alexandria."

Salomon de Caus is the author of a work entitled *Les Raisons des forces mouvantes avec diverses machines tant utiles que plaisantes*. This work appeared at Frankfort in 1615, and it contains the following theorem (No. 5) thus set forth: "Water will rise by means of fire higher than its own level." The Marquis of Wor-

cester, whom the English regard as the real inventor of the fire-engine, lived in the reign of the Stuarts, and having lost his immense fortune during the revolutions of those times, he was cast into prison, but escaped to France. Returning to England, he was detected and shut up in the Tower of London. It is said that Worcester's idea as to the impulse which steam could give originated in his remarking how the lid of the saucepan in which his food was being cooked was suddenly lifted up. A second edition of Salomon de Caus's book had appeared in France while he was residing there. Worcester's apparatus is thus described in his book entitled *A Century of Inventions*:—

“I have discovered an admirable and very powerful means of raising water by means of fire, not by suction, for then, as the philosophers say, one would be limited *intra spheram activitatis*, as suction only operates for a given distance. But there is no limit to my means if the vessel is strong enough. By way of trying it, I took a whole cannon, the mouth of which had burst, and three parts filling it with water, I closed the end which had burst and the touch-hole with screws. I kept up a very strong fire inside, and in twenty-four hours the gun broke up with a loud report.”

Denis Papin (1690-1695).—The machines of Salomon de Caus and the Marquis of Worcester were merely apparatus for raising water. This was the first object which Papin had in view with his engine, but at the same time he had quite seen that the up

and down movement of the piston on the body of the pump could be applied to other uses. I may perhaps be permitted to quote in this connection a few extracts from a speech which I made at Blois on behalf of the Académie des Sciences, at the inauguration of Papin's statue on the 29th of August, 1880.

I said: "The great inventions destined to change the face of humanity rarely enter the domain of accomplished facts until they have passed through what may be regarded as a providential network of experiments, which may be isolated, but which are summed up and applied by the close researches of a man who is at once perspicacious and disinterested, who knows no guide but science, and who has no object but that of being useful to humanity, disregarding of the atmosphere of errors and prejudices amid which his discoveries are conceived and put in action.

"Denis Papin was one of these exceptional men. The following is the summary of his labours and discoveries:—

"1674-1709. Perfecting and modifying the pneumatic engine.

"1681. Apparatus known in the present day as Papin's digester, autoclave, etc. The guidance of steam. Safety valve.

"1685. Discovery of the principle of air-pressure syphons.

"1687. Discovery of atmospheric locomotion.

"1695. Fumivorous apparatus, or apparatus for the

combustion of smoke. Doubly exhausting stop cocks, of which Watt and Leopold have made one of the principal features in the high-pressure steam-engines; where the barrel might be used for other purposes. He also discovered a method for transforming the reciprocating motion into a rotary motion. Papin invented the first piston engine. He was the first to note that vapour of water affords a very simple means for obtaining a vacuum in the capacity of the barrel. He was the first to whom it occurred to combine in the same engine the action of the elastic force of steam with the power which, as he pointed out, this same vapour possesses of condensing itself as it cools."

Captain Savery, an Englishman, who lived at the end of the seventeenth century, made some inventions in the same line, which are referred to by Arago as under:—

"We have no proof that Salomon de Caus ever constructed his steam-engine. I might say the same of the Marquis of Worcester. Papin's engine in which the action of the steam and its condensation are successively brought into play was only executed in miniature and with a view to make an experimental trial of the exactitude of the principle upon which it was based. So that although there was nothing very new in Savery's steam-engines, it would be very unjust not to mention them, as they are really the first which were put into practical

use. According to Salomon de Caus's plan the motive steam was to be engendered in the vessel containing the water and by means of this same water. In Savery's engine there were two separate chambers, one containing the water and the other, which may be called the boiler, the steam. This steam, when a sufficient quantity has been generated, finds its way to the upper part of the water chamber by a communicating tube which can be opened at will by means of a tap. It exercises a downward pressure upon the liquid surface, and forces it back into a vertically ascending tube, the lower orifice of which must always be beneath this surface, for otherwise the steam itself would escape.

"In Salomon de Caus's engine, as soon as the presence of the steam has produced its effect, a workman has to make good the water which has been driven out by means of an orifice in the upper part of the metallic sphere which opens and shuts at discretion. All that then remains to be done is to keep the fire going. In Savery's engine the water is let in, not by a workman, but by atmospheric pressure.

"In short, Savery sought to utilise steam for driving water into a vertical tube, but Salomon de Caus had done precisely the same thing eighty-three years before. Savery, again, effected the vacuum which brought about the suction by the cooling of the steam. This was a very important matter, but Denis Papin had long before drawn attention to it."

SUMMARY.

1615. Salomon de Caus was the first who conceived the idea of utilising the elastic force of vapour of water in the construction of an hydraulic pumping engine.

1690. Papin conceived the possibility of making a steam and piston engine. He was the first to combine in one and the same steam and piston engine the elastic force of vapour of water with the precipitating property which steam acquires through cold.

1705. Newcomen, Cawley, and Savery were the first to see that in order to effect a rapid precipitation of vapour of water, the injected water must find its way into the mass of steam in the shape of very small drops.

1769. Watt explained the immense advantages, from an economical point of view, obtained by substituting for the condensation which had hitherto been effected in the barrel of the engine condensation in a separate chamber. He was the first to point out the advantage which might be derived from the expansion of the vapour of water.

Chaillet's steam pump was made after his plans in the workshops of the brothers Perrier.

1783. Jouffroy, in the presence of thousands of spectators, made the first trial of a paddle-wheel steam-boat, which he had constructed himself, and which went up and down the river Saône, between

Lyons and the Ile Barbe. This steamer was 150 feet long by $14\frac{1}{2}$ feet in diameter, with a draught of rather over 3 feet of water, and a speed of two leagues an hour.

1801. The first locomotive high-pressure engines made by Messrs. Trewithiet and Vivian, Englishmen.

1807. Fulton applies steam navigation to the great American rivers.

II.

Papin must be considered the first inventor of the steam-engine and of the idea of applying it to navigation. But his first attempt could not be practically tested owing to the destruction of his machine by the populace before the experiment took place, and the glory of having executed the first steamer which ever navigated a stream belongs to Claude de Jouffroy. This young nobleman of the Franche-Comté belonged to a class which, especially in his neighbourhood, set but scant store by scientific studies. With a few exceptions, the country nobility had a horror of any kind of trade. The scientific tastes of Claude de Jouffroy, the singular aptitude with which nature had endowed him, were a source of annoyance to him at home. He was laughed at in the drawing-rooms of his neighbours and nicknamed "Jouffroy the Pump." Even at Court, where the report of his experiments had preceded him, people pointed him out to one another, and said: "Do you know this young man of the

Franche-Comté, who embarks steam engines upon rivers, this lunatic who would have us believe that he can marry fire and water? ”

In order to escape from the yoke of the prejudices which surrounded him, Claude de Jouffroy determined to take service in the artillery, so that he might be able to utilise the experience which he had gained. But there was a great outcry at this, for the nobility at this period considered it derogatory to enter that branch of the service, leaving the artillery and engineers to the middle classes. Having been a page to the Dauphin's wife, and having entered at the age of twenty the Bourbon regiment as sub-lieutenant, he had a duel with his colonel. He was then exiled for two years to the island of St. Marguerite, opposite Cannes. During his enforced leisure, while watching the galleys and their oarsmen, he was struck by the drawbacks of this mode of navigation, and conceived the idea that the use of steam as a motive power might obviate it. When his exile was over, in 1775, he went to Paris, where the brothers Perrier had just founded a large establishment, and had imported from Birmingham one of Watt's engines, known in France as the “Pompe à feu de Chaillot.”

Jouffroy met in Paris two men from his own district, soldiers like himself, the Comte d'Auxiron and the Marquis Ducrest, colonel in the Auvergne regiment, brother of Madame de Genlis, member of the Académie des Sciences, and author of a work on mechanics. Count

d'Auxiron encouraged him strongly to persevere, and wrote to him from his deathbed, "Be of good cheer, my dear friend. You alone are right!"

Jouffroy, having no influence in Paris, went back to his own province, where, full of confidence in the future of his idea, left to his own resources, and having no guide save his own persevering studies, and no other workman than a village tinker, he succeeded, in 1776, in constructing a machine which he adapted to a boat. This first steamer was about forty-two feet long by seven feet broad, and the floating apparatus consisted in rods about eight feet in length, suspended upon each side of the forepart of the vessel, and having at their extremities chains fitted with movable two-foot wooden flaps. The chains described a radius of eight feet, and a lever fitted with a counterweight kept them in their place. A single Watt engine fixed in the centre of the boat set the articulated oars in motion. The construction of this apparatus, in a place where it was impossible to procure drilled cylinders, was a work of genius, courage, and patience; and, despite its imperfections, the apparatus was superior to anything which had hitherto been proposed for navigating purposes. The boat was in use on the river Doubs, at Baume-les-Dames, between Montbéliard and Besançon, during the months of June and July.

Somewhere about 1780 Jouffroy came to Lyons, in the hope of obtaining the funds required for perfecting his invention, and while there he married Mdle. Made-

leine de Vallier, and fitted up a fresh apparatus in the smithy of the Messrs. Frèrejean.

The dimensions of this second boat were, as already stated, very much larger than those of the first, and in it he ascended the current of the Saône, from Lyons to the Ile Barbe, on July 15th, 1783, in the presence of a committee of savants and of thousands of spectators.

After repeating his experiments with unvarying success, Jouffroy entered into partnership with MM. de Follenay, Auxiron, and Vedel, with the view of founding a steam navigation company for the conveyance of passengers and goods, first of all upon the Saône, and afterwards upon the Rhône and the other navigable rivers of France. Another financial company offered to join him, upon condition that the founders would secure for it the privilege of working the enterprise for a period of thirty years.

This privilege was not secured, as appears from a letter which M. de Calonne wrote from Versailles on January 21st, 1784. The boat continued to ply on the Saône for sixteen months, and was then abandoned.

Jouffroy was completely ruined during the Revolution, but in 1815 he obtained a patent for invention and improvement, and built a boat named *Charles-Philippe*, after the Comte d'Artois, which was launched upon the Seine on April 20th, 1817, in the presence of the Comte d'Artois, his sons, the Paris municipal authorities, a great number of learned men, and a

crowd of spectators. All promised well for the prosperity of the enterprise, when a rival company in turn obtained a patent, disputed Jouffroy's claim to priority, and brought from England a boat fitted with their engines. The competition in a mode of navigation against which prejudice was still so strong proved disastrous to both companies.

Jouffroy, whose faith in the future of steam navigation was not to be shaken, once more retired to his native district to get together the means for starting a fresh society, and, with the help of a few intelligent friends, he succeeded in forming a capital of £960, divided into twenty-four shares of £40 each. This small capital was spent in the construction of a steamer called the *Persévérant*. Upon July 8th, 1819, the partners agreed to constitute a capital of £8,000 for the construction of several steamers, so as to organise a regular service. The *Persévérant* plied for several months between Lyons and Chalons. Prejudice and conflicting interests prevented the creation of the required capital, not that anyone denied that this mode of transport was speedy, but they urged that navigation was impossible on the Rhône and full of obstacles on the Saône, owing to shallowness of the stream, and that the powerful Compagnie Générale des Transports would not stop at anything to put down competition. So great were the obstacles in the way of steam navigation at Lyons, even twelve years after it was prospering in America, and after Henry Bell had overcome the

prejudices which marked its introduction upon the coasts of the United Kingdom.

In this same year (1819) Captain Moses Roger crossed the Atlantic, from New York to Liverpool, in a compound sailing and steam vessel of 380 tons.

Foreign capitalists gathered, even in France, the fruit of the labours upon which Jouffroy had for half a century concentrated all the resources of his genius and his fortune.

In the year following, Steel, an English builder, launched upon the Seine a steamer provided with an articulated oar or goose-foot, after the first system tried by Jouffroy. Two years later, an English company brought two iron steamers into France. In 1825, a compound English steamer made a voyage from Falmouth to Calcutta, and a Dutch boat of the same kind went from Amsterdam to the West Indies. From 1825 to 1830 nearly all the navigable rivers and ports of France used steam-boats.

The problem of the employment of steam for transatlantic voyages was definitely settled in 1830 by the passage of the *Great Western* (1,300 tons) from Bristol to New York, and by that of the *Syrius* (700 tons) from Cork to New York.

What, it may be asked, had become of Jouffroy while all this progress was being made? In 1829 he lost the wife whose goodness of heart and intelligence had consoled him during these forty-six years for all his disappointments, and, unable to endure the

solitude which her death inflicted on him, he liquidated his retiring pension as captain in the army, and got admitted to the Hôtel des Invalides, where he died of cholera in 1832, at the age of eighty-one, leaving to his children no other inheritance than the example of the laborious life which his eldest son so loyally followed.

FULTON.

At the close of the last century, a young American, who had been at school while the War of Independence was in progress, came to study art, for which he showed great aptitude, in France, although he had no special genius for invention, he was endowed with great readiness in the study of mechanical discoveries, and with a perseverance which no rebuff could retire.

Of Irish origin, and born at Little Britain (Pennsylvania) in 1765 of parents who had emigrated in a state of great poverty, Robert Fulton was first apprenticed to a jeweller, and afterwards to a painter. At twenty years of age he left America and passed ten years in England, where he devoted himself entirely to the study of mechanics, coming to Paris in 1796. For five years he concentrated his attention upon submarine navigation, and upon the means of exploding at a given point boxes filled with gunpowder, so as to blow up vessels on the water.

The French Government refusing to adopt this invention, Fulton was about returning to America,

when he met Chancellor Livingston, then Ambassador of the United States in Paris, who was then studying the question of steam navigation in the company of an Englishman named Nisbett and the French engineer Brunel, who afterwards made the Thames Tunnel. Livingston undertook to find the necessary funds for establishing steam navigation in America, and Fulton, after making a study of the previous essays, decided to adopt the paddle-wheel. Experiments made on the Seine (August 9th, 1803), before a committee of the Académie des Sciences, proved a complete success, but Napoleon refused to let the question come before the Academy, for, as England at that period alone had large workshops for the construction of the machinery, she would have benefited by the invention long before France would be in a position to utilise it. Moreover, Fulton frequently stated that it was his intention to establish steam navigation upon the broad American rivers, and not on what he called the rivulets of France. A steam-engine ordered by Livingston and Fulton, unknown to Bolton and Watt, in 1804, was only ready in October, 1806, upon which date Fulton sailed for New York, and launched his boat on the East River. When his success in the States was placed beyond all question, the priority of his claim was disputed, and the worry of the lawsuit undoubtedly hastened his death, which occurred when he was only fifty, on February 24th, 1815. The

legislature went into mourning for him for a month, but his family was left very badly off.

Fulton never questioned Claude de Jouffroy's priority in the practical invention of steam navigation, and when his fellow-citizens ascribed it to him he wrote to Paris and disclaimed it. To both of them alike all honour and gratitude are due.

The Académie des Sciences has recently, at the request of Mdlle. Marthe de Jouffroy, the granddaughter of the illustrious inventor, appointed a committee to examine the question as to whether her grandfather is not entitled to some mark of national recognition; and this commission unanimously agreed to associate itself with the municipality of Besançon, in erecting a statue to one whose discovery was turned to material advantage by the foreigner, but which is none the less one of the glories of France.

CHAPTER IX.

ALGERIA AND TUNIS.

Si vis pacem, para bellum.

IN order to obtain the great advantages which the possession of Algeria insures to France, we must consider the difficulties or facilities which the character and habits of the Mussulman Arabs offer, regarded from the point of view of European civilisation.

I am not speaking of the results which must be attributed to Algeria in the military education of our army, of what relates to life in the open, the aptitude for enduring fatigue and privation, the value to our soldiers of struggles which, as in the Middle Ages, have an individual character. I am thinking more of the novel moral dispositions derived in Algeria from contact with the native populations.

In the early days of the conquest, the duty and the constant preoccupation of the French authorities were loyally to carry out the Convention of Algiers, which guaranteed to the Arabs that they should be allowed the free exercise of their religion, that their habits

should be respected, and that they should be left in full enjoyment of their properties. The Arabs had struggled long and manfully against our rule, and it was to be feared that the war would leave feelings of rancour and prejudice in the breasts of those who might be appointed to administer the tribes after the pacification. But, by a happy selection, the army which had vanquished the natives was entrusted with the duty of governing them. It had learnt to appreciate what was honourable in their character; it had become initiated into their habits and language, and had opened its ranks to a large number of Mussulman soldiers. It was, therefore, in a position to fulfil the duty allotted to it not only with justice but, to its credit we may add, with generous sympathy for the vanquished.

Without being blind to the radical difference in feeling and aptitude which mark the two races, we have proved that there is no inseparable barrier between the Mussulman Arabs and ourselves, and that civilised Europe need not look upon them as incorrigible barbarians.

The Arabs who serve under our flag have gained a brilliant position side by side with our bravest troops. Under the conduct of the able officers who managed the Arab bureau, they built houses which they gradually began to inhabit; they planted trees, constructed dams, extended their areas of cultivation, improved their roads, and took the first steps towards

the constitution of well-regulated civil life. When once we entrusted them with arms, the teaching and the example of the intrepid and kindly-disposed officers placed in command soon made excellent soldiers of them. When we shall have given them well-selected industrial leaders we shall derive immense benefits from the labour of these quick-witted Algerian races.

But in order to succeed it is indispensable to treat the Mahometans with the kindness and sympathy due to men whom we shall some day have to make French citizens. There has ceased to be any irreconcilable hatred between the Eastern and Western races ; and it is for France to organise and administer with equity the Mussulmans subject to her authority. Fanaticism against the Christians no longer exists except among the Turks, for the Arab race, which follows the practices of Islam in all their purity, and according to the precepts of the Koran, regards as infidels the idolaters, and not the Christians.

France has governed Mussulmans for more than fifty years, and though many people regard them as subjects who are not upon equal terms with the French political family, I consider it as a civic duty not to withhold from them our solicitude and esteem. It would be very inconsistent for us to treat the Mahometans of Algeria as rayahs when we are urging the Sultan to emancipate the rayahs of the East.

We must not, in our relation with the Mahometans

of Algeria, lose sight of the real views of their apostle in regard to the Christians—views expressed in the Koran, though the meaning of them has been changed by fanatic commentators. The proclamations which Mahomet addressed to his compatriots, and which have become chapters of the Koran, applied principally to the tribes of the Arabian peninsula, who were given over to idolatry. He enjoined them to respect the belief in the one God.

We read in chap. ii. verse 59: "Assuredly they who believe and practise the Jewish religion, and the Christians; in a word, all who believe in God and do good works shall receive the reward of the Lord; fear shall not fall upon them, and they shall not be afflicted." Verse 25: "No constraint in matters of religion. The right path is easily distinguished from the way of perdition." Chap. iii. verse 78: "We believe in God, in what he has sent us, in what he has revealed to Abraham, Ismail, Jacob, and the twelve tribes; we believe in the Holy Books which Moses, Jesus, and the prophets received from heaven. We make no distinction between them. We are resigned to the will of God." Verse 98: "The Jews and the Christians believe in God. They order all to do good and forbid that which is evil. They vie in good works, and they are virtuous. Chap. iv. verse 16: "But the men of solid learning among the Jews and the Christians, as well as the faithful, which believe in that which has

been revealed to thee and before thee, those who make prayer and give alms, who believe in God and in the day of judgment, to all them will we grant a glorious reward." Chap. v. verse 7: "This day you are permitted to do all that which is good; you are permitted to espouse the virtuous daughters of the faithful, and of them who have received the Scriptures before, provided that you give them a dowry." Verse 51: "Let those who hold to the Gospel judge according to its contents. Those who do not judge according to a book of God shall be impious." Chap. xxix. verse 45: "Do not enter upon any controversy with the men of the Scriptures, save in the most becoming manner, unless it be with the wicked. Say: We believe in the books which have been sent us, as well as in those which have been sent to you. Our God and your God are one. We submit ourselves wholly to his will." Chap. v. verse 35: "He who shall kill a man who has committed no murder or done no wrong in a country, the same shall be regarded as the murderer of the whole human race, and he who shall have given back a man his life shall be regarded as having given back the life of the whole human race."

It will be seen from these quotations that Mahomet never anathematised the faith sanctioned by the Pentateuch or the New Testament. He never spoke of Moses or Jesus save in the terms of the utmost veneration; he never refused his benevolent protection to Christian priests and monks; he never com-

manded intolerance or set an example of fanaticism. Before he began to preach, at the time when he was sent by his first wife, who was older than himself, to trade in Syria, he was the guest of the monks in the Holy Land, and he received the teaching, especially in matters of religion, from the monks who kept watch over the Holy Sepulchre. On returning to Arabia, he spent some time on Mount Sinai; and he was so grateful for the way he was treated during his twelve months' stay there, that he left with the Patriarch a document, at the foot of which he placed his hand dipped in ink by way of a signature. This document conveyed a grant to the Patriarch of Mount Sinai of certain privileges and of various properties in the region one day to be conquered by Islam. The grant was recognised as valid after the establishment of the Turks at Constantinople, and it is deposited in the Treasury at Stamboul. The concessions granted by Mahomet were carried out, and this was what made the Patriarchate of Sinai the wealthiest religious establishment in the East. Among the concessions granted by the Prophet was the produce of the customs at Suez. I discovered this little-known fact in the following manner. One day Said Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, who had granted me the concession, told me that he had purchased from the Patriarch of Sinai the Suez customs, which would, he added, be a profitable transaction if our enterprise succeeded.

Mahomet, in enjoining hostility against the infidels,

that is to say, against the idolators, had solely in view the pacification of Arabia.

In the seventh year of the Hegira, three years before his death, he meditated propagating the Islam faith beyond the frontiers of Arabia.

"The Mussulmans," says Rabasson, in his "*Histoire de Charles Quint*," "are the only enthusiasts who, by taking up arms to propagate the doctrine of their Prophet, have enabled those who refused to receive it to remain attached to the practices of their own worship."

When the Mahometans went to besiege Jerusalem, the Holy City offered a long and obstinate resistance. Finding at last that they could hold out no longer, the Christians agreed to capitulate, upon condition that they should treat with the Caliph in person. Omar, who had succeeded Abu-Bekr, the father-in-law and successor of the Prophet, having left Medina as soon as he was informed of this, proceeded to Djabia, where the Jerusalem delegates came to see him. He granted them the free exercise of their religion, and confirmed them in the possession of their churches. The Patriarch Sophronius received, upon entering Jerusalem, the chief of the Mussulmans, who, by the simplicity of his costume and the austerity of his life resembled more one of those Christian anchorites and dwellers in the desert than the prince of a people already famous for its victories. Omar went through several quarters of the

city, with his hand linked in that of the Patriarch, and discoursing familiarly with him. The hour of prayer having come, he withdrew to the steps of the eastern portico of the church of Constantine, fearing that if he prayed inside the church the Mahometans would seize it and convert it into a mosque. Passing through Bethlehem, he prayed in the church built over the grotto where Jesus was born. But to prevent it being taken away from the Christians, he left a written order forbidding the Mussulmans to pray in it more than one at a time.

In Africa, the same spirit of moderation marked the progress of the Islam faith. When it made its appearance among the many heresies which were disgracing the African Church, it was regarded not so much as a new religion as a Christian sect. The partisans of Arius welcomed it almost, and it spread without persecution or violence among the barbarous tribes relegated to the southern countries after the recent invasions which had swept across Africa.

In Algeria, the Mussulmans must be treated as fellow-citizens, entitled to equal rights and equal respect, while in the East they must treat us as we treat their brethren in Algeria. What nonsense has been written about the intractable fanaticism of the Algerian Arabs! How often Abd-el-Kader has been represented as an implacable sectary! The people who made these accusations had never lived among

the Mussulmans, or their acquaintance was limited to those who inhabited the towns, where the presence of the French had revolutionised all their habits of life, increased the friction, and engendered profound antipathy.

The opinion of those who have been in constant communication with the Arabs is, as a rule, very different. They have understood that fanaticism had not nearly so much to do with the resistance of the Arabs as patriotism. Religion was the only flag around which they could rally and concentrate their efforts, and it indisputably has been a powerful stimulant for inducing them to confront the perils of an unequal struggle, to support the evils of war, ruin, exile, and misery, though since December, 1847, when Abd-el-Kader declared it impossible to continue resistance, religion has not been for an instant an obstacle in the way of pacification. The exhausted tribes have accepted French rule; the so-called fanaticism has disappeared, as if by enchantment, in the course of the relations which ensued on the establishment of peace; the taxes have been regularly paid; and the chiefs invested with authority have been universally obeyed.

This is not the place to explain the causes which have, on various occasions, interrupted these friendly dispositions, and led to severe repression, but something may surely be forgiven this grand people if they exhibit some little mistrust and irritability against

the conquerors of their country. After having combated them with the utmost energy, we cannot but esteem them. Time, which heals so many wounds, is speeding onward ; a sincere respect for their religion and customs, great equity in our administration, and a constant solicitude for the welfare of the people and for their education, will aid us to conquer their hearts, just as the bravery of our soldiers has overcome their armed resistance.

I have mentioned the name of Abd-el-Kader. Those who knew him during his captivity and in Syria, where he saved the Christians from Turkish barbarity, have admired the noble simplicity of his manners, the even benevolence of his disposition, and the loftiness of his mind and ideas.

He preserved his prestige undiminished, and whenever he came forward to express tolerant feelings in the face of Europe, it was with the conviction that he would not lose the confidence of his co-religionists.

A few years ago I wrote to ask him to send me a circular, which had been addressed to all the Arab chiefs of the region in which the late Commander Roudaire was about to conduct his researches with regard to the formation of an inland sea in the Tunisian and Algerian chotts. His letters of recommendation proved very useful, and facilitated the accomplishment of M. Roudaire's mission ; and I trust that this scheme, calculated to effect the pacification of Southern Algeria and Tunis, will be carried out.

Subjoined are some extracts from an Arab work which Abd-el-Kader addressed a few years ago to the French Asiatic Society :—

“All the prophets, from Adam to Mahomet, are agreed upon the fundamental points: they have all proclaimed the unity of God, and the duty of paying him worship. . . . There is one point common to all—that of proclaiming respect for the divinity and charity towards His creatures. The modifications which have occurred, at different epochs, relate to principles of emergency, to matters which vary according to circumstances. Just as a doctor may prescribe one potion one day, and another the next, in the same way it may be said that a religion is good for the epoch in which it was revealed. Mahomet said, ‘I am not come to abolish the Pentateuch or the Gospel, but to supplement them. The Pentateuch contains external directions appropriate for the masses; the Gospel contains inward directions specially intended for those who seek perfection. I admit both the one and the other; I maintain the *lex talionis*, which is a guarantee for the security of human life. So much for the external and general directions. At the same time I enjoin pardon for injuries received as an excellent means for being pleasing in the sight of God. So much for the inward and special precepts.’

“It will be seen that in reality these three religions are but one, and that the divergences between them are only on points of detail. One may compare them

to children of the same father by different mothers. If the Mussulmans and Christians will be guided by my advice, they will live in harmony and treat each other as brethren, in speech as well as in outward form."

The foregoing observations and quotations are made by me with the view of contributing to the pacification of Algeria, which we hold by virtue of a conquest which half a century's expenditure of blood and money has legitimised.

With regard to Tunis, it is henceforward united to France, under the sovereignty of the reigning family, by the ties of a vassalage which dates, morally speaking, from the conquest of Algeria, and, materially, from the day when the Government of this territory, which is wedged in, as it were, between our possessions, endeavoured to shake itself free from our preponderating influence.

I am one of the earliest participators in our constant policy in this respect. Going back to the capture of Algeria in 1830, I will recall an incident not generally known or remembered. As soon as our troops had taken possession of the provinces of Algeria and Oran, the Government which succeeded that of Charles X. declared in favour of a partial occupation. It was then that my father, Mathieu de Lesseps, Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires, with whom I was serving as student-consul, bethought himself of asking the Bey of Tunis to authorise his brother and heir

to accept the Beylicate of Constantine, under the authority of France, and in consideration of a tribute guaranteed by Tunis. Taking with me this treaty, concluded *ad referendum*, signed by the Bey and the representative of France, I went with it to Marshal Clauzel, the Governor-General of Algeria, who approved its terms. Various circumstances prevented its ratification in Paris, but it none the less remained on record from this date that we could not under any circumstances allow the Bey of Tunis to place himself under the effective dominion of Turkey or any other Power, to the detriment of the security of our Algerian possessions.

CHAPTER X.

ABD-EL-KADER.

I HAVE spoken in the previous chapter of Abd-el-Kader, who for thirteen years maintained so gallant a struggle against the best of our African generals, until, hemmed in by superior force, he was compelled to surrender to General Lamoricière.

I will not attempt to describe his career in the field, but I am in a position to give some particulars as to the life he led after he had become our prisoner. When on my way to the Madrid Embassy in 1848, I stopped on the way at the Château de Pau, where Abd-el-Kader and the whole of his family were detained, I had never seen him before, and I was struck by his air of nobility and resignation. He spoke highly of the bravery and generosity of our army, and showed himself resolved to serve France as effectually by his moral influence as he had combated her bravely sword in hand. He was to his very last hour faithful to his promise. His conduct during the Syrian massacres in 1866 checked the excesses of the Mahometan fanaticism. Surrounded by his sons, he

constituted himself the protector of the Christian population of Damascus, and his services were recognised with the ribbon of the Legion of Honour. In the year following, while travelling in Syria to get together labourers for the Suez Canal, I sent a message from Jerusalem to inform the Emir that I proposed to come and pay him a visit at Damascus, the inhabitants of which were reported to be still very hostile to Europeans. He came out to meet me as soon as my caravan was within sight, and made me mount beside him in his carriage. We then drove through the city, the inhabitants, who were drawn up in long lines outside their houses, prostrating themselves before him to the ground, and I spent several days there, being treated with great kindness.

It will be remembered that Abd-el-Kader came to Paris in the Exhibition year (1867), and was, with all the sovereigns of Europe, the guest of the Emperor. In 1869 he left Damascus to greet the Empress at Port Said, and to be present with her at the opening of the Suez Canal, when the French frigate *Forbin* was placed at his disposal.

Abd-el-Kader prolonged his stay in the Isthmus, where the Suez Canal Company gave him the use of the domain of Bir-abu-Ballah, at the entrance to the valley of Goshen, near Ismailia. One of our surveyors of works had built a pleasant house there, with gardens and land reclaimed from the desert. This territory formed part of the vast domain of Pithom,

which had been purchased by the Canal Company, and upon the 25,000 acres of which ten thousand Arabs were already employed.

My intention was to obtain Abd-el-Kader's consent to superintend the cultivation of the 150,000 acres which had been conceded to us to the west of the Canal, from Lake Timsah to Suez, and through which we had already cut a sweet-water canal. But the policy which had in vain endeavoured to prevent the execution of the maritime canal still continued to stimulate the suspicions of the Viceroy of Egypt, who begged me to abandon my scheme, which I did with the concurrence of Abd-el-Kader, whose behaviour was, as usual, very loyal and disinterested.

When Commander Roudaire was charged by the French Government with the mission of completing his researches as to the possibility of making an inland African sea, Abd-el-Kader, as I have already mentioned, sent a circular to the Arab chiefs, enjoining them to assist him. And when I recently undertook a voyage of discovery to the same region, the Emir sent me a fresh message, which may be regarded as a noble testament on his part, for he intended it to help to pacify our African possessions, and to attach to us by links of kindness the three million Mussulmans who are subject to our laws.

“Praise to the only God !

“Abd-el-Kader ben Mahiddin, to all the Arab

tribes inhabiting Tunis, and more especially to their ulemas, sheiks, and religious and military chiefs.

“Salutation to you, with the mercy and blessing of God !

“While forming my wishes for your prosperity, and wishing you well in all that concerns the welfare of the body and soul, I take it as my bounden duty to give you the following counsel.

“The French Company which formed the project of piercing the Isthmus of Gabes, and concerning which I have already spoken to you, has now determined to put the work into execution, and to pay a visit to your neighbourhood. It is to be hoped, nay, it is your bounden duty, to see that these strangers meet with from you a most favourable welcome, generosity, encouragement, and assistance, both by word and deed.

“Do not lend the ear to those who erroneously imagine that the piercing of the Isthmus of Gabes is contrary to the interests of the country and of its inhabitants. These are false conjectures, and those who believe in them are ignorant people. Moreover, if it be God’s will that this enterprise should be carried out it will be, however little it may be expected.

“It was thus that God permitted the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, the benefits of which are now being reaped by humanity.

“In short, this French Company, the object of

which is to ameliorate the land by increasing its fertility and diminishing the extent of waste land, will do no harm to any one, and in the event of its requiring a field, a garden, or a house, it will pay for them a much higher price than they are worth. Moreover, Providence utilises this Company, which is by itself very powerful, thanks to the riches which God has granted it for the good and benefit of His creatures.

“It is for this that the Company is about to make great efforts, and spend immense sums in order to benefit the creatures of God. It is true that the Company will gain some fruit from its labours, but is it not also the creature of Allah ?

“So it is with the king when he is just and good. Although he is the chief of his subjects, and placed in a position higher than they are (seeing that upon him depend the fertilisation of the country and the suppression of waste lands), he is in reality only the servitor of his subjects, and his duty is to seek to do them all the good he can, and guard them from all that is hurtful.

“For those who labour to this end a great reward is promised in heaven, but if they seek an earthly reward God will grant it to them here below ; but if they seek a heavenly reward God will grant it to them in the other world.

“A prophet of the Israelites said, ‘The kings of the Persians are heathens and fire-worshippers ; they

have been loaded by Thee with good things. They adore another than Thee, and yet Thou leavest them their kingdom and givest them long life.'

"And God said unto him, 'These people have made my land to prosper, so that my creatures can live therein with comfort. This is why I have left them their kingdom and granted them long life.'

"The prophet David built the holy temple at Jerusalem, but so it was that no sooner had he built the house than it fell to the ground. And God said unto him: 'Because thou hast shed blood abundantly, and hast made great wars, thou shalt not build an house unto my name.' *

"'But, O Lord!' replied David, 'is it not for Thy glory?'

"'Yes,' replied the Lord; 'but are they not my creatures whom thou hast slain?'

"Thus men are of the family of God, and the Lord loves those who seek to do good unto his family.

"The human race is very dear to God, its creator, and all His creatures, from the highest to the lowest, are meant for the service and benefit of the great whole which we call the human kind.

"ABD-EL-KADER EL HUSNY.

"The 28 Rébi-el-Anouar, 1800."

* See 1 Chron. xxii. 8.—Note of the Translator.

CHAPTER XI.

ABYSSINIA.

I.

Origin of the Abyssinian People.

THE Abyssinians have a tradition, the origin of which is lost in antiquity and which is said also to be prevalent among the Jews, viz., that soon after the deluge, Chus, the grandson of Noah, went through Lower Egypt, which was then uninhabited, and crossing the Atbara settled with his family in the tablelands of Abyssinia. The same tradition relates that Chus and his family, still terrified by the recollection of the Deluge, chose rather to live in caves upon the mountain side than to trust themselves to the plains.

This race of men hewed with amazing perseverance large caverns in the mountains of marble and granite, many of which are still in existence.

The Abyssinians also say that the children of Chus built the town of Axoum, shortly before the birth of Abraham. Soon after this they established colonies as far as the Atbara, where, as we gather from Herodotus (Book II., chapter xxix.), they cultivated

the sciences. Josephus, in his "Antiquities of Judea," calls them Meroëtes, or inhabitants of Meroë (Atbara), an island situated between the Astaboras and the Nile.

The fragments of the colossal statues of the constellation of Sirius, which are still to be seen at Axoum, show that this people possessed some astronomical knowledge. Seir, in the language of the Chussites or Troglodytes and in that of the land of Meroë, means "dog," which explains why this province was named Siré and the large river which skirts it the Siris.

In the plain between the Fazoglou and Sennaar the river is named *Nile*, that is to say, *blue*. The ancients knew it by this name and also by that of Egyptus, but they more generally designated it by that of Siris. Pliny says that it bore this name above its junction with the other branch, that of the White Nile: "Sic quoque etiamnunc Siris, ut ante nominatus per aliquot millia et in Homero Egyptus."

The name of Egyptus, which Homer gives to the stream, was known in Ethiopia long before his time; and Egypt in Ethiopian is called Y Gypt, while an Egyptian is Gypt. Y Gypt signifies the country of ditches or canals.

Thebes was built by a colony of Ethiopians who came from Siré, the city of Seir or of the dog-star, and of Meroë. Diodorus of Sicily says that the Greeks, by putting an *o* before Siris had made the word unintelligible. Siris then was Osiris, but he was

neither the sun nor a real person. It was the star Sirius or the dog-star, designated by the figure of a dog because of the information which it gave to the people of Atbara, where were made the first observations of its emerging from the sun's rays which made it easy of perception with the naked eye. The comparison of the "barking Anubis" was made because its first appearance was like the barking of a dog which gave notice of the approaching inundation. The theory of the constellation of Sirius was specially studied at Thebes on account of its connection with the rural year of the Egyptians.

Ptolemy has related an heliacal ascension of Sirius observed upon the fourth day of the summer solstice in the year 2250 B.C.; and there are very good reasons for believing that, long before this period, the Thebans were excellent astronomers. This observation certainly makes Thebes much older than it is supposed to be according to the chronicles of Axoum.

That city is not mentioned in the Bible by the name under which it is known to us. Before Moses's day it was destroyed by Salotes, Prince of the Agaazi or Ethiopian pastors. In the ancient tongue it was called Ammon-No. The name of Thebes is said to be derived from Theba, a word which in Hebrew signifies the ark (of polished wood, *theba*) which God ordered Noah to build.

While the descendants of Chus were extending their progress in the central and northern parts of

their territory, their brethren were advancing into the mountains which run parallel with the Gulf of Arabia. This country was always known as Saba, or Azab, both of which words signify the south. It was thus called because it was on the southern coast of the Gulf of Arabia, and that, on coming from Arabia or Egypt, it formed the southern frontier of the African continent.

The inhabitants, who wore long hair and had very delicate and regular features, with dark brown skin, and who lived with their flocks in tents upon the vast plains, made overtures to the Chussites and acted as messengers to them for the conveyance of their merchandise. These men were called Phut in Hebrew, or in all other languages, Balous, Bagla, Belavé, Berberi, Barabra, Zilla, and Souah, all of which signify pastor. The country which they inhabited was called Barbaria by the Greeks and Romans, after the word *Berber*, which originally signified pastor.

It was over the long tongue of land which extends along the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea that the pastors carried the merchandise to the ports of these two seas as far as the plains of the Isthmus of Suez, which probably derives its name from Souah pastors.

In the Bible one of these plains is spoken of as Goshen, that is, the land of pasturage, and the Arabs still call it Beled-el-Guéche, which means the same.

The principal residence of the pastors was the low and level part of Africa situated between the tropic of Cancer and the mountains of Abyssinia. But the noblest and most warlike of the pastors were, beyond all doubt, those who inhabited and still inhabit the mountains of Habad, which extend from the neighbourhood of Massowah to Suakim. In the ancient language of the country *so* means shepherd, *souah* being the plural.

The mountains inhabited by the Agaazi are called *Habad*, which in their language, as in Arabic, means serpent. Hence comes the historical tradition told in the book of Axoum, that a serpent conquered the province of Tigré and ruled over it.

According to this book, which is the most ancient chronicle in the country and the best authority next to the Bible, five thousand years elapsed between the creation of the world and the birth of Christ. Abyssinia was not inhabited until 1800 B.C., and four hundred years later many eminent men, speaking different languages, sought refuge there. They were well received by the Agaazi, and each one of them was allowed to choose the land which he wished to occupy. This establishment is called in the Chronicle of Axoum, *Angoba*, that is to say, the entry of the nations. There is a tradition, too, that this people came from Palestine at about the time that an inundation caused great damage there, and we know from Pausanias that there was a great inundation in Ethiopia during the reign

of Cecrops in Greece in the year 1490 B.C. At this period the Israelites, leaving Arabia, entered the promised land under Caleb and Joshua. We cannot wonder at the terrible impression which this invasion made upon the minds of the dwellers in Palestine. Thus, when Joshua had crossed the Jordan and caused the walls of Jericho to fall, a panic seized all the peoples of Syria and Palestine. (See Joshua vi. 21.)

These peoples, each of whom spoke a different language, hearing that the conqueror, followed by a numerous army and already master of a portion of the country, was putting the vanquished to death beneath harrows of iron, did not wait to face so formidable a foe, and sought safety in flight, their most natural refuge being the pastors of Abyssinia and the Atbara. Procopius mentions two columns which in his day were still standing upon the coast of Mauritania, opposite Gibraltar, and upon which was inscribed in Phœnician, "We are Phœnicians, and we are flying before the face of the son of Nun" (Joshua).

Thus, among the various inhabitants of Abyssinia, from the southernmost limits to the frontiers of Egypt, there were to be found descendants of Chus, who, after having been troglodytes and lived in caves, and then pastors, became partially civilised and resided in cities. After them came the nations which left Palestine—the Amharas, the Agows of Damot, the Agows of Tohue, and the Gafats.

II.

Journey of the Queen of Sheba to visit Solomon at Jerusalem, and Conversion of Abyssinia to the Jewish Faith.

It is not surprising that the constant traffic and the important business transacted by the men of Tyre and the Jews with the Chussites and the pastors of the African coast should have established close relations between them. We can understand, therefore, that the Queen of Sheba, the sovereign of those lands, should have desired to see for herself what became of the treasures which had been exported in such large quantities from her own country, and to make the acquaintance of the prince for whom they were intended. There can be no doubt as to the journey having taken place, for all the Eastern nations speak of it in the same terms as those in which it is described in the Bible. The Abyssinian annals say that the Queen lived at Saba or Azab, the land of myrrh and incense, situated not far from the Red Sea. They add that she went to Jerusalem under the auspices of Hiram, King of Tyre, whose daughter accompanied her, as we are told in Psalm xlv. ; that she did not go by sea or pass through Arabia for fear of the Ishmaelites, but went from Azab into Palestine, and returned by way of Massowah and Suakim, escorted by her own subjects, the pastors ; and that she performed the

journey upon a white camel or dromedary of very great size and surpassing beauty.

Many ancient writers imagined this queen to be of Arabic descent; but Sheba was a kingdom of itself, and must not be confounded with a small town in Arabia also called Saba, to the south of Mecca. We know from history that the Sabeans were accustomed to be governed by a queen rather than a king, while the Homerites, or Arabian Sabeans, who inhabited the coast of Arabia opposite Azab, were ruled by kings. The Homerite kings were not allowed to leave their country or even their residence, and if they appeared in public the people had a right to stone them.

We may be sure that a people which treated its sovereigns in this way would not have allowed the queen, if perchance they were ruled by one, to undertake a long journey. The Arabs assert that the name of the Queen of Sheba who came to Jerusalem was Belkis, while the Abyssinians call her Maqueda. In the New Testament, Matthew speaks of her as the Queen of the South (chap. xii. v. 42).

The annals of Abyssinia are full of details concerning her journey. They say that the queen, who was a pagan when she left Azab, was so filled with admiration of Solomon, that she became converted to the Jewish faith while at Jerusalem, and had a son by Solomon, whom she named Menilek. The queen brought him back with her to Sheba, but a few years afterwards sent him to his father to be educated.

Solomon was careful to give him a very good education, and he was anointed king of Ethiopia in the Temple, taking henceforth the name of Solomon's father David (Daoud). He then returned to Azab with a colony of Jews, among them many doctors of the Mosaic law, including one of each tribe. He made these doctors judges in his kingdom, and from them are said to be descended the present judges (umbares), three of whom always accompany the king. With Menilek was Azarias, son of the high priest Sadoc, bearing a copy of the law; and he, too, was given the title of Nebrit, or high priest, while, although the book of the law was burnt in the church at Axoum, when the Arabs despoiled the province of Adel, the functions of Azarias were preserved in his family, his descendants being still nebrits, or priests, of the church of Axoum.

The whole of Abyssinia was thus converted to the Jewish faith, and the government of the state as well as of the church was modelled upon that of Jerusalem. The last use which the Queen of Sheba made of her power was to order that no woman should in future reign, and that the crown should go to the nearest heir male. In the later history of Abyssinia we find that if no woman wore the crown, many queen-regents have left a great name behind them, and it may even be said that the most prosperous and peaceful epochs of Abyssinian history have been when a queen was regent. The Queen of Sheba died

after a reign of forty years, about 986 B.C., and was succeeded by her son Menilek, whose descendants were, as we know from the traveller Bruce, still on the throne in 1790.

III.

Conversion of Abyssinia to Christianity.

The Abyssinians accept the Holy Scriptures as we do, and count the same number of books.

The Revelation of St. John, called by them "the Vision of John-Abu-Kalamsis," is their favourite reading. The old Abyssinian priests read with much gusto the Song of Solomon, but they prohibit the reading of it to their deacons, to laymen, and to women. They believe that Solomon composed it in honour of the daughter of Pharaoh. Next to the Revelation they esteem the Acts of the Apostles, which they style *Synnodos*, these *Synnodos* serving as the written laws of the country.

Another book is called *Haimanut-Abu*, and consists chiefly of the works of Greek fathers treating of and expounding certain articles of faith which were the subject of disputation in the ancient Greek Church. There are also translations of the works of St. Athanasius, St. Basilus, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Cyril also extant in Abyssinia. Another book much revered is the *Synaxar*, or "Flower of the Saints."

According to Abyssinian history, Bazen, who was the twenty-second king descended from the Queen of

Sheba, was contemporary with Augustus and reigned sixteen years, the birth of Christ taking place in the eighth year of his reign. The conversion of Abyssinia to Christianity took place under King Abreha, or Atzeba, the thirteenth successor of Bazen, about 333 years after Christ, and the first Bishop of Abyssinia was delegated by St. Athanasius of Alexandria, who himself occupied the episcopal see of that city, A.D. 330.

It is also related that Frumentius, the apostle of Abyssinia, came to the kingdom during the government of a woman, who was probably the mother of a king under age. The Greek philosopher Meropius, who was living at Tyre and had embraced the Christian religion, embarked upon the Red Sea to go to India, taking with him Frumentius and Adesius, two young men whom he was anxious to establish in trade, after having given them the best of educations. The ship upon which they had embarked was wrecked off the coast of Abyssinia, and while Meropius perished in defending himself from the inhabitants, the two youths were captured and taken to Axoum, where the court then resided. They soon became acquainted with the language, and as the Abyssinians were always very kindly disposed towards strangers, they were very well treated, Adesius being appointed master of the king's household, a post which has since then always been held by a foreigner. Frumentius was deemed worthy to be entrusted with the education of the king, and

the queen appointed him her son's tutor. Frumentius inculcated in him great veneration and love for the Christian religion, and he then proceeded to Alexandria to inform Bishop Athanasius of his hope of converting Abyssinia to Christianity, and to ask him to send there a number of men capable of spreading instruction among the people.

Athanasius consecrated him Bishop of Axoum, and on his return the king publicly embraced Christianity. The greater part of Abyssinia followed his example, and the Church of Ethiopia has endured down to our own day.

It appears that the conversion took place peaceably and without any effusion of blood. This was the second time that the empire changed its faith in the same orderly fashion, no fanatical preachers or overzealous saints causing any disturbance. If war has at various periods desolated Abyssinia, it has been for purely temporal reasons.

Towards the year 1200, while Lalibala reigned in Abyssinia, the Christians were violently persecuted in Egypt. Amru, the lieutenant of the Caliph Omar, had then completed the conquest of that kingdom, and the masons and stone-cutters suffered more than any of the others, as the Arabs had a special detestation of those trades. Lalibala offered many of them a refuge, and employed them in hewing out of the solid rock in the province of Lasta, his native place, a number of churches which are still intact.

" During the reign of Saif-Araad (of the line of Solomon), from 1342 to 1370, the Soudan of Egypt had imprisoned Mark, the Patriarch of the Copts, and as soon as Saif-Araad heard of it, he ordered all the Egyptian merchants to be arrested, and sent bodies of cavalry beyond the frontier to stop the caravans. The Soudan soon released the Patriarch, the only condition he stipulated being that he should make peace between him and the Abyssinian king, which he soon did.

Zara Jacob, fourth son of David II., succeeded his nephew and occupied the throne for thirty-four years (1434—68) under the name of Constantine, and he was regarded in Abyssinia as a second Solomon. The Abyssinians had a long time before this founded at Jerusalem a monastery, to which Zara Jacob made several donations, and he obtained permission from the Pope to found a second one at Rome. Nicodemus, then superior of the monastery at Jerusalem, sent priests in his name to the Council at Florence, and these priests concurred in the views of the Eastern Church as to the procession of the Holy Ghost, which was the cause of the schism between the Greeks and the Latins. The Abyssinian embassy was deemed of sufficient importance for the recollection of its visit to have been preserved in a picture which is still in the Vatican.

IV.

Struggle of Abyssinia against the invasion of the Mussulman tribes of Arabia and the coast of Africa. Its alliances with Portugal. Before and after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope.

Prince Henry, son of John I., King of Portugal, jealous of the greatness of Venice, which owed its prosperity to the trade with India, discovered another means of communicating with the East, and that was by sailing round the famous cape then known as the Promontory of Tempests.

He had to combat the prejudices of the whole nation, but he had learned from history that the voyage had already been accomplished by the Phœnicians, during the reign of Necos in Egypt, and afterwards by Eudoxius under Ptolemæus Lathyrus. Eudoxius passed round the southernmost point of Africa and arrived at Cadiz.

But there are always plenty of people who, incapable of achieving any great thing themselves, are ready to criticise the enterprise of others, and these people declared that the sea was continually raging and boiling around these arid shores, and that the air was so heated by the sun that all men who went through it would come out quite black. These arguments, industriously circulated by the Venetians, would have sufficed to prevent Prince Henry's project being carried out if King Edward, instead of being

influenced by them, had not favoured his uncle's plans, and several voyages were made under his auspices.

Christians returning from Palestine reported that they had seen in Jerusalem a monastery, the monks in which were subjects of a Christian prince in the heart of Africa, whose empire extended from the shores of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean to the shores of the Atlantic. It was further said that several of these monks came to Alexandria, the patriarch of which alone enjoyed the privilege of sending a bishop into their country. This Christian prince was known in Europe as Prester John. While sending vessels to circumnavigate Africa, the King of Portugal despatched two ambassadors to Prester John by way of Egypt. Covillan and Paiva were entrusted with this mission, and they took with them a map drawn by Prince Henry, being instructed to correct it by the light of the observations which they made.

The Portuguese travellers went together to Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, and Aden, where they separated. Covillan proceeded to Calicut and Goa, and from that point, crossing the Indian Ocean, visited the mines of Sofala. On his return to Aden and Cairo, where he was to have been rejoined by Paiva, he learned that the latter had died.

At Cairo he received the visit of two Jews, Abraham and Joseph, bringing two letters from the King of Abyssinia, into whose states he then made his

entrance. King Alexander received him with great kindness and kept him at his court. The ambassador married an Abyssinian woman, and was in high favour with several of the princes who succeeded one another upon the throne. He kept up a correspondence with the King of Portugal, describing to him the different parts of India which he had seen, the wealth of the Sofala mines, to the north of the Cape of Good Hope, and exhorted him, on his own behalf as well as that of the King of Abyssinia, to persevere in his researches as to the feasibility of a passage round the Cape. He assured him that the possibility of it was well known in India and Abyssinia, and sent him a map upon which the Cape and the country round were correctly drawn.

Thereupon, the King of Portugal fitted out three vessels which he placed under the command of Bartholomew Diaz, who reached the formidable cape, but his sailors, terrified by the force of the wind and the rough seas, refused to go any farther. The sailors, whose complexions were burnt brown by the sun and the long sea voyage, were afraid of becoming literally Negroes. All the stories which had been told them before their departure appeared to them as realities, and Diaz was obliged to content himself with seeing the Cape of Good Hope, instead of sailing round it, returning to Portugal, where, for the remainder of the king's life, the dangers of the expedition were being constantly dwelt upon.

In order to divert the king from carrying out his spirited enterprise, many influential persons, including the envoys of foreign sovereigns, based their opposition upon motives of state policy. They urged, as it has since been urged in regard to the Suez Canal, that the enterprise was an impossible one, and that as, in the event of its succeeding, the balance of trade would be altered, the nations which had the exclusive possession of the trade with India would combine in a war of extermination against Portugal.

Prince Henry was no longer alive to answer these contradictory objections and perfidious suggestions, and since then the spirit of enterprise and maritime discovery had declined in Portugal.

But some years later King Emanuel determined to follow up the noble project of his predecessors. He selected as his lieutenant Vasco de Gama, a man of great distinction both as regarded his courage and general disposition, and he intrusted him with the journal and maps of Pedro Covillan, as well as the letters of the African and Indian princes of whom he had heard.

Upon July 14, 1497, Gama started from Lisbon with a small fleet, and upon the 18th of November he discovered the Cape of Storms. But the ships were so tempest-tossed that the sailors refused to go any farther. The impressions made by the voyage of Diaz were stronger than the obedience and resignation which they had solemnly sworn in the Chapel of the

Virgin, to which Vasco de Gama had conducted them in procession before he left Lisbon. They revolted, the pilots placing themselves at the head of the mutineers. But Vasco, seconded by his officers, seized the leaders of the revolt, and loading them with irons, placed them in the hold. He himself went to the helm, and, steering off the land, went out to sea, to the great astonishment of his brave companions. The tempest lasted two days more, and on the 20th of November he had the honour of being able to say that he had doubled the Cape. In the moment of victory the trumpets were sounded, and Vasco liberated the prisoners, amid great rejoicing, and impressed upon them that the proper name for the promontory was the Cape of Good Hope.

The admiral landed with Martin Alonzo, who spoke several of the Negro dialects, upon the *Tierra de Natal*, where he was very well received by the king and the natives.

Upon the 15th of January, 1498, after having taken in a fresh supply of water, which the Negroes themselves helped him to get on board, Gama proceeded as far as a cape which he named the Cape of Currents, where the coast of Natal commences, that of Sofala being farther north. He reached the very spot where Covillan, coming from the north, had previously arrived, so that these two Portuguese went right round Africa.

David III., the ancestor of Alexander, ascended

the throne in 1508, when twelve years of age, the Queen-Regent, Helena, and Bishop Mark, her favourite, assuming the reins of government in Abyssinia, which began to suffer from the attacks of the Mussulman kings upon the eastern coast of Africa and on the Arabian side.

Helena, the daughter of a Moorish prince, did all she could to keep the peace between the Abyssinian Christians and their Mahometan neighbours by creating business relations between them, and she had succeeded to a great extent, when a third Power came in to disturb the equilibrium. The Turks, who had never appeared in the south of Africa or Asia, came upon the scene, under Selim, the Emperor of Constantinople, who had just conquered the Soudan of Egypt, soon establishing themselves in the Arabian peninsula up to the shores of the Indian Ocean.

The leading towns on the coast of Arabia—Jeddah, Moka, Suakim, and Massowah, upon the African coast, at the gates of Abyssinia—were garrisoned with Turkish janissaries, who preyed upon commerce instead of protecting it, so the Arab traders took to flight, going with their riches to the coasts of the kingdom of Adel, upon the south-eastern limits of Abyssinia. The trade of India, in order to avoid a like hindrance, was also concentrated upon Adel.

The Turks then seized Zeyla, a small island situated upon the coast of Adel, at the entrance to the Indian Ocean, where they established a custom-house and sub-

jected the trade of the kingdom of Adel with India to heavy dues. This new establishment threatened both the kingdom of Adel and the empire of Abyssinia, and the Queen-Regent Helena, hearing of the Portuguese passage round the Cape, saw that nothing but their assistance could save Adel and Abyssinia from ruin. Pedro Covillan, the Portuguese, was still at her court, and she arranged with him to form an alliance with the King of Portugal. There was also at her court an Armenian merchant named Matteo, who had a great reputation for probity, and who had been in the habit of travelling through the Eastern States to fulfil missions for the kings and the great. Helena selected him as her ambassador to the King of Portugal, and it appears certain that the despatches which he carried were drawn up by Pedro Covillan, their contents being that the Queen's demands would be explained in person by Matteo, who enjoyed her full confidence.

Ambassadors travelled more slowly in the sixteenth century than they do now, and Matteo first went to the Portuguese Indies, it being only three years afterwards, in 1513, that he continued his voyage to Portugal, whither he proceeded with a fleet loaded with spices sent home by Albuquerque, the Portuguese Governor-General.

During this time Helena had concluded a treaty of peace with the King of Adel, but as the relief expected from Portugal did not arrive, that prince, incapable of resisting the Turks, allied himself with them against

Abyssinia. Their combined forces invaded the empire, and in less than a year they had reduced to captivity or had slaughtered twenty thousand Christians. The whole country was terrorised, but David III., though only sixteen, placed himself at the head of an army, while the Queen-Regent and the ladies of the nobility freely contributed their jewels and were lavish in presents to the soldiers, in order to stimulate their courage. The King soon reached the province of Fategar and marched direct upon Aoussa, the capital of the kingdom of Adel. There he drew up his army in battle array, and after a single combat between a young Abyssinian monk, Gabriel Andreas, and Maffudi, one of the Adel leaders, in which the latter was killed, a great battle was fought, in which the Abyssinians were victorious, ten or twelve thousand Moors being left on the battle-field. The next day King David went to a city where the King of Adel had a palace, and finding the gate shut he struck it with his lance. No answer being given, he left his lance sticking in the door, to show that he had come hither and had been free to enter the gates. When the army returned to Abyssinia the young monk who had been the hero of the single combat was loaded with honours, his victory being commemorated in songs. This victory was gained on July, 1516, and upon the same day a Portuguese fleet, under the command of Don Lopez Suarez Alberguiera, had seized the island of Zeyla and burnt the custom-house. The ambassador Matteo, who had

been right royally treated by King Emanuel and sent back to the Indies, embarked at Goa with Admiral de Segueyra and sailed for Massowah, where he arrived on April 16th, 1520. He then set out for the interior of Abyssinia; but the fatigues of the voyage had been too much for him, and he died of fever before he could regain King David. Zaga Zaab, an Abyssinian monk, was selected as his successor, and he started for Portugal in 1525, the year of the death of Queen Helena.

David then made preparations for renewing the war with the kingdom of Adel, which had allied itself with the Turkish pashas and generals commanding in Arabia, the Turks sending a contingent which began by recapturing the island of Zeyla.

It was customary for a caravan to go every year from Abyssinia to Jerusalem, this caravan—which consisted of about a thousand pilgrims, priests as well as laymen—starting from Hamozem, a small territory only two days' march from Dobarwa and Massowah. The caravan was preceded by trumpeters, and crossed the Desert by way of Suakim without meeting with any rebuff. But in the year following the conquest of Egypt by the Sultan Selim, when the reign of the Mameluke dynasty ended the Abbot Azerata-Christos was conducting fifteen hundred pilgrims to Jerusalem, and on their return, having been met by a body of Selim's troops, most of them were massacred and the rest driven into the Desert, where they perished of hunger and thirst. In 1525 another caravan assembled at Hamozem. It

was composed of three hundred and thirty-six monks or priests and fifteen nuns. The second day after it had started it was attacked by the Moors of the Hamozem district, and all the Christians of a certain age were put to the sword, the younger ones being sold to the Turks. Only fifteen persons escaped, of whom three alone succeeded in rejoining the king at Shoa. From this time the Abyssinians cut off all communication with Egypt by way of the Desert, and David entered with his army the province of Dawaro, sending on a detachment of troops which defeated the Adel advance guard, while the king advanced and fought a great battle at Chimbra-Coré, in which he was totally defeated, losing a great part of his nobility and four thousand soldiers.

Mehemet, surnamed Gragne (the left-handed), Governor of Zeyla, was in command of the allied army, and he spent the next two years following this victory in strengthening his forces, at the expiration of which time he invaded the frontier provinces of Fategar, Efat, and the Dawaro, putting most of the inhabitants to the sword and reducing the remainder to slavery.

Seeing his empire threatened with ruin, King David resolved, despite his inferior forces, to fight another battle, but he was once more defeated, losing his principal commander and leading officers. He returned to Amhara and encamped at Hegis, hoping to recruit a fresh army, but the Turkish commander did not give him time to do this, and in the month of April following entered Amhara and then burnt and

pillaged Varvar. In 1530 he invaded the province of Tigré and the King fled to Wogora, while in the year 1531 the Abyssinian king, still pursued by Mehemet, sustained a third defeat at Dalakas, on the banks of the Nile.

Negadé-Yasus and many other heads of the nobility perished beneath his eyes, and the brave monk, Andreas, now well advanced in years, sought a glorious death, being resolved not to survive the disasters of his country.

Other disasters followed, but King David continued an heroic resistance until his death in 1540, the final blow to him being the capture by the Turkish Vizier Mudjid of the whole of his family, who were put to the sword.

The only one who escaped was his son Claudius, and when he came to the throne the fall of the Abyssinian empire seemed inevitable, especially as famine and pestilence, which generally followed upon a prolonged war in the East, were desolating the country. Claudius, who had been very carefully brought up by his mother, Sabel-Venghel, celebrated for her wisdom and courage, had not, of course, much experience, and the Moors thought that they would soon have Abyssinia at their mercy; but the young sovereign had the good fortune to beat them in several engagements, and finally overthrew the army of Ammer, the principal lieutenant of Mehemet.

While this favourable change was taking place in

Abyssinia, the Patriarch Juan Bermudez, who had been sent several years previously to negotiate an alliance with Portugal, returned from Lisbon, and he drew so graphic a picture of the disasters of Abyssinia that the king sent orders to the Viceroy of the Indies to send four hundred soldiers to Massowah. Don Stephano de Gama, brother of Vasco, who was Viceroy of the Indies, determined to land Juan Bermudez with the promised troops on the coast of Abyssinia, and his fleet passed through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to Massowah. These troops, commanded by Martin Correa, seized the town of Ashiko and put all the inhabitants to the sword, Martin Correa cutting off the head of the Moorish commander and sending it as a present to Queen Sabel-Venghel, who was at that time residing in a fortress of the kingdom of Tigré.

Don Stephano de Gama, returning to India, left his younger brother, Christopher, behind him with some of the best of the Portuguese troops, and the latter, after combating the Turks with varying success, was eventually made prisoner by the treachery of a Mahometan woman with whom he had fallen in love, and delivered up to Mehemet the Left-handed, who had his head cut off and sent it to Constantinople, his body being divided among the tribes of Arabia.

Mehemet also seized the Portuguese camp and allowed his men to despatch all the wounded, but when the Turks pursued the women to the lines of

Don Christopher, where they had sought refuge, one of them, to avoid the outrages to which they were about to be subjected, set a light to a powder barrel and blew up the whole camp. The Queen and the Patriarch succeeded in making their escape, and rejoined King Claudius, who was very grieved when he heard of Christopher's death. He soon avenged it, however, defeating Mehemet the Left-handed in a battle at Bet-d'-Isaac, on February 10, 1543. Mehemet himself was killed by a bullet fired by Pedro Leon, a Portuguese, who cut off his ear and put it in his pocket, returning to the ranks to continue the fight. The Moors, deprived of their general, took to flight, and were pursued until nightfall by the Abyssinians and Portuguese, who slaughtered them in great numbers.

Thus Claudius took a splendid revenge upon the Mussulmans who had reduced his father to such cruel extremities, and it only remained for him to punish Joram, who had driven his father from Mount Salim and compelled him to cross the Tacazzé on foot at the risk of being drowned. Joram was not at the battle of Bet-d'-Isaac, but he hastened to march in that direction, and the king, informed of his intention, put some of his troops into an ambuscade and cut Joram's army to pieces.

While Mehemet had been ravaging Abyssinia, the provinces of Siré and Tigré, situated between the Demba and the cities which the Moors occupied on

the Red Sea, had been the theatre of the war. The Turks had completely ruined them, and Mehemet had burnt the city of Axoum and destroyed all the churches and convents of Tigré, Claudius being occupied during the end of his reign in repairing these disasters.

But Del-Tumborea, the widow of Mehemet, did her best to keep up the war, for she told Nur, the Governor of Zeyla, who was madly in love with her, that she would only give her hand to the man who brought her the head of Claudius, the conqueror of Mehemet.

Nur eagerly accepted the challenge, and sent a message to Claudius, bidding him defiance. Claudius quickly reassembled his army and marched upon Adel, contrary to the advice of the queen-mother and his friends, who advised him to wait the coming of the Moors. The battle was a very bloody one, but the Abyssinians were worsted, and Claudius succumbed after receiving twenty wounds. His head was cut off and brought by Nur to Del-Tumborea, who had it suspended by the hair from a tree facing her house, in order that her eyes might ever be able to feed upon a spectacle so grateful to them.

Claudius had reigned nineteen years, and the battle in which he perished was fought on March 22nd, 1559. The principal officers of his army perished with him, and a great part of the army was made captive, the remainder being dispersed and the camp

pillaged. Nur, content with the recompense of his undertaking, did not care to renew the struggle, and he returned to Adel attired as a private soldier, forbidding any of the demonstrations which usually greet a victorious soldier, and declaring that the glory of the triumph was due to God alone.

Since that time the Moors have scarcely ever interfered with the Abyssinian empire, and the reigns of the kings of the Solomon dynasty who succeeded Claudius, from 1559 to 1770, were marked by a series of rebellions, of internal struggles, and of wars, many of them unsuccessful, with the Gallas tribes bordering on Abyssinia.

V.

Modern and Contemporary Period.

At the end of the eighteenth century the governors of the principal provinces refused obedience to the monarch descended from Solomon. The princes of that family had lost their authority, and, up to the present time, Abyssinia has been governed by the ras or kings of the two large divisions which form the empire of Abyssinia: Tigré and the Ambara.

Tigré, with its dependencies, comprises all the region between the Red Sea and the Tacazzé. The Ambara, with its dependent provinces, is formed by the territories between the Tacazzé and the Nile. In 1855 an Abyssinian chief, who was merely governor of a

province, who did not belong to the Solomon race, revolted against his father-in-law, Ras Ali, who had been reigning for a long time at Gondar. He overthrew him, and after having vanquished first Oubié, King of Tigré, and then the King of Shoa, proclaimed himself Emperor under the title of Theodoros. But, as we have seen was the case in previous ages, Abyssinia, a mountainous country favourable for defence as well as for attack, has been the scene of many sudden changes in the fortune of war. In 1858 and 1859, Theodoros was in his turn defeated by Negoucié-Nikar, a nephew of Oubié, who regained possession of forty-four provinces forming part of the kingdom of his uncle, while his brother Dedjamadjé-Tassamma, took possession of Gondar, the second city of the ancient empire. A relative of Ras-Ali, named Amadin-Bechir, several times defeated the army of Theodoros, and remained in possession of the provinces of Wollo, Warro-Cassou, and Warro-Imanat; the King of Shoa recovered his independence by forming an alliance with Amadin-Bechir and another chief, named Tedela-Gualu, who governs the provinces of Godjam, Damot and Agos-Meder, up to the sources of the Blue Nile, while the Gallas tribes are constituted into a kingdom and are hostile to Theodoros.

Thus, having regard to the number and importance of the provinces which he has reconquered, King Nikas seems to be the most powerful prince in Abys-

sinia, and I trust that this unfortunate country, which has been subjected to all the horrors of civil war, may recover the unity which in former ages saved it from foreign conquest, and that King Nikas may, by his intelligence and tendency to open communication with Europe, be equal to this difficult but glorious task.

He sent me, I may add, the following autograph letter, upon his own behalf and that of his people, expressing his wishes for the success of the Suez Canal; and this letter, written in Ethiopian, has been translated by M. d'Abbadie, well known for his travels in Abyssinia.

“I Negus,

“Master (of the horse) Nikas, King of Ethiopia, who reigns by the law of our Lord Jesus Christ, from Mizwa to Gondar, and this is the kingdom of Tigré, and Simen, Wagara, Walqayt, Tagadé, Dambya, Balasa, Kinfaz, Agaw Lasta, Salawa; I salute Ferdinand de Lesseps, who is of the tribe of light, who has accomplished a work wonderful for our day.

“From the beginning until now I have had my mind fixed upon the work which you are accomplishing, and which is a source of joy for all the earth; and now that it is a settled thing, upon behalf of my country, which I love, and in my own name, I give you thanks.

“In piercing the land of Sawis (Suez), you make a mutual union between our lands and the affairs of

Europe. Thus your name will not perish from among us, and our land will be a granary for the regions of the West. And this being so, know that my country and I love you. I am anxious to aid you in your enterprise with cattle or in any other way. I pray the Lord to keep you."

I complete this plain narrative of the leading facts in the history of Abyssinia, by expressing the hope that France will come to an understanding with England to restore to a population of thirty million Christians, now driven into the mountains, their ancient maritime territory.

France has respect for all forms of religion, but she is opposed to religious fanaticism, and it seems to me that in what looks like the impending disturbance of the Mahometan world, she has a noble mission to fulfil, that of maintaining aloft the standard of civilization in the vast regions of Algeria, Senegal the Gaboon, the Congo, Christian Ethiopia, and the Roudaire Sea.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ORIGIN AND DUTIES OF CONSULS.

THE inhabitants of Marseilles and the Catalonians were the first commercial people in Europe who, after creating consuls, at first merely the syndics of the principal trading corporations, and afterwards judges in matters of local trade, felt the importance of extending the influence of this institution abroad. The "consuls beyond the seas" were thenceforward entrusted with the duty of keeping a watch upon the privileges of their nation, and of settling all disputes between fellow-countrymen in regard to matters of trade. Their duties were considered very important, and were entrusted to men who apparently belonged to the leading families in the county.

It was during the Crusades that French princes entrusted to the maritime towns and nations which assisted them, principally to the inhabitants of Marseilles and the Catalonians, the privilege of forming in the conquered ports corporations of traders, under the control of the consuls of their nation. The first privileges obtained in Syria by the inhabitants of Marseilles date from 1117—1136.

The Marquis of Montferrat, Seigneur of Tyre, gave permission in 1187 to the Marseilles traders in that city to appoint a consul to dispense justice.* Three years after this, Guy de Lusignan allowed this city of Marseilles, by letters patent, to appoint at Acre consuls or viscounts, who were sworn in by the King of Jerusalem, and who had jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases, murder and high treason excepted.

Although at this period, Marseilles had no foreign consuls in the city, her own magistrates took special care of the interests of foreign traders. In her municipal statutes (*statuta civitatis Massiliæ*) drawn up in 1228, 1233, and 1255, Marseilles laid down as a principle that, even when at war with a city or a State, it was the duty of the adversary to respect the private property of the inhabitants of that city or State—a principle which does honour to the city which proclaimed it. Avignon, following the example of Marseilles, had also declared the property of strangers to be inviolable, in time of war as well as of peace.

In 1148, the town of Narbonne possessed at Tortosa, in Spain, a commercial establishment, and the privilege of having a consul there; while similar privileges had been obtained by Narbonne at Genoa in 1166 and at Pisa in 1171.

* See *Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe*, by Depping.

A traveller in the fourteenth century found at Alexandria a French consul whose mission it was to protect the foreigners who had no consul of their own nationality.* This honourable privilege of protecting the foreigners who had no consul of their own has been confirmed by the treaties styled *capitulations*, concluded between France and the Ottoman Porte, as far back as the reign of François I., treaties by which the protection of the Catholics is accorded to France.

Jacques Cur took advantage of his position at the court of Charles VII. to give a sort of official character to the relations which he had for some time established in Egypt. The Sultan, flattered by his presents, wrote in 1447 a letter the king, in which he promised his protection to French traders, and authorised the appointment of a consul, whom he agreed to treat upon the footing of the most favoured nation.†

Barcelona, the neighbour and rival of Marseilles, soon entered into competition with her for European trade. Gradually delivered from the yoke of the Sarrazins, from the end of the ninth century, by the assistance of France, she commenced, under Raimond Beranger, towards the close of the eleventh century an era of great prosperity. Her maritime trade had then acquired sufficient importance to elicit the en-

* Extract from Fuscobuldi, quoted by Pardessus in his *Introduction aux Lois Maritimes*.

† *Mémoires de Mathieu de Coussi*, quoted by Pardessus.

couragement of the Sovereign, who had the wisdom to guarantee protection and assistance to all foreign ships, even to those of the Sarrazins. The thirteenth century is the epoch in which the Catalonian trade made its greatest advance. The relations between the Catalonians and France were very important; they attended the fairs in Champagne, and, as we learn from Pardessus's "Collection des Lois Maritimes," they maintained a consul there. Thus the capital of Catalonia, which has provided maritime and commercial legislation with the celebrated "Consulate of the Sea," showed as keen an appreciation as Marseilles of the usefulness of foreign consulates.

James I., King of Aragon, granted in 1266 to the municipal magistrates of Barcelona the privilege of annually electing and sending out to Egypt and Syria consuls of their own; and towards the close of the fourteenth century the Catalonians drew up some regulations for the consulate at Alexandria, according to which the consul was appointed for three years and was re-eligible. He was forbidden to keep a tavern or sell wine by retail, to let the shops on the ground-floor to any but Catalonians, or to admit into his house Jews, or women of ill-fame. He was to be present all day at the custom house, if required, to take part in the examination of goods, and whenever he left his house he was to be preceded by two men in livery.* As early as the thirteenth century, the

* See Capmany's *Mémoires Historiques*, vol. xi.

Catalonians had consuls at Constantinople, Beyrout, Damascus, Cyprus, Rhodes, &c., and they had one upon the confines of Asia, at Tanaïs, who in 1397 appeared before Tamerlane and offered him presents upon his return from the triumphant expedition into Muscovy and Kipsac.*

In Europe, the Catalonians had consuls among all the peoples living upon the Mediterranean: at Marseilles, Genoa, Pisa, Naples, Venice, and Sardinia, and especially Sicily. They also had a consulate at Seville, and the historian Capmany mentions fifty-five consulates of which Barcelona could boast in the days of her splendour, but of which not more than five or six remained in the sixteenth century.

In the Act of Privilege which King Ferdinand granted in 1251 to the Genoese at Seville, it was especially stipulated that the Genoese should have in that city consuls of their own nationality, with the right of deciding without appeal all disputes between persons of their own nationality. If the dispute was between a burgher of Seville and a domiciled Genoese, it was also to be settled by the consuls, but an appeal was to lie to the *alcaldes*. The consuls were to have nothing to do with criminal affairs.†

The habit of appointing consuls in a foreign

* See Count de Laborde's *Itinéraire d'Espagne*, vol. v.

† See Navarrete's *Coleccion de los viages y descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los Españoles*, vol. xi.

country did not become general until the sixteenth century, and especially from the reign of Louis XIV., and in the course of a short time all the trading nations sent consuls to one another and conferred upon them prerogatives more or less extensive.

Colbert was the true organiser of the consulates, and his memoir of March 15, 1669, "upon the steps to be taken by consuls of the French nation abroad to keep his Majesty informed of all that occurs," was the first outcome of the measures which this enlightened Minister had adopted for improving the consular institution. Soon afterwards, the fundamental ordinance of 1681, which was also his handiwork, placed the consulates in a position to render genuine service to French commerce, and formed for more than a century the legislation by which French consular establishments were governed: up to the reforms which were commenced in 1803 and have been gone on with ever since.

The Spanish Government has not yet carried out its project of publishing a set of rules in which the ancient ordinances relating to consulates will be fused, in order to provide a general body of instructions for all its agents.

The general purpose of a consul is to act as commercial agent for his Government in a foreign port or place of trade, to keep an eye upon the commercial interests of his country, to endeavour to develop them, and above all to uphold before the local authorities

the rights of his fellow-countrymen and to arrange their disputes.

There are two kinds of consuls, one being delegated by his Government to exercise a special jurisdiction over his compatriots and their business affairs, without having any other character than that of magistrate and public functionary, while the other is a trader who is allowed to add to his particular profession the duties of consul.

There are several reasons for preferring that a consul should have no interest of his own in commerce. His time and his labour should be not his own, but should belong to his country and Government, to which, like the traveller Anacharsis, he should communicate all that it may be desirable to know concerning the laws, the customs, the habits, the arts, the trade, and the manufactures of the country in which he lives.*

According to the general instructions for French consuls in foreign countries signed by Louis XVIII. in 1814, "the consuls are political agents, but only in this sense, that they are recognised by the Sovereign who receives them as officers of the Government which sends them, and that the principle of their mandate is either specific treaties, or the common custom of nations or general public law."

Then, again, the preamble of the ordinance of December 15, 1815, says: "Consulates being insti-

* See the Comte de Gardens's, *Traité de Diplomatie*, vol. i.

tuted to protect the trade and navigation of our subjects in foreign jurisdiction, to exercise justice and control over our said subjects, and to supply the Government with information which may enable it to insure the prosperity of foreign trade, we have recognised the fact that this object cannot be attained if the persons selected for the duties of consul have not acquired by special studies adapted for the character of their work, as well as by a certain amount of experience, a thorough knowledge of public law, of legislation, and of commercial affairs."

This rule, though at times disregarded, was confirmed by the royal decree of August 20, 1833, relating to the personal composition of the consulates, the fifth clause of this decree providing that "Consuls-General are to be selected from among the first-class consuls, the latter from among the second-class, and the latter from among the students for consulships," the only exception being in favour of the clerks employed in the commercial branch of the Foreign Office after so many years' service.

That learned jurisconsult, M. Pardessus, in his "*Cours de Droit Commercial*" (Part VII. chap. vi.), has devoted several chapters to the political character of consuls, their jurisdiction, the various administrative or mixed functions which are conferred upon them, and to the punitive rights which in certain cases they have as against individuals of their own

nationality. There is nothing, however, to prevent a Government conferring upon its agents such an amount of latitude as may be deemed compatible with its interests, and they should be considered as public officials if they devote their attention solely to public affairs, and if the Sovereign who appoints them, and whose subjects they are, confers this rank upon them.

It is only in the Levant and in Barbary that the consuls have a right of absolute jurisdiction over their compatriots. In other countries they must confine themselves to jurisdiction in trade disputes, which is usually conferred upon them by treaty and usage; and if they decide as to the personal differences between their compatriots, it can only be when called in to arbitrate.

Of all the conventions concluded between the European Powers, none better defines the rights, the immunities, the privileges, and the duties of consuls than that concluded between France and Spain on March 13, 1769. This convention and the previous treaties between France and Spain, as set forth in ministerial decrees and royal ordinances, empowers consuls "To collect and administer the property of their compatriots who have died *ab intestat*. To exercise the full authority conferred by the navigation laws over the vessels of their own nation. To regulate the salvage of shipwrecked vessels. To claim the surrender of deserters from ships. To assist at the examination of

trading vessels where their intervention, or that of one of their agents, is deemed indispensable. To be present when the houses of any of their compatriots are searched for contraband goods (their presence must be first requested by the local authorities before they proceed to the search). To act as interpreters for their fellow-countrymen, and to settle their differences by arbitration and not otherwise, and jurisdiction is specifically denied them by the treaties and by the tenor of their letters of *exequatur*. To appoint vice-consuls for the different ports in their districts."

The convention of 1769 also accords to the respective consuls, when they are subjects of the prince who appoints them and when they are not in trade: "1st. Personal immunity from being arrested or cast into prison, except for some atrocious crime. 2nd. exemption from all personal charges or service, and from having soldiers billeted on them. 3rd. The inviolability of their papers and those of their chancelleries, which are not to be touched under any pretext whatever, unless the consul is a merchant. 4th. The privilege of not being liable to be called as witnesses in court, the tribunal of war, or, failing it, the ordinary tribunal, in the event of requiring any judicial declaration from the consul, being expected to send him a polite message to say that they are under the necessity of coming to his domicile for that purpose, etc. 5th. The right of placing upon the door

of their house a tablet representing a ship, with the inscription, 'Consul of France or Spain.' "

In a speech delivered on the 3rd of March, 1838, at the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Prince de Talleyrand, who had to pronounce the eulogium of Count Reinhard, who had been consul, director of foreign affairs, and ambassador, said, "How many things a man must know to make a good consul, for his duties are endless in their variety, and quite of a different character from those of other officials of the Foreign Office ; they demand a mass of practical knowledge for which special education is required. Consuls should be able to fulfil, in the event of necessity, the duties of judge, arbitrator, and reconciler. They must be able to do the work of a notary, sometimes that of a commissioner of the navy. They have to look after sanitary matters, and from them is expected, owing to their general relations, a clear idea of the state of trade and navigation, and of the industry peculiar to their place of residence. Thus, M. Reinhard, who took the utmost care to be accurate in the information which he was able to give his Government, and in the steps which he had to take as consular and political agent, and as administrator of the navy, had made a profound study of general and maritime law. This study had led him to the conclusion that a time would come when, by carefully prepared combinations, a general system of trade and navigation would be established, by means of which the interests of all

nations would be safeguarded, and the bases of which would be such that war itself would not affect its principle, even if it had the effect of temporarily suspending its application."

The representatives of the Powers to whom the Vienna Congress of 1815 attributed a diplomatic character, are ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, resident ministers, *chargés d'affaires*. Since then, this recognition has been extended to consuls-general in those residences where they enjoy the title of agent, as for instance, in Egypt.

Prince Metternich, in the course of a conversation which I had with him at Vienna, towards the close of his life, expressed views similar to those of Talleyrand, adding, "Politics are a science, diplomacy is an art."

Prince Talleyrand, who was unquestionably an incomparable diplomatic artist, said in his speech at the Institute:—

"Diplomacy is not a science of ruse and duplicity. If straightforwardness is of prime value anywhere, it is in political transactions, for it is that which renders them solid and durable. People have confused reserve and ruse. Straightforwardness is incompatible with ruse, but it is not inconsistent with reserve, which, indeed, strengthens the feeling of confidence."

M. de Talleyrand died three months after making these remarks at a sitting which excited considerable interest. The *Moniteur Universel* gives the names of the principal members of the Institute who were pre-

sent, viz., Royer-Collard, Quartremere de Quincy, Bassano, Guizot, Thiers, Mignet, Cousin, Villemain, Lemercier, Molé, Fauriel, Montalivet, Sainte-Aulaire, de Barante, de Jaucourt, de Flahaut, Bertin de Vaux, de Noailles, de Valencay, etc. M. de Talleyrand entered the room leaning on the arm of M. Mignet.

XIII.

THE FRENCH ACADEMY.

M. DE LESSEPS, having been elected by the French Academy to the chair left vacant by the death of Henri Martin, took his seat for the first time on the 23rd of April, 1885, and delivered the following address :—

“ In admitting me among you, you have both conferred upon me a great satisfaction and placed me in a position of great embarrassment. To form part of the French Academy, this distinguished assembly, this elective aristocracy of letters, is an honour of which the proudest is entitled to be proud; but to speak before it is a task which may make even a clever writer hesitate, and I am, unfortunately, neither the one nor the other. The reception speech was therefore doubly formidable, both for me and for you. This is why I am anxious at the outset to reassure you. You are not about to hear a piece of oratory. I would not subject either my inexperience or your forbearance to so rude an ordeal. Unable to do well, I have done better—I have studied brevity.

“ Your ancestors had the habit of summoning to the Academy of Letters, not merely men of letters,

but men of mark—prelates, generals, and great nobles, whose high position was a substitute for eloquence, and sometimes even for knowledge. Was this why the speech delivered in such cases was reduced to the narrow proportions of returning thanks? Possibly. In any event, seeing that you have revived for me the first part of this tradition, allow me to benefit by the second; and seeing that you have been good enough to let a man of tetter *in partibus* enter, as formerly, your society, do not be surprised if he confines himself, as formerly, to a simple expression of gratitude.

“The chair I now occupy is the one successively occupied by M. Thiers and M. Henri Martin. Both were friends of mine—which is tantamount to saying that I am not ignorant of the dissimilarity between them and me, or of the distance which separates us. They were chiefly men of study; I am chiefly a man of action. They were historians, and I am a geographer—after a fashion. But if I differ from them on many points, there is one on which I claim to resemble them. Both passionately loved their country, and in that respect at least I do not feel myself unworthy to succeed them. Like them, I have devoted my entire life to my country. For more than sixty years, in various situations and with various fortune, anxiety for its interests and glory has been my ruling idea, the constant aim of my labours, and finally, as I am confident, the cause of my success.

“And such an aim required long exertions. Nothing is easy in this world, especially the useful. There is no fresh task, however beneficent, which has not, perhaps in the very ratio of the good it may do, the ignorant and the malevolent for enemies; the former, because they fail to understand the result which you are aiming at, and are not in the secret of your means or strength. They have to be enlightened. Once converted, they become fervent disciples and valuable auxiliaries. As to the others, the sceptics, the haters, even the insulters, they deserve no attention. The Arab proverb says, ‘The dogs bark, the caravan passes.’ I passed on.

“If I thus explain my views to you with an emphasis which may seem complacent, it is not for the empty pleasure of talking of myself; it is to justify you in your own eyes for having chosen me by showing the similitudes existing between my predecessor and myself. And as I am on this point there is one more which I wish to notice in passing. Both of us were accused, at starting, of a little too much imagination. You know that in the poetical and ardent moments of youth, and when entering on the study of the early times of our race, Henri Martin—so at least it is said—was smitten with the Druidical religion. This Celt of St. Quentin had been initiated, it is alleged, into the mysteries of the terrible religion. He was even suspected of having secretly embraced it and of practising its rites in private. Is this true or false? Did

he go through this excess of enthusiasm and conviction? It is far from certain; but what matters it? In any case, did it prevent his writing later on the most complete history of France yet issued?

“As for me, if I am not suspected of being a Druid, I was formerly charged with being a dreamer. This was the beginning of my enterprises. I fancy that I have since proved myself a practical man. I do not, however, for all that, disparage dreamers. A little imagination is a good leaven for the heavy dough of human affairs. The more distant the goal the higher you must aim. It is well for the sculptor to seek a mountain for cutting out his first statue. It is not amiss for the positive man to have to throw off his mind a little of the impracticable and unattainable. It is not amiss that, fancying himself omnipotent, he has thought of attempting everything. Experience will only too soon cut off what was impossible in his illusion; but his works will always retain something strong and forcible to support them, his intelligence something grand to elevate it. From the St. Simonian aberration, now happily forgotten, there nevertheless sprang accomplished engineers, distinguished economists, and first-class financiers. M. Thiers began by writing criticisms of pictures. Claude Bernard himself, your illustrious colleague, began with a tragedy. You have not that, at least, to twit me with.

“I spoke just now of the history of France, written by Henri Martin. It is his chief work; it is in all

the libraries ; better still, it is in the memories of all. I do not wish to dwell on its literary merits, not because there is any lack of good to be said of it, but because I fear I should not say it sufficiently well. Besides, it is not a speech that I am now making, and if I stop to mark with a word what seems to me the special note of his talent, it is because it is at the same time that of his character.

“ Each historian has his peculiarity. M. Michelet has poetry. Every moment his imagination opens wide views over new horizons, through which the mind roams in amazement. Augustin Thierry, an enthusiastic scholar, of a race of writers who called back to life a world that had passed away, is above all things a painter in clear lines, with an incomparable gift of colour. The history of Guizot, like that of Mignet, is a system, philosophical in the one, political in the other, showing in the movement of the facts their sequence, their consequences, and their causes. Thiers excels in recounting events, in bringing situations clearly before us, in elucidating the most special and most obscure questions. His ruling quality is clearness. That of Henri Martin is justice.

“ And this love of justice which is in his mind comes from the love of country which is in his heart. Although a man with convictions, even a party man, absolute in his faith, invariable in his conduct, he puts aside all passion when he enters into history. A sympathising witness of all our glories, he withholds

his admiration from none. He is as enthusiastic an admirer of the Druids as of the martyrs of the first Christian Church, of Jeanne d'Arc as of Henri IV., of the victories of Louis XIV. as of those of the First Republic, of the First Empire as of the Convention. For him it is France that is concerned, and her only he sees. No restriction checks his patriotism, no calculation diminishes it. Whatever be their opinions or their beliefs, all those who serve and benefit France are his friends. This is a fine example to recommend and to follow. Woe to those peoples who, driven to fanaticism by party spirit, mutilate their traditions, not understanding that a nation is a being, never ceasing to live, whose present cannot be separated from its past without existence itself being arrested.

“And from this past, so mournful and so glorious, Henri Martin draws an invigorating lesson; a confidence that nothing will repress, a hope that nothing will discourage: ‘The Frenchman who knows the history of his country,’ he says, ‘will never lose hope in the saddest days. This people is endowed with an incomparable spring of life, with a power of renovation which has never been met with to the same degree in any other people.’

“I am proud that you have thought of me to succeed to the man who uttered such words. This double sentiment of pride in the past and of faith in the future is as deeply rooted in my heart as it was in his. It is by this community of hope that I am proudest of re-

sembling him. And having now sufficiently proved my good will, in default of talent, I stop, not wishing to exceed the limits which I was, in a measure, bound to lay down for myself. He who will succeed me, following the more recent practice, will speak to you hereafter—as far hence, I assure you, as I can make it—with more fulness, competence, and charm of the merits of the impartial historian, the honest man, the great patriot, who was my predecessor. He will doubtless express to the Academy better than I can his gratitude as a newly elected member; but he will not have, at the bottom of his heart, more respect than I have for the memory of Henri Martin, or more gratitude towards you. In 1834, on entering the Academy, M. Thiers said, ‘I thank you for having admitted me to a seat in this asylum of free and quiet thought.’ I thank you, in my turn, for having admitted me into this asylum of free and quiet thought, although I do not promise to remain quietly seated in my chair.”

REPLY OF M. RENAN.

M. Renan, the Director of the Academy, spoke as follows in reply:—

“Monsieur,—Your address is charming, for it is your very self. I may tell you that we were not quite easy in our minds while you were preparing it, being afraid lest, for once in your life, you should deem it incumbent upon you to make a literary composition.

Your exquisite tact has saved you from making this mistake, and I detect in the tone of your observations the geniality and the contagious warmth which are the charm of your conversation. I was sorry to note the absence of certain anecdotes which are familiar to you, and I miss, for instance, certain details that you know about Abraham and Sarah, and about Joseph and the Queen of Sheba. A number of things which you know more about than any one else are absent from your speech, but nothing which is yourself is missing. You possess the greatest and the rarest literary quality of the present day—that of being natural. You never went in for declamation. Your eloquence consists of that manly and straightforward way of communicating with the public of which the example has been set by England and America. No one, assuredly, in our age, has been more persuasive than you, and in consequence no one has been more eloquent. Yet no one has taken less account of the artifices of language, or of the empty forms which are animated by no ardent conviction.

“You remarked upon one occasion: ‘I approve of Latin and Greek being taught to our children, but what we must not neglect is to teach them to think wisely and to speak bravely.’ That is what I so admire. You abhor rhetoric, and you are perfectly right. Rhetoric is, in addition to poetics, the only error we have to reproach the Greeks with. After having produced masterpieces themselves, they thought that they

could lay down rules for others to do the same, in which they were much mistaken. For there is no more an art of writing than there is an art of speaking. To speak well is equivalent to thinking aloud. Success either in speaking or writing has never but one cause—absolute sincerity. When you excite the enthusiasm of a meeting and succeed in reducing that which is the most obdurate thing in the world to metaphors, and the most refractory to the artifices of the so-called art of fine talking—I mean capital—it is not your words but your individuality which attracts; or, I should rather say, your whole person speaks; you exercise a charm. You have that supreme gift which works miracles, like faith, and which is in truth of the same order. Charm has its secret motives, but not its definite reasons. Its action is wholly spiritual. You obtain the same amount of success at Chicago, a city which is not a third your age, as you do in the ancient cities of Europe. You convince the Turk, the Arab, the Abyssinian, the Paris speculator, and the Liverpool merchant, by reasons which differ only in appearance. The true reason of your ascendancy is that people detect in you a heart full of sympathy for all that is human; a genuine passion for ameliorating the lot of your fellow-creatures. You have in you that ‘*Misereor super turbas*’ (I have pity upon the masses) which is the sentiment of all great organisers. People love you and like to see you, and before you have opened your mouth you are cheered. Your adversaries call

this your cleverness ; we call it your magic. Ordinary minds do not understand the seduction exercised by great minds. The fascination of the magician escapes the vulgar mind ; the qualities of enchantment are a gracious gift, and because they are imponderable mediocrity denies that they exist, whereas it is the imponderable which does in reality exist. Humanity will always be led by the secret love-philters of which the crowd sees only the superficial effects, just as the illuminant of the physical world is in the invisible fluids which the ordinary eye cannot discern.

“Your eloquence has captivated the whole world, and has surely entitled you to a place in our midst. The programme of our company is not a purely literary one, carried out with no ulterior aim, and ending in the frivolities which proved the ruin of Oriental literatures. It is things or deeds which are beautiful ; words in themselves have no beauty outside the noble or true cause which they serve. What matters it whether Tyrteus was a man of talent or not. He succeeded, he was as good as an army. The *Marseillaise* is, whatever musicians and purists may say, the greatest song of modern times, inasmuch as it leads men on to combat and to victory. When we reach these altitudes personal merit is of small account ; all depends on predestination, or on our success, if that word be preferred. It is no use saying that a general ought to have won a battle if he loses it. The great general—and this applies equally to politics—is the

man who succeeds, not the one who ought to have succeeded.

“Thus, the persons who were at first surprised to hear of your election were but very imperfectly acquainted with the spirit which governs our company. You have cultivated the most difficult of styles—one which has for a long time been abandoned among us—that of action. You are one of the small band of those who have maintained the ancient French tradition of a brilliant and glorious existence, one useful to all your fellow men. Politics and warfare are too lofty applications of the human intelligence for the Academy ever to have passed them over. Marshal de Villars, Marshal de Belle-Isle, Marshal de Richelieu, and Marshal de Beauvau, had no more literary titles to election than you have. They had won victories. Failing this qualification, which has become a rare one, we have chosen the master *par excellence* in the art of overcoming difficulties, the hardy speculator who has always won his wager in the pursuit of the probable; the virtuoso who has practised with such consummate tact the great and lost art of life. If Christopher Columbus lived in our day we should have made him a member of the Academy. The man who is quite certain to be a member is the general who one day brings back victory to our standard. We shall not quarrel with him as to the nature of his prose, and shall regard him as a very fit member of the Academy. We shall elect him by acclamation, without concern-

ing ourselves as to his writings. What a splendid gathering that will be when he is received! In what demand seats will be, and lucky the academician who presides on that occasion!

“ You have been one of those fortunate workers who seem to have been taken into the confidence of what the genius of civilisation requires at a given moment. The first duty which man has had to impose upon himself in order to become in reality master of the planet which he inhabits has been to rectify, in view of his requirements, the combinations, in many cases opposed to these requirements, which the revolutions of the globe, ignoring altogether the interests of humanity, have inevitably produced. What would have been the fate of our planet if the parts of it which emerge had been much smaller than they are? if the field of evolution of terrestrial life had not been larger than Easter Island or Tahiti? What historical fact has ever produced such consequences as that action of the sea which suddenly brought Cape Gris-Nez and the cliffs of Dover into being, and created France and England by separating them? Sometimes beneficial, these blind chances of unforeseeing nature are sometimes also very baleful, and then it is the duty of man, by skilful readjustment, to rectify the evil services which the blind forces of ancient times have done him. It has been said, and with much truth, that if physical astronomy possessed sufficiently powerful means, we should be able to judge as to the more or less

advanced civilisation of the inhabited worlds by the criterion as to whether their isthmuses were pierced or not.

“For a planet is only ripe for progress when all its inhabited parts have reached that stage of close relationship which constitutes a living organism, so that no one part can enjoy, suffer, or act without the other parts feeling in harmony. We have reached that critical stage in the history of our own planet. Formerly, China, Japan, India, and America might have been convulsed by revolution without Europe so much as knowing of it. For long centuries the Atlantic divided the habitable globe into two parts as distinct one from the other as if they were two different worlds. Now, the stock exchanges of Paris and London are affected by what occurs at Pekin, in the Congo, in Kordofan, or in California; there are but few dead parts in the body of humanity. The electric telegraph and the telephone have annihilated distance as regards the things of the mind, while railways and steam navigation have multiplied tenfold the facilities of bodily movement. It was inevitable, therefore, that our century should regard as an essential part of its work the removal of the obstacles to rapid communication. It was impossible surely that the generation which had tunnelled the Mont Cenis and the St. Gothard should be arrested by a few sandbanks or reefs of rock at Suez, Corinth, and Panama!

“You, sir, have been the chosen artisan for this

great work. The Isthmus of Suez had long since been selected as that the piercing of which was the most urgent. Antiquity had pointed it out, and had attempted the enterprise, but with insufficient means. Leibnitz had indicated this work to Louis XIV. as one worthy of his might. But the completion of such a work demanded a faith which the seventeenth century did not possess. It was the French Revolution which, reviving the age of fabulous expeditions and a state of heroic youth in which man is guided in his adventures by the flight of birds and the signs in the heavens, propounded this problem in such a shape that it could no longer be left dormant. The piercing of the isthmus was part of the programme which the Directory set before the Egyptian expedition. As in the time of Alexander, the conquest of arms was also the conquest of science. Upon December 24th, 1798, our illustrious colleague, General Bonaparte, started from Cairo accompanied by Berthier, Monge, Berthollet, and other members of the Institute, as well as by merchants who had obtained leave to follow in his escort. On the 30th he lighted, to the north of Suez, upon the vestiges of the old canal, and he followed them for a distance of more than twelve miles. On January 3rd, 1799, he saw, near Belbeys, the other end of the canal of the Pharaohs. The researches of the Egyptian Commission have formed the basis of all subsequent investigations, and the only point in which they were defective was the view as to the difference

in level of the two seas, a theory always opposed by Laplace and Fourier.

“The great St. Simonian School, which had so lofty a comprehension of the common labour of humanity, took up the idea and sealed it by martyrdom. More than twelve engineers of the St. Simon School died of the plague in 1833, at the great dam of the Nile. Amid much that was obscure and visionary, one great truth was perceived, viz., that Egypt has an exceptional place in the history of the world. The key to the interior of Africa by the Nile, it is by its isthmus also the guardian. The most important point in the empire of the seas, Egypt is not a nation, it is a State, sometimes the recompense of a maritime dominion legitimately won, sometimes the punishment of an ambition which has not measured its strength.

“A country which has such important relations to the rest of the world cannot belong to itself. It is neutralised for the benefit of humanity. The national principle is put to death there. We are surprised to see among the mad thoughts which passed through the mind of Nero, during the hours which separated his fall and his death, the idea of going before the people in a suit of mourning and asking them, in exchange for the Empire of Rome, to give him the Prefecture of Egypt. It is a fact that the Prefecture of Egypt will always be an independent one. The ruler of Egypt will never bear the same name as other Sove-

reigns. Egypt will always be governed by the civilised nations collectively. The reasonable and scientific explorers of the world's history will always turn with curious, anxious, or attentive glances towards this wonderful valley.

“France for three-quarters of a century has had before her mind a solution of this difficult problem, which will be fully appreciated when experience has shown what torrents of blood and tears the other solutions would have cost the world. She conceived the idea of establishing, by means of a dynasty, Mussulman in name, but in reality free from fanaticism and prompt to recognise the superiority of the West, the reign of modern ideas in this exceptional land, which cannot, without great detriment to the general welfare, be allowed to lapse into barbarism. Through Egypt, thus organised and safeguarded, civilisation had her hand upon the whole of the Eastern Soudan. The dangerous cyclones which Central Africa will from time to time produce, since it has imprudently been allowed to become Mahometan, would have been suppressed. European science had a free hand in a country which has, so to speak, been placed at its disposal as a field for study and experiment. But there should have been something like method observed in carrying out this excellent plan. We should not have weakened a dynasty by means of which the point of the sword of Europe reached almost to the Equator. More especially should an

eye have been kept upon the Mosque of El-Azhar, the centre from which the Mussulman propaganda has been spread all over Africa. Isolated and abandoned to fetishism, the races of the Soudan are of little account; but converted to Islam they become *foci* of intense fanaticism. From want of foresight, we have allowed an Arabia much more dangerous than the true Arabia to be formed west of the Nile. Has it not surprised you, Sir, that there is not yet in that spot a common *sensorium* of the great interests of the world? It is clear that there is a guardian angel of humanity who prevents it from stumbling into all the ditches lining its way. If there were only diplomatists, I would as lief see our poor species intrusted to the care of a band of truant schoolboys.

The origin of your enterprise dates from the commencement of that dynasty of Mehemet-Ali which saw the light under the auspices of France, and which, upon the other hand, has been severely shaken by a passing declension in the fortunes of our country. Your father was the first French agent who resided in Egypt after the departure of our army. He was charged by the First Consul and by M. de Talleyrand with the task of counterbalancing the tyranny of the Mamelukes, which had the approval of the English. Your father's chief of the Janissaries brought to him one day, as being capable of combating the prevailing anarchy, a young Macedonian who was then in com-

mand of a thousand Albanians, and upon which the French expedition had made a very deep impression. This compatriot of Alexander could neither read nor write. His fortune grew rapidly, and as he forgot nothing which had been done either for or against him, when you arrived in Egypt at the beginning of 1832 as a student-consul, the powerful Viceroy at once took you into favour. Mohammed Saïd, one of his sons, was your early friend. You took a strange hold over him, and when he came to the throne you reigned conjointly with him. Through you he dimly perceived an ideal of light and justice for which his soul thirsted, but which dark clouds, issuing from a deep abyss of barbarism, still veiled for a time from his eyes.

You have described, in that easy and natural style which is all your own, the details of this intimacy which has been so big with consequences of the gravest import to the whole world; you have told us of his strange alternations of passion and good sense, of the enthusiasm for science of a nature but just removed from absolute ignorance, of the torrents of tears which succeeded his outbursts of mad fury, of the peals of laughter and of his ungovernable vanity: in short, of the struggle between a Tamerlane and a Marcus Aurelius. Your account of the wonderful journey which you made with him to the Soudan is a document of incomparable value for the student of Oriental psychology. The story of how, upon one

occasion, he threw his sword across the room, fearing that in a moment of passion he might strike you with it, and how, when he had calmed down, you found him in tears because you had anticipated him in suggesting ideas of reform, is typical of the Eastern despot. The barbarian is always more or less of a child, and Mohammed's friendship was a glass which the least pressure of jealousy might break. You felt this, and your well-stored and supple mind provided for every contingency. It is only men of strong character who can deal properly with barbarians. Saïd had taken with him a service of Sèvres china for his own use, and he had given you another for your own use. The Viceroy's service, for want of proper care, was soon broken, while yours was intact. This would never do, so upon one occasion the well-trained camel which bore your service was replaced by a very skittish and almost savage camel. You were too sensible to remonstrate, and in a few minutes your service of china was broken to bits. The Viceroy nearly cracked his sides with laughter, and the work of the isthmus was safe. For from this period the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez was your constant preoccupation, and you had almost succeeded in getting your all-powerful friend to embrace your idea. Your views in this matter dated from an incident which followed your arrival in Egypt. You came from a country which had a clean bill of health to a country infested with disease; and, in obedience

to a rule of logic which has never been altered, you were compelled to submit to a long quarantine at Alexandria. M. Mimaut, the French consul, to beguile the tedium of your confinement, brought you the great work published by the Egyptian Commission, specially commending to your notice Lepère's treatise upon the junction of the two seas. It was in this way that you became acquainted with the isthmus and its history. Henceforward the ambition to realise what others had conceived took hold upon you, and though you had to wait twenty-three years, nothing rebuffed you. You were born to pierce isthmuses, and antiquity would have made a myth of you. You are the man of our age upon whose forehead is most clearly written the sign of an unmistakable vocation. The principle of great deeds is to take possession of force where it is to be found, to purchase it at its proper price, and to know how to make use of it. In the present condition of the world barbarism is still an immense depôt of living forces. Your keen and open intelligence saw that immense power is often invested in hands incapable of making use of it, and that this power is at the disposal of anyone who knows how to employ it. You frankly take human affairs as they are. You do not mind the contact of stupidity and folly. It is all very well, you say, for those who do not touch the realities of life to be fastidious and to remain immaculate. Humanity is composed of two thousand millions of

poor ignorant creatures, to whom a small band of the elect, marked with a sign, are to impart reason, justice, and glory.

“Avaunt with the faint-hearted and the fastidious !
avaunt with the over-nice, who would fain emerge without a speck of mud from the battle with stupidity and evil ! They are not fitted for a work which demands piety rather than disgust, a proud and lofty heart, true kindness, which often differs very much from superficial philanthropy ; something, in short, of the wide-embracing sentiment of Scipio Africanus, who, in reply to some trivial cavilling said : ‘On such and such a day I won the battle of Zama ; let us go up to the Capitol and return thanks to the gods.’

“It is to the East that you owe that gait, as of the Arab horse, which has sometimes startled your more timid friends. The East inspires a craving for grand adventures, for in the East the era of grand and fruitful adventures is not yet run out. The sight of sheep without a shepherd inspires one with the idea of taking charge of the flock. How often in Syria I have envied the sub-lieutenant who accompanied me ! It may be that the man who is destined to found order and civilisation in the East is even now growing to manhood in some cadet school. You avoid in your appreciation of man the narrow judgments of implacable idea-mongers, who believe that all races of men are of equal value, and of flint-hearted theorists

who see no necessity for the humble in the scheme of creation. Those people of the Lake of Mensaleh, who constructed the banks of your canal by gathering up the mud in their large hands and squeezing the water out of it against their chests, will have their place in the kingdom of God. Inferior, no doubt, they are, these poor human families, so cruelly treated by fate, but they are not, on that account, excluded from the common work. They may produce great men, and sometimes with one sudden bound they outshine us; they are capable of prodigies of abnegation and devotion. Such as they are, you love them. You are an optimist, Sir, and you are quite right. The height of art is to work good with evil, to achieve what is great with mean materials. This transcendant game is to be won by the sympathy and the love which one feels for men and which one inspires in them for oneself, by the audacity with which one persuades oneself that the cause of progress is gained and that one is contributing to it. The men of the East are above all things susceptible to being charmed, and you succeeded admirably in this. Your frankness and ease of demeanour inspired them with unbounded confidence. Saïd could not live without you. Your perfect riding won the hearts of the old school of Mehemet-Ali, which was more adept at mounting a horse than in mental pursuits. On November the 30th, 1854, you were out in the desert with Saïd. The Viceroy's tent was pitched upon an eminence formed

of loose stones. You had observed that there was a spot where you could jump with your horse over the parapet, and this was the route you chose. You ought by good right to have broken your neck, but in the East a rash act often answers as well as a wise one. Your hardihood excited universal admiration, and that same day the charter was signed. Saïd from that hour regarded the piercing of the Isthmus as his own special work, and he brought to bear upon it the tenacity of an enthusiast and the vanity of a barbarian. Within a month from that time you started upon your first exploring of the desert over which you were in fifteen years to win so decisive a victory.

“These fifteen years were like a dream, worthy to be included in the ‘Arabian Nights’ or Massoudi’s ‘Golden Prairies.’ Your ascendancy over that world so strangely endowed with rough-and-ready energy was something incredible. You astonished M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who could follow you at last no longer. You were, in short, a king, and you enjoyed the advantages of sovereignty, and learnt the great lesson which it teaches, that of indulgence, pity, pardon, and disdain. I have seen myself your kingdom in the desert. When crossing the Ouadi from Zagazig to Ismailia, you gave me as guide one of your subjects. He was, I believe, an ex-brigand whom you had for a time attached to the cause of order. While explaining to me the way to handle an old sixteenth-century musket, which formed part of his armament, he unbosomed himself

to me of his inmost sentiments, which may be summed up in unbounded admiration for you. You had your faithful disciples—I was almost going to say your fanatics—in the camp of those who might be regarded as your enemies. At Ismaïlia we met an English lady who was watching very intently the progress of your workmen to see whether the prophecies of the Bible were not being confirmed. She took us to see some tufts of grass and flowers which the infiltrations of the sweet-water canal had caused to spring up on the sand. This seemed conclusive to her, for was it not written in the 35th chapter of Isaiah that, before the coming of the Messiah, ‘the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose’! You had some fancy ready to suit every one’s taste, and supplied them all with a dream after their own heart.

“The word religion is not too strong to express the enthusiasm which you excited. Your work was for several years a sort of gospel of redemption, an era of grace and pardon. The idea of rehabilitation and moral amnesty always occupy a large place in the origin of religions. The brigand is grateful to whomsoever comes to preach a jubilee which has the effect of creating a new departure. You were kind to those who came and offered their services. You made them feel that their past would be wiped out, that their offences would be absolved, and that they would begin their moral life anew if they were in earnest to help you pierce the Isthmus. There are so many people

ready to amend their ways if only one will pass the sponge over some incident in their career. Upon one occasion, a whole troop of convicts who had escaped from some prison on the shores of the Adriatic swooped down upon the Isthmus as upon a land of promise. The Austrian consul demanded their surrender, but you spun out the negotiations, and in a few weeks' time the consul was busily employed in forwarding the money which these worthy fellows wanted to send home to their poor relations, perhaps to their victims. The consul thereupon begged you to keep them, as you had succeeded in turning them to such excellent account. In a report of one of your lectures, I remember reading: 'M. de Lesseps stated that men were trustworthy and not at all evilly disposed when they have enough to live upon. Man only becomes evil through hunger or fear.' We should perhaps add: 'or when he is jealous.' You went on to say: 'I have never had to complain of my workmen, and yet I have employed pirates and convicts. Work has made honest men again of them all; I have never been robbed even of a pocket-handkerchief. The truth is that our men can be got to do anything by showing them esteem and by persuading them that they are engaged upon a work of world-wide interest.'

"You have thus caused to blossom once more a flower which seemed faded for ever. You have given in this sceptical age of ours, a striking proof of the efficacy

of faith and verified in their liberal sense that lofty saying: 'I say unto you that if ye have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, remove hence to yonder place, and it shall remove.' The devotion of your staff was immense. I spent a night at Chalouf-el-Terrabah, in a hut inhabited only by one of your employés. That man filled me with admiration: he was convinced that he was fulfilling a mission, he regarded himself as a sentinel placed in an advanced post, as a missionary of France, and an agent of civilisation. All of your men believed that the eyes of the world were fixed upon them and that every one was interested in their doing their duty.

"It is all this, Sir, that in electing you we were anxious to recompence. We are incompetent to appreciate the work of the engineer; the merits of the administrator, the financier, and the diplomatist are not for us to discuss; but we have been struck by the moral grandeur of the work, by this resurrection of the faith, not the faith in any particular dogma, but the faith in humanity and its brilliant destinies. It is not for the material work which we crown you, for the blue riband which, as we are told, would earn for us the esteem of the inhabitants of the moon, if there were any. No, that is not what constitutes your glory. Your glory consists in having set stirring this latest movement of enthusiasm, this latest manifestation of self-devotion. You have renewed in our time

the miracles of ancient days. You possess in the highest degree the secret of all greatness, the art of making yourself beloved. You have succeeded in forming out of incoherent masses a small but compact army, in which the best qualities of the French race have appeared in all their *éclat*. Thousands of men have found in you their conscience, their reason of being, their principle of nobility or of moral renovation.

“The amount of valour, bravery, and resources of every kind which you have expended in this struggle is something prodigious. What a fund of good humour, more especially, must you not have needed to answer patiently the many puerile objections which were raised: the moving sands of the desert, the bottomless mud in Lake Mensaleh, the threats of an universal deluge brought about by the difference in level of the two seas! During the first two years your activity knew no bounds; during that time you travelled twenty-five thousand miles a year, more than the distance round the world. You had to convince Europe, especially England, our great and dear rival. You conformed your habits to those of the country. You went from town to town, with only one companion, taking with you enormous maps, loaded with pamphlets and prospectuses. When you arrived in a town, you went to the mayor or the principal person of the locality, to offer him the chairmanship of the meeting; then you selected your secre-

tary, and after that called upon the editors of the local papers. In that way you held thirty-two meetings in the principal towns of the United Kingdom in forty-five days. You spent your nights in correcting the proofs of your previous day's speeches, and you took away with you a thousand copies, which you distributed the following day.

"You do not scruple to use any of the means which our century has made the essentials of success. You do not disdain the press, and you are right; for, so far as regards its effect upon the public, the manner in which a fact is related is far more important than the fact itself. The press has in our day taken the place of what formerly brought men into communication with one another, viz., correspondence by letter, public speaking, books, and, I might almost add, conversation. To renounce the use of this powerful engine is to renounce one's legitimate share in human action. There are, I am well aware, many Puritanic persons who are content with being right in their own eyes, and who regard it as a humiliating obligation to be right in the eyes of other people. I have an infinite respect for this view, but I am afraid that there is some little historical mistake about it. In former days people gained the good-will of the sovereign and the court by methods very little better than those with which, in our day, the favour of the public is courted. The public at large are guided by their newspaper; Louis XIV. and Louis XV. saw through

the narrow spectacles of those about them. Turgot, the most modest of men, had only to convince four persons of his merit: first of all, Abbé Very, his fellow-student in the Sorbonne, a man of very enlightened mind, who spoke of him with great admiration to a very clever woman, Madame de Maurepas; she mentioned him to her husband, and he presented him to Louis XVI. With universal suffrage the candidature is not quite so simple an affair. But there is a reverse to the medal. All that was needed to bring about the fall of the Minister who alone might have saved the monarchy were a few courtiers' epigrams and a change in the views held by Maurepas. What a long chapter might be written anent the blunders of a limited suffrage! Our time is not more frivolous than those which preceded it. We are told that this is the reign of mediocrity. Well, sir, this reign began some time ago. The sum of good sense which emerges from any given society for the purposes of government has always been very small. The man cast in a higher mould who is anxious to do what is right has always been obliged to lend himself to the weakness of the masses. Poor humanity! In order to be of service to it, one must adapt oneself to its measure, speak its language, adopt its prejudices, and enter with it into the workshop, the slums, the lodging-house, and the tavern!

"You did well, therefore, not to allow yourself to be balked by the petty susceptibilities which, if they

were taken too much account of, would make inactivity to seem the highest wisdom. The days are dark ; we are working in the night ; let us work on nevertheless. The Preacher spoke well when he said that no one can tell whether the inheritor of the fortune which he has built up will be wise or a fool. But did this gifted philosopher draw thence the conclusion that we should do nothing ? Not at all. An inward voice urges us on to action. Man does great deeds by instinct, just as the bird wings its flight, guided by a mysterious map which it carries within its tiny brain.

“ You have not disguised from yourself the fact that the cutting of the isthmus would serve alternately very varied interests. The great saying, ‘ I have come to bring not peace but war,’ must have frequently recurred to your recollection. The isthmus cut becomes a strait—that is to say, a battle-field. One Bosphorus had sufficed till now to give trouble enough to the world. You have created another, much more important than the first, for it does not place in communication two parts of an inland sea. It serves as a passage of communication between all the great seas of the world. In case of maritime war it would be the supreme interest, the point for the occupation of which the whole globe would make a rush. You have thus fixed the spot for the great battles of the future.

“ What more can we do than ring round the field

in which these blind forces meet, than favour in their struggle towards existence all these obscure things which groan, and weep, and suffer before being born? No disappointments shall stop us, we mean to be incorrigible; even amid our disasters works of universal importance still continue to tempt us. The King of Abyssinia has said of you, 'Lesseps is of the tribe of light.' Truly, this king speaks words of truth. We all belong to that tribe. It is a rule in war to march in the direction of firing, from wherever the sound comes. The duty of us civilians is to march towards the light, often without quite knowing whither it is leading us.

"You have rendered such full justice to Henri Martin, your illustrious predecessor, that I need scarcely revert to the subject. He was an excellent citizen, and in all things his thoughts were those of France. When the country took a step forward in that which appears to have been his favourite policy, he followed it; sometimes he even preceded it; but in all things he was sincere. The word of command which he appeared to receive from without in reality came from himself, for he was in perfect harmony with the circle in which he lived. He espoused all the prejudices of which common opinion is composed so honestly that he came to mistake them for primitive and increated truths. But as he was a true Liberal, he experienced no regret when his firmest conclusions were arrested for a stage. He desired that

progress should be made by the amelioration of men's intelligence and by persuasion. He may have had his illusions like the rest of us, but he never allowed himself to be blinded except when doubt might seem to him a want of generosity, a sin against faith.*

* * * * *

"You have been wise, indeed, sir, to place the centre of gravity of your existence above these heart-rending uncertainties of politics, which often leave one only the choice between two blunders. Your glory will not suffer from any intermission. Already you have almost entered upon the enjoyment of the judgment of posterity. Your happy, vigorous, and honoured old age recalls that of Solomon, less, no doubt, its weariness. As to that, you have never known what it meant; and although you have been very well placed to see that all is vanity, I doubt whether that thought has ever suggested itself to you. You must be very happy, sir; satisfied with your life, and indifferent to death, for you are brave. You feel somewhat uneasy, you said in one of your lectures, when you reflect that on the day of judgment the Creator may reproach you for having modified His handiwork. But let me assure you that there is no ground for fear on this score. If there is one person more than another as to whose attitude

* Note of the Translator.—I have omitted here the remainder of M. Renan's remarks on the literary career of Henri Martin.

in the Valley of Jehoshaphat I am under no apprehension it is you. You will continue there to play the charmer's part, and as to the Great Judge, you will win Him over to you. You have improved His work; He will assuredly be well pleased with you.

“In the meanwhile, you will come and rest yourself in our company after the indefatigable activity which you have made the rule of your life. In the intervals between your voyages from Suez to Panama, and from Panama to Suez, you will communicate to us your fresh observations as to the world, whether it is improving or degenerating, whether it is growing younger or older; whether, in process of time, as isthmuses are pierced, the number of lofty and kindly souls increases or diminishes. Our lives, mostly passed in the shade, will be supplemented and completed by yours, all of which is spent in the open air. For my own part, I never see you without fancying what we might have accomplished together, if we had associated to found some work in common. And, indeed, if I was not already an old man, I am not sure that I should not propose some seductive and beneficent scheme to you. But in order to do that, I should be obliged to resign my post in the Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, the pure and absolute friend of truth. This I shall never do, for I derive too much pleasure from my connection with it. And then the world is so strange; as a rule it will

not allow that a man can be an adept at more than one thing. The world listens to you when there is an isthmus to be cut in twain; and there are certain questions with respect to which it is pleased to give me a favourable ear. Upon other subjects we are not consulted, though we might, perhaps, have some good advice to offer. The will of Providence be done; we must not complain of the part which has been assigned to us.

“Yours, assuredly, was a very enviable one. Next to Lamartine, you have, I think, been the most beloved man of our century—the man upon whom the greatest number of legends and dreams have been built. We thank you, as we thank the great poet who is seated by your side, and who introduces you into our company, for having afforded—at a period the great defect of which is the spirit of jealousy and detraction—to our downcast people the opportunity of exercising the noblest faculty of the human heart, that of admiration and love. The nation which knows how to admire and love is not at the point of death. To those who tell us that the bosom of this people has ceased to beat, that it has lost the faculty of adoration, and that the spectacle of so many abortive efforts and disappointments has extinguished all its confidence in what is good, all its belief in what is great, we reply with the names of you our two beloved and glorious colleagues. We recall the worship which is paid you, these wreaths, these fêtes

which as a rule are only celebrated after death, and above all, those flutterings in the heart of the multitude which the names of Victor Hugo and Ferdinand de Lesseps ever awaken. This it is which consoles us and bids us say with all confidence, 'Hapless and dear land of France! no, thou wilt not perish, for thou still lovest and art still beloved.' "

THE END.



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